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SUMMARY 
 
This thesis evaluates transparency in the context of water utilities’ regulation by 
comparing legal frameworks in three jurisdictions: Victoria (Australia), England 
(United Kingdom) and Jakarta (Indonesia). Each of these jurisdictions is selected 
because of their particular ownership and regulatory model. The thesis analyses 
whether specific ownership or regulatory models will have implications for 
transparency.  
The terms “transparency” and “water utilities’ regulation” are first defined and form 
the thesis’ analytical framework. This is then applied against the three jurisdictions 
compared.  By evaluating each of the three jurisdictions, the thesis expects to provide 
explanation on how transparency is enabled or inhibited by the legal frameworks. The 
thesis recommends a solution by comparing the three jurisdictions and generating 
“lessons learned”. 
  
 
1 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Problematique 
1.1.1. Governance Failure 
The Global Water Partnership stated in 2000 that the water crisis is mainly a 
crisis of governance.1 The Camdessus report acknowledged that the root of the 
problem in water services is due to the lack of governance2. Transparency, as well as 
participation and accountability, have been identified as the key to good governance.3 
The 2008 Global Corruption Report which focuses on the water sector attributed the 
lack of transparency as the driver of corruption. 4  
One of the principles for effective water governance is that it should be open 
and transparent, in that language should be accessible and understandable and all 
policy decisions, particularly with regard to financial transactions, should be 
 
1  Global Water Partnership, Towards water security : a framework for action (Global Water 
Partnership ; World Water Forum 2000) 
2 Winpenny, J. and Camdessus, M., Financing water for all: Report of the world panel on financing 
water infrastructure (Global Water Partnership, World Water Council, World Water Forum 2003)    
3  Godbole, M., Public accountability and transparency : the imperatives of good governance (Orient 
Longman 2003)  See also in general Quesada, M.G., Water and Sanitation Services in Europe: Do 
Legal Frameworks provide for “Good Governance”? (UNESCO Centre for Water Law Policy and 
Science at the University of Dundee 2010) <http://goo.gl/g2zN6> accessed January 3, 2012 and 
Hendry, S.M., ‘An Analytical Framework for Reform of National Water Law’ (PhD thesis, University 
of Dundee 2008) 
4  Zinnbauer, D. and Dobson, R. (eds), Global Corruption Report 2008: Corruption in the Water Sector 
(Cambridge University Press; Transparency International 2008) Corruption in the drinking water and 
sanitation sector in developing countries raises connection cost by 30%, inflating MDG cost by more 
than 48 billion dollars p. xxiv also Klitgaard, R., ‘Strategies against corruption’ (Presentation at Agencia 
Española de Cooperación Internacional Foro Iberoamericano sobre el Combate a la Corrupción, Santa 
Cruz de la Sierra, June, 15-16 1998) ; Rose–Ackerman, S., ‘Corruption and government’ 15 
International Peacekeeping 328 
 
 2 
transparent.5 Transparency has been defined as “a process by which information 
about existing conditions, decisions and actions is made accessible, visible and 
understandable”.6 According to Allan and Rogers, transparency and accountability 
“are built on the free flow of Information”.7 The Preamble of the Aarhus Convention 
states transparency as one of its purposes and this is established by enabling ‘access to 
information’.8   
Lack of transparency is a concern for water services around the world: 
Budapest9, Johannesburg10, Jakarta11, Malaysia12, China13 and the Czech Republic14. 
In the UK, even with its advanced  regulatory system, the House of Commons Select 
Committee on Environmental Audit still deemed that OFWAT is still unable “to 
 
5  Rogers, P. and Hall, A., Effective water governance (TEC background papers no. 7) (Global Water 
Partnership, Stockholm 2003)  
6  International Monetary Fund, ‘International Monetary Fund Reports on the International Financial 
Architecture by the G22 Working Group on Transparency and Accountability, Working Group on 
Strengthening Financial Systems and Working Group on International Financial Crises (Group of 22)’   
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/g22/index.htm> accessed May 28, 2009  
7  Rogers and Hall, Effective water governance (TEC background papers no. 7) 
8   See the Preamble of Aarhus Convention. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation 
in Decision Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 25 June 1998 (Aarhus Convention) 
38 International Legal Materials (ILM) (1999) 515 
9  Lobina, E., ‘Problems with Private Water Concessions: A Review of Experiences and Analysis of 
Dynamics’ in Asit K. Biswas and Cecilia Tortajada (eds), Water pricing and public-private partnership 
(Routledge 2005)  
10  McKinley, D., ‘Water is life: the anti-privatisation forum and the struggle against water privatisation’ 
Public Citizen 
11  Interview with Dr. Riant Nugroho at the Jakarta Water Regulatory Body, April 20th 2009. See also 
Estache, A. and Kouassi, E., ‘Sector organization, governance, and the inefficiency of African water 
utilities’ World  
12    ‘Watchdog: Why is water deal under OSA? - Malaysiakini’   
<http://www.malaysiakini.com/news/62323> accessed November 02 2009 
13  Ge, Y. (2008). "Rethinking China’s Urban Water Privatization." 
14   Skapová, H., Water industry privatisation in the Czech Republic: money down the drain? 
(Transparency International - Czech Republic 2009) 
 
 3 
struck the right balance between commercial confidentiality and operational 
transparency”. 15 A research by the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility 
(ICCR)  which represents over 100 billion USD in invested capital  concludes that 
disclosure by water utilities on environmental, social and governance information is 
‘murky’.16 It warned investors to be cautious and, in the absence of a mandatory 
disclosure requirement,  to take extra care to compel the companies to disclose 
more.17    
Private sector participation (PSP) is often associated with the decrease of 
transparency. According to Swyngendouw this is caused by the commodification of 
information that was formerly in the public domain.18 In turn, this limits access to data 
and information required by social groups. However, commodification may not be the 
only reason why information is held. In some cases, confidentiality is also used as a 
pretext by governmental agencies as a shield against political embarrassment.19 The 
(supposed) lack of transparency in PSP is often used to demonstrate the advantages of 
state ownership by its proponents: “The potential for transparency is an essential 
advantage of public utilities over privatised water delivery”, because in privatised 
water delivery “key information is defined as out of reach due to reasons of 
 
15  ‘House of Commons - Environmental Audit - Seventh Report’   <http://www.parliament.the-
stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmenvaud/597/59703.htm> accessed November 02, 
2009  
16 Lowe, L.H., Jones, P. and Brown, R., Liquid Assets. Responsible Investment in Water Services (2009) 
<http://www.iccr.org/news/press_releases/pdf%20files/LIQUIDASSETS-Final_sec.pdf> accessed 20 
November 2011 
17 Ibid 
18 Swyngedouw, E., ‘Dispossessing H 2 O: the contested terrain of water privatization’ 16 Capitalism 
Nature Socialism 81  
19  Zifcak, S., ‘Contractualism, democracy and ethics’ 60 Australian Journal of Public Administration 86 
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commercial confidentiality” .20 Whether or not publicly owned utilities are free from 
confidentiality claims and whether secrecy is prevalent in privatised utilities will be 
tested in this thesis.  
In line with the criticism that PSP reduces transparency, Mulgan considered 
that companies often abused their right to secrecy using contracts they entered into 
with government. He thus suggested that private companies engaged in public 
services should expect more intrusion compared to those in normal dealings. 21 
Lobina and Hall explained that one of the failures of public private partnership 
in the water sector is the failure of knowledge transfer from the multinational 
corporations to the local partner. The multinationals will only be keen to transfer a 
limited degree of technical knowledge which does not endanger their superior position 
with their local partner. According to them “commercial operations invariably prefer 
confidentiality and secrecy, as it protects their ability to manage financial affairs to 
maximise the benefit to their owners”.22 Furthermore, they argued that private actors 
will have control over who has access to the text of concessions.23 It is understandable 
that companies have an interest in managerial knowledge and control over operation 
as they are self interested entities operating for profit. Companies will withhold any 
information as long as doing so maximises their benefit.  
 
20 Brennan, B. and others, Reclaiming Public Water!: Participatory Alternatives to Privatization 
(Transnational institute (TNI) 2004) p.270 
21 Mulgan, R., ‘Contracting Out and Accountability’ 56 Australian Journal of Public Administration 106 
22  Lobina, E. and Hall, D., ‘The comparative advantage of the public sector in the development of 
urban water supply’ 8 Progress in Development Studies 85  
23 Ibid 
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1.1.2. Transparency and Economic Regulation   
The natural monopolistic character of the water supply sector makes it not 
feasible for direct competition to work. Regulation came to supplant the absence of 
competition with the hope of correcting market failure.24 Transparency is one of the 
tools to enable economic regulation. 
In economic terms, the relationship between regulators and utilities is often 
conceptualised in a “principal-agent relation”25, in which a problem then occurs when 
a party hires another party to perform some activities in their interest. In a water 
utilities context, the principal-agent problem can be found in several parts, between 
the regulator and utilities (regulator as principal and utilities as agent) and between the 
regulator and legislator/public in general (regulator as agent legislator/public as 
principal). In each situation, there is a problem of information asymmetry where the 
agent has more information about the job they are doing than the principal. The 
utilities always have more knowledge of their actual cost structure than the regulators. 
Meanwhile, the regulators always have more knowledge of the regulated utilities 
compared to the legislators. As agents always have more informational advantage than 
 
24 Jouravlev, A. and United Nations. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Water utility regulation : issues and options for Latin America and the Caribbean (Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 2000) See also Hantke-Domas, M.P., ‘Economic 
Regulation of Public Utilites with Natural Monopoly Features. A Study of Limitations Imposed by 
Property Rights from a Legal & Economic Approach’ (Dissertation, University East Anglia 2005) and 
Hendry, ‘An Analytical Framework for Reform of National Water Law’ 
25 On the innacuracy and possible danger of using the principal agent analogy to regulation, see Prosser, 
T., ‘Regulatory contracts and stakeholder regulation’ 76 Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 
35. Prosser views regulation as a network in which there is no single dominant objective (e.g. only 
protecting consumer or in allowing investment return). This section is not meant to reinforce the 
conceptualisation on monolithic regulatory objective, but only in describing the cases where an 
“information asymmetry” problem may occur.  
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its principal, it always has the incentive to cheat in order to maximise its own welfare. 
What needs to be done in this case is to make information available to the 
principal(s),26 in this case the regulators and the public.   
There are some ways to reduce information asymmetry between regulators 
and utilities, namely, by facilitating competition, applying incentive regulation and 
conducting information gathering.27 Even if the last two options are feasible, there is 
no way to avoid information asymmetry as, irrespective of any method used, the 
regulator will always be required to audit the company.28  Hence, information 
gathering will always be a substantial part of the regulation process.29   
Information gathering is costly, it requires a certain amount of regulatory 
capacity to decipher the information and the decision resulting from this process is 
susceptible to capture. One way of avoiding potential capture is by providing the 
result of information gathering to the public. The public, in spite of their diverse 
interest and lower per capita gain in intervening in the regulatory process, can 
potentially consists of a pool of different parties, from academics, practitioners, 
 
26 The idea of multiple principle-agent relationships is discussed by Laffont and Tirole Laffont, J.J. and 
Tirole, J., A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation (MIT press 1993) 
27 Burns, P. and Estache, A., ‘Infrastructure concessions, information flows, and regulatory risk’ 203 
Public Policy for the Private Sector 
28 Facilitating competition may not be feasible in large parts of water services, due to economics of 
scope and scale. Applying incentive regulation may, in theory, reveal information on the regulated 
industry. However, in practice, each type of regulation, whether in the form of rate of return or price 
cap, for example, has its own basic informational need which requires direct auditing. In rate of return, 
the base rate needs to be determined and the determination of base rate requires inquiry into historical 
company performance. In price cap, the efficiency factor (X or K in the water sector) is very vulnerable 
to capture.   
29 Green, R. and Pardina, M.R., Resetting price controls for privatized utilities: a manual for regulators 
(World Bank Publications 1999) 
 
 7 
industry (including competitors or potential entrants), potential investors (shareholders 
or creditors) to customers; each have an interest in information regarding the utility. 
The public can form alliances (for example, between consumer organisations and 
competitors) and combine their knowledge to scrutinise the information and the 
regulatory process. Disclosure would bring these benefits: (i) aiding the regulator in 
deciphering information derived from the utility, (ii) proposing alternative policy 
based on the information, (iii) creating incentive for the firm to improve accounting 
quality (iv) preventing collusion and corruption between the regulator and the utility 
and (v) developing the industry by sharing best practices and know-how and, 
therefore, lowering the barrier to entry.30 Not all information submitted by utilities to 
the regulator is available for public disclosure as it may be restricted by sectoral 
regulation or an obligation of confidence not to disclose it to the public.   
The position discussed in this section, which suggests that transparency can 
aid the regulatory process, is only one of several justifications for transparency. 
Previously, section 1.1.1 has elaborated that transparency is required for governance 
purposes such as in mitigating corruption. This is the descriptive rationale for 
transparency. Sections 2.1, 2.5, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 will contain some discussion 
regarding the normative justifications for transparency, among others, for enforcing 
the human right to water or as a prerequisite for democratic regulation. Both the 
descriptive and normative justifications on transparency entail that transparency is the 
 
30 See Boehm, F. and Olaya, J., ‘Corruption in public contracting auctions: the role of transparency in 
bidding processes’ 77 Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 431 Boehm, F., ‘Regulatory 
capture revisited – Is there and anti-corruption agenda in regulation?’ Boehm, F., Regulatory Capture 
Revisited–Lessons from Economics of Corruption (Internet Centre for Corruption Research (ICGG) 
Working Paper 2007) Boehm, F., Anti-Corruption Strategies as Safeguard for Public Service Sector 
Reforms (2007)   
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default position and that non-disclosure shall be perceived as an exception. This 
means that non-disclosure is permitted to the extent that it is legitimate. The burden of 
proof is placed on the parties refusing to disclose. 
1.1.3. Appeals to Legal Frameworks on Disclosure 
Various reports appeal to legal frameworks on disclosure, such as the Freedom 
of Information law, in order to ensure transparency in water services. Transparency 
International in its 2008 Global Corruption Report (GCR 2008) stresses that ‘strong’ 
Freedom of Information laws “provide the foundation for transparency in the water 
sector”.31 The GCR 2008 also recommends that states  “adopt and implement 
transparency and participation as guiding principles for all water governance”.32 
Supporters of PSP also rely on transparency. The Padco Report, facilitated by 
USAID to attract private investment, depends on the Freedom of Information (FoI) 
law, sunshine rules and capital market regulation, primarily citing the US 
experience.33 Authors such as Graham and Prosser contrasted the US condition with 
the UK, where not even a minimal sunshine rule was discussed.34 Many other 
 
31  Zinnbauer and Dobson, Global Corruption Report 2008: Corruption in the Water Sector p.117 
(conclusion)   
32  ibid see “Recommendation 4”, p.xxviii  
33   PadCo, ‘A Review of Reports by Private-Sector-Participation Skeptics, Prepared for  Municipal 
Infrastructure Investment Unit (MIIU), South Africa and The United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), Contract No. 674-0312-C-00-8023-0’ (February 2002)  
<http://www.psiru.org/others/PadcoSkeptics.doc> accessed November 02, 2009 See also Hall, D., 
‘Secret Reports and Public Concerns. A Reply to the USAID Paper on Water Privatisation ‘Skeptics’ 
Londres: Public Services International Research Unit (PSIRU)  
34   Graham, C. and Prosser, T., Privatizing public enterprises: constitutions, the state, and regulation in 
comparative perspective (Oxford University Press, USA 1991) 
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commentators acclaimed the US model of regulation with its sunshine laws35 and 
rules on ex parte contacts.36 A survey of 39 regulators worldwide conducted by 
NERA Economic Consulting for the World Bank recommends that governments  
legislate a legal framework for regulatory transparency, either at a national or regional 
level.37 These appeals for disclosure or transparency frameworks have a basis in 
economic regulation theories, which suggest that publication of accounts will give an 
incentive to regulators to improve their accounting capacity and fosters the firm to 
establish credibility.38 Disclosure is regarded as an anti-capture,39 anti-corruption 
strategy and a prerequisite for participation.40  
1.2. Title and Research Question 
The title of this thesis is “The Role of Legal Frameworks in Enabling 
Transparency in Water Utilities’ Regulation” and the research question that it attempts 
to answer is “How can Legal Frameworks Enable Transparency in Water Utilities’ 
Regulation?” The thesis intends to explore how legal frameworks would enable 
transparency in water utilities regulation  and, in doing so, help to tackle the 
 
35   Palast, G., Oppenheim, J. and MacGregor, T., Democracy and regulation: how the public can 
govern essential services (Pluto Pr 2003)  
36 Olson, W.P., ‘Secrecy and Utility Regulation’ 18 The Electricity Journal 48    
37  Hern, R. and others, Regulatory Transparency: International Assessment and Emerging Lessons A 
Final Report for the World Bank (NERA Economic Consulting, 2005)    
38  Laffont, J.J., Regulation and development (Cambridge University Press 2005)  
39  Boehm, F., Anti-corruption strategies as safeguard for public service sector reforms (2007) 
<http://www.wiwi.uni-
passau.de/fileadmin/dokumente/lehrstuehle/lambsdorff/Economics_of_Corruption_2007/Boehm_-
_Anti-Corruption_as_Safeguard_for_Public_Sector_Reforms.pdf> Accessed, January 5, 2012  
40   Page, B. and Bakker, K., ‘Water governance and water users in a privatised water industry: 
participation in policy-making and in water services provision: a case study of England and Wales’ 3 
International Journal of Water 38  
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governance crisis in the water sector. The thesis rests on the hypothesis that ‘lessons 
learned’ on transparency can be generated by comparing legal frameworks in water 
utilities’ regulation in three different jurisdictions: Victoria, England and Jakarta, each 
with a different modus of ownership and regulation.  
1.3. Methodology 
The methodology applied to this dissertation is analytical and comparative. 
This chapter (Chapter 1) outlines the problematique of  water utilities’ regulation in 
the form of a lack of transparency and corruption and subsequently sets the research 
question. Chapter 2 explores existing literature to identify the “research gap”, defines 
the concept of “transparency” used in the title and the research question, presents a 
rationale and theoretical foundations for regulation and provides a framework within 
which transparency could be enabled. Chapters 3, 4 and 5, respectively Victoria, 
England and Jakarta  (see section 1.5. below for the justifications in selecting these 
case studies) are case study chapters where the analytical framework generated in 
chapter 2 is applied. Chapter 7 presents a side by side comparison of the items 
compared in the previous chapters. These lessons learned, along with the concluding 
chapter (chapter 8), are expected to be able to provide an answer to the research 
question and contribute to solving the problematique explained in chapter 1.  
Comparative methodology needs to pay specific attention to gaps between law 
in books and law in action and to tackle the gap in publicly available information.41 
There are often large gaps between laws in books and how it is actually practiced in 
Indonesia and not all the laws are published. Thus, an interview is required for chapter 
 
41 Reitz, J.C., ‘How to do comparative law’ 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 617 
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6 (Jakarta) in order to supplement the desk legal analysis. Such interview is deemed 
not required for other jurisditions compared in this thesis. 
 
 
 
 
1.4. Scope 
1.4.1. Water Services 
Figure 1 Types of Water Services (adapted from Bakker)42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 Bakker, K., ‘Archipelagos and networks: urbanization and water privatization in the South’ 
[Blackwell Publishing Ltd] 169 Geographical Journal 328 
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Corporate
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Rivers/Well
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In countries where there is no full coverage of water utilities, the term “water 
services” comprises of both networked and non-networked means of providing 
water for drinking and sanitation purposes.43 Some populations in many developing 
countries rely on their water for drinking and sanitation by abstracting it directly 
from natural sources, i.e. surface and groundwater.  
The situation where water is abstracted directly from natural sources without 
any attachment to a network is depicted on the first quadrant of Figure 1. In this 
instance, the governance problem is very much related to the management of water 
resources: the framework of allocation among competing users and the issue of 
environmental water quality. On the second quadrant lies the category of those who 
abstract and treat water through more sophisticated means, albeit still unattached 
from the network. In this category there are small scale water providers, 
microtreatment facilities, water refilling companies and bottled water companies. 
The governance issues with small scale water providers (SSWPs) are related to its 
pricing, availability and monitoring or the problem of monopoly of access to 
hydrants in situations where SSWPs are acting as the complement to a networked 
utility. Meanwhile, water refilling companies and bottled water companies promise 
potable water service. Governance issues with these companies are primarily with 
respect to their monitoring. Water refilling companies and bottled water companies 
need to be constantly monitored by health agencies so that they meet their promise 
in providing potable water and adverse health effects can be avoided. 
 
43 Government Regulation No. 16 Year 2005 on Drinking Water Provision System Art. 5 
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The third and fourth quadrants depict networked water utilities. The fourth 
quadrant of Fig.1 comprises cooperatives, community owned or non-corporatised 
networked water utilities belonging to a government department. Their services are 
prevalent in housing complexes, small villages or apartment and offices buildings. 
Meanwhile, the third quadrant depicts networked water utilities in a corporate legal 
entity. The more a water utility leans to the right side, the more ‘corporatised’ it 
becomes.  
The focus of this thesis is the governance of water utilities existing in the 
lower end of the Y axis (highly networked) and spans across the spectrum between 
the fourth and third and along the third quadrant. Thus, to the extent that the water 
utility is highly networked and an independent legal entity having separate and 
distinguishable assets and liabilities, it falls under the analytical framework, 
irrespective of whether it is public or private. In this category lies  publicly owned 
water utilities established through state owned enterprise laws, concessions or 
unincorporated joint ventures between a publicly owned water utility or government 
with purely private entities, and the ‘full divestiture’ form of water utilities 
incorporated under general company law.  
What differentiates the governance problem between these water utilities and 
other types of water services is their networked character which results in a natural 
monopoly situation: the economics of scale and scope, a high barrier of entry and a 
high ‘exit’ cost for consumers, triggering the need to establish an independent 
regulatory body. It is also the reason why the term used in this thesis is “Water 
Utilities’ Regulation” and not “Water Services’ Regulation”. The term ”water 
services” is a much broader concept than “water utilities”.      
1.4.2. Economic Regulation 
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There are differences of opinion on what may constitute ‘economic 
regulation’. However, it is generally agreed that economic regulation is related to the 
tariff setting and the management of service standards. According to the World 
Bank, economic regulation consists of  “the rules and organizations that set, 
monitor, enforce, and change the allowed tariffs and service standards for water 
providers”.44 The monitoring of compliance with drinking water quality or effluent 
discharge (as a part of service specification) and customer service issue is regarded 
as a part of economic regulation as they are a part of the natural monopoly 
problem.45 On the other hand, health issues arising out of drinking water quality and 
environmental issues from effluent discharge are considered to be outside of 
economic regulation. Also considered outside economic regulation are cross subsidy 
regimes, the protection of vulnerable groups and network extension to unserved 
areas. Nevertheless, the World Bank noted that the borderline is not always clear.46   
In the next section below we will discuss the broader view on regulation.  
How economic regulation can be enabled depends on the ‘regulatory model’. On the 
one hand, there is “regulation by independent agency”, in which the functions above 
are prescribed by law and practised through the discretion of the independent 
regulator. On the other hand, there is “regulation by contract” in which contracts, 
instead of an independent agency, are used to manage the above contingencies. The 
distinction between the two is often debated as the two are probably only a part of a 
 
44  Groom, E., Halpern, J. and Ehrhardt, D., ‘Explanatory Notes on Key Topics in the Regulation of 
Water and Sanitation Services’ 6 Water Sector Board Discussion Paper Series 
45 Ibid 
46 Ibid  
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wider spectrum of regulation.47 The middle ground between the two traditions in 
which contracts are still used but a regulator is installed to deal with some of the 
regulatory features is called a “hybrid” model.48   
1.4.3. Water Utilities’ Regulation 
For public lawyers, the notion of ‘regulation’ is much broader than depicted 
by the World Bank in the previous section. This is due to the fact that all kinds of 
regulation must have been grounded on the constitution, where values such as 
equality, transparency and accountability are guaranteed. Thus, for public lawyers, 
regulations are not constrained to a specific ‘efficiency’ objective, but also have 
social, environmental and rights-based rationales. 
Hendry, for example, considered that a legal framework of water services will 
comprise of the following framework: (1) The structure, ownership and control (of 
water utilities); (2) The duties of supply – this relates to the problem of disconnection, 
constitutional guarantee of the right to water as well as its implementation of sectoral 
water rules; (3) Standards of Water Supply and Treatment; (4) Economic Regulation 
and Business Planning; (5) Customer Protection and Service Standard; and (6) Water 
 
47 Some models are regulation by government, regulation by independent agency, regulation by contract 
and regulatory outsourcing (expert panels). See Eberhard, A., ‘Infrastructure regulation in developing 
countries: an exploration of hybrid and transitional models’ (African Forum of Utility Regulators, 3rd 
Annual Conference, 15-16 March 2006, Windhoek, Namibia) 
<http://www.ppiaf.org/ppiaf/sites/ppiaf.org/files/publication/AFUR_hybrid_and_transitional_models_e
bhart_paper_0.pdf> accessed on February 6, 2012 
48 Ibid 
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Conservation.49 This depicts that water services’ regulation has all the economic, 
environmental and social objectives.  
However, this thesis will not specifically focus on the transparency of the 
environmental aspects of water utilities’ regulation because they are highly interwined 
with the regulation of water resources and general environmental laws. The 
environmental transparency of water utilities’ regulation would require its own in 
depth investigation.  
1.5. Justifications for case studies   
1.5.1. Experience with Freedom of Information Law in England and Victoria 
The United Kingdom enacted the Freedom of Information Act in 200050 and 
the Environmental Information Regulations in 2004. The number of requests made 
under English FoI per year is around 120,000. The FoI costs in 2005 were 35.5m 
GBP.51  
Being a country well known for “privatising” its essential services, the UK 
experience is important in understanding how the FoI regimes can adapt and respond 
to such challenges. It is intriguing to explore whether access to information laws are 
 
49 Hendry, ‘An Analytical Framework for Reform of National Water Law’ Chapter 5 
50 Freedom of Information Act 2000, 2000 c.36 
51‘Freedom of information: Every expense spared | The Economist’ (Dec 19th 2006)  
<http://www.economist.com/world/britain/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_RQVJVSQ&source=login_p
ayBarrier> accessed November 20 2009 
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applicable to the privatised52 water utilities and, if they are, how the exemption 
clauses will operate. 
Victoria has the oldest FoI Law compared to England and Indonesia, valid 
since 1982.53 The interpretation and development of the Victorian FoI experience has 
also been influenced by FoI reforms at Commonwealth level as well as in other 
Australian jurisdictions. The Victorian FoI Act has been revised several times to 
reflect the demands of its age, including the advent of outsourcing.54  
While the UK FoI is interesting from the point of view of how access to 
information regimes adapt to the problem of divestiture, the Victorian FoI is 
interesting in terms of its adaptation to contracting out. As the literature review section 
will elaborate, contracting out of government service has been criticised for reducing 
accountability and transparency. However, due to limitations in finances and 
expertise, it is often inevitable for the public sector to engage with the private sector. 
In this circumstance, the expectation for transparency lies with the FoI regime. It is 
thus relevant to investigate how FoI regimes have been reformed and applied to such 
conditions.   
1.5.2. Recent implementation of Freedom of Information Law in Indonesia 
 
52 The term “privatisation” is ambiguous, nevertheless, it is used widely in the literature as demostrated 
in section 2.1.1. The thesis will use “Private Sector Participation” in order to describe a privatisation in 
terms of ownership models. This will be dealt in section 2.1.2 
53 Freedom of Information Act 1982 No. 9859 of 1982 
54 Snell, R., ‘Freedom of Information: The Experience of the Australian States-An Epiphany?’ 29 
Federal Law Review 343 
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Indonesia enacted the Freedom of Information Law in 200855 and it took 
effect in 2010. The FoI institution has just been set up and made operational, but still 
lacks experience in dealing with FoI disputes. Compared to the UK FoIs, the number 
of exemptions on Indonesia’s FoI is lower and the exemption clauses are more 
narrowly construed.   
In terms of applicability, unlike the UK FoIs, the Indonesian FoI provides a 
definition of public authorities. This covers state owned companies. However, since 
some water utilities are ‘privatised’ (by way of concession) there is a low chance that 
the FoI can be applicable directly to them. 
The Indonesian FoI provided some minimum duty of publication to public 
authorities and this covers regulators. However, the duty to publish is only for a 
limited extent of the public authorities’ finances and performance. The Public Service 
Law mandates public authorities to publish key terms of contracts with private parties 
and also some performance aspects of the contract.56  
1.5.3. Advanced water services regulation in England  
Water services in England has been undergoing reforms ever since it was 
“privatised”. The Water Industry Act 199157 has been amended several times.58 The 
most interesting feature of the English water services law is the creation of an 
 
55 Undang Undang No.14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik 
56 Undang Undang No. 25 Tahun 2009 Tentang Pelayanan Publik 
57 Water Industry Act 1991 c.56 
58 The latest amemndment at  the time of writing is the Water Industry (Financial Assistance) Act 2012 
c.8  
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independent body of an economic regulator, OFWAT. OFWAT is given a lengthy 
mandate under the acts mentioned above, and this covers the power of enforcement 
and adjudication.  
The initial intent for “privatising” the water sector – with the RPI-K formula – 
is to provide ease of regulation. The yardstick competition was expected to provide  
light touch regulation. However, what followed afterwards was a tremendous 
restructuring of the water industry accompanied by the creation of complex 
institutions. Competition appeared to be difficult to implement and as such regulation 
seemed to be perpetual, not a matter of “holding the fort” until competitive forces 
arrived. Furthermore, the light touch of regulation in the water services sector has not 
been proven as OFWAT is still required to rigorously collect information from the 
utilities, although this might change in the future. This information gathering exercise 
contributes significantly to the cost of regulation. In 2003-2004, OFWAT’s annual 
budget was around 12.5 million pounds which represents around 50 pence on each 
water bill.59   
Considerable price increases followed the divestiture with the gains 
transferred to companies and shareholders.60 Meanwhile, there was a growing risk of 
social disparity given the companies’ power to disconnect those who cannot afford to 
pay. When the WIA 1991 was amended in 1999, the law prohibited disconnection to 
 
59  Ballance, T. and Taylor, A., Competition and economic regulation in water : the future of the 
European water industry (IWA Publishing 2005) 
60   Bakker, K., ‘Paying for water: water charging and equity in England and Wales’ 26 Transactions of 
the Institute of British Geographers 143 
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private dwellings for the reason of non-payment.61 This marks the acknowledgment 
that regulation of water services cannot be constrained to a purely economic agenda as 
there are social issues as well.  
The UK experience shows that the privatisation of water utilities is not an easy 
task, as it can only be materialised through adequate regulatory capacity which 
includes expertise and supply of budget and it must also be supported by a good 
system of governance.  
 
1.5.4. Experience with public ownership and contracting out in Victoria 
In contrast to England, Victoria’s water utilities are state owned monopolies. 
Comparing different ownership models is relevant for the study, because lack of 
transparency is often perceived as the result of  privatisation.62   
The regulatory structure is arguably simpler than England’s, as is the role of 
the institutions. The Essential Services Commission (ESC) is a multi utility regulator 
tasked with regulating not only water, but also energy and ports, among others. The 
Victorian water sector is segregated into several different companies on the bulkwater 
 
61 Water Industry Act 1991 (England) Schedule 4A 
62 For example, Hall, D. and Lobina, E., ‘Private to Public: International lessons of water 
remunicipalisation in Grenoble, France’ (American Water Resources Association, Dundee, 6-8 August 
2001)  Psiru, ‘Undermining Democracy and the Environment, PSI Briefing, The Hague World Water 
Forum’ < 
www.psiru.org/reports/2000-03-W-Htrans.doc  > accessed December 25, 2011 Swyngedouw, 
‘Dispossessing H 2 O: the contested terrain of water privatization’ Minow, M., ‘Public and private 
partnerships: accounting for the new religion’ Harvard Law Review 1229 
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supply and retail side, all of which are publicly owned and economically regulated by 
the ESC.  
Furthermore, even when utilities are state owned, there is usually a part of the 
service which is delivered through Private Sector Participation (PSP). In Victoria, this 
occurs at the bulkwater supply side where the state owned bulkwater supply company 
Melbourne Water entered into a concession contract with Aquasure, a private 
company. Jakarta’s water utilities (both the bulkwater supply and the retail 
companies) are also publicly owned. PSP is also found in the Jakarta case study, but 
this is conducted at treatment and distribution level. Notwithstanding these 
differences, the thesis will compare the transparency of the contractual arrangements 
between Victoria and Jakarta. 
The rise of contracting out of government services in Australia in general has 
sparked interest from public lawyers on its impact on transparency and accountability. 
As will be discussed in the literature review section, many of the leading authorities 
on the transparency and accountability impacts of contracting out have come from 
Australian public lawyers. Victorian experiences in dealing with contracting out may 
therefore contribute to the similar situation in Indonesia.    
1.5.5. Hybrid ‘British-French’ model of water privatisation with independent 
regulator in Jakarta and public ownership in other regions 
The Indonesian Constitution mandated that “branches of production which are 
vital for the State and which affect the life of most people are controlled by the State” 
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and this has been interpreted to extend into water utilities.63 However, in practice, 
shares of state owned water utilities can be partially sold to investors and concession 
contracts between water utilities and private parties are allowed. Only full divestiture 
is not allowed. 
The condition of the water utilities is already bleak. Around 220 water utilities 
hold more than 400 outstanding loans to the central government and 63% of these are 
in default, with the total amount of debt amounting to 500 million USD.64 The 
provision for water supply financing is estimated (optimistically) to be at 50 million 
USD per year, whereas in order to reach the MDG target, it is required to be at the 
level of 450 millionUSD, nearly ten fold of the estimated amount. 65  
Responding to this situation, there are three scenarios that are envisaged. The 
first is that the healthy water utilities (which comprise of only around 5% of existing 
utilities) will remain under state ownership. Secondly, institutionalised PPP, or the 
joint ownership of utilities between municipal government and investors is sought. 
The third is the current model of concession as applied in Jakarta, the country’s 
capital, where a regulator is installed.   
The concession model that applies in Jakarta follows the “French model” of 
water privatisation but the French system does not have any independent body tasked 
 
63  Judicial Review of the Law No. 7 of 2004 on Water Resources, Constitutional Court of the Republic 
of Indonesia, Judgment of 13th July 2005, No. 058-059-060-063/PUUII/2004. 
64 Ibid. 
65  Alternative Financing For Water Utilities in Indonesia: A Review of Lessons and Challanges  
(Report by Development Alternatives, Inc for review by the United States Agency for International 
Development under Contract No 497-M-00-05-00005-00, 2008)   
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with the economic regulation of water services. Instead, some part of the regulatory 
function is dealt with by the French Administrative Court with the Conseil d’Etat at 
the top.66  
The Indonesian (Jakarta) version of concession also depends on contracts 
which were signed between the municipal government, the regional (state owned) 
utilities and the private entities. The Jakarta concession mandates for the creation of 
an independent regulator tasked with supervising the private concessionaires, 
adjudicating disputes among the private concessionaire and the state owned water 
utility, and advising the Governor on charges. The Governor reinforces this mandate 
in a gubernatorial decision. Similar to its counterparts in England and Victoria, the 
Jakarta regulator requires information from the utility and has the obligation to 
disclose some information for transparency purposes.  
In addition, water utilities in other regions which are ailing might also be 
privatised by selling parts of their shares to the private sector through institutionalised 
PPPconstruction. As this construction also involves a long term and complicated 
contract (for example, through the shareholders’ resolution), it is also conceivable to 
install an independent regulator. Similar to the regulator in a concession model, the 
regulator of an institutionalized PPP will also require information and the publication 
of such information to the public. The future of Indonesian water regulation thus may 
resemble that of England and Victoria, in terms of an independent regulatory body 
tasked with economic regulation. 
 
66 For a complete account on the French system see Shugart, C.T., ‘Regulation-by-Contract and 
Municipal Services: The Problem of Contractual Incompleteness’ (Ph.D Thesis Harvard University 
1998) especially p.35 
 
 24 
1.5.6. Other Jurisdictions 
The author is aware that there are other jurisdictions which would make 
interesting case studies to be compared with one another. The French model of water 
services provision is said to be the origin of the expanding trend towards regulation by 
contract in the water sector.67 Why not compare France?  As briefly explained above, 
France is particularly unique due to the position of its administrative court as a quasi 
super regulator in managing contracts. This is a particular feature that makes the so 
called “French Model” work in its country of origin. Such a feature is not enjoyed by 
many other countries, such as Indonesia. Most countries utilise an independent 
regulatory body to manage the relationship between the government and the private 
sector and these have also been implemented to supervise government owned utilities.  
 The Dutch water sector is also particularly interesting because it implements 
“sunshine rules” for its water utilities.68 However, private sector participation is 
prohibited by law, and as such it would be impossible to assess the loss of 
transparency due to the delegation to the private sector.  
 Furthermore, one of the aspects that this thesis attempts to explain is 
transparency of the decision making process in independent regulatory bodies. With 
 
67 See Finger, M. and Allouche, J., Water privatisation: trans-national corporations and the re-
regulation of the water industry (Taylor & Francis 2002) 
68 De DeWitte, K., ‘On Analyzing Drinking Water Monopolies by Robust Non-Parametric Efficiency 
Estimations’ (PhD, University of Leuven 2009) Saal, D. and De Witte, K., ‘Is a little sunshine all we 
need? On the impact of sunshine regulation on profits, productivity and prices in the Dutch drinking 
water sector’ 20 Journal of Regulatory Economics 61 
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the absence of such bodies in the French and Dutch water sectors, it would be 
impossible to draw comparison.  
1.6. Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an outline of the problematique and research 
question posed by this thesis, the methodology used, scope and justifications for 
selecting the case studies. The next chapter will discuss existing literature relevant to 
the thesis and clarify several theories and concepts which lead to the formation of the 
analytical framework.  
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
This chapter will first discuss existing literature on public service, 
privatisation and its impact on transparency and identify the research gap. It will then 
attempt to clarify the concepts and theories used throughout this thesis.    
2.1. Literature Review   
There is literature focusing on the transparency aspects of delegated public 
services to the private sectors. Although some of the literature does not concern water 
utilities, it remains relevant because water utilities’ regulation will often involve some 
form of delegation of essential services to the private sector, the degrees of which are 
different from one jurisdiction to another.  
The wave of “privatisation” and contracting out had provoked an intense 
debate about a new kind of accountability for the private sector. Minow warned that 
“access of information about services and results will decrease if the information 
becomes private”.69 This goes along with Swyngedouw’s argument as quoted earlier 
that “privatisation” of some parts of the water cycle “diminishes the transparency of 
decision making procedures and limits access to data and information” that could 
permit stakeholders to base their views, option and decisions.70  
Some commentators consider that “regulation by contract” has particular 
transparency problems. This is argued by Lobina and Hall who suggest that it is “the 
 
69 Minow, ‘Public and private partnerships: accounting for the new religion’ 
70 Swyngedouw, ‘Dispossessing H 2 O: the contested terrain of water privatization’ 
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private operator [which has] control over who can access the text of the concession 
agreement and tariff formulae”.71 Rouse also criticised “regulation by contract”:  
“What it [regulation by contract] doesn't do is provide any means of regulating 
the contract owner, nor does it provide for transparency and public participation. On 
the contrary, it tends to reduce transparency and assumes that governments can look 
after the consumers' interests. Also, this lack of transparency risks providing the 
conditions for corruption.”72  
Similar criticism is voiced by Eberhard:  
“Transparency is also often compromised in regulatory contracts, such as 
concession agreements or power purchase agreements. Few of these contracts are 
open to public scrutiny. Government officials and private operators often justify such 
secrecy on the grounds of “commercial necessity or competition”. But it is unclear 
why the secrecy is needed if the operator has been granted a de facto or de jure 
monopoly that eliminates any possibility of competition, at least for a significant 
number of years”.73  
 
71 Lobina and Hall, ‘The comparative advantage of the public sector in the development of urban water 
supply’ 
72 Rouse, M., Institutional governance and regulation of water services, vol 2 (2007) p.26-27 
73 Eberhard, ‘Infrastructure regulation in developing countries: an exploration of hybrid and transitional 
models’ 
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Meanwhile, Prosser74 had warned against viewing regulatory relationships as 
“essentially contractual”: “the concept of an overall regulatory contract fits badly with 
the openness to changing democratic goals and principles.”. 
One must bear in mind that the claims that ”privatisation” decreases 
transparency are not without contenders. Proponents of private sector participation 
such as Payen et al75 and Marin76 oppose the idea that “privatisations” are not 
transparent. Payen et al77 and Marin78 contend that licences or PPP contracts always 
spell out in  great detail the private sector’s performance targets and also contain some 
form of mandatory reporting to their public counterpart. Often  such mechanism 
provides for better transparency than unregulated public sector. Can it be that both the 
proponents and opponents of PSPs are correct and the problem is merely of their 
definition and idea of transparency? Transparency can have various meanings and 
dimensions. Hendry, for example, associates ‘transparency’ in the context of water 
 
74 Prosser, ‘Regulatory contracts and stakeholder regulation’  
75 Payen, G., Moss, J. and Waeyenberge, T.V., Private Water Operators Contribute to making the Right 
to Water & Sanitation real, AquaFed’s submission, Part 3 Avoiding misconceptions on private water 
operators in relation to the Right to Water and Sanitation (AquaFed 2010) 
<http://www.aquafed.org/pdf/2010%20CDA_RTWS_Aquafed5.pdf>  also Payen, G., UN Human 
Rights Council Public hearing by the Independent Expert on the Right to Water, Introductory remarks 
by Gerard Payen (AquaFed 2010) 
<http://www.aquafed.org/pdf/RTWSGeneva_CDA_PublicHearing_GPspeech_finalb_Pc_2010-01-
27.pdf>   
76 Marin, P., Public-private partnerships for urban water utilities: a review of experiences in developing 
countries (World Bank Publications 2009) 
77 Payen, Moss and Waeyenberge, Private Water Operators Contribute to making the Right to Water & 
Sanitation real, AquaFed’s submission, Part 3 Avoiding misconceptions on private water operators in 
relation to the Right to Water and Sanitation  see para 6.2 also Payen, UN Human Rights Council 
Public hearing by the Independent Expert on the Right to Water, Introductory remarks by Gerard 
Payen para 2 
78 Marin, Public-private partnerships for urban water utilities: a review of experiences in developing 
countries p.131 
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utilities’ regulation with the revelation of not only cost structure or finances79 but also 
access to information.80 Thus, there can be situations where the cost structure is well 
defined but the public has no access of information.   
A large body of literature on the topic of transparency and privatisation topic 
comes from Australia. Mulgan, for example, came up with the conclusion that public 
sector accountability is generally more stringent, despite the fact that the power of the 
private sector is growing to match that of the state.81 He stated that the degree of 
disclosure and the level of scrutiny in the private sector is less than is required of 
ministers in parliaments.82 Freiberg, focusing on accountability issues on the 
contracting out of prisons, argues that contractual arrangements between government 
and correctional agencies must be open, as it is a matter of “public interest”.83 
Meanwhile, Sands opined that a commercial confidentiality clause in Public Private 
Partnership contracts “effectively limits citizen access to publicly owned information, 
thereby jeopardizing the chance of informed public debate and healthy public 
accountability outcome.”84  
 
79 Hendry, ‘An Analytical Framework for Reform of National Water Law’ Transparency is associated 
with billing (p.345), cost recovery (p.352), accounting (p.387), comparative information or 
benchmarking (p.410) , tarriffs (p.292) 
80 Ibid p.430 
81 Mulgan, R., ‘Comparing accountability in the public and private sectors’ 59 Australian Journal of 
Public Administration 87 
82 Ibid 
83 Freiberg, A., ‘Commercial Confidentiality, Criminal Justice and the Public Interest’ 9 Current Issues 
in Criminal Justice 125; for similar concern in England, see Shaw, S., ‘Prisons: Who Gains from 
Commercial Confidentiality?’ [Routledge] 13 Public Money & Management 7  
84 Sands, V., ‘Right to Know and Obligation to Provide: Public Private Partnerships, Public Knowledge, 
Public Accountability, Public Disenfranchisement and Prisons Cases, The’ 29 University of New South 
Wales Law Journal 334 
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In Australia, the concern over the decreasing transparency due to contracting 
out is not only a matter of academic debate, but also a political one. In 2000, the 
Victorian Parliament launched an inquiry into commercially confidential material and 
its intersection with the public interest.85 The inquiry concluded that the blanket 
exception to disclosure granted to trade secrets under the Victorian Freedom of 
Information Act is unnecessarily wide86 and recommended that there should be a 
reversal of burden of proof which would require the private party arguing for non-
disclosure to substantiate that disclosure would be harmful to its commercial 
interests.87 However, how public interest should be defined and how the weighing of 
trade-offs should be carried out remains unsolved.  
The other genre of literature comes from the ‘economic regulation’ discipline. 
This literature has a rather different approach in explaining transparency in the 
regulatory setting. Their focus is on reducing the asymmetry of information and 
thereby enhancing efficiency. For them, “efficiency” is a central concept and the 
purpose of transparency. Transparency is relevant if it enhances the quality of 
regulation or if it promotes competition. Transparency which is not compatible with 
the efficiency objective is considered a cost.  
 
85 Victorian Parliament Public Accounts and Estimates Committee, Inquiry into commercial in 
confidence material and the public interest : thirty-fifth report to Parliament (2000)   
86 Ibid p.117 
87 Ibid p.137  
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Laffont88 briefly mentioned in his book that disclosure of information by the 
regulator on cost structure provides an incentive for utilities to act honestly and 
improve their accounting quality. Boehm,89  using capture theory and the economics 
of corruption, argued to overcome ‘the myth of business secrecy’ in order to enhance 
information flow between regulator and utility. The reason for this is twofold: first, in 
order to enhance regulatory capacity by aiding the regulator in deciphering 
information from the utility (through stakeholder participation) and second, to prevent 
collusion between the two by increasing the cost of concealment through 
transparency. Boehm is attempting to justify his first argument,  enhancing regulatory 
capacity,  by developing a potential capture by consumer interest which focuses on the 
alliance between stakeholders groups90 in the regulatory process, with an aim to match 
the utility’s dominance. Also argued by Klein,91 the consumer can, in Boehm’s 
perspective, influence the decision making process by submitting alternative 
interpretations of information to the regulator. The second justification in Boehm’s 
theory came from the capture theory developed by Laffont and Tirole. According to 
them, a regulator who has more time and resources to find the true nature of the firm 
has more information compared to the principal, the legislator.92 The regulator, in 
collusion with the utility, can have an incentive by hiding information from the 
 
88 “Making cost information public may be a way for the regulator to improve the quality of accounting 
by fostering more truthful disclosure of information by establishing its credibility for honest behavior.” 
See Laffont and Tirole, A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation 
89 Boehm, Anti-corruption strategies as safeguard for public service sector reforms 
90 See Becker, G.S., ‘A theory of competition among pressure groups for political influence’ The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 371 
91 Klein, M.U., Economic Regulation of Water Companies (World Bank, Private Sector Development 
Dept. 1996) Klein advocates to use rival and interest groups to generate information 
92 Laffont, J.J. and Tirole, J., ‘The politics of government decision-making: A theory of regulatory 
capture’ 106 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 1089 
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legislator, if it is beneficial to the utility.  As mentioned by Boehm,93 capture can 
occur through the “revolving door”, conference travel or industry-favourable 
academic research. In their theoretical model, Laffont and Tirole demonstrate that 
capture reduces social welfare.94  
It is important to note that the “public lawyer” approaches have different 
motivation and values to promote than the “economic regulation” school and this may 
influence how transparency should be implemented in practice, especially if there is 
no direct justification of economic benefit. Aronson argued that the public lawyer 
concept of “public interest” is wider than only correcting market failure or granting 
cross subsidy.95 For them, public interest involves other values such as fairness, 
consistency, rationality, participation, legality, accountability and accessibility of 
judicial and administrative grievance procedures. Aronson further rejected the trade-
off between transparency and commercial confidentiality and argued for the 
expansion (rather than contraction) of the governmental notion of transparency when 
it involves privatisation and contracting with private actors.96  
The debates over regulation, however, had incorporated more political 
rationales of regulatory objectives which would go along with Aronson’s arguments 
above. Prosser argued that the objectives of regulation are not constrained into the 
maximisation of economic efficiency – although such remain important – but also 
 
93 Boehm, Anti-corruption strategies as safeguard for public service sector reforms 
94 Laffont and Tirole, A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation 
95Aronson, M., ‘A Public Lawyer's Response to Privatization and Outsourcing ’ in Michael Taggart 
(ed), The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing 1997) 
96 Ibid 
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have more rights-based and egalitarian justifications.97 Such a position has been 
widely acknowledged in recent regulatory debates as reflected in the works of 
Majone,98 Graham99 or Lodge and Stirton,100 for example. This shift towards non 
economic arguments means that transparency in utility regulation should be fostered 
not only because of the economic rationale, but also because there are underlying 
equity and democratic justifications. Nevertheless, when there is a conflict between 
efficiency values versus ‘public law’ values, the resolution is not always clear cut.  
Another strain of the debate focuses on the issue of natural monopoly and 
confidentiality. Authors such as Palast, Oppenheim and MacGregor 101 considered 
that commercial secrecy is an oxymoron, especially in cases where firms do not have 
competitors, such as in some segments of the electricity industry.102 A similar position 
is advocated by Simpson103 who argues that “in a natural monopoly there is no 
justification for commercial confidentiality during the life of a contract”. Eberhard 
(quoted above) also considers that a de facto or de jure monopoly granted to 
operators should render it difficult for them to justify secrecy.104 Meanwhile, whilst 
not rejecting confidentiality in its entirety, the UK’s Department of Trade and 
Industry suggests that information provided by monopoly businesses to the regulator 
 
97 Prosser, T., Law and the Regulators (Oxford University Press, USA 1997) p. 31 
98 Majone, G., ‘The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems’ 22 West European Politics 1  
99 Graham, C., Regulating public utilities : a constitutional approach (Hart 2000) 
100 Lodge, M. and Stirton, L., ‘Regulating in the Interest of the Citizen: Towards a Single Model of 
Regulatory Transparency’ 50 Social and economic studies 103 
101 Palast, Oppenheim and MacGregor, Democracy and regulation: how the public can govern essential 
services 
102 Ibid 
103 Simpson, R., ‘Down and dirty: providing water for the world’ 14 Consumer Policy Review 146 
104 Eberhard, ‘Infrastructure regulation in developing countries: an exploration of hybrid and transitional 
models’ 
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should “generally be disclosable” whereas for markets emerging into competition, the 
extent of disclosure required is related to the degree to of the company’s market 
power.105 
There are gaps which have not been adequately addressed through the above 
research. First, there is a lack of a coherent, holistic approach on transparency research 
with a focus on water utilities’ regulation. This requires a clear definition and 
understanding of what “transparency” actually means. Most of the literature does not 
clarify what it means by transparency (or the lack thereof) and this eventually leads to 
an incoherent debate.  It also tends to focus only on some particular aspect of water 
utilities’ regulation, mostly on the contracting parts, therefore, eclipsing the more 
complex “big picture” of the water sector. The literature gap can only be addressed by, 
firstly, providing a clear definition of transparency and reconciling the above research 
with more comprehensive work on water utilities’ regulation. 106  Only then can a 
more coherent understanding of transparency in the context of water utilities’ 
regulation be achieved. Second, there are hypotheses in the literature which need to be 
tested through case studies. The hypotheses are: (a) that confidentiality in a natural 
monopoly context is oxymoronic or unjustified, (b) that privatisation (or the 
delegation of) some or all of the parts of the water services cycle diminishes 
transparency, and (c) that regulation by contract has specific transparency problems.  
These hyphothesis will be evaluated in subsequent chapters. Third, when the causes of 
 
105 Department of Trade and Industry, A Fair Deal for Consumers: Modernising the Framework for 
Utility Regulation (CM 3898, London, The Stationery Office 1998a)   Proposal 7.6  
106 See Hendry, ‘An Analytical Framework for Reform of National Water Law’ Chapter 5 also 
Quesada, Water and Sanitation Services in Europe: Do Legal Frameworks provide for “Good 
Governance”? 
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opacity have been properly analysed and demonstrated, it would be appropriate to 
suggest viable solutions.  
2.2. “Privatisation” and Private Sector Participation 
Readers may note that in this dissertation the term “privatisation” is often used 
within quotation marks. This is because “privatisation” is a fuzzy concept that carries 
different meanings. In the judicial review of the Indonesian Water Law 7/2004, the 
petitioners insisted that by opening doors for private parties to participate in the sector, 
the law is an instrument of privatisation although the term privatisation itself is never 
mentioned by the law. On the other hand, the government representatives insisted that 
the law was never meant to “privatise” the water sector since it does not regulate the 
transfer of shares to the private sector.107 Indeed, under Indonesian State Owned 
Enterprise Law, “privatisation” is defined as partial or full divestiture of shares 
belonging to a state owned enterprise.108 Likewise, in England, when literature uses 
“privatisation” it often means divestitures.109 
However, “privatisation” has a very broad meaning and is not only limited to 
divestiture.110 The term “private” often denotes secrecy or opacity whereas the term 
 
107 Judicial Review of Law Number 7 Year 2004 regarding Water Resources, Judgment of 13th July 
2005, No. 058-059-060-063/PUUII/2004  Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia See the 
orginal Bahasa Indonesia version, particularly p.412 and p.435. See also dissenting opinion of Judge 
Mukhtie Fadjar which labels the law as a disguised “privatisation” at p.512 
108 Iwanami, M. and Nickson, A., ‘Assessing the regulatory model for water supply in Jakarta'’ 28 
Public Administration and Development 291 Article 1 (12) 
109 Prosser, T., ‘Public service law: privatization's unexpected offspring’ 63 Law and Contemporary 
Problems 63 Littlechild, S.C., Privatization, competition and regulation in the British electricity 
industry, with implications for developing countries (World Bank 1999) Bakker, K.J., ‘A political 
ecology of water privatization’ 70 Studies in Political Economy 
110 Starr, P., ‘The meaning of privatization’ 6 Yale Law & Policy Review 6    
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“public” is often used in equation with transparency. For the economist, “public” is 
often equated with the “state” and “private” for non-state, whereas for the 
anthropologist, “privatisation” could mean the withdrawal from previously conceived 
public spheres, such as from taverns into homes, due to the advent of television.111 In 
this case, what was formerly a question of community engagement and intimacy 
becomes the pursuit of self-interest or in other words from public action to private 
concern.112 Then there is a third concept: the “commons” and its kindred 
“community” which are often invoked in public debate in opposition to market/private 
or public/state, somewhat in a diversion from the mainstream academic debate.113 In 
Wales, the Dwr Cymru “mutual” model where a non-profit company limited by 
guarantee is established, has been perceived as a representation of the “commons”, 
where ownership is returned from the private sector to the public. However, the 
public/private binary is simplistic and inaccurate when applied to the community 
model such as Dwr Cymru as, on the one hand, they are perceived as a “retreat from 
the market” and an alternative to “privatisation” while, on the other hand, such a 
 
111 Willmott, P. and Young, M., The symmetrical family (New York: Pantheon 1973) also quoted in 
Starr, ‘The meaning of privatization’ 
112 Hirschman, A.O., Shifting involvements: private interest and public action (Princeton Univ Pr 2002) 
also quoted in Starr, ‘The meaning of privatization’ 
113 This is discussed in Bakker, K.J., ‘From public to private to... mutual? Restructuring water supply 
governance in England and Wales’ 34 Geoforum 359 For the invocation of commons as an independent 
entity in opposition with private/market and public/state, see Barlow, M., Our Water Commons: 
Toward a new Freshwater Narrative (The Commons 2007) Shiva, V., Water wars: Privatization, 
pollution and profit (South End Pr 2002) Rowe, J., ‘The Parallel Economy of the Commons’ State of 
the World. In the mainstream academic debate, the term commons may include both private or public; it 
includes open access, group property, individual property and government property. See Ostrom, E. and 
others, ‘Revisiting the commons: local lessons, global challenges’ 284 science 278 also Dietz, T., 
Ostrom, E. and Stern, P.C., ‘The struggle to govern the commons’ 302 science 1907  
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model is made possible through divestiture and the use of corporate law, both of 
which are synonymous with “privatisation” itself.114   
It is thus difficult to pinpoint the meaning of “privatisation” as it could mean 
different things: a shift from public (openness) to private (opacity), from state to non 
state or from the whole (community) to the part (a few or the individual).115 Starr 
rightly raised an important issue with “privatisation”:  
“it is a critical question whether moving from public to private in the sense of 
state to non-state entails a movement in the other senses: from open to closed 
(in access to information) or from the whole to the part (particularly in the 
distribution of benefits)”.  
For scholars such as Swyngedouw, Minow, Lobina and Hall, the move from 
state to non state may always entail the move from open to closed information access 
but, as will be evaluated later in case studies, this is not categorically true.116 
For the sake of precision and to avoid pitfalls in analysis, this thesis uses the 
term “private sector participation” (PSP) to denote a subset of “privatisation” which 
deals with shifting of ownership and/or responsibilities of delivering water services to 
non-state entities. As discussed in various literatures, PSPs have several models, 
differentiated through  risk, duration and the breadth of private sector responsibility: 
 
 
114 The Dwr Cymru model will be discussed in Section 4.4.3 
115 Starr, ‘The meaning of privatization’ 
116 Swyngedouw, ‘Dispossessing H 2 O: the contested terrain of water privatization’, Minow, ‘Public 
and private partnerships: accounting for the new religion’, Lobina and Hall, ‘The comparative 
advantage of the public sector in the development of urban water supply’ 
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Figure 1: Models of Private Sector Participation 
 
 While there is no strict categorisation of the PSP model, it is usually divided 
into these six categories: management contract, affermage, lease, build-operate 
transfer (BOT), concession and divestiture. Only in a full divestiture model is the 
asset’s ownership transferred to the private sector. Management contracts typically 
last three to five years and transfer the responsibility of managing utilities to the 
private sector. In affermage and lease, utilities are responsible for the operations and 
maintenance of the assets, but not for conducting infrastructure investment.117 The 
difference between the two is that in affermage, the operator and the private sector 
share revenue from customer whereas in lease, the operator retains revenue from 
customers. In BOT, the private sector designs, builds and operates a facility for 15-30 
years, in exchange for a fee, and then transfers the asset’s title to the government. 
Concessions provide the rights and obligations for the private sector to operate, 
maintain assets, collect revenue and for investment while the assets are still legally 
owned by the public sector until the concession period ends. Finally, in divestiture, the 
share ownership of a utility is sold to the private sector. This thesis will elaborate, in 
detail, how divestiture of the water utilities is implemented in England. 
Note that the term public private partnership (PPP) is often used as an 
alternative to PSP, but authors such as Marin include divestitures as a form of PPP 
 
117 Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, Approaches to private participation in water services 
: a toolkit (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank 2006) 
Management 
Contract Affermage Lease BOT Concession Divestiture 
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whereas Marques excludes them from PPP, as the public sector is deemed to 
disengage completely from providing the services, except in regulation.118  It is also 
important to highlight that the typology of PSPs above simply describes the “business 
model” of infrastructure used by international financial institutions. Such a model 
often does not represent the actual institutional configuration in the legal culture 
where they are imported from, France,119 or the country where the model is 
transplanted, such as Indonesia. Thus, a concession according to the World Bank may 
or may not be a concession as understood legally in each jurisdiction. This will be 
dealt with in later chapters.120    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118 Marques, R.C., ‘What are Public-Private Partnerships and the general principles behind such 
institutional arrangements?’ Regulation Body of Knowledge 
<http://www.regulationbodyofknowledge.org/faq/pppPrinciples/> accessed June 1, 2012 also Marin, 
Public-private partnerships for urban water utilities: a review of experiences in developing countries 
119 On why the World Bank chose to export the “French Model”, see Finger and Allouche, Water 
privatisation: trans-national corporations and the re-regulation of the water industry 
120 See section 6.4.2. for a detailed discussion on this subject 
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2.3. Information flow and beneficiaries of transparency 
Figure 2: Information flow in regulation 
 
Information flows from suppliers to utilities, from utilities to the regulator 
(and to the stakeholders directly) and from the regulator to stakeholders. The regulator 
requires full disclosure from the utilities in order to set prices and monitor the utilities’ 
compliance with service levels, customer service and environmental standards.– These 
will be discussed in detail in later sections. To tackle this problem, water services law 
or concession contracts are often equipped with a duty for the utilities to furnish the 
regulator with information (see sections 4.3.4, 5.3.4 and 6.4.5). Nevertheless, 
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interpreting such information requires expertise and a considerable amount of time 
and costs.  
Relying on the utilities alone to provide information may not be adequate. 
Stakeholders can reveal and provide alternative information. According to Klein:121  
“Better information can be generated by public hearings and consultations for 
arriving at regulatory decisions. For example, when information about 
equipment costs provided by a utility is public, competing equipment suppliers 
may be able to detect overpriced supply contracts and complain. Equally 
various interest groups will provide information to support their various 
claims. Where various companies compete for water contracts - even if only 
from time to time - the regulator may benefit from information generated by 
an aggressively bidding competitor. Together with yardstick information 
otherwise obtained and share price information from companies quoted on the 
stock market, the regulator would then get the fullest possible set of data to 
arrive at good decisions.” 
In countries where regulatory capacity is weak and public expectation is high, 
stakeholders would have a higher stake in participating in the regulatory process. Such 
participation would require full information from regulators and utilities. 
Stakeholders, notwithstanding their diverse interests, comprise different parties which 
have an interest in information regarding the utility.122 They can form alliances and 
contribute their knowledge to scrutinise the information in the regulatory process. 
Disclosure may aid the regulator in deciphering information submitted by the utility.  
 
121 Klein, M.U., ‘Economic Regulation of Water Companies’ [Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 1649] 2010 SSRN eLibrary 
122 See Boehm, F., 'Anti-Corruption Strategies as Safeguard for Public Service Sector Reforms' 
(working paper, available at www.icgg.org/downloads , 2007), also Boehm, F. ‘Regulatory Capture 
Revisited–Lessons from Economics of Corruption’ (Internet Centre for Corruption Research (ICGG) 
Working Paper 2007). 
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Note that the above explanation by Klein on the benefits and role of disclosure 
in regulation only represents a particular model of regulation as envisaged by the 
“economic regulation” school, discussed earlier. The danger in this is that the multiple 
ranges of stakeholders outside the utilities and the regulator could be perceived only 
as “auxillary” to the whole process: the role of disclosure is to aid regulatory decisions 
and thus making the regulatory process more efficient. However, as discussed in the 
literature review section, there are public law approaches to transparency which 
suggest that the purpose of transparency is not confined to enhancing regulatory 
decisions. Since all stakeholders are both the beneficiaries (and the “principal”) of 
regulation, disclosure which serves any regulatory objectives – not only in making 
regulatory decision more efficient – should be promoted. 123 This is evident in the 
English regulatory system, which provides discretionary power for the regulator in 
disclosing regulatory information, if it is perceived to be in the “public interest”. 124 
The “public interest” here does not only mean an efficient decision making process, 
there are also equity and rights based considerations.125   
 This section clarifies the intended beneficiary for transparency in this thesis. 
Transparency is to serve the “public interest” which – as will be seen in the next 
sections – oftentimes must be decided on case by case basis. In certain cases there 
might be public interest in competition, which then requires disclosure of certain 
 
123 Prosser, ‘Regulatory contracts and stakeholder regulation’ 
124 “The Secretary of State may arrange for the publication, in such form and in such manner as he 
considers appropriate, of such information relating to any matter which is connected with the carrying 
out by a company holding an appointment under Chapter I of Part II of this Act of the functions of a 
relevant undertaker as it may appear to him to be in the public interest to publish.” S.201 of the  Water 
Industry Act 1991 (England) 
125 In general, see Feintuck, M., " The public interest" in regulation (Oxford University Press 2004) 
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information. In some other cases, there might be a public interest towards 
accountability.  
Since information is non-excludable and non-rivalrous, the same information 
resulting from disclosure will benefit several stakeholders at the same time. 
Information on utilities’ cost structures, which may benefit entrants, could also benefit 
consumers for accountability purposes. Thus, transparency does not serve a single 
regulatory objective or a single stakeholder.  
Nevertheless, there may be competing interests in transparency. As the thesis 
will elaborate, such interests are recognized provided that they are legitimate. 
Legislation protects certain interests from disclosure. The intensity of protection 
differs from one jurisdiction to another. When a competing interest arises, a balancing 
test must be sought. In some cases there is a public interest towards disclosure and in 
some other cases there is a public interest towards non-disclosure. The thesis – 
through the case studies -- will elaborate how the balancing test is performed, applied 
and contextualized in a water utility regulation. 
2.4. The Working of a Transparency System 
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Figure 3: Transparency Mechanism126 
A transparency framework will always involve at least two parties: the 
discloser on one side and the receiver on the other. Among the discloser and the 
receiver there is information asymmetry. The discloser may tend to exploit the 
receiver’s lack of knowledge to their own benefit. In this context, receivers are the 
general public; they could also be water consumers, the local population, investors, 
potential investors or governmental agencies. Their interest and stakes in information 
being disclosed could differ from one to another. In certain cases, there are third 
parties involved in the disclosure process: the intermediaries. Their role is in making 
information more comprehensible and understandable for the receivers. This may 
comprise civil society, rating agencies, auditors or regulators. The activities of the 
intermediaries may include ranking institutions, rating them, benchmarking the 
performance of institutions or simply in making the language of the disclosure more 
understandable in layman’s terms.  
The transparency mechanism as depicted in Figure 3 is a process started from 
the discloser’s part in disclosing data or information. The role of the legal framework 
at this stage is in determining which data or information should be disclosed, in which 
quality and format, the deadline for such activities and the legal consequences for 
 
126  The above chart is inspired by the work of Weil, Fung, et al who characterise  two important 
elements in the transparency cycle:  disclosers and users. They theorise that in order for a disclosure 
policy to be effective, it must be “embedded”, that is to say that the disclosure of information becomes a 
part of the disclosers/users’ routine in daily decision making. See Weil, D. and others, ‘The 
effectiveness of regulatory disclosure policies’ 25 Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 155 
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failing to disclose. This is particularly important for “active” disclosure rules although 
some specifics such as format and timing is also important in “passive” disclosure 
rules – the differences between them will be dealt in the next section.  
A legal framework has the role of aligning with the incentive of the receiver to 
react against such disclosure. Such incentives may be “internal”, existing within 
oneself, such as conscience or values, or could be “external”, in the form of social 
(such as reputation) or legal sanctions. Legal frameworks should provide means for 
the receivers to ‘voice’ their concern. This is manifested in the form of an 
accountability mechanism where information is exchanged and praise or blame are 
given, or through public hearings where customers’ complaints are heard, or through 
redress mechanisms. It is conjectured that the Dutch sunshine regulation of its water 
utilities as discussed above would be effective only when conducted in an adequate 
“naming and shaming” framework involving internal ‘carrot’ (for managers) and 
external ‘stick’ (from municipalities).127   
Finally, the whole transparency mechanism needs to be aligned with 
incentives in order to produce positive results – in the form of rectification of 
damages, behavioural change on the part of the discloser, higher efficiencies or more 
sustainable water services.  This research will not focus on the results of the 
transparency mechanism as they are empirical in nature and can only be appropriately 
addressed through disciplines other than law. It will instead focus on how such a 
transparency mechanism is provided through legal framework.  
 
127   Saal and De Witte, ‘Is a little sunshine all we need? On the impact of sunshine regulation on profits, 
productivity and prices in the Dutch drinking water sector’ 
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It is apparent from the above exposition that the notion of “transparency” is 
much more complex than that of “disclosure”. Disclosure is only a part of the 
transparency mechanism. In order to be transparent, information disclosed may still 
need to be tailored to make it more comprehensible for the receiver. Intermediaries 
could play an important role in this process.   
2.5. Passive and active disclosure rule 
Disclosure rules can be divided into “passive” as opposed to “active” 
disclosure rules. Passive disclosure rules establish the right of the receiver to file an 
information request to public authorities. As a general rule, the receivers are entitled to 
request any information that the public authority holds, as long as they are not 
exempted by legislation – a typical feature in “access to information” laws. On the 
other hand, active disclosure rules establish specifically the types of information that 
should be published by disclosers. Disclosers do not have any obligation to publish 
any other information, unless as stated in the legislation.  Legislation can have both 
“active” and “passive” elements of disclosure, however, a freedom of information law 
will have a lot more  “passive” disclosure rules than “active” ones. 
Here, we can see that differentiating between active versus passive disclosure 
rules will be helpful for the analytical framework. In active disclosure rules, there is a 
need to specify the exact type of information to be published, the format, manner and 
timing for such disclosure. From one point of view, active disclosure rules may 
actually require the discloser to produce information, whereas, in passive disclosure 
rules, the discloser is only required to reveal information which already exists in their 
databases, etc., on an “as is” basis.  
Furthermore, in active disclosure mechanisms, there is scope for the legal 
framework to require that such information be processed in a way that would make it 
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comprehensible and understandable for the public. Thus, there is room – for the 
discloser – for interpreting such information so long as it complies with the required 
disclosure standard. Conversely, in passive disclosure provisions, there is less scope to 
require that the information be processed before they are released. Indeed in passive 
disclosure provision, information is required to be released on an “as is” basis. Some 
freedom of information laws contain criminal provisions for tampering with such 
information.128  
As there is room for interpretation in active information provisions, the 
problem of “creative compliance” may occur. The discloser may provide information 
only to the extent that it is beneficial for them and, at the same time, conceal 
information which may jeopardise their position. Data can also be tailored and 
presented in a particular way in order to create the impression that nothing has gone 
wrong.   
In passive information provision, the ‘playing ground’ for the discloser would 
be the exemption clauses. Since there is less advantage in tampering with the 
disclosure process, there is less room for creative compliance in the presentation of 
such information to the public. The only way for the discloser to prevent information 
from being released is by arguing that it falls under the exemption clause. Normally, 
(but not always—this will be discussed further in subsequent chapters) the exemption 
clause may contain a burden of proof of harm and a public interest test.  
 
128 Undang Undang No.14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik See the criminal 
sanction on Art 55 for providing misleading information. See also FoI Act 2000 (England) Section 77 
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Due to the requirement to disclose on an “as is” basis, passive disclosure rules 
may rely heavily on the role of intermediaries to make them more comprehensible for 
the receiver. Information is often released in bulk in which further processing by 
experts possessing specific knowledge on the subject matter may be required.  
Active disclosure mechanisms can be embodied in sectoral or general rules, 
contractual obligations, general administrative laws or specific licence conditions. The 
legal consequences for breaching disclosure rules would, therefore, depend on the 
regulatory framework used: it could be in the form of licence infringement, breach of 
contract or a violation of a sectoral rule. On the other hand, passive disclosure 
provision is most likely to be contained in access to information legislation.129  
How do active and passive disclosure rules interact? Active and passive 
disclosure rules complement each other. Passive disclosure rules can be used to verify 
disclosures made under the active provision of information. If there are indications 
that the information presented under the active disclosure rule is inaccurate or 
misleading, more details can be obtained through a passive disclosure rule. Secondly, 
passive disclosure rules can also be used to cover types of information which are not 
included in the active disclosure mechanism. 
 
129 FoI rules also contain active information provision, for example, the UK FoI model publication 
schemes. See FoI Act 2000 (England) Sections 19-20or Indonesian FoI Law 14 Year 2008 Art 9. See 
also 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/what_we_cover/freedom_of_information/publication_schemes/definition_docu
ment_ndpb_england.aspx accessed March, 20, 2010 
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Likewise, a passive disclosure rule cannot stand by itself. It would be too 
costly for the receiver if they have to file a request for information every time new 
information is produced (provided that they know such information exists).130 
Moreover, a passive disclosure rule does not require the production of new 
information but simply the revelation of existing information to the public. Hence, 
without an adequate active disclosure rule, the system will not be adequately 
transparent.   
2.6. An analytical definition of transparency 
By no means is the term “transparency” easy to define. The word originates 
from the Latin phrase trans (through) and parere (appear).131 This Latin meaning 
influences the modern dictionary definition of the word “transparent”: “(of a material 
or article) allowing light to pass through so that objects behind can be distinctly easy 
to perceive or detect”.132 Other dictionaries also invoke similar definitions: “fine or 
sheer enough to be seen through”; “free from pretence or deceit”; “readily 
understood”.133 
In the academic discourse, the notion of “transparency” has more or less a 
similar understanding with the standard dictionary definitions but is sometimes 
intertwined with the accountability concept. According to Finkelstein, “transparency” 
 
130 FoI Law may provide or be linked to Information Asset Register, obligating public authorities to 
disclose the list of information in their possession. Only the lists are required to be disclosed, not the 
whole information.  
131 Oxford University Press, ‘Oxford Dictionaries’ (Oxford University Press, 2011)  
<http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/transparent?q=transparent> accessed December 26, 2011 
132 Ibid 
133 Merriam-Webster, ‘Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary’ (Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, 2009)  
<http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transparent> accessed December 26, 2011  
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means “a characteristic of those policies that are easily understood, where 
information about the policy is available, where accountability is clear, and where 
citizens know what role they play in policy implementation”.134 Obviously this 
definition focuses only on the transparency of policy and incorporates the notion of 
accountability and clarity into it.  
In a regulatory context the term is often broadly defined. A broad framework 
for asessing regulatory governance was introduced by Stern and Holder and comprises 
of: (1) clarity of roles and objectives (between regulatory institutions), (2) autonomy 
from political intervention, (3) participation, (4) accountability – which they explain 
as ways for challenging a regulator’s decision, (5) transparency – which they define as 
“a requirement by regulator to explain their decisions and processes” and (6) 
predictability – which is aimed at firms understanding the rules of the game.135 In this 
framework, the distinction between transparency and accountability is less clear, 
accountability is defined “as the ability to challenge” while transparency is equated 
with reason giving, which is also a form of accountability.   
Research on “Regulatory Transparency” by NERA operationalises Stern and 
Holder’s framework above into: (1) Clarity of roles and objectives, (2) predictability, 
(3) transparency of decisions, (4) accountability, (5) participation, and (6) open 
 
134 Finkelstein, N.D., Introduction: transparency in public policy (N. D. Finkelstein ed, Palgrave 2000) 
p.6 
135 Stern, J. and Holder, S., ‘Regulatory governance: criteria for assessing the performance of regulatory 
systems An application to infrastructure industries in the developing countries of Asia’ 8 Utilities Policy 
33 
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access to information.136 There is an overlap in NERA’s framework as Regulatory 
Transparency is deemed to cover wide elements from accountability to predictability 
to participation. Transparency of decision, according to their research is 
operationalised by publishing ‘major’ regulatory decisions in the public domain and 
consultation responses. This is an overlap with the other element, open access to 
information, which consists of making available to the public primary legislation, 
licences or contracts, consultation documents and regulator’s comments on 
consultation documents or on determinations.   
Quesada, in analysing good governance in the water services sector built her 
framework from three general themes: transparency, participation and access to 
justice. Transparency is divided into the following categories: (1) whether or not 
regulatory documents are in the public domain, (2) whether the tariff setting process 
and quality service procedure are regulated, (3) whether decisions are published, (4) 
whether the reasoning behind decisions are published, (5) and whether there are 
formal mechanisms to protect access to information.137 Quesada’s framework 
differentiates between the publication of decisions and the publication of ‘reason-
giving’ underlying a decision, however, the research was focused only on tariff 
setting. The last element, “mechanisms to protect access to information” is a relevant 
and important element in evaluating transparency, but since the existence of an access 
 
136 Hern and others, Regulatory Transparency: International Assessment and Emerging Lessons A Final 
Report for the World Bank 
137 Quesada, Water and Sanitation Services in Europe: Do Legal Frameworks provide for “Good 
Governance”? 
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to information regime alone is not a guarantee to transparency,138 such an element still 
requires more detailed breakdown.   
Another example where transparency is defined broadly in the context of 
regulation is Lodge-Stirton’s concept of “transparency mechanisms” which comprises  
“information, choice, representation and voice”.139 In this understanding, 
“transparency” can also encompass “participation”. The legal analysis of one of the 
instruments, information, is already complicated enough. Thus, such a definition of 
transparency is too broad to be applied to this dissertation as it would require the 
analysis of legal instruments underlying all of the four elements. What this thesis 
requires is a sharp and focused definition of transparency to be used as an analytical 
tool.  
On the other hand, some authors lay emphasis on disclosure. Hall and Rogers 
suggest that transparency and accountability in water governance “are built on the free 
flow of information”.140 Florini’s definition of transparency is more specific: “the 
release of information by institutions that is relevant to evaluating those 
institutions”.141 Similar to Finkelstein, it still implicitly includes the notion of 
accountability by invoking two kinds of institution, the one that releases the 
 
138 It would depend on how the access to information regime facilitates transparency. This could be 
benchmarked through a number of ways but this thesis will focus on applicability, the exemption clause 
and the balancing test. 
139 Lodge and Stirton, ‘Regulating in the Interest of the Citizen: Towards a Single Model of Regulatory 
Transparency’ 
140 Rogers and Hall, Effective water governance (TEC background papers no. 7) 
141 Florini, A.M., ‘Does the invisible hand need a transparent glove? The politics of transparency’ 
(Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, DC 
http://wwwworldbankorg/research/abcde/washington_11/pdfs/florinipdf)  
 
 53 
information and that which evaluates such institution. In a later publication she offers 
another definition:  “the degree to which information is available to outsiders that 
enable them to have informed voice in decisions and/or to assess the decisions made 
by insiders”.142 This definition contains a qualifier: in order to be transparent, the 
information must have the capacity to enable. Such a definition requires that the 
disclosed information has particular qualities.    
“Understandability” has also been the focus of transparency debates. This is 
reflected in the work of Hall and Rogers, which suggests that in good water 
governance “language should be accessible and understandable and all policy 
decisions should be transparent”.143 This is also reiterated by the International 
Monetary Fund as: “a process by which information about existing conditions, 
decisions and actions is made accessible, visible and understandable”.144    
Michener and Bersch suggest that transparency has two prerequisites: 
“visibility” and “inferrability”.145 By visibility they mean completeness and a high 
likelihood to be found, whereas “inferrability” reflects its usefulness or accuracy, 
somewhat equal to Florini’s to enable. Their definition also has little to do with 
accountability. While it adds to existing definitions, such a concept may be 
 
142 Florini, A., ‘Introduction: The Battle Over Transparency’ in A. Florini (ed), The right to know: 
transparency for an open world (Columbia Univ Press 2007) 
143  Rogers and Hall, Effective water governance (TEC background papers no. 7)  
144  International Monetary Fund, ‘International Monetary Fund Reports on the International Financial 
Architecture by the G22 Working Group on Transparency and Accountability, Working Group on 
Strengthening Financial Systems and Working Group on International Financial Crises (Group of 22)’  
145 Michener, G. and Bersch, K., ‘Conceptualizing the Quality of Transparency’ (Midwest Political 
Science Association, Chicago, March 31-April 3, 2011) 
<http://gregmichener.com/Conceptualizing%20the%20Quality%20of%20Transparency--
Michener%20&%20Bersch.pdf> January 20, 2012 
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problematic on two grounds. First is the encouragement of “visibility” by assuming 
that “the more information ‘stares people in the face,’ the more likely it is that people 
will act on that information”.146 This is not completely correct as information 
overload may trigger cognitive biases and affect decision making capability.147 Only 
relevant information should be actively disclosed to stakeholders. Furthermore, 
Michener and Bersch consider that disclosure through a freedom of information 
regime “does not fulfil one of ‘transparency’s’ two necessary conditions, visibility… 
In other words, there is no guarantee that requested information will be made 
transparent” .148 As making all information public at the same time entails high cost 
(for some countries it may be impossible), an on-demand information request remains 
relevant. While the author agreed that information disclosed through FoI may not be 
necessarily of sufficient quality (information is disclosed “as is”, there is no obligation 
to make it more “inferable”), it is arguable that countries which enable disclosure 
through FoI are certainly more transparent than those that do not. 149 Thus, 
pinpointing transparency based on the quality of information alone will not be able to 
capture a continuum of conditions where (1) there is complete opacity or (2) there are 
disclosures – irrespective of quality, or (3) there are disclosures with specific quality 
 
146 Ibid 
147 See Toffler, A., Future shock (Bantam 1984) p 350-358 Macrae, C.N. and Hewstone, M.R.C., 
‘Cognitive biases in social categorization: process and consequences’ 68 Advances in Psychology 325 
For more contemporary research see Schwartz, B., The paradox of choice: Why more is less (Harper 
Perennial 2005) p.52-63; Schwartz, B. and others, ‘Maximizing versus satisficing: Happiness is a matter 
of choice’ 83 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1178  
148 Michener and Bersch, ‘Conceptualizing the Quality of Transparency’ 
149   The Preamble of The Aarhus Convention equates transparency with access to information, 
irrespective of its quality. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision 
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 25 June 1998 (Aarhus Convention) 38 
International Legal Materials (ILM) (1999) 515  
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of information. Therefore, for the purpose of comparison of the jurisdictions evaluated 
in this thesis, it is important to perceive transparency in context and for the analytical 
definition of transparency to incorporate these circumstances. 
 Of all those definitions presented above, there is only one similarity without 
which the definition of transparency would not be generally acceptable: information. 
For that reason, this thesis incorporates information as the sine qua non of 
transparency. Other notions in addition to information, such as accountability, will be 
considered, but it is only one among the many reflections on the quality of 
information that this dissertation will address below. 
Instead of attempting to create a rigid definition, the author offers a flexible 
dimension of transparency by building on the notion of information. The dimension of 
transparency consists of, first, the availability of information, as without available 
information entities will have nothing to disclose. If information is not available, then 
it must be created although this may entail cost. For utilities regulators this is 
materialised, for example, by way of imposing regulatory accounting standards and 
obligating utilities to submit reports to them or by directly investigating them.   
Second is the public disclosure of information. Information availability is not 
yet a “transparency” in this thesis framework if it is not followed by public disclosure. 
Information which is held in secrecy, for example, is not  transparency, although it is 
already available somewhere. In order for transparency to exist, such information 
must be in the public domain;  
Third is the “manner of disclosure”. In this third category the notions of 
quality of information could be applied depending on the case. The manner of 
disclosure can be evaluated based on several categories:  
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(1) The comprehensibility of such information. If information is vague or not 
comprehensible, then it is of no use to the users. This also denotes clarity. 
Regulation is transparent “If someone subject to the law can understand what 
is expected of her, can understand and comply with the commands of the law, 
and can foresee the consequences of compliance or noncompliance…”;150; (2) 
The medium in which such information is disclosed; for example, the internet, 
leaflet, state gazette or newspapers; 
(3) The timeliness of disclosure;  
(4) Any relevant reasoning or rationale – this is of particular relevance to 
accountability;   
(5) The comprehensiveness of information; and  
(6) The accuracy of information.    
 
150 Mock, W.B., ‘An Interdisciplinary Introduction to Legal Transparency: A Tool for Rational 
Development’ Dickinson Journal of International Law (now Penn State International Law Review), Vol 
18, No 2, p 293, 2000 
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2.7. Chapter Conclusion  
This chapter starts by describing the literature discussing transparency 
implication on the delegation of public service to non state entities. Several authors 
criticize “privatisation” for reducing or deminishing transparency while others denied 
such premise. Some other authors conclude that “regulation by contract” model 
suffers from lack of transparency. There has been claim that the transparency 
threshold for a company should be put in the context of its market power. Thus, this 
chapter implies that there are corellation between the specific form of ownership and 
regulatory model towards transparency and that stronger market power must be 
associated with more transparency. Whether these hypotheses are true or not will be 
evaluated in later chapters.  
This chapter also explain the various meaning of “privatisation” and clarifies 
to use of the term “private sector participation” in the thesis to denote a subset of 
privatisation in terms of ownership. The flow of information in the regulatory process 
are elucidated, so as the working of the transparency system. The thesis further 
differentiates between “active” and “passive” disclosure and elaborate why such 
distinction would be important for the analytical framework. Finally, the chapter 
elucidate and clarify what transparency meant and how this could be used in the 
thesis.   
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3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
In determining the object of analysis one must first identify the institutions 
and the objects of regulation where transparency can be employed. This is conducted 
by reviewing existing literature which depicts the stages and subject matter of water 
utilities’ regulation.  
Hendry’s framework in analysing the legal framework of water services 
comprised the following: the structure, ownership and control (of water utilities); the 
duties of supply; standards of water supply and treatment; economic regulation and 
business planning; customer protection and service standard and water 
conservation.151 Meanwhile, according to Plummer and Cross152 corruption153 may 
occur across the value chain of water projects. These “value chains” are a creation of 
policy/regulation, project planning and budgeting, management and programme 
design, tendering and procurement, construction, operation and maintenance and up to 
the final stage when the service is delivered to the consumer. The difference between 
the two approaches is that the Plummer and Cross framework focuses on procurement 
but less on the subsequent regulatory process which is emphasised by Hendry. The 
analytical framework used here must, therefore, combine the two.  
3.1. Ownership and Delegation to Private Sector 
 
151 Hendry, ‘An Analytical Framework for Reform of National Water Law’ Chapter 5 
152  Plummer, J. and Cross, P., ‘Tackling Corruption in the Water and Sanitation Sector in Africa’ The 
Many Faces of Corruption 221 
153 Corruption is a reflection of a governance failure which occurs due to the existence of wide 
discretion, combined with the lack of transparency and accountability. See Klitgaard, R.E., Controlling 
corruption (University of California Press 1988) 83 
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Procurement and the preceding decision to delegate services is an important 
stage. When Jakarta’s Regional-Owned Water Utility was in financial trouble, the 
World Bank got involved and persuaded the Indonesian Government to privatise its 
water utilities. 154  The decision to privatise water in 1997 never involved the public. 
There was no public discussion or debate.  
From the above experience, it is then imperative for the analytical framework 
to addres the question of delegation to the private sector, unless the delegation 
question is determined at the legislative process, in which this thesis assumes that 
there is transparency. Noting that there are power asymmetries between states and 
multinationals and the characteristics of water as a political good, the current Human 
Right to Water agenda explores the appropriate procedures for transparency and 
public participation in the decision making process in instances where governments 
seek to involve the private sector in water services.155  The General Comment 15 on 
the Human Right to Water asks states to guarantee the right to participate in any 
decision making process, which include also the “full and equal access of 
 
154 Harsono, A., ‘When Water and Political Power Intersect’ Nieman Reports 
<http://www.nieman.harvard.edu/reportsitem.aspx?id=101044>  
155 de-Albuquerque, C., Report of the independent expert on the issue of human rights obligations 
related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation, A/HRC/15/31 (2010) 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/water/iexpert/docs/A-HRC-15-31-AEV.pdf> February 11, 2011 
See recommendation (e): “The process of decision-making and implementation, any instruments that 
delegate service provision including contracts, and instruments that outline roles and responsibilities 
must be transparent, which requires the disclosure of adequate and sufficient information and actual 
access to information.” 
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information” concerning water held by states or third parties.156 The decision to 
delegate should be democratic, participatory and transparent.157  
Some of Human Right to Water advocates went as far as suggesting a 
referendum for the model for decision making if privatisation is to be adopted, 
whereas the private sector tends to consider that discretion from exercised by a 
democratically elected government is sufficient.158  
Nevertheless, before discussing the issue of delegation to the private sector 
and its procurement, central to the analytical framework is how the question of 
ownership is resolved in the legal framework. Prior to ascertaining this, it would be 
required to provide an overview of the legal and institutional frameworks in each case 
study as well as an analysis of each jurisdiction’s mode of ownership and regulation.  
Only when there is clarity on the question of ownership in the legal framework, what 
follows next would be the selection of private providers through bidding and contract 
negotiation.  
Discussion on procurement may not be applicable to England where its 
utilities are fully divested but it is certainly relevant in Victoria and Jakarta. Again, in 
 
156 United Nations, Subtantive Issues Arising in The Implementation of The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15 (2002) The right to water (arts. 11 and 
12 of the International Covenant  on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) E/C.12/2002/11, 20 
January 2003 (2003)   para 48 
157 de-Albuquerque, Report of the independent expert on the issue of human rights obligations related to 
access to safe drinking water and sanitation, A/HRC/15/31 para 34 
158 Id 
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procurement, the question of transparency is relevant.159 The symptom where the 
private sector bribes officials to win a water contract is not specific to developing 
countries. Miloon Kothari, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Adequate 
Housing (2000-2008) and Hall pointed out the lack of transparency in the French 
water concession system, and referred to the case where Suez-Lyonnaise and Vivendi 
were convicted by a French court for paying bribes to obtain water concessions and 
received prison sentences. 160   
One part of the procurement chain is the publication of the final contract. This 
is of relevance due to the experiences of several countries in which the terms of the 
final contract is kept secret.161 The Independent Expert on the Right to Water, in her 
report, outlined that the:  
“subsequent process of tendering, bidding and contract negotiation also must 
be transparent. The terms of reference and the final contract should be made 
 
159 Boehm and Olaya, ‘Corruption in public contracting auctions: the role of transparency in bidding 
processes’ 
160 Kothari, M., ‘Privatising human rights–the impact of globalisation on adequate housing, water and 
sanitation’ Social Watch Report. On the case of Grenoble, Angoulème and St-Denis See  Hall, D., 
‘Water in Public Hands’ <http://world-
psi.org/Template.cfm?Section=Home&CONTENTID=10168&TEMPLATE=/ContentManagement/Co
ntentDisplay.cfm> 
161 For Indonesia See Daryanto, A., Jawaban Surat KRuHA (Letter No. 581/DIV.T&P/XI/2011 dated 
November 8 2011 on PAM JAYA's response to FoI Request by KRuHA) (PAM Jaya 2011)  ; Al'Afghani, 
M.M. and others, Transparansi Lembaga-lembaga Regulator Penyediaan Air Minum Di DKI Jakarta 
(ECOTAS/KRuHA/TIFA, 2011)  ; Disclosure of final contracts are also denied in Slovakia. See 
Havlicek, R., ‘Learning from Privatisation of Water Services in Trencin, Slovakia’ in B. Brennan and 
others (eds), Reclaiming Public Water: Achievements, Struggles and Visions from Around the World 
(Transnational Institute and Corporate Europe Observatory 2005) also in Gdansk and Hungary see Hall, 
D., ‘Introduction’ in B. Brennan and others (eds), Reclaiming Public Water: Achievements, Struggles 
and Visions from Around the World (Transnational Institute and Corporate Europe Observatory 2005)  
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available for public scrutiny and commenting. Commercial confidentiality must not 
jeopardize the transparency requirements provided for under the human rights 
framework” . 162  
As such, the analysis will include the following themes: 
1) Overview of the legal and institutional framework 
2) Policy on Involving the Private Sector 
a. Ownership and Regulatory Model 
b. Procurement  
c. Publication of Contract.  
 
 
3.2. The Regulatory Decision Making 
 The next focus should be the regulatory institutions and the objects of 
regulation. In many cases, one of the tasks of the regulators is to issue licences. As 
natural monopolies, water utilities licences are often exclusive to a particular area and 
provides the licence holders with a legal monopoly to operate in that area. Licences 
normally come with conditions.163 The conditions need to be clear and transparent and 
 
162 de-Albuquerque, Report of the independent expert on the issue of human rights obligations related to 
access to safe drinking water and sanitation, A/HRC/15/31 recommendation (e) also para 36: “When 
deciding to delegate service provision, and once that fundamental decision has been taken, the 
subsequent process of tendering, bidding and contract negotiation also must be transparent. The terms 
of reference and the final contract should be made available for public scrutiny and commenting. 
Commercial confidentiality must not jeopardize the transparency requirements provided for under the 
human rights framework.” 
163 For the importance of licences in English utility regulation, see Graham, Regulating public utilities : 
a constitutional approach p.33  
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the granting of such licences must also be transparent. The transparency of licences is 
correlated with some other aspects: service levels and violations of service levels – 
both will be discussed in the next sections. These service levels could be imposed 
within licence conditions. Licences could be revoked by government or regulators 
when service levels are violated. The transparency of licensing provides justifications 
for governmental actions if the company breaches the requirement imposed in their 
licences. The transparency of licensing thus depends on three conditions: the criteria 
for approval, the conditions of licences and whether there are obligations to publish 
licences.   
Not least important in discussing regulatory institutions is the debate on 
regulatory independence.164 To ensure independence, the process of selecting 
regulatory personnel must be transparent. However, it is a commonplace that in 
developing countries, regulators are faced with limited capacity, limited commitment, 
limited accountability and limited fiscal efficiency. 165 There have been cases where 
positions in the regulatory body are filled with incompetent persons or people having 
a conflict of interest with the regulated companies. It is, therefore, important to ensure 
that the criteria and eligibility for regulator’s appointments are made transparent, the 
 
164 See for example Majone, ‘The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems’ Smith, W., ‘Utility 
regulators: the independence debate’ 127 Public Policy for the Private Sector Scholten, M., 
‘Independence vs. Accountability : Dilemma or Misperception?’ (The Netherlands Institute of 
Government Annual Work Conference, Maastricht, 26 November 2010)  
165 For discussion on regulation in developing countries see Laffont, Regulation and development; also 
Estache, A. and Wren-Lewis, L., ‘Towards a Theory of Regulation for Developing Countries: Insights 
from Jean-Jacques Laffont's last book’ Journal of Economic Literature, 47 (3) 729 drawing on Laffont’s 
latest work 
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capability of the prospective candidates is communicated to the public and that 
existing or potential conflicts of interest are disclosed. 
Information is the prerequisite of regulation (See section 2.3: Information 
Flow in Regulation above).166 Without any power to acquire information from utilities 
or other parties, it would be impossible for regulators to carry out their duties. At the 
same time, the breadth and depth of information available in the public domain will 
depend on the aforesaid power to acquire information and if there are disclosure 
policies that would enable regulators to disclose regulatory information.167  
As Hendry168 and Graham169 both note, one of the regulatory tasks is to 
ensure that providers maintain service levels. Service levels, in addition to tariffs and 
protection of vulnerable groups, are essentially the heart of regulation. It is – in 
addition to determining prices or rate of return – one of the primary reasons why a 
water company is regulated and a manifestation of the price that consumers are 
paying. Therefore, it is logical if consumers are informed about what the service levels 
are since it is what they can legally expect to get from the water company. 
Transparency of service levels requires not only that the standards of supply, customer 
service, compliance review and consumer grievances are made transparent but also 
that non-compliance with service levels and the consequences for companies in breach 
be disclosed.  
 
166 In general see Laffont and Tirole, A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation also Burns 
and Estache, ‘Infrastructure concessions, information flows, and regulatory risk’ 
167 Graham, Regulating public utilities : a constitutional approach p.31-38 
168 Hendry, ‘An Analytical Framework for Reform of National Water Law’ Chapter 5 
169 Graham, Regulating public utilities : a constitutional approach p.39-40 
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Service levels could be elaborated on in the form of legislation or, 
alternatively, embodied in a contract. There could be a problem with transparency if 
the service levels are set through contractual terms – which are not published – rather 
than if they were set through legislation, which by default is always promulgated.  
Closely related to service level is the utilities’ investment policy. Regulation 
can serve many values: environment, equity or higher water quality. This could trigger 
trade-offs in the “regulatory quadrangle”: prices, network expansion, water quality 
and the environment. If utilities invest in expanding the network to provide more 
coverage, then less money is spent on investing in other priorities. What is it that the 
consumer really wants? Better water quality, more extension to the poorer consumers  
or higher environmental standards? Consumers need to be informed of the utilities’ 
investment plans so that they can give  proper feedback. Hence, utilities’ investment 
planning should be made transparent and participatory. 
At the same time, network expansion or other forms of investment as 
discussed above could also mean higher prices. To some who cannot afford a price 
hike, such burdens are unacceptable. In developing countries especially, utilities’ 
prices are politically sensitive. There have been cases in the past where a riot occurs 
because of  price increases.170 In big cities where the gap between the rich and the 
poor is wide, prices could be related to supply security. There have been cases in 
Jakarta where main water pipes are being tapped into illegally by the citizens to 
 
170Wood, D., ‘Bridging the Governance Gap: Civil Society, Democratization and Electricity Sector 
Reform  ’ (Arusha Conference,“New Frontiers of Social Policy” – December 12-15, 2005) 
<http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADO643.pdf> accessed July 03, 2010  
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provide for their daily consumption as they cannot afford to pay the price.171 More 
investment may require a tariff increase, but a tariff increase may provoke unrest.172 
The private sector tends to take the position that a tariff increase is the only solution as 
they believe that the poor actually pay more with the status quo. 173 However, previous 
research by Bakker indicates that the discussion on willingness to pay is too simplistic 
as it does not take into account disincentives embedded within the current system, 
such as high transaction costs and high connection fees.174 In order to mitigate such 
adverse effects, cross subsidisation might be required. Furthermore, to a certain 
extent, even the lower part of the tariff band may need to get a tariff increase on the 
condition that more flexibility is given to the poor. In order to be legitimate, cross 
subsidisation and the increasing of the tariff rate needs to be effectively communicated 
to the poor. This requires transparency of the tariff setting methodology for the 
consumption of intermediary organisations such as civil society, and a simplified 
 
171 ‘Water Worries: Special Issue’ The Jakarta Globe (July 25, 2009) 
<http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/pages/downloads/Water_Worries.pdf> accessed December 4, 2010 
172 Ibid.  According to a former Jakarta regulator:  “This is a very difficult puzzle. If you want to raise 
the tariff on poor people to create equilibrium with rich people, there will be social unrest — even 
though they are paying more for vendor water. It’s a vicious cycle.” At p. 6 
173 Ibid. In the words of PT Palyja (The private concessionaire, a subsidiary of Suez Environnement in 
Jakarta) Director Philippe Folliasson: “...note that the city’s poor who don’t have piped water pay 20 
times more than the current tariff rate to water truck gangs, and inflation alone dictates that rates must 
be increased. “The only way forward is to expand the network, increase connections and make sure 
everyone has access to piped water.” At p.6   
174 There are higher transaction costs to connect in the form of: infrastructure costs to build storage due 
to intermittent supply, line-ups and time off work to pay bills (for those without access to banking or 
regular income), difficult geographical position requiring more investment to connect and lack of 
security of tenure. Private sector also has disincentive to extend into unprofitable area as they exist in 
the lower part of the tariff band, hence, will indirectly affect their revenue collection. Bakker, K., 
‘Trickle Down? Private sector participation and the pro-poor water supply debate in Jakarta, Indonesia’ 
38 Geoforum 855 
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explanation of a tariff increase combined with ease of payment mechanisms for the 
poor.  
When a utility fails to submit the required information, or if it is in breach of 
its service level, investment or customer service obligation, then typically the 
regulator will provide sanctions. How sanctions are imposed and their underlying 
rationale is, therefore, an important part of the analytical framework. Transparent and 
accountable sanctioning will provide legitimacy. On the other hand, reckless 
sanctioning depicts partiality or incompetencies in regulating. 
Next, the framework focuses on redress.175 Redress is an important feature of 
legal accountability and is relevant to all parties: utilities, consumers and other 
stakeholders. Transparency brings legitimacy and credibility into the redress system. 
In normal circumstances, the courts are the primary institutions referred to for redress. 
However, water services disputes are of a kind which require quick settlement and the 
specific expertise of the industry. There are different ways in which redress can be 
provided. In some jurisdictions such as Victoria, Australia, the disputes between 
consumer and the water companies are referred to the industrial ombudsman. In 
England, a specific consumers’ representative body is given the authority to 
investigate consumer claims under the legislation.   
In terms of regulatory decision making, the framework is as follows: 
 
175 See Graham, Regulating public utilities : a constitutional approach p.40-41 and Quesada, Water and 
Sanitation Services in Europe: Do Legal Frameworks provide for “Good Governance”? which 
includes “access to justice” as one component of good governance. See also Hendry, ‘An Analytical 
Framework for Reform of National Water Law’ Annex A.2. “Access to Justice and Dispute 
Resolution”, comparing UK, Queensland and South Africa water sectors. 
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3) Regulatory Decision Making  
a. Licences 
i. Criteria for approval  
ii. Licence conditions  
iii. Obligation to publish 
b. Regulator’s internal governance 
i. Selection and removal 
ii. Conflict of Interest 
c. Means of Acquiring Information  
d. Regulator’s General Disclosure Policy  
e. Investment and Price Determination  
f. Service Level and Customer Service  
g. Non-compliance 
h. Redress  
 
3.3. Utilities Corporate Governance 
One of the most important actors in a water project is the utility itself. It is 
thus not adequate to pay attention only to regulatory institutions and their decision 
making process. Utilities are typically subjected to some form of corporate rules 
depending on the form of the entity. These rules may contain important transparency 
elements. 
When the utility is state-owned (Victoria) it is likely to be regulated under a 
state enterprise law or a specific charter prescribed for the utility. In full divestiture, 
such as England, the utility may be regulated under normal company law but with 
some element of its governance contained in its licence conditions. In concessions 
between a state-owned utility and a private company, such as Jakarta, then one 
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company is regulated by a state-owned enterprise law and the other falls under normal 
(private) company law.   
The lack of governance in water utilities is illustrated by Tortajada.176 In the 
majority of Asian water utilities staff, including senior managers, are often selected 
because of their political connections, instead of their management abilities or 
technical skills. Managers often do not have any autonomy to make decisions, and 
when they do have it is often the case that they lack managerial capability. Water 
utilities are overstaffed and the positions are often filled due to nepotism or political 
connections. This poor governance may be reflected in the huge burden of the utilities 
in paying inefficient employees and lower employee wages compared to normal 
market rates in the other industries. Eventually this will result in poor water services 
and higher costs. Aguas Argentina provides another example of lack of corporate 
governance.177 Aguas Argentina, the project company, had a low standard of 
corporate governance. There was a lack of disclosure on internal control mechanisms 
towards Aguas Argentina under the guise of proprietary and “commercially sensitive” 
information. It is alleged that the company maintained this for the purpose of 
safeguarding its position in case renegotiation occurred.178  This lack of transparency 
made the project unpopular with civil societies, prompting the government to 
nationalise the company. Hence, unless developing countries embrace corporate 
 
176 Tortajada, C., ‘Water management in Singapore’ 22 International Journal of Water Resources 
Development 227 
177 Porporato, M. and Robbins, P.T., ‘Privatisation and corporate governance in emerging economies: 
What went wrong with Aguas Argentinas SA?’ 2 International Journal of Economics and Business 
Research 187 
178 The company won the bid due to lower price. Later, renegotiation did occur, asking the government 
to increase tariffs in order to speed up collection rate.  Ibid 
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governance, PSP will not be likely to deliver improved performance with 
accountability.179  
Porporato and Robbins180  opined that government intervention in water 
services is justified not only because of the naturally monopolistic character of the 
industry, but also because of the externalities present. Hence, to them, the question of 
government involvement in the water services sector exists irrespective of the natural 
monopoly problem. Should the natural monopoly be reduced and competition 
introduced, they argued, government would still be involved in regulating the water 
sector. Both the natural monopoly feature and the presence of negative externalities 
will shape the feature of corporate governance in water utilities. 
The role of transparency in corporate governance in general has been widely 
acknowledged. The earliest corporate governance guidelines such as the Cadbury 
Report had pointed out the need for transparency. In the words of the Cadbury Report: 
“The lifeblood of markets is information”. The Cadbury Report considers that barriers 
to the flow of information are representative of market imperfections and that 
transparency will contribute to the efficient working of the market economy, prompt 
boards to take action and allow stakeholders to scrutinise the company. 181  
 
179 Dyck, A., ‘Privatization and corporate governance: Principles, evidence, and future challenges’ 16 
The World Bank Research Observer 59 
180  Porporato and Robbins, ‘Privatisation and corporate governance in emerging economies: What went 
wrong with Aguas Argentinas SA?’ 
181  ” See Cadbury, A., Report of the committee on the financial aspects of corporate governance (Gee 
Publishing, London 1992)   
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Other corporate governance guidelines such as the Greenbury Report (1995), 
Hampel Report (1998), Turnbull Report (1999) and the Paul Myners report (DTI, 
1996, HMT, 2001) also highlight the importance of transparency.182 International 
organisations have also issued important documents and guidelines such as the OECD 
series on “Principles on Corporate Governance” and the UNCTAD 2006 on corporate 
governance disclosure which stresses the importance of transparency. 183 These 
frameworks are designed to apply to corporations in general and not specifically to 
address a regulated natural monopoly.  
The UNCTAD defines “Board” as “the highest governing and monitoring 
body or bodies of an enterprise on which executive and non-executive or supervisory 
board members sit”.184 Most corporate governance documents recognise the need to 
disclose the names and composition of the board. Another key point is the disclosure 
of the board’s role, functions and accountability mechanisms. Such disclosure is 
necessary for accountability purposes where the board members may be held 
responsible to the extent of their role and responsibility. When there is clarity on roles 
 
182 Myners, P., Report on institutional investment (HM Treasury, London, 2001)   Myners, P., 
Developing a Winning Partnership: How Companies and Institutional Investors are Working Together 
(1996)   Hampel, R., Committee on Corporate Governance : final report (Gee 1998) Greenbury, R., 
Directors' remuneration: report of a study group chaired by Sir Richard Greenbury (Gee Publishing 
1995) Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales, Internal control : guidance for 
directors on the combined code (Turnbull Report) (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England & 
Wales 1999) 
183 OECD, OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2004) 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/32/18/31557724.pdf> July 01, 2010; UNCTAD, Guidance on Good 
Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure (2006) 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteteb20063_en.pdf> July 01, 2010 
184 UNCTAD, Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure p.12 
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and responsibilities, the accountability mechanism would be much clearer as the 
accountee would know where and of whom accountability should be asked.  
Utilities may need to purchase goods or contract out services from third 
parties. Unless regulated, utilities may purchase goods and services at a price higher 
than the market price from an affiliated company. The profit from such purchase then 
flows down to the utility’s shareholders through the parent company. In the end, the 
investor receives profit at the expense of the utility’s consumer. Thus, transparency is 
required. In theory, transparency of utilities’ accounts will provide incentives for 
consumers and potential providers to track down the possibilities of transfer pricing 
and any other anti competitive behavior.185 For regulated monopolies, reporting to 
regulators must often be based on specific regulatory accounts.186 Regulatory accounts 
normally require more specific and industry-focused information by economic 
regulators for benchmarking, determining prices or allowable rate of return. On the 
other hand, statutory accounts require more general corporate information.  
The UNCTAD guideline recommends that at least the nature, type and 
elements of the related-party transactions and the decision making process for 
approving such related-party transactions are disclosed.187 Normally, procurement 
between a regulated company and a third party is covered by the regulatory account. 
There could be a requirement to disclose to the regulator (but not necessarily the 
 
185 Baldwin, R. and Cave, M., Understanding regulation: theory, strategy, and practice (Oxford 
University Press 1999) p. 308 
186 Inter-Regulatory Working Group, The role of regulatory accounts in regulated industries, A joint 
consultation paper by the Directors General of Oftel, Ofgem, Ofwat, Electricity & Gas Supply 
(Northern Ireland), Rail Regulator and Civil Aviation Authority (2001)   
187 UNCTAD, Guidance on Good Practices in Corporate Governance Disclosure p.6 
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public) if the utility’s trading partners are, in fact, a related party. Usually, there is no 
prohibition to transact with a related party as long as the procedure to assess that the 
transaction is entered into at a fair market value is fulfilled. The framework will not 
discuss the content of the regulatory account in detail. It will analyse the legal 
mechanisms used in applying and enforcing regulatory accounts and in making 
financial reports available to the public.   
UNCTAD Guidance on Corporate Governance Disclosure considers 
information on beneficiary ownership structure as vital for informed investment 
decisions, especially with respect to the equity of shareholders.188 Disclosure on the 
top shareholding position is regarded as part of the effort to protect minority 
shareholders. Specific shareholder’s rights which have implications towards company 
control, such as those related to voting or the appointment of directors should be 
disclosed. In cases where control of the company is performed through different 
entities, the UNCTAD guidance promotes the disclosure of the ultimate controller. 
Echoing the OECD principles, the UNCTAD Guidance also favours the disclosure of 
ultimate ownership, in addition to disclosure on record ownership. Related to the 
question of ownership above is ‘corporate restructuring’ (the change of a company’s 
structure through merger, acquisition, sale of assets or other means for the purpose of 
improving economic performance). Through restructuring, the liability that carries 
with the ownership of a company could shift from one party to another. Ownership 
changes may also impact on the reliability of the investor’s commitment to 
continually invest in water services and to fill the new managerial positions with 
 
188 Ibid p.8 
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people having expertise in the field. The nationality of ultimate ownership may also 
have an implication on how friendly the investor state would be with respect to human 
rights and corruption issues. There may also be problems related to unemployment 
and soaring prices as a response of water utility restructuring. The problem of 
corporate restructuring will become interesting in a regulated environment because the 
regulator’s jurisdiction will only cover the regulated company and not its parent 
companies. The framework on utilities’ corporate governance will comprise of the 
following: 
4) Utilities’ Corporate Governance  
a. The Board and its accountability  
b. Related Party Transaction  
c. Corporate Restructuring 
 
3.4. Passive Disclosure Rules 
Last but not least is the role of “passive disclosure rules”. All of the 
framework above will analyse how legal frameworks obligate “active disclosure” in 
institutions involved in water utilities’ regulation. This is still incomplete because a 
comprehensively transparent system requires also a set of passive disclosure rules (see 
sections 2.5 and 2.6 above).    
A passive disclosure rule sets requirements upon public bodies to provide 
information if requested by any person. Any information is subjected to the rule, 
unless it falls under the exemption clause. A passive disclosure rule is normally 
provided by access to information legislation. The existence of an access to 
information regime alone, however, is not sufficient in guaranteeing transparency as 
such a regime needs further evaluation. Two crucial elements of a passive disclosure 
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rule that will be used to evaluate the access to information regime are its applicability 
to institutions in water services and the exemption clauses, which in turn comprise: 
a. Law Enforcement and Investigation;  
b. Decision Making and Policy Formulation;  
c. Obligation of Confidence; and  
d. Commercial Information.189  
3.5. Chapter Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter is to devise a framework to analyze transparency 
in a water utilities regulation that would be applied in the three case studies in the 
subsequent chapters. It consists of five general categories: an overview of the legal 
and institutional framework, policy in involving the private sector, regulatory decision 
making utilities corporate governance and passive disclosure rules. The breakdown of 
the analytical framework that has been discussed in this chapter is in the form of the 
following: 
1. Overview of the legal and institutional framework 
2. Policy in Involving the Private Sector 
a. Ownership and Regulatory Model 
b. Procurement  
c. Publication of Contract  
3. Regulatory Decision Making  
 
189 See Fitch, M. and Graham, C., ‘The draft Freedom of Information Bill-implications for utilities’ 10 
Utilities Law Review 257 
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a. Licences 
i. Criteria for approval  
ii. Licence conditions  
iii. Obligation to publish 
b. Regulator’s internal governance 
i. Selection and removal 
ii. Conflict of Interest 
c. Means of Acquiring Information  
d. Regulator’s General Disclosure Policy 
e. Investment   
f. Price Determination   
g. Service Levels and Customer Service  
h. Non-compliance 
i. Redress 
4. Utilities’ Corporate Governance  
a. The Board and its accountability  
b. Related Party Transaction 
c. Corporate Restructuring  
5. Passive Disclosure Rules  
a. Applicability 
b. Exemptions  
i. Law Enforcement and Investigation; Decision Making and 
Policy Formulation 
ii. Obligation of Confidence, Commercial Information  
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4. VICTORIA 
4.1. Overview of the legal and institutional framework 
4.1.1. Federal Regulation and the NWI 
The Australian Constitution at Article 100190 prohibits the Federal government 
from limiting the powers of the states towards the ‘reasonable use’ of the waters of 
rivers for conservation or irrigation. Historically, the Constitution does not give the 
Federal government the powers over environmental matters. However, the Federal 
government generally has jurisdiction to prescribe legislation over interstate and 
international trade, corporations, taxations and matters of foreign affairs.191  
As a result, water services in Victoria are a combination of complex regulatory 
arrangements between the Federal and the Victorian (State) government. Major parts 
of the regulatory framework are enacted by the state under policy guidelines from the 
Federal government while the rest is federal legislation. 
Federal policy guidelines in the water sector came mainly from the Council of 
Australian Government (CoAG), in the form of the National Water Initiative 
(NWI).192 The NWI contains principles of reform of state water laws. The Victorian 
Government, as a signatory party to the 1994 CoAG reform initiative and the 2004 
 
190 An Act to constitute the Commonwealth of Australia (taking into account alterations up to Act No. 
84 of 1977) Article 100 
191 An Act to constitute the Commonwealth of Australia s.51 
192 The Commonwealth of Australia and others, Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water 
Initiative (2004)   
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CoAG NWI Intergovernmental Agreement, has enacted the Victorian NWI 
implementation plan.193 
The Victorian NWI implementation plan contains measures which are relevant 
to water utilities’ reforms, among others, reforms in urban water governance in the 
form of upper bound pricing, development of pricing policies for recycled water/storm 
water, and for rural and regional water services in the form of review and 
development of pricing policies for trade wastes.194 Benchmarking efforts are also 
carried out under the Victorian NWI implementation plan, also including new 
investment, refurbishment of infrastructure and the setting up of independent pricing 
bodies for water storage and delivery. Some of these plans are underway and some 
have already been completed.  
 
4.1.2. Victorian Water businesses 
Victoria’s water industry comprises (i) Melbourne Water Corporation 
responsible for the collection, storage and supply of bulk water, (ii) three retail water 
services companies supplying the metropolitan Melbourne area: City West Water, 
South East Water, Yarra Valley Water (“The Three Retailers”) (iii) 15 regional-urban 
water authorities (RUWA) and (iv) five rural water authorities (RWAs) responsible 
for approving water trade and transfer of water shares.   
 
193 The Commonwealth of Australia and others, The Council of Australian Governments' Water Reform 
Framework (1994)  ;  The Commonwealth of Australia and others, Intergovernmental Agreement on a 
National Water Initiative; Government of Victoria, Victoria’s NWI Implementation Plan (2006)   
194 Government of Victoria, Victoria’s NWI Implementation Plan  
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The following Table 1 lists regulated water businesses in Victoria.   
Corporation Function/Area Legal basis of 
incorporation  
Melbourne 
Water (also 
serves as RWA) 
Bulk water and bulk sewerage service in 
Melbourne as well as the management of 
rivers, creeks and major drainage system 
in Port Philip and Westernport.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Water Act 
1989 (Vic) 
and Water 
(Governance) 
Act of 2006 
(Vic) 
Gippsland and 
Southern Rural 
Water (RWA) 
 
Domestic, irrigation and stock and bulk 
water supply in regional Victoria 
Goulburn 
Murray Rural 
Water (RWA) 
Grampians 
Wimmera 
Mallee Water 
(RWA) 
 
Water, sewerage, irrigation and domestic 
and stock services 
Lower Murray 
Urban and Rural 
Water (RWA) 
Barwon Water   
 
 
 
 
 
Water and sewerage services in regional 
Victoria 
Central 
Highlands 
Water 
Coliban Water 
(RWA) 
East Gippsland 
Water 
Gippsland 
Water 
Goulburn Valley 
Water 
North East 
Water 
South Gippsland 
Water 
Western Water, 
Westernport 
Water 
Wannon Region 
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Water Authority 
City West Water 
Ltd 
Retail water supply and sewerage 
services in Melbourne metropolitan area 
Corporations 
Act 2001 
(Cth), SOE 
Act 1992 
(Vic)  
South East 
Water Ltd 
Yarra Valley 
Water Ltd 
 
Sixteen of the water corporations are established through the Water Act 
1989195 while the remaining three were set up under the (Commonwealth) 
Corporations Act  2001196 in conjunction with the State Owned Enterprise Act 1992 
(SOE Act)197. The Three Retailers (City West Water, South East Water and Yarra 
Valley Water) are State Owned Companies under the SOE Act. Unlike other ordinary 
corporations under the 2001 Corporations Act, their status as State Owned Companies 
means that their constitutions are already prescribed by the SOE Act and any 
deviation from this prescription must obtain the approval of the Treasurer.198 
Although for-profit companies, The Three Retailers can be subjected to non-
commercial activities by the Victorian Government but these are subject to mutual 
agreement between each of the companies and the government, which then allows the 
government to reimburse its non commercial activities.199   
As discussed in Section 1.4.1 (Water Services), the analytical framework for 
this PhD research will be applicable to highly networked water utilities which are 
 
195 Water Act 1989 No. 80 of 1989 
196 Corporations Act 2001 
197 State Owned Enterprises Act 1992 (Victoria), No. 90 of 1992, Version No. 036 
198 Mandatory model of Articles of Association of a Victorian SOE is prescribed in the Schedule 1  ibid 
199 Ibid, s.72 also Financial Management Act 1994 No. 18 of 1994 (Victoria), Version No. 061 Part 2 
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separate legal entities from the state. As such, only the governance systems of The 
Three Retailers and Melbourne Water are evaluated and the other regional-urban 
water utilities which supply water to towns and rural areas are excluded.  
The research will also assess the governance framework for private sector 
participation between the Victorian Government, Melbourne Water and a private 
entity called Aquasure, a consortium comprising of Thiess, Degremont (a subsidiary 
of SUEZ) and Macquarie Capital to build a water desalination plant in Wonthaggi. 
The 30-year long 3.5 billion USD build-operate-transfer desalination contract is 
financed both through debt and equity.200 There were controversies surrounding the 
project as  to the actual sum of money paid each year to Aquasure, irrespective of 
water sold, 201 and the confidentiality of the contract provisions.202 
4.1.3. Sectoral rules and regulatory institutions applicable to Victorian water 
businesses 
 
200 ‘Public Private Partnership’ (Government of Victoria,)  
<http://www.ourwater.vic.gov.au/programs/desalination/about-us/ppp> accessed November 24, 2010 
p.2 
201 “The government has steadfastly refused to disclose the level of the water security payment. Back-
of-the-envelope estimates by both The Age and  The Australian Financial Review  indicate annual 
payments of at least 300 million USD for the luxury of having the plant.”  Schneiders, B. and Millar, R., 
‘Brumby’s giant money pit’  <http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/brumbys-giant-money-pit-20100827-
13w2n.html> accessed November 24, 2010  
202 “Nationals Leader Peter Ryan repeated his call for the government to release the full desalination 
plant contract. He said Mr Brumby should reveal the cost of the water security payment, which is an 
annual sum paid to Aquasure to keep the plant in a condition capable of delivering water at any time, 
even if none was ordered.”  AP, ‘Govt's desal figure misleading: Brumby’ (November 24, 2010) 
<http://news.smh.com.au/breaking-news-national/govts-desal-figure-misleading-brumby-20100917-
15ewb.html> accessed August 5, 2011  
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The legislative framework for the metropolitan water sector is comprised of a 
number of Acts, most of which are Victorian (Table 1) but relevant Commonwealth 
Acts include the Trade Practices Act 1974203  and the Corporations Act 2001.204 The 
most significant Victorian Acts are the Water Act 1989205  (and the Water Industry 
Act 1994 (WIA)).206 
Water services in Victoria are regulated primarily by six main institutions 
explained below. In some instances, the regulating powers of these institutions 
overlap.  
4.1.3.1. Minister for Water 
For the regional-urban water businesses, rural water businesses and 
Melbourne Water, the Minister for Water requests reports and information, creates 
policy, issues directions and sets standards and obligation.207  
The Three Retailers do not report directly to the Minister for Water as they are 
set up under the Corporations Act 2001. The Treasurer is responsible for their 
supervision and monitoring.208 However, the Minister for Water is also tasked by the 
 
203 Trade Practices Act 1974, Act No. 51 of 1974 as amended 
204 Corporations Act 2001 
205 Water Act 1989 No. 80 of 1989, Verson 102 
206 Water Industry Act 1994 No. 121 of 1994, Version No. 063 
207 Department of Sustainability & Environment Government of Victoria, A Governance Guide to the 
Victorian Water Industry (Victorian Government) 
<http://www.ourwater.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/54555/Governance-Guide-update4a.pdf> 
November 24, 2010 
208 State Owned Enterprises Act 1992 (Vic) ss 19, 24, 26, 41-43, 45-55 
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WIA with issuing water supply and sewerage licences and Statements of Obligation to 
The Three Retailers.209   
Licences issued by the Minister of Water can be in the form of a water licence, 
a water and sewerage licence, a drainage licence, a sewage treatment licence or a 
water headworks licence.210 The Three Retailers each hold a licence for water and 
sewerage. The licence document contains the term of a licence, the area of operation, 
licence charge, obligation to enter into a dispute resolution scheme with the 
ombudsman, security deposit and ring-fencing of the utility company to engage in 
water-only businesses.211  
In addition to licences, The Three Retailers must comply with a “Statement of 
Obligation” (SOO). The Minister of Water has the power to make, issue, amend, vary 
or revoke an SOO, after consulting with the Essential Services Commission (ESC) 
and the Treasurer.212 The WIA 1994 does not limit the scope of regulation through the 
SOO, thus, the Minister can virtually regulate anything213 as long as it is not in 
contravention of  higher laws. To date the Minister has issued two types of Statement 
of Obligation applicable to water businesses. The 2007 SOO obligates the retailers to 
prepare and deliver a Water Plan for the ESC to determine prices; clarify governance 
and risk management, board performance, customer and community engagement, 
 
209 Water Industry Act 1994 No. 121 of 1994, Version No. 063 s.4I and s.8 
210 Ibid  s.5 (1) 
211 Government of Victoria, Water and Sewerage Licence, Yarra Valey Water Limited A.B.N. 93 066 
902 501, Reprinted incorporating amendments as at 28 July 2004 (2004)   Government of Victoria, 
Water and Sewerage Licence, City West Water Limited A.B.N. 70 066 902 467, Reprinted incorporating 
amendments as at 28 July 2004 (2004)   
212 Water Industry Act 1994 No. 121 of 1994, Version No. 063 s.4I 
213 Ibid s. 4I (2) and (3) 
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consultation with other authorities, response to incidents and assets management; 
planning and service delivery, environmental management, payment schemes and 
contributions.214 In 2009, the Minister of Water issued an additional Statement of 
Obligation (System Management) to The Three Retailers to regulate bulk water 
entitlements from Melbourne Water to The Three Retailers.215 
4.1.3.2. Essential Services Commission 
The Essential Services Commission (ESC) regulates performance assessment 
(through benchmarking) and pricing. ESC is a multi utility regulator enacted through 
the Essential Services Commission Act of 2004 (“ESC Act”).216 The ESC is 
considered an ‘independent pricing body’ as required by the Victorian NWI 
implementation plan.217 The ESC is tasked with determining prices,218 standards and 
conditions of service219 and issuing regulatory codes220. It also has the power to 
require the regulated industries to submit information for regulatory purposes.221  
Another instrument which prescribes the power of the ESC is the Water 
Industry Regulatory Order (WIRO).222 The WIRO is an Order issued by the Governor 
 
214 See Water Industry Act 1994, Statement of Obligation, City West Water Limited (2008) 
<http://www.water.vic.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/12811/CWW-SOO-Consolidated-v.-oct-
08.pdf> January 3, 2011 
215 See  Water Industry Act 1994, Statement of Obligation, City West Water Limited (Systems 
Management) 
216 Essential Services Commission Act 2001 No. 62 of 2001 
217 Government of Victoria, Victoria’s NWI Implementation Plan  
218Essential Services Commission Act 2001 (Vic), s.33 
219 Water Industry Act 1994 No. 121 of 1994, Version No. 063 s.4.e 
220 Ibid , s.4.f 
221 Ibid , s.4.g 
222 Water Industry Act 1994, Water Industry Regulatory Order 2003 
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by virtue of the WIA and the ESC Act. The WIRO itself is a single document (which 
is amended from time to time) and governs all business entities regulated by the ESC.  
The WIRO and the WIA also empowers the ESC to enact Codes.223 In 
practice, these Codes contain important details of the ESC operation. Regulatory 
accounts and customer service have a legal basis under these Codes. The ESC has 
issued several regulatory accounting codes, customer services codes and two 
guidelines, one on new network connections and the other for approving, conducting 
and reporting audits. 
4.1.3.3. Energy and Water Ombudsman 
Disputes between water businesses and consumers are referred to the Energy 
and Water Ombudsman (EWOV). The EWOV is a company limited by guarantee 
(and not having share capital) set up under the 2001 Corporation Act.224 Water 
businesses are obliged to enter into an agreement with EWOV to settle their disputes 
with customers. According to the EWOV Charter225, its jurisdiction does not extend to 
complaints relating to tariff setting or determination of price structures, presumably 
because this has been reserved for the ESC.226 Government policies are also excluded 
 
223 Water Industry Act 1994 No. 121 of 1994, Version No. 063 s.4F also Water Industry Regulatory 
Order (WIRO) ss 14-15 
224 Energy and Water Ombudsman Victoria, Constitution of Energy and Water Ombudsman (Victoria) 
Limited  <http://www.ewov.com.au/site/documents/EWOV-Constitution_17May2010.pdf> November 
24, 2010 
225 Energy and Water Ombudsman Victoria, Energy and Water Ombudsman Charter 30 May 2006 
(2006) 
<http://www.ewov.com.au/site/DefaultSite/filesystem/documents/PDF/Charter%2030%20May%20200
6.pdf> November 24, 2010 
226 Ibid para.4 (Jurisdiction) 
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from EWOV’s jurisdiction as well as those cases that are being referred to tribunals or 
the courts and any matters that are specifically stipulated by legislation. The same 
applies for ‘events beyond reasonable control of the participants’227 as the remedies 
for such a force majeure are set out in legislation and its enforcement is subjected to 
judiciary bodies.    
Finally, the jurisdiction of EWOV does not cover actions undertaken by the 
utilities in ensuring the security of water supply by virtue of administrative or 
regulatory power.228 This exclusion is typical in the redress mechanism in water 
utilities as the question of policy and economic regulation is reserved by the executive 
(Minister of Water) and the economic regulator (ESC).  EWOV is intended to deal 
only with the day-to-day operation of a regulated business and not with large scale 
cases affecting the sustainability of a water supply system such as those related to a 
force majeure.   
4.1.3.4. Other departments 
Water businesses in Victoria are regulated by several other departments. The 
Treasurer of the Department of Treasury and Finance regulates financial management 
of the water businesses while drinking water standards are regulated by the Secretary 
to the Department of Health. Activities related to waste water discharges and other 
environmental protection issues are carried out by the Environment Protection 
Authority (EPA).   
 
227 Ibid para 4.1 (g) 
228 Ibid para 4.2 (h) 
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4.1.3.5. General administrative, corporate and economic rules applicable to 
Victorian water businesses 
Water businesses in Victoria are also covered by general administrative and 
corporate rules in addition to the sectoral rules as discussed above. The Three 
Retailers are private companies fully owned by the Victorian Government under The 
Corporations Act 2001.229 This Act does not apply to the other 16 government-owned 
corporations.  
The Audit Act 1994230 establishes the power of the Victorian Auditor General 
to commence audit against government departments or government-owned 
corporations, at their request and expense. The Public Administration Act 2004231 is 
also applicable to the water companies, by virtue of the Water Governance Act 
2006.232 The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has 
enforcement jurisdiction over Water Market Rules 2009 and the Water Charge 
(Termination Fees) Rules 2009 by virtue of the Water Act 2007 (Cth).233 The 
jurisdiction of the ACCC under the Water Act 2007 does not extend into Victorian 
urban water supplies. However, the ACCC has jurisdiction over the competitive parts 
of Victorian water businesses under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).234  Victoria 
 
229 Corporations Act 2001    
230 Audit Act 1994, No. 2 of 1994 (Victoria), Version No. 051    
231 Public Administration Act (Victoria) 2004 No. 108 of 2004 Version No. 024 
232 Water (Governance) Act 2006 Act No. 85/2006 
233 Water Act 2007, Act No. 137 of 2007 also Water Market Rules 2009 - F2009L02424 Water Charge 
(Termination Fees) Rules 2009 - F2009L02425 
234 Trade Practices Act 1974 (Vic) 
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also has a Freedom of Information Law 1982 which is applicable to certain 
government-owned corporations and regulatory institutions.235  
 
 
 
235 Freedom of Information Act 1982  
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Table 2: Recapitulation of primary regulatory institutions overseeing Victorian 
Water Businesses 
Area Institutions Primary Legal 
Basis 
Regulatory Outputs 
General policy/ 
direction and 
licensing 
Minister of 
Water; 
Department of 
Sustainability 
and Environment 
Water Industry 
Act 1994 (Vic) 
Operational 
licences for The 
Three Retailers, 
Statement of 
Obligation 
Financial 
management 
Treasurer at the 
Department of 
Treasury 
Financial 
Management 
Act 1994 (Vic) 
Financial reporting 
guidelines. 
Review of annual 
reports, corporate 
plans and business 
Drinking Water Secretary at the 
Department of 
Health 
Safe Drinking 
Water Act 
2003 (Vic) 
Drinking Water 
Standard 
Pricing and 
monitoring of 
performance 
Essential 
Services 
Commission 
Essential 
Services 
Commission 
Act 2001 (Vic), 
Water Industry 
Act 1994 (Vic) 
Price 
determinations (S. 
33 of ESC Act).  
Standards and 
conditions of 
service (S.4E of 
WIA). 
Codes (in relation 
to its functions and 
powers (S.4F of 
the WIA). 
Information 
requirement from 
regulated 
businesses (S 4G 
of the WIA). 
Water Industry 
Regulatory Order 
(WIRO). 
Environmental 
protection, waste 
water discharges 
Environment 
Protection 
Authority 
Environment 
Protection Act 
1970 (Vic) 
Waste water 
licence 
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Consumer 
dispute 
Energy and 
Water 
Ombudsman 
Direct (not 
applicable to 
The Three 
Retailers): 
Water Act 
1989 (Vic) 
Through 
licences (for 
The Three 
Retailers): 
Water Industry 
Act 1994 (Vic), 
Essential 
Services 
Commission 
Act 2001 (Vic) 
Binding decision 
Freedom of 
Information 
Victorian 
Ombudsman, 
Victorian Civil 
& 
Administrative 
Tribunal 
(VCAT) 
Freedom of 
Information 
Act 1982 (Vic) 
Recommendation 
(from 
Ombudsman) 
 
Decision (From 
VCAT) 
Competition 
(Federal 
Jurisdiction) 
Australian 
Competition and 
Consumer 
Commission  
Trade Practices 
Act 1974, 
Water Act 
2007 (Cth) 
Decision 
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4.2. Policy in involving the private sector 
4.2.1. Determination of ownership and regulatory model 
The questions of ownership and the regulatory model for water utility in 
Commonwealth Australia are reserved for the state.236 The status of Victorian water 
services as “publicly owned” is entrenched in Victoria’s State Constitution when an 
amendment was introduced in 2003.237 Article 97 of the Victoria Constitution states: 
“If at any time on or after the commencement of section 5 of the Constitution (Water 
Authorities) Act 2003 a public authority has responsibility for ensuring the delivery of 
a water service, that or another public authority must continue to have that 
responsibility” and that it must “be accountable to a responsible Minister of the 
Crown for ensuring the delivery of that service”.238  This provision can only be 
modified when the special majority requirement is fulfilled which requires the 
approval of approximately three fifths of parliament members.239   
The Act clarifies that a “Public Authority” can mean a statutory authority, a 
council, a company whose shares are held by or on behalf of the state or an agency 
head.240 The utilities can thus be in the form of a statutory corporation or an ordinary 
company established under the Corporations Act as The Three Retailers are today.  
 
236 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act Article 100 
237 Constitution (Water Authorities) Act 2003 Act No. 37 of 2003 The Act clarifies that a Public 
Authority can mean a statutory authority, a council, a company whose shares are held by or on behalf of 
the state or an agency head and that the scope of water services spans from supply, sewerage, irrigation, 
collection and storage to sewage treatment.  
238 Constitution Act 1975, No. 8750 of 1975, Version No. 196 s.97 (1) (2) 
239 Ibid s.18(2)(h) 
240 Ibid s.96 (a)-(d) 
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Within the public ownership spectrum, there are still debates as to the most 
efficient form of entities, as each form entails its own costs and benefits. If utilities are 
in the form of a statutory corporation, the Parliament can have more influence on the 
corporate governance including, for example, in determining the composition of the 
board of directors and how they should be appointed. This is not the case with respect 
to publicly owned companies established under the Corporations Act.  
A second disadvantage of the Corporations Act is the executive’s relative lack 
of influence in providing direction to the company. The executive has the power to 
issue direction to utilities but this process is perceived to be less transparent if 
compared to what happens in a statutory corporation.241 At the moment, the 
“Statement of Obligation” (SOO) and the Water Plan provide most guidelines, but the 
executive has no legislative powers beyond that.242  
The other disadvantage lies in the difficulties of reconciling commercial with 
non-commercial objectives. 243 In Victoria, this is currently balanced through the SOO 
and the WIRO, but both instruments have been perceived as inadequate as far as 
protecting vulnerable groups and the environment because the duties are imposed on 
regulators and not directly upon utilities.244   
 
241 Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission, Water Ways: Inquiry into Reform of the 
Metropolitan Retail Water Sector, Final Report February 2008 (2008)   p 163 
242 Ibid p.164 
243 Some jurisdictions, such as England, provide a non profit company limited by guarantee model of 
corporation. This has been used for Yorkshire Water. However, such a model requires full divestiture 
which is not compatible with the current constitution.  
244 Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission, Water Ways: Inquiry into Reform of the 
Metropolitan Retail Water Sector, Final Report February 2008 p.164 
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Having said that public ownership is entrenched, the Constitution never 
prohibits private sector participation. The Constitution does not prohibit arrangements 
with another body, including an independent contractor, for the provision of water 
services so long as the public authority retains the responsibility and remains 
accountable to the Minister.245 Meanwhile, restructuring of water services is allowed 
as long as they remain accountable to the Minister.246 
It is clear from the above that the Victorian Government can contract out its 
water services, however, there may be an extent to which the law limits this power.   
The Victorian Constitution provides no clarity as to the degree of private 
sector participation allowed by it under section 97 (3). 247 In cases of affermage or 
concession, for example, public authorities retain ownership of the assets and remain 
accountable to ministers, however, as will be discussed in Chapter 5 (Jakarta), the 
private sector will have a considerable degree of control over the services whereas, on 
 
245 Constitution Act 1975, No. 8750 of 1975, Version No. 196 s. 97 (4). See also para (3) “Nothing in 
this section prevents a public authority that has responsibility for ensuring the delivery of a water 
service entering into an arrangement of any kind with a person or body (including an independent 
contractor) relating to the delivery of that service while itself retaining that responsibility and 
remaining accountable to a responsible Minister of the Crown for ensuring the delivery of that service” 
.  
246 Ibid s. 97 (4) “Nothing in this section prevents the making of an alteration to the structure, 
composition or membership of a public authority that has responsibility for ensuring the delivery of a 
water service if the alteration does not affect its status or the status of a successor body as a public 
authority accountable to a responsible Minister of the Crown for ensuring the delivery of that service”. 
247 Ibid s. 97 (3) “Nothing in this section prevents a public authority that has responsibility for ensuring 
the delivery of a water service entering into an arrangement of any kind with a person or body 
(including an independent contractor) relating to the delivery of that service while itself retaining that 
responsibility and remaining accountable to a responsible Minister of the Crown for ensuring the 
delivery of that service.”  
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the other hand, the state’s powers in regulating the sector diminishes due to the 
contractual nature of the relationship.  
In the Australian Commonwealth, the source of power to contract government 
services can come directly from executive’s prerogative, statutory authority or through 
the common law. 248 The power to contract government services through the 
executive’s prerogative is deemed to be vested in the Commonwealth’s 
Constitution.249 Alternatively, a statute can also confer to the executive that it has the 
power to enter into a contract with private parties. When this is the case, the statute 
may provide limitation to government on the subject on which they can contract with 
the private sector. Lastly, the power to contract can come from the common law. In 
this case, the government is perceived as an embodiment of the Crown. The Crown, 
like an ordinary legal person, is deemed to have the ability to enter into a contract with 
another party.250 
According to Seddon, for the Commonwealth government, its power to 
contract is limited by Constitutional provisions and several legislations. However, that 
is not the case for states such as Victoria. In Victoria and the other states, the source of 
power to contract stems mainly from the prerogative rights.251  Therefore, as Seddon 
concludes, for State governments, there is nothing that prevents them from entering 
 
248 Seddon, N., Government Contracts: federal, state and local (4th edn, Federation Pr 2009)p 55-86 
249 Ibid 
250 Ibid 
251 “As we have seen, the commonwealth power is limited by Constitution that contains specific, 
enumerated power. By contracts, states and territories have no enumerated legislative powers so that, 
apart from their place in the federation, there should be no limit on their executive powers to enter into 
contract.s”  Ibid p. 77 
 
 95 
into contracts with private parties.252 This also follows that they can contract out any 
kind of services they deem appropriate.  
As nothing in the Constitution and prevailing laws can prevent the 
government from entering into a contract for the provision of water services with third 
parties, public scrutiny relies mostly through ordinary procurement rules. 253  Public 
law values are still applicable albeit with some difficulties. The following sections will 
evaluate how transparency, which is recognised as one of the cornerstones of public 
law values,254 is reflected in water contracts in Victoria.  The Wonthaggi desalination 
project between the Victoria Government and Aquasure, a consortium comprising 
Thiess, Degremont (a Suez Environnement company) and Macquarie Capital, will be 
used as an example.  
4.2.2. Procurements 
4.2.2.1. Procurement Committees  
Disclosure of Conflict of Interest (CoI)255 under the Victoria Government 
Purchasing Board Guideline256 and the Victorian Public Service Code of Conduct is 
 
252 Ibid 
253 The guideline and policy framework for PPPs in the whole of Australia is issued by Infrastructure 
Australia – a federal advisory body established by Infrastructure Australia Act 2008 No. 17, 2008. 
Australian states may issue specific guidelines based on this national guideline Department of Treasury 
& Finance (Victoria), National PPP Guidelines, Partnerships Victoria Requirements (2010)  . Portfolio 
ministers are responsible for PPP projects in Victoria 
254 For transparency as one of the public law values see, for example, Freeman, J., ‘Extending Public 
Law Norms Through Privatization’ 116 Harvard Law Review 1285 
255 Public Administration Act (Victoria) 2004 s.7(1): Public officials should demonstrate integrity by 
(b)(iv) avoiding any real or apparent conflicts of interest 
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made internally to the superiors of the public officials. CoI disclosure on these 
guidelines is not directed to the public or tender participants.257  
4.2.2.2. Tender Processes 
The Australian National PPP guideline258 mentions four phases in the PPP 
project cycle. These are: (i) the release of Expression of Interest (EoI), (ii) the release 
of Request for Proposal (RFP), (iii) selection of preferred bidder; and (iv) the 
execution of the contract. In each of these stages a decision – requiring government 
approval – is made. The National PPP guideline acknowledges the importance of 
considering public interest matters such as, access, accountability and consumers’ 
rights, both in the project planning and development stages.259 There is emphasis on 
transparency in every stage of the project cycle. “Full disclosure should be the default 
position of a PPP contract with the private sector.”260  
While the majority of the provisions in the guideline regulate the relationship 
between government and the private sector, it acknowledges that proper management 
of PPP contracts would require “ensuring appropriate governance, probity and 
compliance practices” within the government, and in the relationship between the 
 
256 Government of Victoria (Strategy and Policy Government Services Group Department of Treasury 
and Finance), Good Practice Guidelines, Conduct of Commercial Engagements (July 2011)   Annex A 
257 Australian Government, National Public Private Partnership Guidelines, Volume 2: Practitioners’ 
Guide (2011)   Appendix C (Conflict of Interest on Public Officials); Office of Public Employment, 
Code of Conduct for the Victorian public sector (Government of Victoria 1995)   sections 34-42 
258 Australian Government, National Public Private Partnership Guidelines, Volume 2: Practitioners’ 
Guide 
259 Ibid para 3.4.3 
260 Ibid para 6.5.3 General Disclosure Principle. The exceptions are cases  involving trade secrets, 
‘genuine’ commercial confidentiality and materials which, if disclosed, will harm the public interest 
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government and “any other government stakeholders”.261 There is no emphasis in 
managing good relations with end users of the PPP project, which is the public 
themselves, however, this is much better than Indonesian procurement framework that 
we will discuss later in Chapter 5.  
Victorian Government requires all procurement to be assessed in terms of its 
“Public Interest” at every stage. The assessment covers the project’s effectiveness, 
accountability and transparency, affected individuals and communities, consumer 
rights, public access, security and privacy.262  
However, the template issued by the Victorian Government in assessing 
transparency and accountability is not so useful, as it only requires public bodies to 
‘identify’ government policies which require transparency and accountability in all 
stages of the procurement (bidding, negotiation, contract execution) as well as any 
applicable disclosure requirement under legislations or similar contracts.263 On the 
other hand, the PPP Guideline issued by the Commonwealth Government (also 
applicable to Victoria) is rather useful as it recognises government’s accountability 
“risk”, and prescribes that the assessment factors should cover the scrutiny by the 
auditor-general, ministerial accountability to the parliament and the availability of 
administrative law remedies.264  
 
261 Ibid para H.7.5 p. 133 
262 Department of Treasury & Finance (Victoria), Partnerships Victoria Requirements, Annexure 7, 
Public Interest (2009)    
263 Ibid p.5 
264 Australian Government, National Public Private Partnership Guidelines, Volume 2: Practitioners’ 
Guide appendix H.7.5 p 133-134 
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Below, are the stages of procurement in Victoria. 
4.2.2.2.1. Expression of Interest (EoI) 
According to the National PPP Guideline, in order to ensure transparency, 
release of EoI should be advertised publicly or made through a procurement 
website.265 (In Victoria, this is done through the Tenders Victoria website).266 EoI 
responses from the private sectors will then be evaluated. The National PPP Guideline 
contains criteria and methodology of EoI evaluation. Based on the evaluation, bidders 
will be shortlisted. Failed EoI respondents – according to the guideline – can be 
debriefed so that they may learn from their experience. Details concerning EoI 
evaluation will not be released after the process is closed.  
4.2.2.2.2. Request for Proposal (RFP) 
After bidders are shortlisted, the next step is the RFP stage.  In this stage, the 
government formally requests selected bidders to make a proposal for the bid, and the 
bidders will incur some costs to prepare their proposal. Although there is no guarantee 
that the project will continue, this stage already reflects the seriousness and 
government’s commitment.  
 
265 Ibid para 4.3   
266 Department of Treasury & Finance (Victoria), National PPP Guidelines, Partnerships Victoria 
Requirements (2010)  para 13 ‘Tenders Vic, Victorian Government Tenders System’ (Government of 
Victoria,, 2012)  <https://www.tenders.vic.gov.au> accessed January 3, 2012 
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The RFP document  should already contain a draft project agreement and 
payment mechanisms.267 The contracts may consist of the project or concession 
agreement; services specifications; financing agreement, agreement with builders and 
operational service providers; and security documents providing government with 
rights over the project’s assets. There is no mention on the National Guideline that this 
document can be subjected to public disclosure at this stage. 
Information supplied by individual bidders is treated with special care. 
Interaction and discussion on RFPs between shortlisted bidders and the procurement 
team are commenced individually to preserve intellectual property.268 The 
procurement team must also take reasonable steps to prevent information from certain 
bidders accidentally being conveyed to another.   
Evaluation of the RFP submission will have to be undertaken transparently 
with the methodology clearly stipulated. The National PPP Guideline advocates the 
use of a Public Sector Comparator269 as a method to quantitatively assess the RFPs, 
however, a Public Sector Comparator is not the only determining factor. The 
Guideline also highlights that some qualitative factors need to be properly weighed. 
The Evaluation report should be made in detail comprising views of different270 panel 
or sub panel members of the project team and directed to the project steering 
committee. The bids should be ranked from most attractive to least attractive.  
 
267 Australian Government, National Public Private Partnership Guidelines, Volume 2: Practitioners’ 
Guide Chapter 5.1. see also p.22  
268 Ibid p.25 
269 Australian Government, National Public Private Partnership Guidelines Volume 4: Public Sector 
Comparator Guidance (2011)   
270 For example, design, finance, service delivery 
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4.2.2.2.3. Selections of preferred bidder 
Based on the RFP evaluation report, a single bidder should be selected. In the 
event that the committee fail to select a single bidder then the shortlisting of two 
bidders, undertaking of a “Best and Final Offer” or the use of ‘structured negotiation’ 
can be envisaged.271 Before undertaking any of these options,  government approval 
would be required.   
The next step, negotiation, is led by a project director.272 As RFP documents 
already contain draft agreements, the National Guideline makes it clear that 
negotiation must be constrained into issues which depart from the RFP. It is 
recommended that drafting is tightly controlled by legal advisors and the procurement 
teams and that agreed items should be recorded. The project team should then report 
back to the Government on the results of the negotiation. Only when the government 
approves will the project continue to the execution of contracts. 
 
4.2.2.2.4. Execution of the contract 
The final stage is execution of contract, attended by public officials signing 
the contract document. The Guideline mentions that it is  ‘good practice’ that 
following the execution of contract, losing bidders are invited to discuss their bids. 
 
271 Australian Government, National Public Private Partnership Guidelines, Volume 2: Practitioners’ 
Guide p.26-27 
272 Ibid p.29 
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However, information supplied by losing bidders is not likely to be disclosed to the 
public. 
A review of the whole procurement process may be undertaken by the Auditor 
General and the results of such a review would be in the public domain. According to 
the guideline: 
273 “As a general principle, this requirement for visibility and accountability 
means that full disclosure should be the default position for a PPP contract with the 
private sector, except for consideration of voluntary disclosure of the following: trade 
secrets; genuinely confidential business information; and material which, if disclosed, 
would seriously harm the public interest.” (emphasis by author). 
From the above paragraph, it would appear that disclosure is intended only 
after the final stage of the procurement process – after the execution of contract and 
closing is achieved. The guideline stresses that “Confidentiality is particularly 
important during the bid stage where bidders supply confidential and sensitive 
commercial information”274 and that the disclosure of cost structures would 
compromise the competitive bidding process while at the same time acknowledging 
that transparency “of the bid process is paramount to give bidders certainty and to 
meet public procurement probity requirements” .275 
 
273 Government of Victoria, 'National Public Private Partnership Guidelines Volume 2: Practitioners’ 
Guide' 2008) N.35 above at p.32 
274 Ibid. “While government is committed to a policy of openness and transparency, a strong measure 
of confidentiality may be required during the procurement process” Australian Government, National 
Public Private Partnership Guidelines, Volume 2: Practitioners’ Guide para 13.4 p.66 
275 Ibid 
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An innovative approach by the Guideline is the requirement for government to 
ensure that information on project performance276 is available for  release after the 
contract is executed. In order for it to happen, the guideline mentions that private 
parties should acknowledge that disclosure by government by operation of the FoI Act 
will not amount to a breach of confidentiality. 277  
This requirement must be incorporated in the contract during the drafting 
period. The guideline contains no clue as to how this is applied in practice. 
Presumably, this could be made operational through insertion of a waiver clause side-
by-side with the standard confidentiality clause, which will apply when disclosure 
under FoI is made. However, a confidentiality obligation does not only arise from a 
contract, it can also arise from general common law, in which event the waiver clause 
would not be able to derogate.    
The Wonthaggi Desalination Contract278 contains a general confidentiality 
clause which binds all the companies and individuals (the contractor, guarantor, 
reviewer and auditor, including Melbourne Water but not the State) from disclosing 
the contract and any document and information resulting from its activity. Through 
 
276 Accountability for performance is only a part of other sets of accountability features in a democratic 
government. The other types of accountability are accountability for finances and accountability for 
fairness. See Behn, R.D., Rethinking democratic accountability (Brookings Inst Pr 2001)   
277 Australian Government, National Public Private Partnership Guidelines, Volume 2: Practitioners’ 
Guide para 6.5.3. 
278 Article 14.1 of the D&C Direct Deed: D&C Contractor, the D&C Guarantor and the Independent 
Reviewer & Environmental Auditor must keep the contents of this deed and all documents and 
information made available to it under, or in connection with, or in the course of the performance of, 
this deed or any other Project Document, confidential and must not disclose the same to any other 
person without the prior written consent of the other party.  The Minister for Water of the State of 
Victoria and others, Victorian Desalination Project D&C Direct Deed (2009)   
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these general terms, the contract bars the parties from disclosing any of the project 
information to anyone, including to the government or regulator. However, this 
general confidentiality clause is limited by several exceptions.  
The exceptions include: (i) disclosure required by Law or legally binding 
Approval279, (ii) public disclosure by the state, its ministries or agencies under the 
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), the Ombudsman Act 1973 (Vic) or to satisfy 
the requirements of the Victorian Auditor General or the Government policy 
concerning Partnerships Victoria, for the purpose of Parliamentary accountability; and 
for Ministers to fulfil his or her duties of office, (iii) Publication and disclosure by the 
state, or that which relates to the project performance except if the parties (in this case 
the D&C Contractor, the D&C Guarantor and the Independent Reviewer & 
Environmental Auditor and the Project Co) considers – and the state agrees – that 
such information is confidential.  The D&C contract also bars some of the parties – 
but not the State –from voluntary disclosure.280 
Hence, in the D&C Wonthaggi Desalination Contract, disclosure under the 
FoI, the Ombudsman Act and for the purpose of parliamentary accountability are 
 
279 14.2 Exceptions to confidentiality. Clause 14.1 will not apply in the following circumstances: (a) any 
disclosure required by Law or legally binding Approval. See ibid 
280 Article 14.4.c.1 of the D&C Direct Deed: Each of Project Co, the D&C Contractor, the D&C 
Guarantor and the Independent Reviewer & Environmental Auditor  must not, and must ensure that its 
Associates do not, make any public disclosures, announcements or statements in relation to the Project 
or the State's or the State's Associates' involvement in the Project without the State's prior consent and, 
if such disclosure, announcement or statement is required under clause 14.2, such consent will not be 
unreasonably withheld; ibid 
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enabled. However, “active” disclosure under the initiative of the parties other than the 
State (such as Suez and their guarantor) may not be imparted.   
4.2.3. Publication of contracts 
On October 2000, the Bracks’ Labor government issued a transparency policy 
which includes the requirement to disclose Victorian government contracts to the 
public domain.281 Contracts worth more than  100,000 USD in value must disclose its 
full title and contracts over  10 million USD should be published on the internet in a 
full and readily accessible format.282 This internet publication scheme is administered 
by the Victoria Government Purchasing Board (VGPB).  
In 2005, the Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance issued directive 
FRD 12A283 “Disclosure of Major Contracts”. The directive refers to Bracks’ policy 
statement284 and the implementation guideline.285  Disclosure requirements are 
 
281 Bracks, S., Ensuring Openness and Probity in Victorian Government Contracts, A Policy Statement 
(2010) 
<http://www.growingvictoria.vic.gov.au/CA256D800027B102/Lookup/EnsuringProbityPolicy/$file/Op
en_pro.pdf> May 3, 2010 In the Australian Capital Territory, disclosure of contract is not only a matter 
of policy but also stipulated in the legislation. See Government Procurement Act 2001 (ACT) Part 3  
http://www.legislation.act.gov.au/a/2001-28/current/pdf/2001-28.pdf . See also Freedom of Information 
Act 1981 (Nsw) s.15 A (Disclosure of government contracts with the private sector) 
http://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/fullhtml/inforce/act+5+1989+cd+0+N#pt.2-sec.15a 
282 Some of the contracts are available in the Victoria Government Contract Publishing System website 
http://www.old.tenders.vic.gov.au/CA256AEA00206A7D/webpages/PublicContractsFrameset?Open 
283 Department of Treasury & Finance (Victoria), FRD 12A Disclosure of Major Contracts (2005)   
284 Bracks, Ensuring Openness and Probity in Victorian Government Contracts, A Policy Statement  
285 Bracks, S., Ensuring Openness and Probity in Victorian Government Contracts, Implementation 
Guidelines (2010) 
<http://www.growingvictoria.vic.gov.au/CA256D800027B102/Lookup/EnsuringProbityGuide/$file/Gu
ide.pdf> May 3, 2010 
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applicable to all “departments” as defined by section 3 of the Financial Management 
Act 1994.286   
Premier Bracks’ policy permits limited excision of contractual terms from 
disclosure, subject to the principles laid down under the Victorian FoI Act and the 
Victoria Civil and Administrative Tribunal’s (VCAT) decisions.  The policy statement 
further requires that the scope and grounds of such excision must be provided.287 
There are three reasons for exemptions or excision from disclosure under the policy 
statement: (1) trade secrets, (2) genuinely confidential business information and (3) 
material which if disclosed would seriously harm the public interest. Confidential 
business information is defined as information which is “likely to expose [a private 
sector contractor] unreasonably to disadvantage”.288 When confidentiality is granted, 
the policy requires that it is time limited up to six months and should be disclosed 
afterwards.289  
Under the policy statement, the burden of proof is said to be shifted, in favour 
of disclosure.290 It is not clear what this means. Presumably the Bracks’ government 
intended that explanation and justification would be required every time non-
disclosure is invoked. However, the current Victorian FoI Act applies differently, in 
 
286 Financial Management Act 1994 (Vic) 
287 Bracks, Ensuring Openness and Probity in Victorian Government Contracts, A Policy Statement 41 
para.26 
288 Ibid 
289 Ibid para 23 
290 Ibid Para 18: “The Bracks Government is committed to maximum disclosure of  all the contracts 
entered into by Departments.  We will shift the burden of proof in favour of contract disclosure, 
reducing to a minimum the information that is withheld from the public.  A requirement to disclose 
major contracts will be entrenched in legislation as a statutory obligation on Government agencies”.   
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its s. 50 (4), which places the burden of proof of public interest towards disclosure on 
the requester. The government also promised in the policy statement that the 
requirement to disclose major contracts will be formalised into legislation.291  
Apparently, at the time of writing, this has not materialised.  
In a June 2010 report292 by the Victorian Auditor General it was revealed that 
government departments appears to be reluctant to disclose the full text of contracts 
(which is required for contracts worth more than  10 million USD). The audit finds 
that in three selected departments, only on 12 occasions were contracts worth more 
than 100,000 USD disclosed.  Forty-three of the 144 contracts valued over 10 million 
USD had not been disclosed and logged on to the Contract Publishing System (CPS) 
website as required by the Policy statement. The Auditor General concluded that the 
level of non-compliance of publishing contracts worth more than 10 million USD is 
higher, and that it does “reflect systemic breakdowns in disclosure and reporting 
controls that diminish transparency” .293 
The differential treatment on disclosure based on the value of contracts (those 
which cost more than 100,000 USD need to be given a title and those worth more than 
10 million USD need to be fully disclosed and logged into VGPB’s Contract 
Publishing System) may have triggered “creative compliance”. On one occasion the 
Auditor General implied that several contracts on water quantity and quality 
monitoring by the Department of Environment and Sustainability, jointly worth  11.9 
 
291 Ibid 
292 Pearson, D.D.R., Managing the Requirements for Disclosing Private Sector Contracts (2010) 
<http://www.audit.vic.gov.au/pdf/20100623_Disclosures_Full_Report.pdf> November 10, 2010 
293 Ibid, p.vii 
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million USD, were split into several parts, presumably in order to avoid the disclosure 
requirement. DSE  subsequently denied the possibility of tender splitting and stated 
that each of the contracts was awarded through separate tender processes. The Auditor 
General replied:  “the fact that these contracts were entered into on the same day, for 
a similar time period and to provide identical services by the same supplier indicates 
poor procurement practice and results in avoiding the intended level of disclosure”.294 
Contracts between Aquasure and the Victorian Government for the 
establishment of Victoria’s Desalination Plant295 also fall under the scope of this 
policy. One of the points of controversy with the Desal contract is the obligation to 
pay for water produced irrespective of whether it is used (“Water Security Payment”) 
and the overall actual cost (per litre) of desalinated water.296 The figures are important 
because, according to one author, the actual cost of desalination will increase up to 4.8 
billion USD in the 30th year or even more since the pressurisation of water 
transmission to regions with higher altitude may cause mains to burst.297 This may 
eventually add to the cost that consumers have to pay in the coming years.298  
 
294 Ibid, p.xi 
295 See section 4.1.2 above “Victorian Water businesses”  
296 Fyfe, M., ‘Voters out of loop in ALP's Victoria: a state of secrecy’ The Age  
<http://www.theage.com.au/national/voters-out-of-loop-in-alps-victoria-a-state-of-secrecy-20101009-
16d3b.html> accessed November 15, 2010 
297 Davidson, K., ‘Water plans drift behind a veil of secrecy’ 
<http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics/water-plans-drift-behind-a-veil-of-secrecy-20100411-
s0os.html> accessed November 14, 2010 
298 “He concluded that each year, on average, every Melbourne water ratepayer would pay $345. ''John 
Brumby has in effect signed up every household and business in Melbourne to a debt which averages 
about $9560.”   Millar, R. and Schneiders, B., ‘Desal plant a $570m-a-year drain’ The Age  
<http://www.theage.com.au/victoria/desal-plant-a-570mayear-drain-20100916-15enu.html> accessed 
September 20, 2011 
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The contracts were finally published – in bulk – on the VGPB’s Contract 
Publishing System website under the category of “Building and Construction 
Machinery and Accessories” but with some items being excised.299 Forty-five items 
were excised from the Wonthaggi Desal Contracts300, these included calculation of 
early termination payments for the supply of electricity, annual minimum quantity of 
electronic tradeable renewal energy certificates, details of annual supply of water 
volume and compensation for relevant intervening events. The detail of the water 
security payment is blacked out in the version published in CPS301 and was not 
revealed in a parliamentary inquiry.302  
The Victorian Auditor General acknowledged that excisions on the Wonthaggi 
Desal Contracts were made after consultation with the Secretary of the DSE and 
 
299 DTF, ‘Victorian Desalination Project’ (Contract Publishing System, Department of Treasury and 
Finance, Victoria)  
<http://www.old.tenders.vic.gov.au/domino/Web_Notes/eTenders/etdrPublishing.nsf/ContractsByCateg
ory/6CC923E330DE8F5CCA25767A00109C1E?OpenDocument#Downloads> accessed November 
10, 2010 
300 Pearson, Managing the Requirements for Disclosing Private Sector Contracts 
301 The Minister for Water of the State of Victoria and others, Project Deed Schedule I (2009)   
302 Standing Committee on Finance and Public Administration, Inquiry into the business case for water 
infrastructure (Transcript),  Hearing With Chloe Munro, Chairman of AquaSure Pty Ltd, 17 June 2010 
(Victoria Parliament 2010) 
<http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/images/stories/documents/council/SCFPA/water/Transcripts/Munro
_Final.pdf> accessed 15 February 2012. The dialogue runs as follows: “The CHAIR — I guess to put the 
question directly: will the water usage payment essentially be the same dollar value, irrespective of the 
actual volume of water ordered? Ms MUNRO — I understand the question; however, I am not at liberty 
to answer that. Mr BARBER — Have a look at that table down the bottom, Chair. The CHAIR — The 
table down the bottom, Mr Barber, would be much more helpful if it had numbers on it”. Chloe Munro 
is Aquasure’s Pty Ltd’s chairman and is bound by the confidentiality provision. The State Government, 
however, is not bound by such provision.    
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approved by the Minister of Water.303 Out of 65 excision proposals, 45 were 
approved. However, the parts that are excised are not summarised on the VGPB’s 
Contract Publishing System website and the reason for excision is also absent.  
DSE’s failure to provide reasons for excision appeared to be in contravention 
of Bracks’ policy, which requires that excisions are made on a case by case basis, in 
accordance with the principles of the 1982 Freedom of Information Act and are 
enforced with a time limit. DSE has no protocol to provide for the future release of 
information.304 Responding to the Auditor General’s query on why excisions are not 
supplemented by explanations, DSE argued that it has followed all disclosure 
requirements on Partnership Victoria (see section 4.2.2) and that no such requirements 
exist on FRD12A.305 It also explains that it will provide additional explanation for 
such excision – “as required”306 – in its upcoming (2010) annual report. However, in 
its 2010 annual report, the DSE still did not provide justifications for excisions.307 It 
says only that it will disclose the items excised “if and when the circumstances giving 
 
303 Pearson, Managing the Requirements for Disclosing Private Sector Contracts at p.14 “The process 
to excise information also included consultation with the Minister for Water, the Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal and the Privacy Commissioner. DSE also sought independent legal advice. The 
secretary endorsed and the Minister for Water approved 45 excisions deemed commercially sensitive.” 
304 Ibid p.15 
305 See para. 5 of DSE letter to Victorian Auditor General ibid 
306 Ibid 
307 It only provides several paragraphs with the heading “Disclosure of major contracts note for the 
Victorian desalination plant” explaining that it “carried out a comprehensive assessment of the 
proposed excisions against the above criteria, and obtained all required approvals before releasing the 
documents publicly in November 2009” . Government of Victoria (Department of Sustainability and 
Environment), Annual Report 2010 (2010) 
<http://www.dse.vic.gov.au/CA256F310024B628/0/C9928523D9FF9B3ECA2577A1000C0AF5/$File/
DSE+Annual+Report+2010.pdf> November 01, 2010 at p. 228 
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rise to the exemption are no longer present”.308 When and how these circumstances 
arise is not explained and, as such, there is no exact date as to where the excised items 
will be published. 
Arguably DSE’s argument could be technically correct since FRD12A – 
although it refers to Bracks’ Policy Statement which requires excisions to be 
justified309 – does not explicitly mandate that government departments’ need to 
provide reasons for excision. Nevertheless, it defeats the spirit of Brack’s Policy 
Statement. This likely occurs due to the reliance of the contract publication 
requirement on a set of policies, instead of legislations.  
4.3. Regulatory Decision Making 
4.3.1. Licences 
Melbourne Water does not have any licences since most of the governance 
system is provided through legislation and by itself is acting under delegated 
responsibility from the government in issuing licences for water diversion. 
Meanwhile, The Three Retailers: City West Water, South East Water, and Yarra 
Valley Water respectively, have their own separate business licences. There are five 
 
308 Ibid Furthermore it states that “The 45 excisions from disclosure on the basis of current state 
exemption requirements are to be disclosed in accordance with the state’s requirements, if and when 
the circumstances giving rise to the exemption are no longer present, or those circumstances no longer 
give a basis for exemption under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 and/ or relevant state guidelines 
or requirements.”   
309 Department of Treasury & Finance (Victoria), FRD 12A Disclosure of Major Contracts  
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types of licences, respectively (a) a water licence; (b) a water and sewerage licence; a 
drainage licence; (d) a sewage treatment licence; and (e) a water headworks licence.310  
4.3.1.1. Criteria for approving licence 
The criteria for approving licences is contained in the WIA 1994, in which it is 
determined that the Minister (of Water) has the discretion to refuse or grant licence 
applications for any reason that it considers appropriate.311 The WIA stipulates that 
the Minister must not grant an application unless it is satisfied that all of these 
prerequisites are fulfilled: (a) the applicant is financially viable; (b) the applicant has 
the technical capacity to comply with the conditions of the licence; and that (c) the 
applicant is a Victorian body corporate or a statutory corporation within the meaning 
of the State Owned Enterprises Act 1992.312 Any decision by the Minister with 
respect to a licence application must be communicated to the applicant in the form of 
a written notice. If the decision is in the form of a refusal of such application, the 
Minister is under an obligation to provide reasoning for such refusal.313  
4.3.1.2. Licence conditions 
The conditions of a licence are determined by the Water Industry Act, the 
licence document itself and a statement of obligation issued by the Minister. The WIA 
only sets the general framework for licence conditions, namely, that it requires the 
payment of a specified charge, preventing the licensee from engaging in or 
 
310 Water Industry Act 1994 No. 121 of 1994, Version No. 063 s.5 
311 Ibid  s.6 
312 Ibid 
313 Ibid  s. 6(5) 
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undertaking specified business activities or any other business and requiring 
compliance with a Statement of Obligations issued by the Minister.314  
4.3.1.3. Legal obligation to publish licence  
One key transparency mechanism in Victoria’s water licensing activities is the 
prohibition of persons to apply for a licence unless the Minister has published in the 
Government Gazette and a newspaper circulating in the licensing area inviting the 
application of licences specifying the type of the licence.315  
The WIA contains some obligations on the part of the minister to announce 
and publish applications for licences in the newspaper circulating in Victoria.316 Such 
announcement must specify the name of the applicants and the area which is intended 
to be covered by the licence. The Minister is also obliged to invite interested persons 
to make submissions with respect to the licence applications.317 There is no 
requirement on the WIA to publish licences in newspapers, but the Minister must 
notify the applicant318 in writing of his decision and, in the event of refusal, the 
reasoning for such refusal must be provided.319  
There is a requirement to publish notification in the Victorian Government 
Gazette pursuant to the issuance, revocation or amendment of licences under the WIA. 
This must specify the name of licensees, the term of the licence, the licence area and 
 
314 Ibid s. 7(4) 
315 Ibid s. 5 (2) 
316 Ibid , s.6.3.a 
317 Ibid  s.6.3.b 
318 The applicant must be a Victorian body corporate or a statutory corporation See s. 6 (2) ibid 
319 Ibid  s.6 (5) 
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the place where the copy of such licence may be inspected.320 In practice, licences are 
available from the websites of all of The Three Retailers except for South East 
Water.321   
In addition, the Minister is also obliged to provide notice for the making and 
issuance of the Statement of Obligation to a licensee or any amendments thereof in the 
Government Gazette.322 All of the Statements of Obligations of The Three Retailers 
contain provision obligating (i) the document of the Statement of Obligations itself, 
(ii) information about the services the utility provides and (iii) information about 
water conservation and the efficient and responsible use of water323 “available to the 
public” by way of publication on the licensee’s company website, public inspection at 
the licencee’s offices and provision of the copies of such documents free of charge or 
at a reasonable charge.324   
4.3.2. Selection and removal of economic regulators 
The Essential Services Commission consists of a Chairperson and several full 
time and part time additional Commissioners, the number of which is determined by 
the Minister.325 Additional members may be appointed on a full time or part time 
basis or only for a specific period; or a specific inquiry or determination. The 
 
320 Ibid , s. 13 
321 Government of Victoria, Water and Sewerage Licence, Yarra Valey Water Limited A.B.N. 93 066 
902 501, Reprinted incorporating amendments as at 28 July 2004 Government of Victoria, Water and 
Sewerage Licence, City West Water Limited A.B.N. 70 066 902 467, Reprinted incorporating 
amendments as at 28 July 2004. South East Water’s licence is not available on its website. 
322 Water Industry Act 1994 No. 121 of 1994, Version No. 063 , s.8 
323 Ibid. 
324 , Water Industry Act 1994, Statement of Obligation, City West Water Limited   
325Essential Services Commission Act 2001 (Vic), s.17 
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Chairperson326 and additional members327 of the Commission are appointed by the 
Governor in council. Requirement for and qualifications of the members of the 
Commission are regulated in the ESC Act. Both Chairperson and additional members 
of the Commission should have qualifications in one or more of these fields: industry, 
commerce, economics, law or public administration, either because of their 
knowledge or experiences.328  
The Governor may suspend the Commissioners from office at which event the 
Minister must provide a full statement elaborating the grounds of such suspension to 
the House.329 Suspensions may only escalate into removal if the House in Parliament 
approves the removal through a Resolution. Pursuant to such resolution, the Governor 
must remove the Commissioner. However, if within 42 days after the Minister 
provided such a statement to the House, the House failed to produce a resolution, the 
Governor must reinstate the Commissioner to office.330   
4.3.3. Conflict of interest  
As a rule, the Chairperson of ESC cannot directly or indirectly engage in any 
other paid employment unless approved by the Governor.331 This rule, however, is not 
applicable to the other members of the Commission other than the Chairperson.  
 
326 Ibid s.18 (1)  
327 Ibid s.21 (1) 
328 Ibid, s18, s21 
329 Ibid, s19 (4), s22 (5) 
330 Ibid 
331 Essential Services Commission Act 2001 (Vic), , s.18 
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There is an obligation – applicable to all members of the Commission – to 
disclose existing or foreseeable pecuniary interest332 to the Minister as soon as a 
member becomes aware of it. Following such declaration, the Commissioner is 
barred333 from taking any part in any matters related to the Decision, unless otherwise 
agreed by the Minister. Failure to comply with the obligation to declare pecuniary 
interest to the Minister does not affect the validity of any decision taken by the 
Commission.  
 
 
4.3.4. Means for Acquiring Information 
4.3.4.1. WIA 1994 
The DSE are given wide powers by legislation to acquire information from the 
licensees (which includes The Three Retailers and Melbourne Water). The rationale 
for empowering the DSE with such authority is because the Minister of Water (who is 
a portfolio Minister at the DSE) issues licences to water companies and, therefore, is 
also responsible for the enforcement of the licence conditions. As an authority who 
issues licences, the Minister of Water is also accountable before the Victorian 
Parliament. Information from the companies is, therefore, essential for the Minister in 
order to establish whether or not the companies are complying with the licence 
 
332 Pecuniary interest as a result of supply of goods and services available to members of the public 
under similar terms and conditions are excluded from this rule ibid, s.27 
333 Ibid at s.27 (3) 
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conditions and in order to present the Minister’s accountability report to the 
Parliament and the public.  
The powers to acquire information (which are delegated to “inspectors” under 
s.38) are limited to the following purposes: (a) the planning, construction, operation or 
maintenance of works; (b) technical performance standards; and (c) water quality 
standards.334 The types of powers range from the authority to conduct searches in 
premises, which include the power to inspect, take photographs or samples, seize or 
open any containers which allegedly contain information.335 Under s.45, WIA 1994 it 
also empowers DSE inspectors to require persons to give and/or produce information 
to the inspectors and to provide reasonable assistance to them in carrying out their 
duties.336  
The differences between the “search” power (under s.38) and the “power to 
require information” to be submitted (under s.45) is with respect to its effect on 
another person. Under s.38, other persons remain passive, as their legal obligation is 
only to allow the inspectors to conduct search, inspect and seize anything on their 
premises. Whereas, under the power to require information to be provided (s. 45), 
third parties are required to be active in submitting already available information in 
their possession or in producing information which is not readily available.  Failure to 
 
334 Water Industry Act 1994 No. 121 of 1994, Version No. 063 s.38(1) 
335 Ibid s.38 (2) and s.41  
336 Ibid s.45 (1) 
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do so may entail penalty.337 Deliberately providing misleading information or 
documents is also punishable by penalty.338 
The companies are obligated to keep separate accounts and records of their 
transactions and affairs which explain their financial operation and position. Licensees 
must also report annually water usage by non-domestic, non-agricultural users to the 
Minister, to be further reported to the parliament.339 There is also an obligation to 
report to the Minister, the ESC and the customer.340 
 
 
4.3.4.2. ESC Act  
While regulatory bodies are typically empowered with the authority to obtain 
information only from the regulated companies, the ESC has the power to acquire 
information from both (1) any person341 and (2) the regulated companies.342 Under 
s.37 (General power to obtain information and documents), the ESC can require any 
person to submit information or documents to them, and to appear before them, if they 
believe that such person has information or documents which are relevant and 
 
337 Ibid s.45 (2) 
338 Ibid s.45 (3) 
339 Ibid s.77A 
340 Ibid s.78 
341 Essential Services Commission Act 2001 (Vic) s.37 
342 Ibid s.37A 
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necessary for regulatory purposes.343 In doing so, the ESC must issue a written notice 
specifying the information or document required, the format in which the information 
must be submitted to them, the deadline; referral to s.37 and a copy of that section 
should be included in the notice.344 If such person fails to comply, it could be 
considered an offence which entails penalty.345 There are some limitations to this 
power. First, the obligation to submit information does not apply if the person has a 
“lawful excuse”346 and second, the Minister may limit these powers if it is believed 
that it is used in an inquiry (will be elaborated below) which is not directly correlated 
with the regulated industry.347 The ESC Act also protects disclosers by imposing 
penalties on those who threaten, incite or coerce to cause injuries, losses or 
disadvantages to them.348 
Regulated companies must provide information as requested by the ESC in its 
notice.349  The ESC may require the companies to enter into arrangements with third 
parties in order to compel it to submit the information to the ESC.350 This section also 
 
343 Ibid s.37 
344 Ibid s.37 (2) and (3) 
345 Ibid s.37 (4) 
346 Ibid s.37 (5) A lawful excuse is when the disclosure to the ESC will cause the person to be 
incriminated or leads to a penalty for any other offence. Presumably, a court action may be required to 
disclose this type of information.  S.37(8) clarifies that a person who discloses in good faith is not liable 
for any damage, injury or loss suffered by other person.   
347 Ibid s 41 A. The limitation by the minister is provided through a ministerial direction 
348 Ibid s.37 (7) 
349 Ibid s.37A 
350 Ibid s.37A (1) and (2) 
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empowers the ESC to enact a Code of Practice which specifies the types or classes of 
information that entities must maintain for regulatory purposes.351   
Inquiry powers do not include the power to enter utilities’ premises, however, 
the inquiry power is linked with s.37 (General power to obtain information and 
document) above which empowers the ESC to request information from any person as 
described above.352 Apart from that, there are no other powers provided by the ESC 
Act to conduct inquiries.   
Inquiries can be conducted through the Minister’s referral353 or by the ESC’s 
own initiative.354 If the latter is the case, the ESC must first consult with the 
Minister.355 The ESC is obliged to publish notice of inquiry in the Government 
Gazette, newspapers and the internet, specifying the purpose of the inquiry, the 
matters to be inquired, the length of the inquiry, the period when the public may make 
submissions and the details of public hearings.356 The Act also specifies that in 
conducting inquiries, at least one public hearing must be held.357 If there are 
commercial confidentiality or public interest concerns, the hearing can be conducted 
in private.358 A very important transparency aspect is the requirement to publish the 
final report (by the Minister). The ESC is obligated to submit its final inquiry report to 
 
351 Ibid s.37A (3) 
352 Ibid s.41A 
353 Ibid s.41 (1) 
354 Ibid s.40 
355 Ibid s.40 
356 Ibid s.42 (1) and (2) 
357 Ibid s.43(4) The ESC has the discretion to determine whether a person may appear on the hearing or 
be represented. See s. 43 (4) (b) 
358 Ibid s.43 (5) 
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the Minister359 and must also dissect and indicate information which is confidential or 
commercially sensitive.360 Upon receiving the report, the Minister then must lay the 
copy to the Parliament,361 ensure that the copies are available for public inspection362 
and make the copies publicly available.363 Only non-confidential reports are laid 
before the Parliament and available in the public domain.364 
So, it is the Minister and not the ESC who is obligated to lay the reports in 
front of the Parliament and to make it available to the public. Presumably, this is an 
exercise of the ministerial responsibility doctrine, in which it is the Minister, as a 
political appointee, who is ultimately held accountable to the Parliament. The 
discretion in determining which part of the report is confidential, however, lies with 
the ESC and not the minister.365 
 
4.3.4.3. WIRO and SOO 
There are two categories of powers enjoyed by the ESC in acquiring 
information from the utilities under the WIRO. The first is with respect to price 
enactment where the ESC is given the power to request extra information from the 
 
359 Ibid s. 45 (1) 
360 Ibid s. 45 (2) 
361 Ibid s.45 (5) 
362 Ibid s.45 (6) 
363 Ibid s. 45 (7) 
364 Ibid s.45 (3) 
365 Ibid s.45 (3) 
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utilities, in addition to what they have included in the Water Plan366 (Water Plans will 
be discussed further in the sections regarding Investment and Prices & Tariffs below).  
Secondly, WIRO also empowers the ESC to conduct an audit against the 
utilities. An audit is carried out to ensure utilities’ compliance with service levels, to 
verify the reliability and quality of information submitted to the ESC and to ensure its 
compliance with the Statement of Obligation (SOO).367 Audits made under WIRO are 
limited to only once per financial year.368 WIRO stipulates that all audit results must 
be publicly reported.369 
4.3.4.4. Safe Drinking Water Act 2003 
Another power to acquire information comes from the Safe Drinking Water 
Act. It is the Secretary of State who is empowered to require water storage managers 
or water suppliers to provide information.370 The Secretary can request any 
information especially in relation to compliance with water quality standards371 and 
specify the format and frequency of delivery.372 In addition, water storage managers 
and water suppliers are obligated to report on the condition of drinking water quality 
in Victoria every financial year.373 The Safe Drinking Water Act also protects the 
 
366 Water Industry Regulatory Order (WIRO)  para.12 The purpose for requiring utilities to submit 
additional information is to ensure their compliance with primary legislations in water services and 
ascertain that they have sufficiently consulted on the Water Plan with the relevant authorities 
367 Ibid  para.17 
368 Ibid  para 17(d) 
369 Ibid  para. 19 
370 Safe Drinking Water Act 2003, No.46 of 2003 (Victoria) s.29(1) 
371 Ibid s.29 (2) 
372 Ibid s.29 (4) and (5) 
373 Ibid s.32 
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quality of information by penalising those who knowingly supply false and misleading 
information or data.374 
4.3.5. General Disclosure Policy 
One of the functions of the ESC according to the WIRO is to “publicly report 
the performance of a regulated industry.”375 However, there are two limitations under 
the ESC Act to disclose information to the public. The first is a restriction on 
disclosing information which the ESC acquired by virtue of the powers granted by 
s.37 and s.37A of the ESC Act376 (see section 4.3.4.2) and second, restriction on 
disclosure of any information exempted by the FoI Act 1982.377 Both restrictions 
come with qualifications. 
If the ESC had acquired information under s.37 or s.37A and at the time the 
information was provided to them the person giving the information stated that such 
information is confidential or commercially sensitive, the ESC must ask that person to 
provide (i) the reason why such information is deemed confidential and (2) the harm 
or detriment from disclosure.378 The ESC must not disclose information unless it is 
certain that disclosure will not cause harm to the person supplying it379 (or third 
parties that might be affected by it)380, or, that in such cases where harm occurs, the 
 
374 Ibid s.55 
375 Water Industry Regulatory Order (WIRO)  para 16 
376 Essential Services Commission Act 2001 (Vic) s.38 
377 Ibid s.39 
378 Ibid s.38 (1A) 
379 Ibid s.38 (2) (a) (i) 
380 Ibid s.38 (2) (b) (i) 
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public benefit would outweigh its harm.381 If the ESC eventually decides to disclose 
such information, it must serve notice to the supplier of the information specifying the 
nature of the intended disclosure and its rationale in detail.382 Persons receiving such 
notices may appeal the ESC’s decision of disclosure.383 
The ESC Act also prohibits the disclosure of information if it is acquired from 
other “Ministries or Agencies” and they are exempted under the FoI Act 1982.384 The 
provision does not apply the FoI Act 1982’s exemption clauses to all information in 
ESC’s possession, it only extends to information acquired by the ESC from another 
public bodies.  
This means that an individual may only obtain regulatory information from a 
public body which acquired it in the first place – subject to some restrictions under 
FoI – and, on the other hand, the regulatory bodies can only disclose information if it 
is acquired by itself, after considering the harm and the public interest affected by the 
disclosure. It appears that this provision seeks to protect the exchange of information 
among regulatory bodies from disclosure by the ESC and, therefore, promotes 
uniformity on how FoI exemptions are applied among public bodies.  
4.3.6. Investment 
 
381 Ibid s.38 (2) (a) (ii) and (b) (ii) 
382 Ibid s.38 (2) (c) and (d) 
383 Ibid s.55 (1) (b) Interestingly, only those receiving notice under s.38 (2) (c) and (d) have the right to 
appeal, not all ‘aggrieved’ parties.  
384 Ibid s.39 
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Each utility’s Statement of Obligation (SOO) contains obligations for them to 
manage their assets in a way that would allow them to supply their services 
sustainably, maintain service levels and to minimise their assets’ life-costs as well as 
the environmental, social and economic externalities that may be caused by its 
operation.385  
The details of each utility’s investment plan are contained in a “Water Plan”, 
which must be submitted before the next regulatory period commences. The 
obligation to submit this “Water Plan” is embodied in the SOO.386 There is a 
minimum of information that must be contained in the Water Plan, among others: (a) 
outcomes to be delivered with respect to service levels, fulfilment of future demand, 
its compliance with SOO and other relevant legislations,387 (b) a description of how 
they propose to deliver those outcomes; (c) the utility’s revenue requirements in that 
regulatory period; (d) the proposed price to be charged.388  Utilities are also required 
to describe, in their Water Plan, their proposal to meet their sustainability management 
plans, which incorporates climate change concerns, maintenance of natural assets and 
minimisation of environmental impacts.389 
The WIRO states that there are two ways for prices to be determined by the 
ESC: by way of approval of a Water Plan submitted by utilities390 or by unilaterally 
 
385 , Water Industry Act 1994, Statement of Obligation, City West Water Limited para 14.1 
386 Ibid Part 3 The SOO also sets the deadline for submitting the Water Plan 
387 These are deemed to be the Environment Protection Act 1970, Water Industry Act 1994, Safe 
Drinking Water Act 2003, the Food Act 1984 or the Health (Fluoridation) Act 1973. 
388 , Water Industry Act 1994, Statement of Obligation, City West Water Limited  para 7.3 
389 Ibid para 25.1 and 25.2 
390 Water Industry Regulatory Order (WIRO) para 8.a. 
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specifying prices if utilities fail to submit the Water Plan.391 The latter should occur 
only if the utilities miss the prescribed deadline for the submission of the Water Plan 
or if it has been formulated without due regard to procedural requirements392 as set out 
in the SOO and/or the regulatory principles of the WIRO.393  The “regulatory 
principles” obligate the ESC to allow the utilities to recover its expenditures and rate 
of return on assets, to provide incentives on sustainable water use and improve 
efficiency. It also obligates the price setting to have regard and to ‘take into account’ 
the interest of vulnerable and low income customers. In the English water industry, 
such principles are enshrined in a primary legislation.394  
The Water Plan consists of outcomes which are expected to be delivered by 
the retailers, investment programmes required to deliver such objectives, the 
expenditures involved and the revenue in order to fund the expenditures.395 An 
exposure draft is presented to the ESC for review. The ESC must review the 
consistency between the prices in the Water Plan with WIRO as well as SOO and may 
also use external resources to review the utilities expenditure projections.396  
 
391 Ibid  para 8b 
392 The so called procedural requirements are no more than the duty to consult the drafting of the Water 
Plan with relevant regulatory agencies (Environment Protection Authority, the Secretary to the 
Department of Human Services, and the ESC) with respect to their specific regulatory competences. See 
CWW SOO para 8 
393 Water Industry Regulatory Order (WIRO)  para 10. The regulatory principles are outlined in para. 
14.   
394 Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s.2   
395 See for example Yarra Valley Water, Water Plan 2009/10 - 2012/13, Yarra Valley Water, November 
2008 (2008)   and , Water Industry Act 1994, Statement of Obligation, City West Water Limited  
396 Water Industry Regulatory Order (WIRO)  paras 9, 10 and 13.   
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The Minister of Water (in consultation with the Treasurer) and other 
regulatory agencies can give comments on the retailers’ Water Plan.397 If the Minister 
requests, the retailer must make variation to its Water Plan. There is, at present, no 
obligation for the Minister to explain the rationale behind variation of the water plan 
and such a requirement would require amendments of relevant acts.398 
With respect to other regulatory agencies, the retailer should only ‘pay 
attention’ to their comments. The retailers are under a duty to consult with customers 
but the SOO does not prescribe the detail and timeframe for such consultancies. The 
time frame between the Draft Water Plan and the submission of the Final Water Plan 
to the ESC is one month; meanwhile, the period between final submission and the 
ESC’s obligation to “have regard” to comments from other regulatory agencies is two 
weeks.399 Customer consultation takes place within this one month period.  
One of WIRO’s regulatory principles is an obligation on the utilities to enable 
customers and potential customers to understand pricing and how it is calculated.400 
This one month period is perceived to be too short to allow agencies and the public to 
comment on the Draft Water Plan. A four month timeframe between the Draft Water 
 
397 See for example, , Water Industry Act 1994, Statement of Obligation, City West Water Limited  para 
8.1.a and 8.2 
398 Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission, Water Ways: Inquiry into Reform of the 
Metropolitan Retail Water Sector, Final Report February 2008 p.153  
399 Ibid 
400 Water Industry Regulatory Order (WIRO) para 14 (1) (a) (ix) If utilities fail to adhere to this 
provision then the Water Plan may be deemed contrary to ‘regulatory principles’ and as a result they 
may need to be revised or the ESC will instead prescribe prices 
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Plan and the Final Water Plan is perceived to be ideal.401 It is suggested that the SOO 
contain an obligation for the Minister to explain and publish his rationale for requiring 
the variation of the Water Plan. It is also suggested that other regulatory agencies 
publish their comments on the Draft Water Plan.402  
Neither the WIRO nor utilities’ SOOs contain specific obligations to publish 
the Water Plan. The SOO, however, requires that utilities “develop and implement 
open and transparent processes to engage its customers and the community in its 
planning processes”.403 in addition to some obligations to make available to the public 
information about water supply, sewerage and recycled water services, water 
conservation and the efficient and responsible use of water; and also to put 
educational materials about water conservation into schools.404 In practice, the Water 
Plan is published on the ESC’s website. The utilities also make available the water 
plans on their websites in order to ensure consistency with the obligation to develop 
an ‘open and transparent’ planning process.405 
Another important document in the planning process is the “Corporate Plan”. 
Information on the Water Plan feeds in to the corporate plans. All other 16Victorian 
water businesses are obligated by the 1989 Water Act to submit corporate plans to the 
 
401 Victorian Competition and Efficiency Commission, Water Ways: Inquiry into Reform of the 
Metropolitan Retail Water Sector, Final Report February 2008 See Box 7.3 
402 Ibid See Box 7.3 
403 CWW SOO para 10.1 
404 CWW SOO para 10.2 
405 Lower Murray Water, Lower Murray Water Exposure Draft Water Plan 2008-09 to 2012-13, 
October 2007 (2007) <http://www.lmw.vic.gov.au/documents/132602PartC-8October2007.pdf>  Yarra 
Valley Water, Water Plan 2009/10 - 2012/13, Yarra Valley Water, November 2008 
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Minister and the Treasurer406 for their approval. However, ever since the retail 
function was unbundled from Melbourne Water into The Three Retailers, the 
applicability of this provision to the retailers is not clear.407 The Water Act does not 
obligate the corporate plans to be published, however, companies must ensure that 
they are ready for inspection, upon request.408 In practice, South East Water publishes 
this on their website409 while other utilities do not. The ESC and the retailers often 
refer to Corporate Plans on their official documents. 
 
4.3.7. Tariffs & Prices 
The Water Plan exposure draft is made available for public review. The final 
drafts are also published. Unless the ESC decides to determine prices on its own, the 
Water Plan will be the substantial document upon which the prices are based.  
Various consultations are carried out in the price setting process. The ESC has 
a good practice of making the consultation documents and the public comments and 
 
406 Corporations Act 2001 Part 13 
407 According to a Guide issued by the Victorian Government: “Each water business must submit an 
annual corporate plan that provides a statement of corporate intent, expected activities and a financial 
forecast for the following five years.” See Victorian Government, A Governance Guide to the Victorian 
Water Industry (The State of Victoria 2009)   p. 10 ‘Water business’ refers also to The Three Retailers. 
However, according to a manual issued by the Victorian Water Industry Association, the corporate 
plans are obligated only for the statutory water corporations. See VIctorian Water Industry Association 
Inc, Legal Compliance and Information Manual Victorian Water Industry (2009)   para 17.1   
408 Corporations Act 2001 s.249   
409 South East Water, Water Solutions for a Better Future, Corporate Plan 2011–2016 (2011) 
<http://www.southeastwater.com.au/SiteCollectionDocuments/About_Us/Corporate_Reports/Corporate
_Plan-2011_2016.pdf> Octiber 24, 2011 
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submissions available on its website.410 Water utilities also conduct various 
consultations with stakeholders, as they are required by the SOO411 to develop an 
open and transparent planning process. One of the “regulatory principles” under 
WIRO412 – with which the utilities must comply if they want their Water Plan to be 
approved by the ESC – is to enable customers to understand pricing. As such, the 
water utilities’ method of consultation is embodied in their Water Plan.  
ESC’s power to make determinations is vested in the ESC Act.413 The ESC 
Act obligates that every determination includes a statement of purpose and the reason 
for making such determination.414 When a determination is made, a notice must be 
published in the Government Gazette, the daily newspaper generally circulating in 
Victoria or on the internet.415 Such a notice must contain information on the nature 
and effect of the determination, the effective date and how the copy of such 
determination may be obtained from the Commission.416 The ESC is obliged to send 
the copies of its Determination to regulated entities and to any person who makes 
inquiries.417   
 
 
410 ‘Melbourne metropolitan water price review 2009-10 to 2012-13, Consultations’ (Essential Services 
Commission,)  
<http://www.esc.vic.gov.au/public/Water/Consultations/Melbourne+metropolitan+water+price+review
+2009-10+to+2012-13/Melbourne+metropolitan+water+price+review+2009-10+to+2012-13.htm> 
accessed October 16, 2011  
411 , Water Industry Act 1994, Statement of Obligation, City West Water Limited  
412 Water Industry Regulatory Order (WIRO) 
413 Essential Services Commission Act 2001 (Vic)  s.33 
414 Ibid s.35 (1) 
415 Ibid. s.35 (2) 
416 Ibid. s.35 (3) 
417 Ibid. s. 35 (4) 
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4.3.8. Service Levels and Customer Service 
The ESC has the power to make determinations418 with respect to standards 
and conditions of service and supply, licensing, market conduct and ‘other’ economic 
regulatory matters as stipulated by the empowering instrument419. Other normative 
sources for service levels and customer service are found in the WIRO, the Codes of 
Practice and the approved Water Plan. Drinking water quality standards are regulated 
directly by legislation.420 
The WIRO enables the ESC to prescribe service standards, either by 
approving companies’ Water Plans or by issuing Codes.421 In practice, quantitative 
service standards (such as the average time taken to repair leaks or average duration or 
planned interruption) as well as Guaranteed Service Level payment schemes of each 
company are approved by the ESC through the Customer Services Code (CSC)422 as 
the conditions differ from company to company.   
The CSC sets the general standards on what the customer can expect from its’  
utility.423 It contains the utilities’ duty to connect to customers, and the utilities’ right 
 
418 Ibid at s.34 
419 “Empowering instrument” is defined as other relevant legislations; a Governor’s Order, the Tariff 
Order; or the Water Industry Regulatory Order made under Part 1A of the Water Industry Act 1994, see 
s.3 of the Essential Services Commission Act 2001 (Vic) 
 
420 Safe Drinking Water Act 2003, No.46 of 2003 (Victoria)   
421 Water Industry Regulatory Order (WIRO) para 15 
422 Essential Services Commission, Customer Service Code Metropolitan Retail and Regional Water 
Businesses (Issue No 7, 15 October 2010, 2007) <http://www.esc.vic.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/D8B6324D-
1531-4BD2-B9A6-80FE9E0A44D1/0/CustomerServiceCode.pdf>  these forms Schedules 2 and 1 of 
the CSC 
423 Ibid 
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to refuse or discontinue connection to waste water service which is not in accordance 
with the utilities’ terms. The Code also regulates charges that water businesses can 
impose on customers, the complaints and disputes policy and the resolution of 
disputes. The CSC also requires utilities to provide customer information about 
referral to EWOV and other external dispute resolution when a complainant is not 
satisfied with the utility’s response.424 One key transparency mechanism is the 
obligatory publication of the Customer Charter containing the condensed form of the 
CSC and explaining the details of service levels and customer service standards that 
customers can expect from the utilities.425  
The format of billing is regulated in the Code.426 It is stipulated that a bill must 
contain certain information such as the date of issue, the customer’s billing address 
and account number, including the amount, the date and ways for the customer to pay 
the bill, the total of any payments made by the customer since the last bill, information 
on concessions available and any concession to which the customer may be entitled, 
and in the event of financial difficulties, the channels available to resolve the situation.  
Bills must be broken down into several parts to increase transparency: any 
service charge to the property, the usage charge for each service to the property, other 
charges in connection with the provision of services and rates and other charges.427 
The bill must also contain graphical illustrations of the customer’s current water and 
recycled water usage, the customer’s usage for each billing period over the previous 
 
424 Ibid para 3.2 
425 See ibid Part C (Customer Charter) 
426 Ibid part 4, p.5 
427 Ibid p. 5-6 
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12 months; and a comparison of the customer’s usage with the customer’s usage for 
the same period of the previous year. 
In case of financial difficulty, a water business is obligated to make flexible 
payment plans according to the customer’s capacity to pay. Other measures such as 
referral to the Utility Relief Grant Scheme or free financial advice are available. There 
is also a hardship policy428 which will be applicable if a customer has the intention but 
not the financial capability to pay its bill. The code forbids utilities to employ supply 
restriction, legal action, or any additional debt recovery costs if a customer is suffering 
hardship.429 There is a requirement in the Code that this hardship policy must be 
published on the utility’s website and a copy must be made available to a customer 
upon request.430  
As for water quality, the Safe Drinking Water Act requires the publication of 
water quality monitoring programmes within seven days after the test results are 
compiled.431 There are penalties for the publication of knowingly misleading 
materials.432 The Secretary of State can impose additional reporting duties if there are 
risks to public health433 and to require water suppliers to notify customers that 
treatment might be required before drinking.434 
 
428 Ibid p.9-10 
429 Ibid para 5.4 
430 Ibid para 5.4 
431 Safe Drinking Water Act 2003, No.46 of 2003 (Victoria) s.23 
432 Ibid s.23 
433 Ibid s.34 (1) and (2) 
434 Ibid s.34 (3) (b) 
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Unlike England, however, the “Guaranteed Service Levels” schemes are so far 
voluntary. Business is not bound to provide compensation to customers for failures to 
meet service levels. Lack of clarified service levels435 and inadequate historical data 
on service levels are among the reasons why some businesses are reluctant to propose 
GSL Schemes.436 All three retailers have GSL schemes.  
The Customer Service Code (CSC) obligates utilities to make available to 
customers all regulatory instruments including the CSC itself.437 The GSL must be 
approved by the ESC. After they are approved, they form a part of the ESC-issued 
Customer Service Code.438 As every code must be published, the approved GSL 
schemes are also automatically published along with the CSC.   
4.3.9. Non-compliance 
The ESC publishes performance reports on the retailers regularly. The 
performance report synthesises data from each retailer’s Key Performance Indicator 
 
435 GSL payments are said to be appropriate when businesses propose higher service levels than what is 
required by regulation. The existing service levels already require compliance. GSL may have 
disincentives; for example, utilities may choose to pay GSL rather than improving the service. See 
Brody, G., Policy Proposals for refinements to Essential Services Commission regulatory framework 
for water (Prepared for the Department of Sustainability and Environment by the Consumer Law Centre 
Victoria) <www.consumeraction.org.au/downloads/DL91.pdf>  
436 Lower Murray Water, Lower Murray Water Exposure Draft Water Plan 2008-09 to 2012-13, 
October 2007 p.9 
437 Essential Services Commission, Customer Service Code Metropolitan Retail and Regional Water 
Businesses  para 12.8 
438 Ibid See Schedule 1 (Approved GSL Schemes) 
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set by the ESC and through audits made by ESC.439 Water utilities’ compliance with 
service levels is outlined in the performance report.  
The ESC has enforcement powers against contraventions with WIRO, Codes 
or Determinations made by it, applicable only when such contraventions are deemed 
to be of a “non-trivial” nature.440 There are two kinds of enforcement orders: 
provisional and final. The purpose of such orders is to ensure compliance with WIRO, 
Codes and Determinations or in rectifying the occurrence of contraventions.441 A final 
order is not required if the utilities provide an undertaking or that the ESC is satisfied 
with their actions.442 Inquiries might be established before any sanctioning is imposed.  
Penalties are available for not complying with the orders.443 There is  room for 
objection and submission.444 One key transparency mechanism of non-compliance is 
the publication of the orders in the Government Gazette.445  
4.3.10. Redress 
A water utility’s operational licence contains a clause obligating the utility to 
enter into a dispute resolution scheme. There is no specific reference to EWOV (the 
Energy and Water Ombudsman of Victoria) on utilities’ licences. The Three Retailers 
 
439 Essential Services Commission, Water performance report Performance of urban water businesses 
2009-10 (December 2010) <http://www.esc.vic.gov.au/NR/rdonlyres/7C1CEDEC-37DA-4C8F-A298-
7423D1524305/0/RPT200910urbanwaterperformancereports20101222.pdf> September 20, 2011 
440 Essential Services Commission Act 2001 (Vic) s.53(1) 
441 Ibid s.53(2) 
442 Ibid s.53(5) 
443 Ibid s.53(9) 
444 Ibid s.53(6) 
445 Ibid s.53 (7) 
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licences contain only a general obligation for the utilities to enter into a dispute 
resolution scheme.446  In practice, utilities enter into contractual agreements with 
EWOV to resolve disputes.  
The obligation to inform the public of the existence of a dispute resolution 
body lies with both the utilities and the EWOV itself – by virtue of its Charter. 
Utilities are obligated under the ESC Code to “provide to customer, information about 
referral to [EWOV] and other relevant external dispute resolution”, in the event that 
the customer is not satisfied by the response from the water utility.447 The EWOV 
Charter, meanwhile, contains the obligation to promote its dispute resolution scheme 
and to make available to the public “an accurate and up-to-date list of all 
Participants”.448 It appears from the Code that the obligation to inform of the 
existence of a dispute resolution body is triggered only when the customer is not 
satisfied with the utility’s explanation. When a customer is satisfied, the obligation to 
inform the existence of the EWOV scheme does not arise.  
The Decision by the Ombudsman shall be made in writing and should provide 
rationales.449 The Decision must be published but the names of the parties must not be 
 
446 Government of Victoria, Water and Sewerage Licence, Yarra Valey Water Limited A.B.N. 93 066 
902 501, Reprinted incorporating amendments as at 28 July 2004 Government of Victoria, Water and 
Sewerage Licence, City West Water Limited A.B.N. 70 066 902 467, Reprinted incorporating 
amendments as at 28 July 2004 para 7b 
447 Essential Services Commission, Customer Service Code Metropolitan Retail and Regional Water 
Businesses  para 3.1.d 
448  Energy and Water Ombudsman Victoria, Energy and Water Ombudsman Charter 30 May 2006 
para. 2.2 
449 Ibid para 6.2 
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identified.450 From the perspective of the complainant, this requirement is 
understandable, since water disputes may involve the indication of a financial problem 
which is a matter of a complainant’s privacy. For the utilities, however, water disputes 
with complainants may reveal its compliance with service level and customer rights. 
Such information may be in the public interest to be disclosed. The EWOV Charter 
stipulates that in the event of a dispute utilities should provide all relevant information 
to the Ombudsman, except for confidential information of a third party, after a 
reasonable effort by the utilities to acquire it.451 There is an obligation for the 
Ombudsman “to act in accordance with accepted privacy principles”.452 It is not clear 
to whom this privacy concept is applicable, since the corporation could also,  to a 
certain extent, invoke some privacy protection. 
Finally, EWOV’s form as a private entity – a company limited by guarantee – 
has cultivated criticism in the literature.453   EWOV’s private status means that the FoI 
Act will not be applicable to it – this will be discussed in another section below. 
However, in terms of the active disclosure rule the redress mechanism provided by 
EWOV is adequately transparent.  
 
 
450 Ibid  para 6.1 
451 Ibid para 5.1.c 
452 Ibid, para 5.1.d 
453 Criticism on the existence of EWOV as a “creature of contract” (Company Limited by Guarantee) 
and its accountability implications has been raised in the literature. See O'Shea, P. and Rickett, C., ‘In 
Defence of Consumer Law: The Resolution of Consumer Disputes’ (2009) 28 Sydney L Rev  139 
Stuhmcke, A., ‘How good is private justice?’ 71(1) The Law Institute Journal 6 Zifcak, S., ‘Complaint 
Resolution in Government Owned Corporations and Privatised Utilities: Some Legal and Constitutional 
Conundrums’ in Michael J. Whincop (ed), From bureaucracy to business enterprise: legal and policy 
issues in the transformation of government services (Ashgate 2003) 
 
 137 
4.4. Corporate Governance 
The Three Retailers are a Public Company Limited by Shares, with the 
Victorian Government as the sole Shareholders. This type of company is subject to 
certain disclosure requirements under the Australian Corporations Act of 2001. In 
addition, The Three Retailers are also regulated by the Water Industry Act 1994 (Vic), 
the State Owned Enterpise Act 1992, the ESC Act of 2004, WIRO, and a set of Codes 
prescribed by the ESC. The disclosure rules applicable to The Three Retailers are, 
therefore, a result of a combination of these regulatory frameworks. 
4.4.1. Corporate structure and the Board 
The corporate structure of The Three Retailers follows the Corporations Act, 
as they were established under it. The Corporations Act 2001 contains obligations for 
companies to lodge to ASIC personal details of a new secretary or director of the 
company.454 It obligates companies to report to their members, (i) the financial report, 
(ii) the directors’ report, and (iii) the auditor’s report.455 There is no public disclosure 
requirement, although if members elect, they may choose that companies publish 
these reports on their websites, which would render them available to the public at 
large.456 
As an SOE, The Three Retailers are subject to reporting rules under the SOE 
Act which contain some accountability mechanisms. The SOE Act requires the 
 
454 Corporations Act 2001 s. 205 B The details include their given and family names; all of their former 
given and family names, date and place of birth; and addresses. 
455 Ibid s.314 
456 Ibid s.314 (1AA) 
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Treasurer to present accounts and report to the Parliament on (i) the retailers’ 
memorandum and articles of association as well as its amendments, (ii) financial 
reports, directors’ reports and auditor’s report and (iii) every report by the Auditor 
General with respect to the company.457 There is no requirement to publicly disclose 
the contents of these reports and accounts in the SoE Act.458 When they are tabled at  
Parliament the author assumes that they are under public scrutiny and can be accessed 
through the state Gazette.459 In practice, the annual report, which also contain the 
directors’ report, financial report and auditor general’s report is published by The 
Three Retailers.460 
Under the Public Administration Act (PAA)461 the Minister has the authority 
to appoint, remove or recommend the appointment and removal of the directors of a 
State Owned Company.462 The PAA also determines that the board of a State-Owned 
Company is “accountable to the Minister responsible for the entity for the exercise of 
 
457 State Owned Enterprises Act 1992 (Vic) s.75 
458 The Water Industry Act actually requires retailers to report to the Minister, the Commission and its 
customers. However, this general reporting obligation does not detail what information it must report. 
See Water Industry Act 1994 No. 121 of 1994, Version No. 063 s.78 
459 However, the Victorian Government Gazette is not user friendly. The author is unable to find any 
record of The Three Retailers’ Memorandum and Articles of Association or any reports by its directors.  
460 South East Water, Annual Report 2010-2011 including the Financial Report, (2011) 
<http://www.sewl.com.au/SiteCollectionDocuments/Corporate_Reporting/Annual_Report_2010-
11.pdf> October 20, 2011 Yarra Valley Water, Yarra Valley Water Ltd, Annual Report 2010/11 (2011) 
<http://www.yvw.com.au/yvw/groups/public/documents/document/yvwannualreport2011.pdf> October 
20, 2011 City West Water, City West Water Ltd, Annual Report 2011 (2011) 
<http://www.citywestwater.com.au/documents/annual_report_2011.pdf> October 20, 2011 
461 The PAA define “Public Entity” as “…a body, whether corporate or unincorporated that is 
established by or under an Act (other than a private Act) or the Corporations Act”. See Public 
Administration Act (Victoria) 2004 s.5 (1) 
462 Ibid s.85 (2) (b) (i) 
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its functions”463, in this case, the Minister of Water. In addition, the Minister may give 
directions to them or request information from them.464 All of these powers enjoyed 
by the Minister shall be held accountable to the Parliament.465 
The prerequisite for becoming a director is prescribed only generally by the 
Corporations Act.466 The rules of appointment and dismissal for the board members 
are not available in the public domain, although presumably, as an entity established 
under the Corporations Act, they are prescribed by a resolution.467 As every 
amendment of the company’s Memorandum and Articles of Association must be 
tabled by the Treasurer to the Parliament, the resolutions should, therefore, be 
available and accessible at the Victorian Government Gazette.468  
 In practice, the appointments of members of The Three Retailers’ Board are 
quite transparent. The Department of Sustainability and Environment issue an 
advertisement accessible through its website, outlining the vacant position, its duties 
and challenges, links to the remuneration rules, the selection criteria and its process 
 
463 Ibid s.85 (1) 
464 Ibid s.85 (2) (b) (ii) 
465 Ibid s.85 (2) 
466 Corporations Act 2001 s.201B.  It only specifies the minimum age of 18 and that if a person was 
previously disqualified, ASIC’s permission would be required 
467 Ibid s.203D The Public Administration Act contain rules on removal of directors which are vested on 
the person appointing them. However, for State-Owned Companies, this rule can be derogated by the 
companies’ constitution See. Public Administration Act (Victoria) 2004 s.89 (10) 
468 The author, however, is unable to find any of the retailers’ Articles of Association at the Victorian 
Government Gazette Kothari, ‘Privatising human rights–the impact of globalisation on adequate 
housing, water and sanitation’ 
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and the procedures to apply.469 After being shortlisted and endorsed by the cabinet, 
the Minister for Water announces the result of the selection process.470  
However, the Corporations Act allows directors to appoint one or more 
managing director from among themselves471 or “alternate director” and subsequently 
delegate their responsibilities to them.472 This can be done without any interference by 
the Treasurer or the Minister473, unless it is specified otherwise in the company’s 
constitution.    
4.4.2. Related party transaction 
The Corporations Act regulates the provision of financial benefit to related 
parties, and obligates members’ approval for such transactions, unless the transaction 
is carried out at arm’s length or is less favourable than arm’s length.474 This 
arrangement, however, is in place in order to protect company members “as a whole” 
 
469 Department of Sustainability and the Environment, ‘Melbourne Water Retailer Board Director’   
<www.ourwater.vic.gov.au/boardappointments> accessed January 4, 2011 
470 State Government of Victoria, ‘Appointments to Melbourne region water boards’ (September 6, 
2011)  <http://www.premier.vic.gov.au/media-centre/media-releases/1910-appointments-to-melbourne-
region-water-boards.html> accessed October 21, 2011 
471 Corporations Act 2001 s.201 J This rule could be replaced by the company’s constitution 
472 Ibid s.201K This rule could be replaced by the company’s constitution 
473 The Victorian Parliament’s Public Accounts and Estimate Committee cited the appointment of City 
West Water’s CEO by the Board which was conducted without any involvement from the Minister or 
Treasurer. Victoria Parliament Public Accounts Estimates Committee, Report on the inquiry into 
corporate governance in the Victorian public sector : sixty third report to the Parliament (2005)   p.48 
474 Corporations Act 2001 s.208 According to the Act, ‘financial benefit’ is to be interpreted broadly, 
even if criminal or civil penalties may be involved and it includes any transactions such as giving or 
providing finance or property, buying, selling, leasing an asset, supplying or receiving services, issuing 
securities or granting an option, taking up or releasing an obligation in connection with related party. 
See also s.210 
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and not specifically tailored for consumer protection. 475  In addition, the definition of 
“related party” only covers “controlling entities” and directors and spouses and, as 
such, is not wide enough to cover all affiliated entities. 476   There is no public 
disclosure requirement for such transactions.  
The Corporations Act requires compliance with accounting standards477 and 
mandates the Australian Accounting Standards Board to issue such accounting 
standards.478 The AASB’s479 definition of “related party” 480 is broader than the 
Corporations Act and it requires public disclosure of transactions entered into with 
them in the companies’ annual reports.481 However, the 2009 edition of AASB 124 
excludes government entities from its public disclosure obligation.482  
The ESC enacted the Regulatory Accounting Code (RAC), which regulates 
both transactions with a “related party” and with a “third party”. A related party is 
defined as any other entity subject to control or significant influence by the water 
business whereas a third party is a term used to cover transactions with any party 
which is not categorised as a related party. 483  The definition of “related party” in the 
RAC is a simple one and covers the relationship between the water businesses and a 
 
475 Ibid s.207 
476 Ibid s.228 Various parties are included in the definition of related party, including “controlling 
entities”, parties ‘acting in concert with a related party as well as directors, spouses (and de facto 
spouses) and relatives (parents and children)’ 
477 Ibid s.296(1)  
478 Ibid s.334 
479 Australian Accounting Standards Board, AASB 124, Related Party Disclosures (2009)   
480 Ibid 
481  ibid para 18 
482 Ibid  
483 Essential Services Commission, Water Industry Regulatory Accounting Code, October 2009, Issue 
No. 4 (2009)   p.11 
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daughter company or any other company within its influence. This is because, unlike 
the English water utilities with multiple layers of ownership, the Victorian 
Government is the ultimate shareholder of the companies.  
In conducting transactions with a related party, water businesses are required 
to disclose the names of the related party, the water businesses interest in them, the 
value of payment, a description of how the payment is reflected through RAC and a 
description on how shared costs are allocated.484 Similar to the English June Return 
Reporting Manual485, information on related party transactions are confidential. For 
transactions with any third parties worth more than 1 million USD of Opex or 10 
million USD of Capex, the names of the third parties, description of the service, the 
values of payments made to them, a description of the basis of the payment made and 
how they are reflected in RAC must be provided.486    
As the Corporations Act requires no public disclosure of a transaction which 
provides benefit to a related party, the AASB exempts public disclosure requirements 
for government entities and the RAC related party disclosure to ESC is confidential; 
there are no normative requirements for the public disclosure of related party 
transactions entered into by The Three Retailers. However, as a matter of practice, all 
 
484 Ibid part B.12 
485 Ofwat, Chapters 30 & 31: Transactions with Associated Companies, June return reporting 
requirements and definitions manual 2011, Issue 1.0 - January 2011 (Ofwat 2011) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/content?id=07f6e8a1-2ef2-11e0-805b-21f1b94cbce2> accessed June 7, 2011 
486 Essential Services Commission, Water Industry Regulatory Accounting Code, October 2009, Issue 
No. 4 part B.11 
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of The Three Retailers still published their related party transactions in their 2010-
2011 annual reports.487  
4.4.3. Corporate restructuring 
Under the SOE Act prescribed Articles of Association, no offering, allotment 
issuance of shares, disposal or sale of a main undertaking and involvement in 
acquisition, or disposal of shares in a subsidiary is possible without a ‘special 
resolution’.488  As the Victorian government is the sole owner of The Three Retailers, 
they obtain ultimate control of such resolutions.  
Assuming the Treasurer agrees to the sale of assets or shares of The Three 
Retailers, will the process be transparent? The SOE Act contains no reference as to 
public disclosure of such plans. Presumably, this is perceived as a policy matter in 
which the Treasurer and other Cabinet members would be subjected to Parliamentary 
scrutiny. As discussed above, any changes to the company’s Memorandum or Articles 
of Association must be tabled at the Parliament.489  
However, the Constitution requires that water utilities are a “public authority”, 
accountable to the Minister. 490 This provision is “entrenched” as it can only be 
modified if a special majority is achieved. 491 Therefore, every corporate restructuring 
 
487 South East Water, Annual Report 2010-2011 including the Financial Report Yarra Valley Water, 
Yarra Valley Water Ltd, Annual Report 2010/11 City West Water, City West Water Ltd, Annual Report 
2011 
488 SOE Act 1992, Exhibit I, para 3,4,5 
489 State Owned Enterprises Act 1992 (Vic) s.75 
490 Constitution Act 1975, No. 8750 of 1975, Version No. 196 s.97 (1) (2) 
491 Ibid s.18(2)(h) 
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measure which will affect the status of the water utility as a Public Authority would 
require a constitutional change by parliamentary vote. As such a plan would require 
parliamentary scrutiny and provoke a public debate, it is a transparency mechanism in 
itself.  
4.5. Passive Disclosure Rule 
4.5.1. Applicability of FoI Act into water institutions  
Table 3 
Institutions Role FoI 
Applicable? 
Minister of Water; Department 
of Sustainability and 
Environment 
General policy/ 
direction and 
Licensing 
 
Yes 
Treasurer at the Department of 
Treasury 
Financial 
management 
Yes 
Secretary at the Department of 
Health 
Drinking Water Yes 
Essential Services Commission Pricing and 
monitoring of 
performance 
Yes 
Environment Protection 
Authority 
Environmental 
protection, waste 
water discharges 
Yes 
Energy and Water Ombudsman Consumer dispute No 
Victorian Ombudsman Public Service 
Complains 
Yes 
City West Water Ltd Retail water supply 
and sewerage services 
in Melbourne 
metropolitan area 
Yes 
South East Water Ltd Yes 
Yarra Valley Water Ltd Yes 
Melbourne Water Bulk Water Supplier Yes 
Aquasure Consortium of SUEZ- 
Degremont, et al, 
water desalination 
plant, concessionaire. 
No. 
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The Victorian FoI Act is applicable to “Agencies”492, which could be in the 
form of a Government Department, Council or a Prescribed Authority. “Prescribed 
Authorities” under the FoI Act cover (a) a body corporate for a public purpose or a 
body unincorporated created by the Governor in Council or by a Minister,493 (b) any 
other body declared by the regulations to be a prescribed authority either because they 
are supported directly or indirectly by government funds or through other assistance or 
over which the State is in a position to exercise control or a body established by or 
under an Act of Parliament.494 
A branch of the executive in Victoria is covered by the FoI Act as a 
government department. The Minister of Water, Department of Sustainability and 
Environment, Treasurer at the Department of Treasury, Secretary at the Department of 
Health, Essential Services Commission and Environment Protection Authority all fall 
under this category.495  
Melbourne Water is covered under the Act as a Prescribed Authority, a body 
established under an Act of Parliament.496 The Three Retailers: City West Water Ltd, 
South East Water Ltd and Yarra Valley Water Ltd are a Prescribed Authority under 
 
492 “agency means a department council or a prescribed authority”, “…council has the same meaning as 
in section 3(1) of the Regional Government Act 1989” ; “department means a department within the 
meaning of the Public Administration Act 2004 or an office specified in section 16(1) of that Act”;  
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Victoria) No. 9859 of 1982 Version No. 066 , s.5(1) 
493 Ibid, s.5(1) (a).   
 
494 Ibid, s.5(1) (b) 
495 Ibid, s.5(1) 
496 Freedom of Information Act 1982 Section 5a 
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the Victorian FoI Act as confirmed by the Freedom of Information Regulations 
2009.497 
Not covered by the FoI Act are the Victorian Energy and Water Ombudsman 
(EWOV) and Aquasure. EWOV is not covered by the FoI (Vic) Act as it is a company 
limited by guarantee and is not yet determined as a Prescribed Authority through the 
Freedom of Information Regulations. Aquasure, the consortium partnering with 
Victorian government to provide desalination services to Melbourne Water, is a 
purely private entity. Aquasure is not covered by the Victorian FoI Act although 
information it submits to the government during the tender process and in the course 
of routine regulatory activities can be subjected to FoI requests. This reveals that the 
‘privatisation’ of services (be that in the form of dispute resolution or provision of 
bulkwater) hinders the application of the FoI Act.    
4.5.2. Exemption clauses  
The FoI Act (Vic)498 contains a number of exemptions: personal information, 
cabinet documents (s 28), Commonwealth’s diplomatic matters (s 29A), internal 
working documents (s 30); law enforcement documents (s 31); documents affecting 
legal proceedings (s 32); documents affecting personal privacy (s 33); trade secrets, 
etc. (s 34); material obtained in confidence (s 35); any information where disclosure 
would be contrary to the public interest (s 36); certain documents arising out of 
companies and securities legislation (s 37); documents to which secrecy provisions of 
 
497 Freedom of Information Regulations 2009 S.R. No. 33/2009 Section 5b 
498 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) 
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enactments apply (s 38); council documents (s 38A) and disclosures where the 
processing of an application would be unduly burdensome. 
Several types of exemptions, namely internal working documents (s 30); law 
enforcement documents (s 31); documents relating to trade secrets, etc. (s 34); 
documents containing material obtained in confidence (s 35); and exemptions where 
disclosure would be contrary to the public interest (s 36) are of important relevance to 
water utilities’ regulation and, therefore, will be evaluated in detail.   
However, before considering the exemption clauses in detail, it would be 
necessary to discuss the unique structure of the “public interest” test under the 
Victorian FoI Act. Unlike the English and the Indonesian FoI Acts, the Victorian FoI 
Act has two kinds of public interest clause. The first type is public interest test clauses 
that come together with FoI exemptions clauses, such as in sections 30, 34 (2) and 35 
1 (b) as discussed above. In this type of exemption, the public body has the discretion 
to consider whether disclosure of a particular document would be in the public 
interest. The second type is a general public interest “override” in s.50(4). This clause 
is applicable to all exemptions, except for exemptions in sections 28, 31(3), and 33. 
The authority to evaluate exemptions rests not on a public body (or ‘Agency’, the term 
used in Victoria’s FoI) but on the Tribunal, when a dispute occurs.  
When arguing for an s.50(4) override, the onus of proof on the existence of a 
public interest in disclosure lies with the applicant. 499 This runs contrary to the 
 
499  Russell, E.W., Waterman, E. and Seddon, N., Audit Review of Government Contracts: Contracting, 
Privatisation, Probity and Disclosure in Victoria 1992–1999, An Independent Report to Government 
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ordinary public interest test which put the onus on the public authority in 
demonstrating that there is a public interest not to disclose such as in s.35 and 36. In 
cases where both types of public interest clauses applies, the Tribunal might be 
required to examine public interest twice500, in two stages, each having a different and 
competing idea: the first, the public interest in not disclosing the information argued 
by the public authority, and when this is confirmed, the second stage under s.50(4), 
the public interest for disclosing the information, argued by the applicant.   
In Department of Premier and Cabinet v Hulls the appeal court invoked the 
idea that public interests in the general exemption clauses ( in ss.29-38)  may wear 
different aspects with the public interest in s.50(4).501 This means that whilst the Court 
may accept Public Interest arguments for maintaining the exemptions, the Court may 
still weigh different aspects of Public Interest which leads to disclosure.  
4.5.2.1. Internal working documents (s.30) 
This section exempts documents containing recommendations, advice, 
opinion, consultations or deliberations taking place among officers and ministers in 
the course of government processes. Disclosure of such documents is prohibited if it 
would be contrary to a public interest. 
 
(State Government of Victoria, (May 2000), 2000) 
<http://www.dpc.vic.gov.au/auditreview/1_main.pdf> November 10, 2010 
500 Ibid 
501 Department of Premier and Cabinet v Hulls  Department of Premier and Cabinet v Hulls [1999] 
VSCA 117 (11 August 1999) Supreme Court of Victoria - Court of Appeal para 27-30 
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The sentence in s.30 contains the conditional ‘if’ and the conjunction ‘and’.502 
Hence, non-disclosure would be triggered only when the two prerequisites are 
fulfilled: first, the document contains advice, recommendation, consultation or 
deliberation of the officials and secondly, that such disclosure is contrary to public 
interest. The burden of proof for arguing that there is a public interest for non-
disclosure lies on the agencies. This provision does not contain a harm test.   
The public interest which is often argued in favour of non-disclosure is the 
free and frank deliberation of government officers, as it is feared that without 
sufficient protection from disclosure, the quality of decisions arrived at by deliberation 
will decrease.503 However, this “candour and frankness” has been treated with 
scepticism.504 Only when an office is at a sufficiently high level where frankness and 
candour exist, is the exemption considered appropriate.505  
4.5.2.2. Law enforcement documents (s.31) 
Law enforcement documents are protected from disclosure. This exemption 
includes documents containing information on investigation of breach or possible 
breach of law, proper “administration of the law”, fair trial and fair adjudication, 
 
502  Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) s.31 
503 Re News Corporation Limited, Mirror Newspapers Limited, Nationwide News Pty Limited and 
Control Investments Pty Limited and National Companies and Securities Commission [1983] AATA 
311; 8 Aclr 316 (14 September 1983) Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
504 Re Robyn Frances Murtagh and Commissioner of Taxation [1984] AATA 249 (5 July 1984) Re 
Howard and the Treasurer of the Commonwealth (1985) 3 AAR 169  Department of Premier and 
Cabinet v Hulls   
505 Sankey v Whitlam Sankey v Whitlam [1978] HCA 43; (1978) 142 CLR 1 (9 November 1978) High 
Court of Australia para 39 
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disclosure which may endanger the life of police informants and law enforcement 
officers and methods of crime prevention or law enforcement.506 
The clause covers both ‘investigation of a breach or possible breach’ of the 
law and “proper administration of the law”. The latter has been argued to encompass 
“something concerned with the process of the enforcement of legal rights or duties” 
and covers both civil and criminal law.507 Investigation by the Ombudsman or any 
other regulatory bodies may be covered by this exemption, but the harm must be 
sufficiently argued if the exemption is to be granted.    
4.5.2.3. Document relating to trade secrets and commercial information (s.34) 
This section regulates two kinds of documents: documents obtained by the 
minister or agency from a third party and documents within an agency or ministry.  
Documents acquired from a third party containing (a) trade secrets or (b) other 
business, commercial or financial information is protected from disclosure. However, 
 
506 S. 31 (1) Subject to this section, a document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act 
would, or would be reasonably likely to:  
(a) prejudice the investigation of a breach or possible breach of the law or prejudice the enforcement or 
proper administration of the law in a particular instance;  
(b) prejudice the fair trial of a person or the impartial adjudication of a particular case;  
(c) disclose, or enable a person to ascertain, the identity of a confidential source of information in 
relation to the enforcement or administration of the law;  
 
(d) disclose methods or procedures for preventing, detecting, investigating, or dealing with matters 
arising out of, breaches or evasions of the law the disclosure of which would, or would be reasonably 
likely to, prejudice the effectiveness of those methods or procedures; or (e) endanger the lives or 
physical safety of persons engaged in or in connection with law enforcement or persons who have 
provided confidential information in relation to the enforcement or administration of the law. 
507 Accident Compensation Commission v Croom [1991] VicRp 72; [1991] 2 VR 322 (24 September 
1990) 
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exemptions under category (b) contain a further qualification, namely, that it must 
expose an undertaking to a disadvantage. Trade secret information (category (a)) is an 
absolute exemption since according to s.34 (2) the elements in weighing disclosure are 
applicable only to category (b).  
In determining whether information may cause disadvantages to an 
undertaking, the Act lays down several elements, namely, whether the information is 
already generally available to competitors, whether it would be an exempt matter if it 
were generated by an agency and whether disclosure could be possible without 
causing substantial harm to the competitive position of an undertaking. Finally, there 
is a requirement to determine if there are any public interest considerations in favour 
of disclosure which outweigh considerations of competitive disadvantage. In order to 
qualify for exemption, information must have the “essential quality or character of the 
matter business, commercial or financial”.508 
A harm test is applicable to this exemption and demonstrated through the use of 
the phrase “would be likely to expose the undertaking unreasonably to a 
disadvantage”.509 Reasonable expectation that a harm would exist is adequate. In Re 
Actors' Equity Association510:  
“The question is whether there is a reasonable expectation of adverse 
effect...[...].. What there must be is a foundation for a finding that there is an 
expectation of adverse effect that is not fanciful, imaginary or contrived, but 
rather is reasonable, that is to say based on reason, namely 'agreeable to 
 
508 Re Croom and Accident Compensation Commission  (1989) 3 VAR 441 
509 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) s.34 (1) b 
510 Re Actors' Equity Association of Australia and Australian Consumers Association and Australian 
Broadcasting Tribunal and Federation of Australian Commercial Television Stations [1985] AATA 69   
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reason; not irrational, absurd or ridiculous' (Shorter Oxford Dictionary). This 
is not very much to ask of evidence of an expectation of an adverse effect on a 
business." 
Attorney-General’s Department v Cockcroft511 is a leading authority and 
concludes that the harm tests: 
 “require a judgment to be made by the decision-maker as to whether it is 
reasonable, as distinct from something that is irrational, absurd or ridiculous 
[...]….. It is undesirable to attempt any paraphrase of these words. In particular, it 
is undesirable to consider the operation of the provision in terms of probabilities or 
possibilities or the like...”   
Subsequent decisions such as Alan Sunderland v the Department of 
Defence512, Organon v Department of Community Services v Health and Public 
Interest Advocacy Centre 513, Queensland and Department of Aviation514 and 
Maksimovic and Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and Anor515 all 
refer to and reiterate Cockroft. Hence, so long as a disclosure can be expected to 
cause negative consequences, it will fulfil the likelihood element, without needing 
much proof.  
 
Goodwill can be categorised as a commercial interest and the loss of goodwill 
considered a form of ‘harm’ if it leads to the loss of the consumer. In one case 
 
511 Re Peter Cockcroft  and  Attorney-General'S Department  and Australian Iron and Steel Pty Limited 
[1985] AATA 224  
512 Re Alan Sunderland and the Department of Defence [1986] AATA 278 (19 September 1986)  
513 Re Organon (Australia) Pty Limited and Department of Community Services and Health and Public 
Interest Advocacy Centre [1987] AATA 396  
514  Re Queensland and Department of Aviation [1986] AATA 142   
515 Maksimovic and Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions and Anor [2009] AATA 700  
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invoking exemption under s.45(1)(c) of the Queensland’s FoI Act, (equivalent to the 
Victorian FoI s.34(b) on the protection of commercial, business and personal interest) 
the Queensland FoI Commission decided that516  “adverse effect on a corporation's 
business reputation or goodwill […] is feared ultimately for its potential to result in 
loss of income or profits, through loss of customers”. Hence, a harm caused to a 
corporation could either be direct, in the form of decreasing profit, or indirect, such as 
in the form of goodwill which leads to the loss of customers and, eventually, profit. 
This would certainly be interesting if argued in a water utility context. More 
importantly, the FoI Commission considered whether the company is operating in a 
monopoly context which would influence its assessment of “harm”: 
 “A relevant factor in this regard would be whether the agency or other 
person enjoys a monopoly position for the supply of particular goods or 
services in the relevant market (in which case it may be difficult to show that 
an adverse effect on the relevant business, commercial or financial affairs 
could reasonably be expected), or whether it operates in a commercially 
competitive environment in the relevant market.”517 
If disclosures are to be made, the Ministers or relevant Agency should consult the 
third party in order to obtain their view on the planned disclosure. When the decision to 
disclose is made, they should notify the undertaking of their right to apply for a review 
towards such decision.  
Documents of an agency containing (a) trade secrets or (b) other business, 
commercial or financial information the disclosure of which would expose the agency 
 
516  Cannon  and  Australian Quality Egg Farms Ltd  [1994] QICmr 9; (1994) 1 QAR 491 (30 May 
1994) 
517 Ibid para 84 
 
 154 
to a disadvantage and (c) the results of scientific or technical research undertaken by an 
officer of an agency, which may either lead to a patentable invention; an incomplete 
research whose disclosure is at the disadvantage of a third party; incomplete results of a 
research whose disclosure will expose the agency or its officers at a disadvantage are also 
exempt under this section. 518 
 
4.5.2.4. Material obtained in confidence (s.35) 
Material obtained in confidence by an agency or a Minister is protected from 
disclosure.519 The key feature of this clause is that the information must be 
communicated “in confidence” to an agency or a Minister. Section 35 excludes 
information acquired by an agency or a minister from a business, commercial or 
financial undertaking and that which relates to trade secrets or other matters of a 
business, commercial or financial nature, presumably as this has already been covered 
in s.34.  
The Russell Report520 concludes that exemptions are deemed to apply only 
where information is submitted to the government in confidence (s.35) and not when 
the information is generated jointly between the government and a third party.521 The 
Victorian Administrative and Appeals Tribunal Decision Thwaites and MAS 
emphasized:  
 
518 Freedom of Information Act 1982 s.34 
519 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) s.35 
520 Russell, Waterman and Seddon, Audit Review of Government Contracts: Contracting, Privatisation, 
Probity and Disclosure in Victoria 1992–1999, An Independent Report to Government 
521 Similar condition applies to s.34 exemption 
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“….the documents do not so much consist of information acquired by the 
agency from a business, commercial or financial undertaking but rather 
constitute the record of the transaction between the parties. Such documents, 
recording the agreement as to the arrangements between the parties, are, in 
effect, the contractual outcome of negotiations. However, at the same time, 
they contain information of a business, commercial or financial nature.” 522  
Hence, if this interpretation is taken, any contracts between a government and 
a third party, such as the Victorian Desalination Contracts, will not fall under the 
exemptions provided in s.34 and s.35.  
 
4.5.2.5. Other ‘general’ exemptions under s.36 
The Victorian FoI Act contains another type of exemption (s.36) to protect 
governmental information from premature disclosure that would be reasonably likely 
to have a substantial adverse effect on the economy of Victoria. Some of the examples 
provided in the Act are movement of bank interest rate or sales tax, plan for credit 
controls, sale or acquisition of land or property by the Crown, urban re-zoning, 
formulation of land use and planning controls and the formulation of customs.523   
The above class of protection contains three elements that need to be satisfied: “a 
premature disclosure”, “reasonably likely” and “substantial adverse effect”.524 The phrase 
‘premature disclosure’ indicates a possibility that such a document could be released in 
the future. “Reasonably likely” is a phrase signifying causality between disclosure and its 
 
522  Thwaites V Met Ambulance Service (1995/04289) [1994] VICCAT 6 (3 May 1994). The Victorian 
Administrative and Appeals Tribunal  is the former name of VCAT     
523 Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) s.36 
524 Ibid s.36 
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effects.  Finally, the phrase ‘substantial adverse effect’ is the presumed harm effect of a 
disclosure.  
Another type of disclosure that is deemed to be contrary to the public interest is 
the  disclosure of documents containing information on instructions or guidelines for 
officers or agencies to be used in negotiation, including financial, commercial and labour 
negotiation, the execution of contracts, the defence, prosecution and settlement of cases, 
financial property, personnel management and assessment interests of the Crown or of an 
agency.525  
 
4.6. Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter starts by reviewing the legal and institutional framework 
regulating Victoria’s water utilities. Victoria’s utilities are state owned and there is 
constitutional “entrenchment” to ensure that its water utilities remain publicly owned. 
PSP, however, is not prohibited. There are no rules limiting the extent and breadth of 
private sector involvement in the water services sector, hence, any PSP model which 
does not alter the public authority’s status and accountability line to the government 
will be allowed. This is a weakness that needs to be addressed in future reform as 
certain PSP models such as concession can have far reaching consequences towards 
democratic goals.  
The Victorian procurement policy can be a good example of a high degree of 
integration between active and passive disclosure rules.  The procurement policy 
 
525 Freedom of Information Act 1982 s.36 
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enables the Victorian FoI to be enforced and confidentiality clauses in PSP contracts 
to be addressed and the contract documents itself published through the Contract 
Publication System (CPS). As mentioned in Chapter 1, a confidentiality clause creates 
transparency problems in various countries but Victoria seems to be able to manage it 
well, although there are still some compliance problems. In terms of regulatory 
decision making, the regulatory system in Victoria developed fairly well, although, as 
will be discussed in the next chapter, England is much more advanced. The 
Regulator’s disclosure policy in Victoria lays emphasis only in certain issues relating 
to utilities’ performance and pricing. There are no discretionary powers for the 
Regulator to independently disclose information.   
In terms of utilities corporate governance, there are adequate transparency 
frameworks in terms of corporate structure and board accountability. Regulation on 
related party transaction, however, is very minimal, especially if compared to 
England, as will be discussed in the next chapter. Normatively speaking, there are no 
requirements for Victorian water utilities to disclose their related party transactions. 
Such information must be submitted to the regulator as  part of the regulatory account 
submission but disclosure by ESC is prohibited. Recent Australian Accounting 
Standards Board (AASB) rules also exempt government entities from the requirement 
of disclosing related party transactions. Interestingly, Victorian water utilities decide 
to continuously invoke the former AASB rules. Hence, this information remained 
published. 
Finally, the Victorian FoI Act is applicable to all water institutions, except 
Aquasure and EWOV, as they are both private entities. This reinforces the arguments 
that the “privatisation” of government services decreases transparency, in terms of 
“passive” disclosure rules. The relationship between monopoly position and 
disclosure has not been addressed in Victorian Case Law, but one case in Queensland 
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creates a precedent which treats an entity’s disclosure threshold in accordance with its 
monopoly power. However, the case does not pertain to a water utility in particular 
and the discussions on the relationship between monopoly and disclosure were not the 
dominant feature of the case.  All findings in this chapter are summarised in a 
comparative form in Annex I. 
The next section will discuss England, which has a more advanced regulatory 
system than Victoria. Differing from Victoria, whose utilities are state-owned, English 
utilities are fully divested. It would, therefore, be interesting to test the hypothesis of 
whether private sector participation will necessarily lead to the decrease of 
transparency.   
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5. ENGLAND 
5.1. Overview of the Legal and Institutional Framework 
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is a unitary state 
between four countries comprising England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. 
Each of these countries has a different legal system. Northern Ireland, Wales and 
Scotland have their own legislatures but with a different degree of devolved powers. 
England has no sub-national parliament of its own and falls directly under 
Westminster’s legislative authority. Each of these countries has their own model for 
the governance of water services. This thesis only focuses on England, and also to a 
certain extent Wales, as their water companies are both regulated by the same 
economic regulator, the Water Services Regulation Authority (OFWAT). 
Water services in England have undergone several institutional changes 
throughout history. During the period 1750-1870, water services were provided 
mostly by the private sector following the laissez-faire principle where state 
intervention has to be minimized.526 Realizing that this was not successful, the 
Government enacted an Act to control the private companies.527 By 1875, local 
authorities were required to ensure adequate water supplies in their areas, if necessary, 
by acquiring privately-owned networks, which led to the remunicipalisation 
 
526 Bakker, K.J., An uncooperative commodity: Privatizing water in England and Wales (Oxford 
University Press, USA 2003) p. 46-49 
527 Ibid p.48 The act, accompanied by modifications in local legislations, was largely technical, 
containing measures for the undertaker’s financial control and operational mechanisms for the laying of 
mains although there was also a duty to connect to all houses in a street where a main was laid. See 
Hassan, J., A history of water in modern England and Wales (Manchester University Press : Distributed 
in the USA by St. Martin's Press 1998) p. 17 
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movement until 1945. 528 In 1973 the government consolidated and then regionalised 
all municipal water services into 10 Regional Water Authorities (RWA)  which took 
over the responsibility of 157 water undertakings, 29 river authorities and 1,393 
sanitary authorities, along with the principles of Integrated Water Resources 
Management.529 However, the regionalisation process was perceived as a failure and 
the RWAs were deemed not able to protect environmental and potable water qualities. 
By this time, the EC had begun enacting various legislations on water qualities, 
notably the bathing and drinking water directives,530 as well as enforcing them against 
the UK.531   The politicisation of the environment, serious enforcement effort by the 
EC, the perceived failure of the RWAs and a conservative approach to market 
liberalism all provided a background to water privatisation.532 A discussion paper was 
issued in 1986 paving the way for the privatisation and, in 1987, the Conservative 
government who had previously privatised other utilities (British Gas in 1986 and 
British Telecom in 1984) returned to power and proceeded with its previous plan to 
privatise the water industry.533   
 
528 Hassan, A history of water in modern England and Wales p.18 
529 Ibid p. 126 
530 Council Directive 76/160/EEC of 8 December 1975 concerning the quality of bathing water, Official 
Journal L 031 , 05/02/1976 P. 0001 - 0007 and Council Directive 80/778/EEC of 15 July 1980 relating 
to the quality of water intended for human consumption, Official Journal L 229 , 30/08/1980 P. 0011 - 
0029 
531 See Case C-56/90, Commission of the European Communities v United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland - Directive 76/160/EEC - Bathing water, European Court reports 1993 Page I-
04109 
532 See generally Hassan, A history of water in modern England and Wales and Bakker, An 
uncooperative commodity: Privatizing water in England and Wales 
533 Ofwat and Defra, ‘The Development of Water Industry in England and Wales’ 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/content?id=55ec1308-4f56-11de-8387-6dfad2269788>  
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Full divestiture of the 10 RWAs (with minimal enterprise or managerial 
reorganization) – and not a long-term contract model such as concession – was opted 
for as the method of privatisation.534 The 1989 Water Act was the privatising 
legislation which also sets the foundation for post-“privatisation” regulatory 
architecture. The RWAs are converted into water services companies and their former 
river basin management duties and consumer protection duties are transferred, 
respectively, to the newly established National River Authorities and the Office of 
Water Services (OFWAT).535  Other than statutes and secondary laws, licences are 
used as the main regulatory instrument. The post-divestiture regulatory architecture is 
thus far much more complicated than the previous publicly-owned arrangements. The 
government’s desire to remove water infrastructure financing from the public budget 
led to the inevitable creation of powerful monopolies. If the regulatory arrangements 
malfunction the political and economic cost would be dire and, as a consequence, a 
complex regulatory system would be required to safeguard the public interest.536   
It is generally agreed that, at least, there are three key regulatory actors in the 
English water industry: the drinking water quality regulator, the environmental 
regulator and the economic regulator.537 Drinking Water Quality is regulated by the 
 
534 According to Hassan, this was due to (i)  the lack of compelling evidence in support franchising at 
that time (ii) the fact that franchising will preserve public institutions, something that would be contrary 
to the Conservative government’s political aspirations and (iii) that the government was expecting a 
successful flotation and this would have less chance if franchising was opted. See Hassan, A history of 
water in modern England and Wales p.169 
535 Ibid p. 170 The transfer of river basin management and environmental duties to the NRA was a 
result of long parliamentary scrutinies.  
536 Ibid p. 170 
537 Hendry, ‘An Analytical Framework for Reform of National Water Law’ also Quesada, Water and 
Sanitation Services in Europe: Do Legal Frameworks provide for “Good Governance”? Hassan, A 
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Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) while the NRA and OFWAT are, respectively, 
the economic and environmental regulators. This structure was changed in 1995 
where the NRA was incorporated into the Environmental Agency.  
5.2. England’s Water Businesses 
There are 10 Water and Sewerage Companies (WaSC) and 12 Water Only 
Companies (WOC) in England and Wales. There is a variation of form of legal 
entities among the water businesses. At the time of writing, of all the 10 WaSCs, only 
one is a Public Limited Company (Plc), United Utilities, and one,  Welsh Water, is a 
company limited by guarantee, whereas the rest are privately held companies (Ltd). 
Meanwhile, the 12 WOCs are either Plcs or Ltds.   
Table 4: Water Companies in England and Wales 
 
history of water in modern England and Wales p. 180 Bakker indentified at least 8 regulators at the EU, 
national and regional levels: The European Community taking the role in standard setting; the 
Environment Agency as the Environmental Regulator; the OFWAT as the Economic Regulator, 
DEFRA tasked with standard setting, appointment of regulators and special permits; DWI as the water 
quality regulator, Competition Commission in charge of reporting and appeals; Environment Agency 
(Regional) Tribunals on abstraction/discharge licenses as well as monitoring and OFWAT’s Customer 
Service Committee (Regional) for settling matters on customer complaints, service standards disputes 
and compensations. 
Water and Sewerage 
Companies 
 
Water Only Companies 
Anglian Water Services Ltd Bristol Water plc 
Northumbrian Water Ltd Bournemouth & West Hampshire 
  Severn Trent Water Ltd Cambridge Water plc 
South West Water Services 
 
Dee Valley Water plc 
Southern Water Services 
 
Cholderton & District Water Co Ltd 
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5.2.1. Sectoral rules and regulatory institutions overseeing England’s water 
businesses 
5.2.1.1. The Water Services Regulation Authority (OFWAT) 
The Water Services Regulation Authority (now the statutory name of 
OFWAT) is a non-ministerial government department established in 1989. The Water 
Act 1989 which was also the privatising legislation for water services in England and 
Wales  sets the duties, rights and responsibilities of the Director General of Water 
Services538 and authorises the Director to arrange and appoint staff and delegate 
responsibilities to his staff.539 The Water Act 2003 abolished the office of Director 
General of Water Services540 and replaced541 the role of the single director of 
OFWAT with a board542, bearing the name “Water Services Regulation Authority”. 
The replacement of the Director General with a regulatory board is consistent with the 
 
538 Water Act 1989 c.15 for example, Sections 5 and 7 
539 Ibid Schedule 3 of the Original version, s.5 para 1-4 
540 Water Act 2003 c.37 s.34 (3)s.34 (3) 
541Ibid c.56 with s.1A 
542Ibid schedule 1, s.1(1) “The Authority shall consist of a chairman, and at least two other members, 
appointed by the Secretary of State” 
Thames Water Utilities Ltd Portsmouth Water plc 
United Utilities Water plc South East Water plc (including Mid 
 Dŵr Cymru Cyfyngedig  
  
South Staffordshire Water plc 
Wessex Water Services Ltd Sutton & East Surrey Water plc 
Yorkshire Water Services 
Ltd 
Veolia Water Central Ltd 
Veolia Water East Ltd 
Veolia Water Southeast Ltd 
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UK’s best practice on regulation543 and has been conducted in other utilities. After the 
2003 amendments, the Water Services Regulation Authority continues to use the 
name OFWAT.  
The primary duties of OFWAT (and the Secretary of State) under the original 
WIA 1991 were to ensure that the undertakers are able to perform their functions and 
that they are able to secure reasonable return on their capital544 and its secondary 
duties are to protect consumers’ interests, promote efficiency and facilitate 
competition.545 With the ascent of the Labour government to power, these were later 
amended (in force in 2005) by the 2003 Water Act, making the furtherance of the 
consumer objective a first duty, followed by the duties to ensure that undertakers are 
able to carry out their functions properly, duties to ensure reasonable returns on capital 
and duties to enforce licence conditions.546 However, the duty to further the consumer 
objective should be achieved “wherever appropriate by promoting effective 
competition”.547  
OFWAT regulates water companies through licences. As discussed above, it 
has the duty to ensure that licence conditions are met by the companies. In performing 
 
543 See Hendry, ‘An Analytical Framework for Reform of National Water Law’ p.304 
544 Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s.2 (2)  
545 Ibid s.2 (3) 
546 Water Act 2003 c.37 ss. 39(3), 105(3); S.I. 2005/968, art. 2(f) 
547 Competition can be achieved through awarding of licences, inset appointments; cross-border 
supplies; private supplies; and in providing new mains and service pipes. See Ofwat and Defra, ‘The 
Development of Water Industry in England and Wales’ p. 98. The Cave report seeks to widen 
competition in the water industry more than just these five factors Cave, M., Independent review of 
competition and innovation in water markets: final report (Department for Environment Food and 
Rural Affairs (Defra), 2009)   
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this task, OFWAT is equipped with the power to impose sanctions to water 
companies.    
OFWAT uses the price cap as the instrument of economic regulation. By 
capping prices (and not dividends) water companies are expected to be able to boost 
performance by increasing efficiency. The cost-efficiency savings as a result of the 
company’s performance can then be credited back to the company while at the same 
time used as a factor in price reduction.548 The price cap549 is embedded in each water 
company’s Licence Condition ‘B’ (regarding Charges)550 and is reviewed once  every 
five years (initially it was planned for a 10 year review). Utilities are required to 
submit regulatory information annually as specified by OFWAT, known as the “June 
Return”. This June Return is the primary information input for OFWAT. Through 
 
548 King, S., ‘Principles of price cap regulation’ in Margaret Arblaster and Mark Jamison (eds), 
Infrastructure Regulation and Market Reform: Principles and Practice (ACCC and PURC 1998) 
549 The general formula is RPI-X, whereas RPI is the retail price index and X is the efficiency factor. 
The RPI (or consumer price index in US) is chosen as it reflects the inflation (or deflation) rate of the 
price. Water industry uses K factor, instead of a plain X, in order to incorporate water quality 
requirements from the EC and network expansions, whereas K=-X+Q with X signifying efficiency 
factor and Q the cost of higher water quality requirement. See Green, R., ‘Has price cap regulation of 
UK utilities been a success?’ 132 Public Policy for the Private Sector. In the second periodic review of 
2000-2005, OFWAT set a new general formulation of the K factor of - P0 - X + Q ± V ± S, whereas P0 
is the initial reduction in prices resulting from out-performance in the period before, X is the expression 
of efficiency in the next period, Q reflects the cost of higher demand of drinking quality (due to EC 
Directives), V represents the impact of the supply/demand balance (The V value can be positive if new 
resources are required or expansion should be made and negative if companies have an abundance of 
resources and can sell their surplus) and finally S represents the service factor (The S value could either 
result in enhancement [+] or a controlled reduction in standards [-]). During this second periodic review, 
OFWAT was under pressure for a lower price amid the regulatory demand for higher water quality and 
possible network expansion. The only way for this was to push the companies to be more efficient 
(making the -X value to be greater or at least equal to the + Q ± V ± S values). See Booker, A., 
‘Incentive regulation in water - case study’ (Utility Regulation Training Program ) 
<http://www.regulationbodyofknowledge.org/documents/155.pdf> accessed April 10, 2011 
550 The Licence Conditions are imposed by OFWAT under the authority provided Water Industry Act 
1991 (England) s.11  
 
 166 
this, OFWAT compare water companies’ cost information and then use it to 
determine the K factor in its price cap formula (“yardstick competition”). The allowed 
price cap is thus determined using the industry’s average unit cost.551  Yardstick 
competition, the combination of the authority to impose sanctions and award a 
favourable K factor that would allow the companies to recoup its profit, serves as the 
carrot-and-stick of the English regulatory system. 
The 2003 Water Act also inserted new principles of emerging regulatory 
practice, by requiring that OFWAT “shall have regard to the principles of best 
regulatory practice (including the principles under which regulatory activities should 
be transparent, accountable, proportionate, consistent and targeted only at cases in 
which action is needed)”.552 Since there is no other provision in the WIA 1991 which 
elaborate the elements of ‘best regulatory practice’ above in more detail, the provision 
above entails no direct practical legal consequences to OFWAT.  Having said that, the 
principles of “better regulation” are practiced by OFWAT and its elements are well-
reflected in its policies. This will be elaborated in the preceding sections. 
5.2.1.2. Environment Agency 
 
551 Bernstein, J.L., ‘Price cap regulation and productivity growth’ 1 International Productivity Monitor 
23 
552Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s 2 (4) as amended by Water Act 2003 c.37 ss. 39(4). On “Better 
Regulation” and its evolution see Better Regulation Executive, ‘Better Regulation’ (Department for 
Business Innovation and Skills, 2008)  
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/bre/index.html/index.h
tml> accessed May 21st, 2012 Better Regulation Task Force, Regulation–Less is More. Reducing 
Burdens, Improving Outcomes (London: Cabinet Office, 2005)   Baldwin, R., ‘Regulation lite: the rise 
of emissions trading’ 2 Regulation & Governance 193 
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The Environment Agency (EA) is a result of consolidation553 of several 
regulatory bodies:  the NRA, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Pollution (HMIP) and the 
Waste Regulation Authorities. The purpose of the consolidation was to provide an 
integrated approach to environmental protection by combining the regulatory 
authority on land, air and water in a single body.554 
 
The EA is one of the most important actors in the regulation of the English 
water industry since it is tasked with the control of pollution555 and the management 
and conservation of water resources,556 both of which are factors influencing water 
charges imposed on consumers and the company’s investment decisions. The 
Environment Act 1995 specifically clarified that the EA’s function of protection 
against pollution shall include the protection of any waters – surface or underground – 
from which any water undertaker is authorised to take water.557  
 
The EA issues abstraction licences and discharges permits to the water 
companies. The Water Resources Act (WRA) 1991 specifies the types, form and 
content of licences, the mechanism for applying them, the rights and obligations 
attached to the licence, the right to appeal against licensing decisions and matters 
pertaining to modification of licences.558 Abstractions are charged on a cost-recovery 
 
553 Environment Act 1995 c.25 s.2 
554 Ofwat and Defra, ‘The Development of Water Industry in England and Wales’ p.9 
555 Environment Act 1995 c.25s.5 
556 Ibid s.6 
557 Ibid s.10 
558 Water Resources Act 1991 c.57 s.36A, s46, s34-38, s.40, s43-45, s.51-59  
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basis. The EA has the power to prosecute water companies who are in breach of their 
licence condition or cause pollution.559  
 
Discharge consents560 are regulated in the WRA which also stipulates that the 
EA may impose consent conditions.561 If water companies are in breach of consent 
conditions, the EA will send an enforcement notice to the companies specifying the 
contravention or potential contravention. If the enforcement notice is not complied 
with, a criminal and/or financial penalty follows.562 Companies must submit a 25-year 
water resources plan which the EA will review.  
 
5.2.1.3. Drinking Water Inspectorate 
The Drinking Water Inspectorate (DWI) monitors and supervises tap water 
quality distributed by water companies in England and Wales. The DWI was set up in 
1990 through the 1989 Water Act.563 The organisation conducts technical audits of 
water companies, assesses their sampling programmes and investigates consumer 
complaints and water quality incidents.564  The DWI also liaises with OFWAT for its 
periodic reviews.565  
 
559 Ofwat and Defra, ‘The Development of Water Industry in England and Wales’ p.50 
560Water Resources Act 1991 c.57ss. 88-90 
561Ibid s. 90A 
562 Ibid s. 90B 
563 Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s.86 
564 DWI, ‘About Us’ (Drinking Water Inspectorate UK)  <http://dwi.defra.gov.uk/about/index.htm> 
accessed April 20th 2010   
565 Ibid 
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The WIA 1991 and WA 2003 amend and add more authority to the DWI in 
conducting its tasks.566 The DWI’s Chief Inspector of Drinking Water is appointed by 
the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs but operates 
independently from DEFRA. 
European legislation sets the basic standards for English drinking water 
quality regulation and this is empowerd by the WIA 1991, WA 2003 and 
implemented in several statutory instruments. 567 The WIA empowers the Secretary of 
State to require the water companies to publish information about the quality of water 
supplied by them.568 The DWI has the power to investigate569 the possible 
contravention of water company’s duties570 with respect to drinking water quality and, 
on the other hand, the water companies have legal obligations to assist the inspector 
and provide him with all information as may be required to perform investigation.571  
5.2.1.4. Consumer Council for Water 
The Consumer Council for Water is a statutory body whose task is to 
represent consumers’ interests in the English water industry, primarily by taking 
complaints and investigating them against the water industry. The body originated 
 
566 The original WIA 1991 refers to the organisation as ‘technical assessors’. See, for example, the 
original Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s 86. Water Act 2003 repealed the term and directly 
referred to the ‘Chief Inspector of Drinking Water’. See also Hendry, ‘An Analytical Framework for 
Reform of National Water Law’ p.329 
567 This is primarily set on the EC Drinking Water Directive Directive 98/83/EC of 3 November 1998 
on the quality of water intended for human consumption, O.J. 330 p.32-54  
568 Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s. 69 (5) and (6) 
569 Ibids.86 (1B) (a)  
570 Ibid The duties of the water undertakers with respect to water quality are laid down under ss. 68, 69 
and 79 
571 Ibid s. 86 (3) 
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from the regional “Customer Services Committee” (CSC) created at the beginning of 
the privatisation through the 1989 Water Act and further reinforced by the 1991 Water 
Industry Act.572  Originally, the CSCs were established at every water companies and 
were structurally a part of OFWAT.573 This changed when the 2003 Water Act 
abolished the CSCs and established the “Consumer Council for Water” (CC Water) 
with a separate structure from OFWAT.   
The Water Act 2003 provides CC Water with wide authority and 
responsibilities. The authority includes the power to require OFWAT or water 
companies to supply it with information574 and to investigate complaints.575  
5.2.1.5. Competition Commission 
Formerly the “Monopolies and Mergers Commission” but changed to the 
“Competition Commission” by the 2002 Enterprise Act576, the Commission is an 
independent statutory body tasked with supervising mergers, utilities’ regulation and 
ensuring healthy competition between business actors in the UK. 
The WIA 1991 tasked the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) with referring water 
companies’ mergers to the Commission577, except if they are considered as ‘small 
 
572 Water Act 1989 c.15 s.6 and Water Industry Act 1991 (England) ss.28-29 
573  The preamble of the 1989 Water Act states: “An [A.D. 1989.] Act to … provide for the appointment 
and functions of a Director General of Water Services and of customer service committees;…” 
574Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s 27h as amended by WA 2003 s.44 
575Ibid s.29A 
576 Enterprise Act 2002, 2002 c.40 
577Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s. 32. Among the consideration made by the CC(?)  is whether 
the merger will hinder OFWAT’s task in comparing different water eterprises against benefits of the 
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mergers’.578  The OFT and OFWAT have concurrent579 jurisdiction with respect to 
investigation and enforcement agreements between undertakings, decisions or 
concerted practices which may affect trade or with the objectives or effect in 
preventing, restricting or distorting competition580 or constitute an “abuse of dominant 
position”.581   
5.2.1.6.  DEFRA 
The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) – chaired 
by the Secretary for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs – has wide powers in 
creating policies for the water industry and the environment.  
DEFRA is involved in standard setting, drafting legislation, policy making and 
in the appointment of OFWAT officers.582 Although OFWAT is independent in 
performing its tasks and is directly accountable to parliament, DEFRA continues to 
supervise OFWAT’s work.  
Recently, DEFRA announced an OFWAT review, with the purpose of 
examining “how the industry regulator works, whether it offers good value for money 
 
merger to consumer. See schedule 4ZA of ibid 991. See also Hendry, ‘An Analytical Framework for 
Reform of National Water Law’ p. 359 
578Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s.33  
579Ibid s 31 as amended by Competition Act 1998 c 41 s 5 (6). S 31 of theWater Industry Act 1991 
(England) also empowers OFWAT, concurrently with the OFT, to investigate directly violation of EC 
Treaty Articles  81(1) and 82. The concurrent jurisdiction is also enabled by the Enterprise Act 2002, 
2002 c.40  
580 Competition Act 1998 c 41 s2.1 andWater Industry Act 1991 (England)  s 31 (3) (a)  
581 Competition Act 1998 c 41  s 18 and Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s 31 (3) (b) 
582 “The Authority shall consist of a chairman, and at least two other members, appointed by the 
Secretary of State”. Water Industry Act 1991 (England) Schedule 1A, para 1 (1) see also Bakker, An 
uncooperative commodity: Privatizing water in England and Wales p.71 
 
 172 
and if it is delivering what the Government and customers expect”.583  DEFRA had 
carried out an online survey which feeds in to its “Water White Paper”.584 As far as 
water services are involved, The Water White Paper simply incorporates 
recommendations from the Cave, Walker and Gray reports585 which will be referred 
to below. The next section will elaborate the implication of the re-regulation strategy 
of the English water industry.  
Table 5: Recapitulation of sectoral rules and regulatory institutions 
Institution Function Enabling Rules 
OFWAT 
 
Regulation of the water industry 
in general: price setting, 
consumer protection, 
competition 
Water Act 1989 
Water Industry Act 
1991 
Licence Condition 
 
Environment 
Agency 
Pollution control, management 
and conservation of water 
resources, issuance of 
abstraction licence and discharge 
permits 
Water Resources Act 
1991 
Environment Act 1995 
Drinking 
Water 
Inspectorate 
Water quality regulator, 
technical audit on water 
companies, investigating 
Water Industry Act 
1991 
 
583 ‘Ofwat review will consider future challenges facing industry’ (Department for Environment Food 
and Rural Affairs,)  <http://www.defra.gov.uk/news/2010/08/26/ofwat-review/> accessed April 25, 
2011 
584 Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, ‘Water White Paper’ (DEFRA)  
<http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm82/8230/8230.pdf> accessed February 16, 2011  
585 Walker, A., The independent review of charging for household water and sewerage services : final 
report (Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs, 2009)   Cave, Independent review of 
competition and innovation in water markets: final report Gray, D., Review of Ofwat and consumer 
representation in the water sector (Defra and the Welsh Government, 2011) 
<http://www.defra.gov.uk/publications/files/ofwat-review-2011.pdf> accessed July 26, 2011 
 
 173 
consumer complaints and water 
quality incidents 
Consumer 
Council for 
Water 
Representing consumers’ 
interests, taking complaints, 
investigating water industry on 
consumer complaints 
Water Act 1989 
Water Industry Act 
1991 
Water Act 2003 
Competition 
Commission 
Accepting referrals on merger 
issues, adjudicating breaches of 
competition law concurrently 
with OFWAT 
Water Industry Act 
1991 
Competition Act 1998 
Enterprise Act 2002 
Department of 
Environment, 
Food and 
Rural Affairs 
Standard setting, drafting of 
legislations and policies, 
appointment of regulators, 
industry restructuring 
Water Act 1989 
Water Resources Act 
1991 
Water Industry Act 
1991 
Environment Act 1995 
Water Act 2003 
5.2.2. Further re-regulation of the English water industry 
DEFRA has recently commissioned several reviews of the English water 
industry. An independent review was carried out recently by Martin Cave on 
competition and innovation in the water industry.586 Another review on charging for 
household water and sewerage services was led by OFRAIL’s chair Anna Walker.587 
Finally, DEFRA also conducted a review of OFWAT and e CC Water, led by David 
Gray.588  
 
586 Cave, Independent review of competition and innovation in water markets: final report note 547 
above 
587 Walker, The independent review of charging for household water and sewerage services : final 
report 
588 Gray, Review of Ofwat and consumer representation in the water sector 
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Part of the coalition government’s programme is to “examine the conclusions 
of the Cave and Walker Reviews, and reform the water industry to ensure more 
efficient use of water and the protection of poorer households”.589 Meanwhile, 
OFWAT’s review of terms of reference includes, among others, how effectively the 
statutory duties and guidance are translated through OFWAT’s decision making; the 
effectiveness of the present governance system involving OFWAT and the Consumer 
Council for Water, in protecting water consumers and ensuring that their views 
influence the way the water sector is managed and regulated; value for money in 
regulation, particularly in comparison with other economic regulators and OFWAT’s 
approach to minimising the burdens from its regulatory activity.590 Gray’s OFWAT 
review, however, confirms that there would be no significant changes to the structure 
of the water industry and, therefore, both OFWAT and CC Water are to be retained.591  
The most important part of the Gray review is probably its call to reduce the 
regulatory burden and to induce “positive” incentives. Gray was of the opinion that at 
the moment OFWAT is focusing too much on negative incentives in the form of 
penalties and compliance mechanisms. At the same time, he felt that that the 
regulatory burden is too excessive.592 Gray’s review appears to go along with a 
previous report from Harris, which also calls for the reduction of regulatory burdens 
and incentivisation of companies with good track records of reporting and 
 
589 Cameron, D. and Clegg, N., The Coalition:our programme for government (2010) 
<http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/news/coalition-documents> April 25, 2011 p.17 
590 United Kingdom, Review of Ofwat -- Terms of Reference (2010) 
<http://www.defra.gov.uk/news/files/2010/08/ofwat-review-tor.pdf> accessed April 25, 2011 
591 Gray, Review of Ofwat and consumer representation in the water sector 
592 Ibid 
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complying.593 The Harris report calls for a reduction in the information requirement 
and to focus information gathering on material issues related to prices and service 
levels.594 The future of the English water industry will thus be marked with the move 
towards utilities’ self-regulation and a “risk-based” approach to compliance 
mechanisms. This pressure towards loosening the regulatory grip is well reflected in 
OFWAT’s recent consultation which outlines that the practical implication of this is 
that OFWAT will reduce its information requirement, such as the June Return.595 This 
move may have significant implications for the quantity of information available in 
the public domain.   
The Cave review’s recommendations can be grouped into three general 
categories596: (i) the increasing use of market-like instruments, (ii) the introduction of 
competition for the market in the supplies of treated water through either an 
independent procurement entity or a single buyer and (iii) competition in the market, 
achieved through common carriage, starting from retail and extending to competition 
in the abstraction and treatment markets or contracting between suppliers, retailers and 
large customers. Cave has indicated that some of these reforms will require 
modification of primary legislation, such as that dealing with retail competition (in 
 
593 Harris, K., Improving regulatory reporting and compliance (Report for Ofwat, 2010) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/publications/commissioned/rpt_com_20101020reporting.pdf> accessed 
December 3, 2011 
594 Ibid 
595 Ofwat, Regulatory compliance – a proportionate and targeted approach, A consultation (2011) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/content?id=f956a963-ef60-11e0-bef5-b560843f3a7f> accessed, January 1, 
2012 
596 Cave, M. and Wright, J., ‘A strategy for introducing competition in the water sector’ 18 Utilities 
Policy 116 
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order to change the existing avoidant cost into full economic cost)597 and in applying 
different pricing for abstraction and discharge depending on each geographical 
context598, to change the merger regime as well as regulating inset appointment and 
network expansions.599 The rest of Cave’s proposals can be dealt with in regulations 
below primary legislation or in policies. 
In many aspects, the Cave review calls for more transparency in the water 
sector. Cave calls for the publication of trade prices600 which is required for the 
trading of abstraction licences and discharge consents in order to reduce the barriers to 
trading. 601 However, this is probably more of an issue for water resources dealt by the 
EA, rather than OFWAT.  
Cave also calls for more transparency in the merger system. In his view, the 
current merger system lacks ex-ante transparency with respect to OFWAT’s 
methodology in assessing the impact of potential mergers to the loss of 
comparators,602 whereas mergers could actually benefit consumers and the 
 
597 The avoidant cost is currently enabled byWater Industry Act 1991 (England) ss 66D (3) and 66E. If 
full economic costs are to be applied, these provisions will need amendments 
598 See also Cave and Wright, ‘A strategy for introducing competition in the water sector’ 
599 Ibid 
600 See p. 34. According to Cave:  “Market prices are more likely to reflect the value(s) of water to users 
than an administrative approach to pricing. Markets need information to function properly. Trading can 
be facilitated further by providing more information to the market by publishing trade prices – this will 
indicate the value of licences in trade and encourage participation in the market.” (p. 42). He continued: 
“To achieve this, legislation should enable the Environment Agency tocollect and publish trade prices to 
provide greater information to traders about the potential value of licences (p.116, ‘Recommendation 
Three’)  Cave, Independent review of competition and innovation in water markets: final report 
601 One of the barriers to liberalisation on the upstream (bulk water supply) level is information 
asymmetry between incumbent utilities and entrants. Entrants have – in Cave terms -- “…little 
information on which to decide whether, where and how to enter” ibid p.46 
602 Ibid p.95 
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environment. This will need to be reformed in the future, by requiring OFWAT to 
publish its methodology.603  
Another implication of the liberalisation of the English water industry to 
transparency is with respect to common carriage and its access pricing. As discussed, 
Cave maintained that the current access pricing system using cost avoidance 
principles will need to be changed into full economic cost. This entails that the 
incumbent’s cost structure itself will have to be transparent, and that the charging of 
access prices to new entrants will not be discriminatory. Cave recommends that 
indicative long-run marginal prices for the wholesale supply of water and waste water 
services at a water resource zone level and transport costs should be based on a 
common methodology and published.604 
5.3. Regulatory Decision Making 
5.3.1. Licences  
Following divestiture, the ten water and sewerage companies (see Table 4) are 
provided with licences by the Secretary of State and OFWAT. As the English 
divestiture appoints those companies as regional monopolists and England and Wales 
have reached almost full coverage, no other licences for an entirely new, large-scale 
greenfield project are possible. Nevertheless, the WIA does provide  scope for the 
 
603 Ibid p. 89 He explained: “The benefits of a transparent assessment methodology are in giving 
merging parties much greater regulatory certainty about the criteria, weightings and methodology that 
OFWAT would use in the evidence that it submits to the Competition Commission”. p. 91 
604 Ibid p. 54 
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development of small greenfield projects and this is translated by OFWAT through its 
New Appointment and Variations (NAV) policy.  
Thus, there are three types of licences in the English regulatory system605: the 
original “undertaker” licences (owners of the main network assets of post 1989 
divestitures),606 NAV licences awarded to a particular area and require variation of the 
aforementioned undertaker’s licence607 and water supply licences (WSL) which 
consisted of either a combined licence or a retail licence containing third party access 
authorisation to an undertaker’s network. 608 Previously, the NAVs’ regime was 
known as “inset appointment” but OFWAT chose to drop the term to signify that the 
new appointees have similar obligations with already established undertakers.609 Thus 
the original undertakers’ and NAVs’ licence conditions are essentially the same. 
Section 4.3.1 will compare the transparency of the undertaker/NAVs and 
WSL type of licences. However, the next sections will refer solely to undertakers’ 
licences as this is the type of licence which currently serves the majority of the 
English and Welsh populations.  
5.3.1.1. Criteria for approval 
Undertaker’s and NAV licences  
 
605 See Hendry, ‘An Analytical Framework for Reform of National Water Law’ p. 303-309 (section 
5.2.3) for another detail account of the licencing regime in England 
606 This is regulated primarily by ss. 6, 7, 11 and 12 of the Water Industry Act 1991 (England) 
607 Ibid. This is regulated primarily by ss. 6, 7, 11 and 12 of the ibid 
608This is granted under s. 17 F  ibid.  
609 New appointments and variations – a consultation on our process (Ofwat March, 2010)   
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The rule on the appointment of an undertaker is outlined in the legislation. It is 
required that water undertakers take the form of a limited company or a statutory 
water company, whereas a sewerage undertaker must be a limited company.610 A 
company is appointed by the Secretary of State or by a general authorisation provided 
by the Secretary of State to OFWAT.611 An appointed company is subjected to duties 
imposed by enactments.612 
A new licence which is granted due to the cessation of an incumbent’s 
licences would be a rare circumstance due to takeovers. New appointments or 
appointments followed by variations of an incumbent undertaker’s licences are more 
common. 613 OFWAT may grant new appointments if one of the three conditions is 
fulfilled: (i) the site is unserved, or (ii) large user criterion (the site will or is serving 
over than 50 megalitres per year) and the customer would like to change its supplier, 
or, (iii) the incumbent company provides consent.614     
Applicants must serve notice to existing appointees, EA and local 
authorities.615OFWAT is also obligated to publish a notice stating its proposals to 
make appointments or variations, stating the purpose and reason in doing so and 
specify the period when representation and objection can be made.616 Such notices 
 
610Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s 6 (5). These are privately financed water companies authorised 
to supply water under the Water Act, 1945. 8 & 9 GEO. 6. c. 42. Most of these companies have 
undergone consolidation with larger companies. See also Statutory Water Companies Act 1991 c.58   
611Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s. 6 (1) 
612Ibid s 6 (2) 
613 See ibid s.7 (4) 
614 Ibid s.7 (4) 
615 Ibid s.8 (2) 
616 Ibid s.8 (3) 
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must be published in a manner appropriate to bringing attention to any affected 
persons.617 
WSL type licences 
A WSL type licence provided the licensee the right to supply water (or to 
supply and introduce water) to consumers using an undertaker’s network, thus 
providing the legal basis for common carriage. A retail licence will authorise a 
licensee only to supply water, whereas to supply and introduce water a combined 
licence would be required.618  
In order to apply for a WSL, an applicant must not be a relevant undertaker.619 
WSL licences620 can only occur under these three conditions, namely, if the 
customer’s premises are not household premises, if the customer’s aggregate demand 
on the premises is not less than 5 megalitres (50 megalitres in Wales)621 annually and 
if the premises are not being supplied by another licensee pursuant to a water supply 
licence.622 OFWAT established and publishes the criteria for approving licences, 
consisting of the applicant’s financial, managerial and technical competencies623 and 
 
617 Ibid s.8 (4) 
618 Ibid s.17 A (5) 
619 Ibid s.17A (8) b 
620 See , New appointments and variations – a consultation on our process p.1 The Competition 
Appeals Tribunal has been critical towards OFWAT licencing regime. See Hendry, ‘An Analytical 
Framework for Reform of National Water Law’ section 5.2.3 
621 The Water Supply (Amendment to the Threshold Requirement) Regulations 2011, SI 2011 No. 3014 
The previous threshold was 50 megalitres but in December 2011 this was reduced to 5 megalitres in 
England through the amendment of s.17D Water Industry Act 1991 (England)  
622 Water Industry Act 1991 (England)s.17A(3) 
623 ‘Guidance on applying for a water supply licence Version 3’ (Ofwat, 2011)  
<www.ofwat.gov.uk/competition/wsl/gud_pro_wslappguid.pdf> accessed March 17, 2012  
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specifies the exact particulars, documents and information that an applicant must 
submit for the purpose of assessment by OFWAT.624 There is no rigid rule for this 
assessment. The legal basis for this type of assessment appears to be rooted in the 
WIA s 2 (2A) (d) which obligates the Director “in the manner he considers is best 
calculated… to secure that the activities authorised by the licence of a licensed water 
supplier and any statutory functions imposed on it in consequence of the licence are 
properly carried out” .625 With this wide formulation on the WIA, OFWAT is free to 
employ its own method of assessing the applicants. 
Companies applying for WSL licences are required under the WIA 1991 to 
publish a notice of application on their website or through any other means after 
OFWAT notifies the applicant that a valid application has been received. 626 The 
notice must contain the timescale and address where representations and objections 
can be made.627 The requirement for transparency is further justified due to the fact 
that water services businesses will involve some sort of local monopoly situation 
where “exit” is impossible or very difficult for customers. Interested stakeholders 
must, therefore, be permitted to convey their views and present their objections. This 
will only be possible if there are adequate transparency mechanisms in place, such as 
the aforementioned legislative requirement to publish the notice of licence application. 
 
624 Ibid 
625 Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s. 2 (2A) (d) 
626 Ibid s.17 F (2) See also The Water Supply Licence (Application) Regulations 2005, SI 2005 No. 
1638 Regulation 5 (5) 
627Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s.17 F (3) 
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In addition, OFWAT is also required by the regulation to publish the application 
notice on its website.628  
The timescale provided to present objections is 20 working days.629 OFWAT 
invokes a “customer no worse-off policy” as a part of its assessment criteria, which 
means that customers should not be put in a worse position after a new licence is 
granted.630 This includes the assessment of service level impacts and prices. OFWAT 
will accept higher service levels for a higher price if there is customer support.631 
5.3.1.2. Licence conditions 
The WIA provides OFWAT (and statutorily, the Secretary of State), the power 
to impose conditions of appointment.632  
 
Undertaker’s and NAV licences 
The conditions for NAV licences are essentially the same as undertaker’s 
licences.633  The conditions of appointment normally comprise of 17 items. Those 
 
628 SI 2005 No. 1638 Regulation 5 (6)  
629 Ibid Regulation 6 
630 New appointments and variations – a statement of our policy (Ofwat February, 2011)   para 6.4 
631 Ibid para 6.4.4. 
632 Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s 11 
633 ‘Appointment of SSE Water Limited as a Water and Sewerage Undertaker and Variation of the 
Appointment of Wessex Water Services Limited as a Water and Sewerage Undertaker’ (Ofwat, 2012)  
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/industrystructure/licences/lic_lic_sse.pdf> accessed April 18th 2012 
‘Appointment of Veolia Water Projects Limited as a Water and Sewerage Undertaker and Variation of 
the Appointments of Thames Water Utilities Limited as a Water and Sewerage Undertaker’ (Ofwat, 
2012)  <http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/industrystructure/licences/lic_lic_vwp.pdf> accessed April 18th 
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with particular importance are condition B (charges) which embodies the price limit 
(RPI+K) and periodic reviews, condition F (accounts and accounting information) 
which includes accounting records, statements, financial ring-fencing, audit and 
publication of statements, condition G (code of practice for customers and relation 
with customer service committee), condition H (code of practice and disconnection 
procedure) and condition J (level of service and service target). 634   
 With the breadth and detail of the items regulated in the licence conditions, 
the licence becomes the primary instrument for regulation, constituting the operational 
“rule of the game” in the water industry, governing the relation between the water 
companies, OFWAT and consumer. Yet, because they are licences, they are much 
more flexible than legislations and contracts, requiring only the exercise of 
discretionary power vested in OFWAT (and statutorily, the Secretary of State) for its 
modification or termination.635  
WSL type licences 
 
634 Instrument of Appointment by the Secretary of State for the Environment of Thames Water Utilities 
Limited as a water and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 1989 (2005) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/industrystructure/licences/lic_lic_tms.pdf> accessed May 24, 2011 
Instrument of Appointment by the Secretary of State for Wales of Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig as a water 
and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 1989 (1989) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/industrystructure/licences/lic_lic_wsh.pdf> accessed May 24, 2011 
Instrument of Appointment by the Secretary of State for the Environment of Severn Trent Water 
Limited as a water and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 1989 (1989) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/industrystructure/licences/lic_lic_svt.pdf> accessed May 24, 2011 
635 On the high transaction cost of contract renegotiation see in general Guasch, J.L. and Straub, S., 
‘Corruption and concession renegotiations.☆Evidence from the water and transport sectors in Latin 
America’ 17 Utilities Policy 185 Guasch, J.L., Laffont, J.J. and Straub, S., ‘Renegotiation of concession 
contracts in Latin America:: Evidence from the water and transport sectors’ 26 International Journal of 
Industrial Organization 421 
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For WSLs, the WIA outlines the principal framework of licence conditions636 and 
further authorises the Secretary of State to enact a standard licence condition.637 The 
standard licence condition is much simpler compared to undertakers’ licences: it 
comprises of certain requirements during droughts, the requirement to provide 
information to relevant undertakers, protocols for transferring customers, definition of 
areas of operation, the obligation to transact at arm’s length, provision of information 
to OFWAT and conditions which entail the revocation of such licences.638   
5.3.1.3. Legal obligation to publish licences 
Undertaker’s and NAV licences 
For NAV licences, OFWAT is required to “serve notice of the making of the 
appointment or variation” to local authorities and the NRA and “serve the copies” of 
the appointment and variation to existing appointees.639 Although the proposal for 
making appointments must be brought to the attention of any persons likely to be 
affected by it there are no statutory requirements to publish NAV licences once they 
are approved. Nevertheless, in practice, both licences of the original undertakers and 
NAVs are published by OFWAT.640 The power in publishing these licences comes 
 
636Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s. 17 G 
637Ibid s. 17 H 
638 Water Industry Act 1991 Section 17 H, Standard Conditions of Water Supply Licences (Department 
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 2005)   
639 Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s. 8 (5) (a) and (b) 
640Ibid s.8 (4)  see section 5.3.1.1, see also ‘Water company licences’ (Ofwat, No Year)  < 
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/industrystructure/licences/> accessed January 13 
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not from a specific statutory obligation to publish licence instruments but from a 
general empowerment to publish regulatory information under WIA s.201.641. 
WSL type licences  
WSLs are different. OFWAT is required to “serve a copy of the licence or 
licence as varied” (instead of just a notice) to a number of regulators (EA, DWI, CC 
Water) including the undertakers, so there is a wider scope of information users 
targetted by the WIA than for a NAV licence, however, there are no requirements to 
serve such copies of licences to customers or to publicly disclose them. 642 OFWAT 
said in its guidance that it “will retain a copy of the licence or variation of the licence” 
in its library, in addition to issuing a press notice subsequent to licence approvals and 
maintain a Register of Licensees on their website.643 OFWAT’s Register of Licencees 
contains the list of WSL licencees and the copies of its licences and its contact 
details.644 To conclude, similar to the publication of undertakers’ licences on 
OFWAT’s website, the publication of WSL licences is OFWAT’s own initiative 
rather than a statutory obligation. Nevertheless, statutes do have the role of enabling 
publication by providing discretionary power to OFWAT to do so, through WIA s.201  
5.3.2.    Selection and removal of economic regulator 
 
641Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s.201, see section 5.3.5 below 
642Ibid s. 17 (F) (7) 
643 , ‘Guidance on applying for a water supply licence Version 3’ p.9 In its website, it says that “The 
Water Supply Licences held on the WSRA's Register may be inspected during normal office hours at 
OFWAT, 7 Hill Street, Birmingham, B5 4UA (telephone number 0121 644 7500)” ‘Water Supply 
Licences’ (Ofwat, No Year)  <http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/competition/wsl/prs_web_wsllicences> 
accessed January 16, 2012    ibid 
644 ‘Water Supply Licensees' Contact Details’ (Ofwat, No Year)  
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/competition/wsl/prs_web_wslcontacts> accessed January 16, 2012 
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The regulation of OFWAT’s internal governance in the WIA is very minimal, 
presumably in order to allow the regulatory body to be independent,with the focus on 
the Secretary of State’s powers to appoint and remove OFWAT’s members and 
Chairman. The WIA prescribes that OFWAT shall consist of at least a chairman and 
two other members645, appointed by the Secretary of State for a five year term.646 The 
Secretary of State also holds the power to remove the chairman or OFWAT members 
from their offices on the grounds of ‘incapacity’ or ‘misbehaviour’.647 In practice, 
OFWAT’s structure consists of a Chairman, a chief executive and a number of 
executive and non-executive directors.648  
In the wake of the Nolan Report649, all public appointments in the UK are 
subject to standards650 imposed by The Commissioner for Public Appointments651 
requiring transparency in appointments, including the setting up of a recruitment 
 
645Water Industry Act 1991 (England) Schedule 1A para. 1(1) 
646Ibid Schedule 1A para. 3(1)  
647Ibid Schedule 1A para. 3(2) (a) 
648 Rules of procedure for the Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat) (Ofwat) 
<http://ofwat.gov.uk/aboutofwat/structure/gud_pro_100616rulesofprocedure.pdf> accessed May 5th, 
2011  
649 Great Britain Committee on Standards in Public Life, Standards in public life, First Report of the 
Committee of Standards in Public Life (Nolan Report) (1995)   
650 The Commissioner for Public Appointment, Code of Practice for Ministerial Appointments to Public 
Bodies (2009)   
651 Public Appointments Order in Council 2002, Notice: 1006 (Issue: 56648), 30 July 2002 (as 
amended).  
 
 187 
website.652 OFWAT and DEFRA also set up a recruitment website and indicate that 
candidates may be required to appear before a Parliamentary Select Committee.653  
Other than the question of appointment and removal of OFWAT members or 
chairman, the OFWAT is free to arrange its own household.654 The WIA enables 
OFWAT to appoint staff, subject to the approval of the Minister of Civil Service and 
applicable rules on civil servants.655 One of the most significant discretions to 
OFWAT granted by the WIA in managing its household is its power to regulate its 
own procedure and to enact a code of practice.656 These two instruments contain 
lengthy and detailed regulations with significant implications for OFWAT’s internal 
governance.  
OFWAT is accountable to the parliament and is statutorily required to present 
two kinds of reports annually: the first is the “forward work program” containing its 
expenditure plans as well as non routine projects and the second is the annual 
report.657 The WIA also prescribes the minimum content of the annual report.658 In 
addition, OFWAT is required by other legislation to create and report its resource 
 
652 The Commissioner for Public Appointment, Code of Practice for Ministerial Appointments to Public 
Bodies para 5.33-5.36 “Publishing Vacancies” 
653 ofwatrecruitmentboard.com, ‘Background to the appointments’   
<http://www.ofwatboardrecruitment.com/sections/about_the_org/background_to_the_appointments> 
accessed Novermber 12, 2011 
654 Consider also, OFWAT’s supplementary power to “…do anything which is calculated to facilitate, 
or is conducive or incidental to, the performance of its functions”, including forming advisory bodies. 
SeeWater Industry Act 1991 (England) Schedule 1A para 12 
655Ibid Schedule 1A para. 5 
656Ibid Schedule 1A para 8 and 9. This should be done by consultation with the Secretary of State, the 
Welsh Assembly, The Environment Agency, the Consumer Council, undertakers,  licensed water 
suppliers and any other parties which OFWAT ‘considers appropriate’. See para 9 (3) 
657 These are obligatory under s.192A and 192B. See ibid 
658 Ibid s.192B (2) 
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account to the Comptroller/Auditor General to the House of Commons.659 The 
Secretary of State is required by law to arrange the publication of such reports and in 
practice such reports including the Comptroller’s certificate are published by OFWAT 
on its website.660 
5.3.3. Conflict of Interest 
Rules on Conflict of Interest (CoI) are embodied in OFWAT’s procedure661 
which, as discussed in the previous section, was enabled through the WIA.662 This is 
quite different from Victoria, where the regulator’s CoI rules are prescribed in detail, 
through legislation.663  
OFWAT’s rules of Procedure require the disclosure of any conflict of 
interest.664 No clear distinction is made between “existing” or “foreseeable” CoI. 665 
When in doubt if a matter amounts to a conflict of interest, an OFWAT member has 
the obligation to disclose,666 in which event the person may either choose to absent 
himself from any discussion and decision or  ask the Chairman  how to proceed.667 
The Procedure provides OFWAT’s Chairman with the discretion of how to proceed in 
 
659 Government Resources and Accounts Act 2000, 2000 c. 20 
660 Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s.192B (5) See OFWAT publication of its annual report and 
resource account Annual report and accounts 2010-11 For the period 1 April 2010 to 31 March 2011 
(Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat), 2011) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/aboutofwat/reports/annualreports/rpt_ar2010-11print.pdf> May 21st 2012 
661 , Rules of procedure for the Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat) 
662 Water Industry Act 1991 (England) Schedule 1A para 7 
663 See also section 3.3.1 on Victoria above    
664 , Rules of procedure for the Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat) para. 19.   
665 Compare this with the obligation to disclose “…existing or foreseeable pecuniary interest” in 
Victoria. See section 4.3.3 on Victoria 
666 , Rules of procedure for the Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat) para.20 
667 Ibid para.22 
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such circumstances, by deciding that the member should absent himself from any 
discussion or decision related to his interest, or to allow him to be present but without 
the right to participate or to allow him to be present and participate in discussions and 
decisions but only with respect to statements of facts.668 If parties affected by a CoI 
have been consulted and do not raise any objection, the matter may cease to be treated 
as a CoI.669 
Definition of a CoI in OFWAT’s Procedure encompasses both pecuniary and 
non-pecuniary interest670 similar to Victoria’s ESC CoI rule.671 ‘Interest’ may consist 
of equity or any other financial interest and any employment, consultancy, 
directorship or other remunerative agreement with companies and its affiliates which 
are currently regulated (or may in the future be regulated) by OFWAT.672 When 
spouses, partners or children of an OFWAT member possess such ‘Interest’673   as 
defined above, there is an obligation to notify the Chairman674 who will then prescribe 
a course of action.   
 
668 Ibid para.24 
669 Ibid Annex A para 1.5 
670 Ibid Annex A para 1.4: “...any interest or duty that is held by a Board Member – whether or not 
financial in nature – that a fair-minded and informed observer, having considered all of the relevant 
facts, would conclude gave rise to a real possibility of bias in relation to a matter which that Board 
Member is required to consider or decide” .  
671 Essential Services Commission Act 2001 (Vic), s.27 
672 , Rules of procedure for the Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat) 
673 Ibid para 4.3 
674 Ibid para 4.6 
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One of OFWAT’s good practices on CoI is the maintenance of a Register of 
Board Members’ Disclosable Interests675 (Register), which is a public document and 
must be amended from time to time to ensure its accuracy.676 As the Procedure 
outlines, the purpose of such Register is to “ensure transparency in relation to any 
interests of Board Members – or of their spouses, partners and dependant children – 
that have or might be perceived as having the potential, to give rise to a conflict of 
interest” .677 As such, the information contained in the Register also encompasses 
existing or past relationships between dependants of OFWAT Members with OFWAT 
regulated companies. 678 
In regulating a possible ‘revolving door’, the Procedure requires Board 
Members to obtain approval from OFWAT’s Chairman and DEFRA if – within the 
period of two years subsequent to their retirement from OFWAT – they wish to accept 
an appointment from (or those which in the future may be) an OFWAT regulated 
company, its affiliates or major supplier or contractors.679  
One of the incentives for the Board Members to comply with the Procedure is 
the possibility of litigation directed against them personally (and not to OFWAT as an 
 
675 This is also practiced by other regulatory boards in the UK, see Ofcom’s  ‘Register of disclosable 
interests – Ofcom Board’ (Ofcom, 2011)  <http://www.ofcom.org.uk/about/how-ofcom-is-run/ofcom-
board-2/members/register-of-disclosable-interests/> accessed May 11, 2011 
676 , Rules of procedure for the Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat) paras 4.7 and 4.8 
677 Ibid para 4.9 
678 This could be in the form of company directorship to employment, consultancy activities, equities or 
financial interest, as well as other remunerative agreements. Ibid Para 4.12  
679 Ibid Annex A, para . 6. The purpose of this, other than to avoid the suspicion of a revolving door (see 
para 6.2.a) is also to protect competitors from unjustified exploitation of trade secret or confidential 
information to which the said OFWAT Members have  had access  during the course of their work (see 
para 6.2.b) 
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institution) from parties aggrieved by their misconduct. The Procedure hinted that 
personal criminal and civil liability may be incurred by OFWAT’s Chairman or other 
members, in cases involving fraudulent or negligent statement, breach of confidence 
or insider trading.680  
In order to function, such a mechanism above may require water companies to 
be listed in the capital market and for sufficient competition (‘for’ or ‘in’ the market or 
through ‘yardstick’) to exist. When some degree of competition exists, regulated 
companies will have adequate interest to pursue litigation against members of the 
regulatory body for their impartiality. If the companies are not listed in the capital 
market (such as the case in Victoria) or if competition is limited or absent (such as the 
case in Jakarta, where only two companies are regulated), there may not be adequate 
economic interest for the regulated companies to commence civil or criminal litigation 
against the members of the regulatory body for their impartiality or negligence.   
5.3.4. Means of acquiring information 
In England, legislation requires companies to submit information to the 
regulator and provides discretion for the regulator to disclose any information in its 
hands, including information provided by the regulated companies, to the public. 
English DWI has the power to enter any of the water companies’ premises for 
the purposes of its investigation and carry out inspections, measurements and tests, 
take away samples or articles681 and it may alternatively, at any reasonable time, 
 
680Ibid Annex G (Code of Conduct) para 13  
681Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s.86 (4)(a),(b) 
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require water companies to supply it with copies, extracts and records indicating the 
company’s effort to comply with drinking water quality regulations or require 
“relevant persons” from the companies to supply them with relevant information.682  
WIA requires companies to “furnish the Secretary of State with all such 
information relating to any matter”683 related to the company’s functions as a water 
undertaker or any other information considered material by the Secretary of State. The 
WIA also empowers the director to collect information on utilities’ performance.684 
Condition M of the Licence Condition of an undertaker typically contains clauses for 
the company to furnish an OFWAT director with information he requires for 
regulatory purposes subject to some exception. 685 Condition M further provides 
discretion to OFWAT to regulate the details of such submission and to require 
companies to provide reasonable explanation. 686 Furthermore, Condition J of the 
company’s licence requires the submission of “Levels of Service Information and 
Service Targets”.687 The regulator has the power to conduct investigations in order to 
verify that the reports on service levels are correct. The power allows the regulator to 
 
682Ibid s.86 (4) c 
683Ibid s.202. Companies are also required to “…comply with any direction given by the Director” in 
accordance with its licence condition or any other arrangements under s 12 (1). See also the duty to 
report compensation and performance under s. 38A. Ibid 
684Ibid s. 38A (2) 
685 , Instrument of Appointment by the Secretary of State for the Environment of Thames Water Utilities 
Limited as a water and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 1989 Condition M 
686  ibid Condition M. 2: “Information required to be furnished under this Condition shall be furnished 
in such form and manner and at such times and be accompanied or supplemented by such explanations 
as the Director may reasonably require”. 
687 Ibid Condition J 
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inspect utilities’ premises, copy, take extracts and conduct tests and measurements, 
subject to reasonable prior notice.688  
OFWAT also issue guidelines to water companies detailing data and 
information it should submit annually.689 This is known as the “June Return”. If a 
company misreports its June Return data, it may be held to be in breach of Licence 
Conditions M and/or J and could therefore be liable for a penalty.690  
However, OFWAT is considering moving towards a “risk based approach” of 
regulation, which according to OFWAT will significantly decrease the regulatory 
burden.691 This would have a significant impact on OFWAT’s information gathering 
processes, especially the June Return. Under the new approach, utilities will no longer 
be required to submit the annual June Return, but provide certificates of risk and 
compliance statements containing their board’s signatures, publish several key 
 
688 Ibid Condition J para 9 
689 ‘Reporting requirements’ (Ofwat, 2011)  
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/junereturn/reportingreq/> accessed June 9, 2011. Other than June 
Return, OFWAT acquire information from other reporting duties such as principal statements; charges 
schemes; regulatory accounts; business plans; customer literature; codes of practice; and cost base 
information. See Ofwat, Getting it right for customers, How can we make monopoly water and 
sewerage companies more accountable? (2010) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/publications/focusreports/prs_web_1011regcompliance.pdf> accessed 
December 01, 2011 p.38 
690 See for exampleNotice of Ofwat’s proposal to impose a penalty on United Utilities Water Plc (Ofwat 
2007) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/enforcement/enforcenotices/not_fne_nwt_notpen180407.pdf?dow
nload=Download#> accessed July 1, 2011 p. 1 
691 Ofwat, Getting it right for customers, How can we make monopoly water and sewerage companies 
more accountable? The incremental cash cost for the June Return for the whole industry is 
approximately 6.5 million GBP. See Gray, Review of Ofwat and consumer representation in the water 
sector p.35 
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performance indicators692 and also directly publish their regulatory accounts and 
accounting separation information.693 With less reliance on utilities’ “reporting 
duties”, it is likely that OFWAT will rely on their investigative power and incidental 
information requests to companies for either clarification or investigation purpose 
should they suspect the utilities to be in breach of its licences.  
5.3.5. OFWAT’s general policy on disclosure 
OFWAT believes that transparency encompasses three elements: (i) 
consultation, (ii) information, and (iii) reasoned decision. Consultation is achieved 
through workshops, seminars, media and seeking written responses to published 
consultations. Information is achieved by publication of regulatory materials and 
reasoned decision is employed at every level, from dispute determination to price 
limits.694   
Legislation is generally silent with respect to the details of the publication of 
information by OFWAT or the Secretary of State, but acts as an “enabler” of 
transparency instead, by providing them with wide discretion to publish. 695 This is 
 
692 The indicators are currently under consultation process. However, OFWAT’s proposal is to include 
these four items: Customer experience, Reliability and availability, Environmental impact and Finance. 
See Ofwat, Regulatory compliance – a proportionate and targeted approach, A consultation 
693 Ibid 
694 How we do our job: A code of practice governing the discharge of Ofwat’s functions (Ofwat 2003) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/legacy/aptrix/ofwat/publish.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/cop_110903.pdf/$FILE/
cop_110903.pdf> accessed May 5th, 2011 
695 There are some transparency requirements, such as the requirement to publish performance 
information to customers under s.93D and 27 F, and in publishing water (s.198) and sewer network 
(s.199) in the form of a map but these applies to utilities, not OFWAT. There is an obligation for an 
OFWAT Director to publish utilities’ performance information “in such form and in such manner as he 
considers appropriate” at least once a year. (s. 38A (4)). This clause corresponds to directors’ powers in 
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reflected, for example, by WIA s.201 which stipulates that the Secretary of State and 
the Director (of OFWAT) may arrange for the publication “in such form and in such 
manner as he considers appropriate”696 of information related to the companies 
which would be in the public interest697 to be published.698 When disclosing the 
information, there is a duty for the Secretary of State and OFWAT to ‘have regard’ to 
the need for excluding information related to individual affairs or the affairs of a body 
of persons (corporate or incorporate) if the publication may “seriously and 
prejudicially affect” their interests.699  
The above discretion to publish comes with a caveat. Section 206 of the WIA 
restricts the disclosure of any information acquired by virtue of the WIA or any 
information relating to the affairs of individuals or business.700 Violation of this 
 
collecting information under s.38A(2) discussed on the previous section. Water Industry Act 1991 
(England) 
696Ibid s 201 (1) 
697 The exact term of s201 (1) is: “as it may appear to him to be in the public interest to publish”. 
Hence, the legislation provides discretion to the regulator to judge which matters are considered to be in 
the public interest.Ibid s 201 (1) 
698 This is further reinforced in the company’s licence condition. See Condition M.3. , Instrument of 
Appointment by the Secretary of State for the Environment of Severn Trent Water Limited as a water 
and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 1989 “…nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the 
Director from using or disclosing any Information with which he has been furnished under this 
Condition or any other Condition of this Appointment for the purpose of carrying out his functions 
under the Act”. 
 
699Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s201 (3) The duty of the regulator is only to “have regard”, and 
so long as it is exercised, the regulator has carried out its statutory obligation. Moreover, in order for 
disclosure to be considered for exemption, the matter must  “seriously” and “prejudicially” “affect” their 
interest. This empowers the regulator with wide powerd to disclose regulatory information. As we shall 
see later on in the chapter discussing the passive disclosure rule, the causality between disclosure and 
harm and the severity of harm may be difficult to assess.  
700Ibid s.206 (1) For similar provision, see Utilities Act 2000, 2000 c. 27 s.105 and Railways Act 
1993,1993 c. 43 s.145 also Enterprise Act 2002, 2002 c.40 s.237 
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provision is considered an offence and may be liable for imprisonment.701 It was 
thought that s.206 would be repealed after the FoI Act 2000 came into force702, but it 
turned out that it was preserved.703 Therefore, information exempt under s.206 can 
still be exempted even when it is requested to be disclosed under the FoI regime, as 
the FoI regime contains exceptions preserving information made confidential by other 
statutes.704 
Such a restriction under s.206, however, contains many qualifiers; for 
example, that it does not apply if the disclosure is necessary to facilitate the carrying 
out of the functions of the regulators (this includes OFWAT, the Secretary of State, 
CC Water and the Competition Commission, among others)705 as well as for health, 
safety, environmental or other regulatory reasons.706  
OFWAT has been publishing the June Return information to the public 
domain although some commercial, in confidence information is being excised.707 
There are several categories in applying the excision: category 1 is price sensitive 
information whose publication or publication by reference to other information may 
 
701Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s.206 (7) and (8) 
702 “DEFRA have told us that the statutory bar on the provision of information to third parties in s206 
of the Water Industry Act 1991 will be amended or repealed to coincide with the full implementation of 
the FOIA on  1 January  2005.” Dunshea, R.D., RD 22/04, Freedom of Information Act 2000  (Ofwat 
2004) <http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/aboutofwat/foi/ltr_rd2204_foi2000> accessed August 4, 2010 
703 Dunshea, R.D., RD 10/05: Freedom of Information Act 2000 – s206 of the Water Industry Act  
(Ofwat 2005) <http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/aboutofwat/foi/ltr_rd1005_fois206wia1991> accessed August 
9, 2010 “The Department of Constitutional Affairs announced on 16 June that s 206 of the WIA 1991 
will be retained” 
704 FoI Act 2000 (England) s. 44 (1) (a) 
705Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s.206 (3) (a)  
706 See the long list of qualifiers in s.206 (b)-(k). Ibid 
707 Ofwat, ‘Publication of the June return 2009’ (Ofwat 2009)  
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/junereturn/ltr_rd0809_jr09> accessed May 24, 2011 
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affect share prices, category 2 is information which could assist contractors or 
potential contractors in tenders, category 3 is information which has not been 
approved by affected organisations or individuals for disclosure, category 4 is 
information which could give third parties a commercial advantage and category 5 is 
information with a security risk to the nation or an individual.708  
Upon making an FoI request to OFWAT,709 the author discovered that such 
categorisation above is not based on any policy710, but probably developed out of 
practice instead. In MD 135, Ian Byatt (OFWAT’s Director at that time) decided that 
he would not pre-determine what information is confidential.711  The companies’ 
 
708 See Thames Water Utilities LTD, June Return 2006: Statement to Accompany the Public Domain 
Version (2006) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/legacy/aptrix/ofwat/publish.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/JR06_TMS_ExcisionsS
tatement.pdf/$FILE/JR06_TMS_ExcisionsStatement.pdf> accessed June 9, 2011 Northrumbian Water 
Limited, ‘June Return 2007: Statement to Accompany the Public Domain Version’ (Northrumbian 
Water, 2006)  
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/legacy/aptrix/ofwat/publish.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/JR07_YKY_ExcisionsS
tatement.pdf/$FILE/JR07_YKY_ExcisionsStatement.pdf>  Yorkshire Water, June Return 2007: 
Statement to Accompany the Public Domain Version (Northrumbian Water 2006) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/legacy/aptrix/ofwat/publish.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/JR07_YKY_ExcisionsS
tatement.pdf/$FILE/JR07_YKY_ExcisionsStatement.pdf> accessed June 9, 2011 United Utilities, June 
Return 2006: Statement to Accompany the Public Domain Version (Northrumbian Water 2006) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/legacy/aptrix/ofwat/publish.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/JR06_NWT_Excisions
Statement.pdf/$FILE/JR06_NWT_ExcisionsStatement.pdf> June 9, 2011 Northrumbian Water 
Limited, June Return 2007: Statement to Accompany the Public Domain Version  
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/legacy/aptrix/ofwat/publish.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/JR07_NES_ExcisionsSt
atement.pdf/$FILE/JR07_NES_ExcisionsStatement.pdf> accessed June 9, 2011 
709 Paula Bennett, Re: Ofwat's excision policy for the June Return data (Email Correspondence, June 
21) (2011)   
710 “I am afraid that there is no source document as such for the categorisation policy” See ibid 
711 Byatt, I.C.R., MD135, Confidentiality for July Returns and PR99 Information Submission  (Ofwat 
1998)    
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responses as to which information should be declared confidential varies.712 Byatt 
gave some indication of which tables (of the June Return) are likely to be prejudicial 
if disclosed, but it is up to the companies to decide which information is confidential 
by marking it in both electronic and hard copy submission made to OFWAT.713 In 
doing so, the companies must set out the justifications for its restriction and this 
explanation will be published along with other information which is not excised.714 
RD 29/98 makes clear that OFWAT may still need to consider the justification used in 
excisions, and if it declines the companies’ justification, it will provide time for 
companies to make representations and prepare for publication.715 
The move towards a risk based approach to regulation as discussed in the 
previous section would mean that the above June Return excision ‘policy’ will no 
longer be relevant. If OFWAT no longer collects the June Return data, it will have no 
similar information to be disclosed to the public. It will be the companies themselves 
who will be responsible for the publication.     
5.3.6. Service Level and Customer Service 
 
712 RD 29/98 sum up the companies’ responses on what information should be made confidential (and 
not) based on MD 135 Dunshea, R.D., RD 29/98, Confidentiality for July Returns and PR99 
Information Submission  (Ofwat 1998)    
713 Byatt, MD135, Confidentiality for July Returns and PR99 Information Submission   “The only areas 
that I believe could be considered to have a serious and prejudicial effect are Tables 30, 31, 35a, 35b, 
36a, 36b and 39 plus the associated commentaries of the standard July Return and table 40 in the 
enhanced July Return for 1998.” 
714 Ibid  
715 Dunshea, RD 29/98, Confidentiality for July Returns and PR99 Information Submission   
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Disconnection for non payment and the use of limiting devices for household 
customers is prohibited by the WIA.716 Vulnerable groups are facilitated with lower 
tariffs and flexibility of payment.717  This policy is not applicable to non household 
customers.718 However, when a premise serves both non household customers and 
household customers, OFWAT categorise this as a “mix-use premise” where 
disconnection is disallowed.719 
WIA requires that water supplied by the utilities is “wholesome”.720 
Wholesomeness is accomplished when the water supplied complies with the list of 
maximum or minimum concentrations or values prescribed by the water quality 
regulations or, when a prescription is absent, does not contain microorganisms, 
parasites or substances at concentrations or values which could be potentially 
dangerous to human health.721 The supply of water unfit for human consumption is an 
offence.722  
When contamination occurs, water undertakers have the power to disconnect 
and the obligation to serve notices to customers, specifying the steps that need to be 
 
716 Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s.61(1A) 
717Water Industry (Charges) (Vulnerable Groups) Regulations 1999 SI 1999/3441 (as amended) See 
Regulation 2 
718Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s.61 
719 ‘Disconnection of Mixed-Used Premises For Non Payment of Water Charges, RD 14/04’ (2004)  
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/charges/ltr_rd1404_disconmixeduse> accessed April 28, 2012 
720Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s 68 (1) (a)  
721 In most situations, the regulation prescribes a maximum value, acidity (pH) level is the exception, 
with a minimum value of 6.5 and a maximum of 9.5. See The Water Supply Regulations 2010, SI 2010 
No. 1991 This SI is regularly amended. Particularly see Regulation 4 (2) (a).  
722Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s. 70  
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undertaken before supply is restored.723 Legislation does not detail any further how 
contamination has to be communicated. There is no uniform standard on how 
companies should deal with contamination, so the mechanism has been developing 
out of practice. Some companies place alerts on websites, deliver notices by hand 
door-to-door, ring the customers and contact local doctors to obtain information on 
sensitive customers, and normally have pre-arranged agreements with local media in 
the event of emergencies.724 From the materials collected in one research project, it 
was revealed that 90% of the notices are ‘readable’.725 
Service and customer service levels in England are contained in a Statutory 
Instrument726 separated from that regulating drinking water quality, and is called the 
Guaranteed Standard Scheme (GSS) which regulates six categories of customers’ 
rights727. These minimum standards are subject to some qualifications such as natural 
 
723 Incidents must be immediately notified to the DWI as soon as they come to the attention of the 
company. The Water Industry (Suppliers’ Information) Direction 2009. SeeWater Industry Act 1991 
(England) s. 75 (1) and (1A) and s.75 (3). Failure to serve notice is considered an offence see s.75 (5) 
724 Risk Solutions, Good Practice for Communicating about Drinking Water Quality; A report for The 
Drinking Water Inspectorate (D5173/R1, 2009)   
725 Ibid There are several methods by which  to assess the readability of  material, namely, through the 
Flesch-Kincaid grade level, Gunning fog index and Lexical Density Function See.  Si, L. and Callan, J., 
‘A statistical model for scientific readability’ (Proceedings of the tenth international conference on 
Information and knowledge management)  
726 The power to make regulation is conferred on the Secretary of State, see Water Industry Act 1991 
(England) ss. 38(2)-(4), 95(2)-(4), 213 (2)(d) (e), (2A)(a)-(c), and (2B)      
727 The Water Supply and Sewerage Services (Customer Service Standards) Regulations 2008, SI 2008 
No. 594 The six categories of customer’s rights are: (1) The making and keeping of appointments ; the 
GSS rule sets the obligation to provide notice specifying the exact time of the appointment with 
customers and the utilities’ obligation to keep such appointment. (2) Lack of pressure; the minimum 
pressure is set at 0.7 bar, violation occurs when a company fails to comply with such requirement more 
than twice, each more than one hour, within a 28 day period.  (3) Supply interruptions; utilities are 
obliged to provide notice of planned interruptions of supply at least 48 hours before it occurs, specifying 
the time when supply will be restored, any alternatives of supplies that can be obtained and the 
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disaster or labour strikes. Violations occur when none of the qualifications apply. This 
entails financial penalties to be paid directly by the utilities to customers.    
Another relevant instrument embodying “service levels and customers 
service” is Condition G of the company’s licence, which applies the “Code of Practice 
for Customers and relations with the Customer Service Committee” (currently CC 
Water).728 The Code of Practice must be approved by OFWAT and typically would 
contain: a description of tariff charges, arrangements for the payment of bills and 
payment by installments including budget plans, the procedures for making 
complaints, testing of meters, methods for meter reading, offences for tampering with 
meters, emergency conditions and making enquiries with the company, a description 
of CC Water and its contact information.729 The existence of the code and any 
substantive revision thereof must be put to customers’ attention.730 Utilities must also 
explain how the code can be inspected and copied by the customers.731 OFWAT 
 
telephone number of the utilities where queries can be made. If a utility fails to restore supplies by the 
time stated on the notice provided to customers it may be subjected to fines. (4) Queries on charges; 
when customers make queries (in writing) about the accuracy of their bill, utilities have the obligation to 
provide a substantive response.  (5) Complaints in general; any written complaints must be responded to 
within 10 working days. (6) Sewer flooding; effluent from utilities’ sewers must not enter customers’ 
buildings and land properties. See ibid , Regulation 6, 10, 8, 9, 7, 11 and 12 
728 , Instrument of Appointment by the Secretary of State for the Environment of Thames Water Utilities 
Limited as a water and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 1989 Condition G 
729 Thames Water, ‘Code of Practice: important helpful information and advice for household 
customers’ (Thames Water,)  <http://www.thameswater.co.uk/cps/rde/xbcr/corp/codes-of-practice-and-
customer-guarantee-scheme.pdf> accessed May 31, 2011 
730 , Instrument of Appointment by the Secretary of State for the Environment of Thames Water Utilities 
Limited as a water and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 1989 Condition G.6 (2) 
731 Ibid  
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require utilities to send, free of charge, the code in its latest form to anyone requesting 
it.732 
While the GSS Rule prescribes the minimum amount of payment against 
violation of service standard, some companies use the Code of Practice to enhance the 
amount of the compensation.733 
5.3.7.  Non-compliance 
As the analytical framework (Chapter 2) has elaborated, transparency is 
required, not only with respect to the content of the service levels and customer 
service, but also with respect to  violation of such standards by the utilities and any 
enforcement measures by the regulator in response to such violations. The reason is 
because information on non compliance is vital for investors and creditors as it may 
influence their investment decisions, as well as for the public to create pressure to hold 
the regulator accountable and for the utilities to take action. It is also used to compel 
other companies to change behaviour in addition to maintaining a sense of fairness. 734 
 
732 Ibid Condition G.6 (4) 
733 Thames Water, ‘Code of Practice: important helpful information and advice for household 
customers’ p.7 See also Thames Water, ‘Our guarantees to you: Customer Guarantee Scheme’ (Thames 
Water,)  <http://www.thameswater.co.uk/cps/rde/xbcr/corp/customer-guarantee-scheme-detailed-
version.pdf> accessed May 31, 2011 
734 According to OFWAT: “Use of these enforcement tools and transparency about their use may also 
incentivise other companies to change their behaviour”.United Kingdom, Ofwat's Approach to 
Enforcement ( ) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/enforcement/pap_pos_090731enforcementapproach.pdf> 
accessed July 1, 2011 para.19 
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Macrory recommended a framework for applying penalties, and that includes 
some transparency principles735, namely: (i) the publication of enforcement policy736, 
(ii) the justification on the choice of enforcement action737, (iii) transparency on which 
formal enforcement activities have been undertaken738 and (iv) transparency in the 
methodology for calculating penalties.739 
OFWAT categorises740 formal enforcement action into several layers: the 
securing of formal undertakings from the companies (s.19)741, the ‘enforcement order’ 
(s.18)742 and finally, the imposition of financial penalties (s 22 A).743 ‘Enforcement 
Orders’ (s.18) can be imposed on utilities that contravene their licence conditions744 or 
 
735 The other framework is in measuring the outcome of enforcement actions and to follow-up 
enforcement actions. United Kingdom, Regulatory justice sanctioning in a post-Hampton world : 
consultation document (2006) <http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file44582.pdf> July 1, 2011 p.8 
736 This is to signal to all stakeholders what the expected behaviours are, and what the consequences 
would be if they breach such expectation.  See ibid p.21  
737 This is to increase confidence in how regulatory non compliance is being dealt with. See ibid p.21 
738 This is in order to keep stakeholders and the public up to date with regulatory action. Macrory 
considers that  when and against whom the enforcement action is taken should be disclosed. This should 
be done for all types of enforcement: criminal, administrative, financial or improvement notices and 
such information must be easily accessible and take into account the firm’s and public’s interest. See 
ibid p.22 
739 If  the methodology for imposing fines is published, firms will have awareness of each mitigating or 
aggravating factor considered by the regulator, leading to the overall amount of the penalty. See ibid 
p.22 Aggravating factors may include the economic gains of non compliance. Mitigating factors may 
include actions to eliminate or reduce risk of damages. This will increase legitimacy of the financial 
penalty imposed and forces firms to learn that there are trade-offs between the amount of their illegal 
financial gain and penalty imposed. 
740 See United Kingdom, Ofwat's Approach to Enforcement There are also ‘special administration 
orders’ for violation of ‘principal duties’ or where the utility is unable to pay its debts. Water Industry 
Act 1991 (England) ss. 23-25), but this occurs only in extraordinary circumstances and is not a part of 
day to day regulation  
741Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s 19 
742 Ibid s 18 
743Ibid s22A 
744Ibid s 18 (1) (a) (i) 
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any other statutory requirement.745 The s.18 order requires them to do or not to do 
things which the order specified.746 An enforcement order must be preceded by a 
notice, specifying the purpose of the order, its effect, the requirement to secure 
compliance, the acts or omission which constitutes contravention and other supporting 
facts justifying the order.747 Such notices must be published748 and its copies served 
on the utilities.749  
The alternative to s.18 enforcement orders is applicable in circumstances 
where OFWAT perceives the contravention to be of a trivial nature750 or where a 
company has agreed to provide an undertaking to OFWAT to secure compliance. 751 If 
the utility provides an undertaking, such undertaking will be perceived as a statutory 
requirement enforceable under s 18.752 This, too, requires OFWAT to serve notice to 
companies and to publish a copy of such notice.753  
Finally, OFWAT has the authority to impose financial penalties on the utilities 
for contravention of their licence conditions or for failing to achieve performance 
standards.754 There is an obligation to serve notice on three occasions: before the 
 
745Ibid s 18 (1) (a) (ii) 
746Ibid s 18 (5) (a)  
747Ibid s 20 (1) 
748 Ibid s 20 (2) (a) The provision continues by explaining that the purpose of such publication is to 
bring the matters to the attention of persons who may be affected 
749 Ibid s 20 (2) (b) 
750Ibid s 19 (1) (a) 
751Ibid s 19 (1) (b) 
752Ibid s 19 (2) 
753 Ibid s 19 (3) 
754Ibid s 22A (1) (a) 
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penalty is made755 (as a Proposal to Impose Penalty), when it is decided that such 
proposal is to be varied756 and, after imposing the penalty.757 These notices should 
contain information, inter alia, on the amount of penalty (this should not be more than 
10% of the utilities’ annual turnover), the acts or omission which is deemed to 
constitute a contravention, supporting facts and justification and the period for the 
utilities to make objection with respect to the penalties issued.758  
Publication of these notices is obligatory as well as the serving of copies of 
such notices to the utilities and other regulatory bodies.759 There is a good practice by 
OFWAT in publishing these notices on its website.760 Its enforcement policy and 
statement of policy on financial penalty761 policy is also published. Hence, most of 
Macrory’s sanctioning framework (with respect to transparency) above has been 
incorporated by legislation762 and also practiced by OFWAT, an example being that 
 
755Ibid s 22A (4) 
756Ibid s 22A (5) 
757Ibid s 22A (1) (a) 
758 See Water Industry (Determination of Turnover for Penalties) Order 2005 SI 2005/ 477, ibid s 22A 
(4) (b) (c) and (d)  
759Ibid s 22A (8), (a) (b), (c), (d) 
760 For example ‘ Notice of Ofwat’s imposition of a penalty on Thames Water Utilities Limited’ 
(OFWAT, 2008)  
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/legacy/aptrix/ofwat/publish.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/not_fne_tms_gssfailurei
mp.pdf/$FILE/not_fne_tms_gssfailureimp.pdf> accessed February 3rd 
761 United Kingdom, Ofwat's Approach to Enforcement  
also Section 22A Water Industry Act 1991: Statement of policy with respect to financial penalties 
(Ofwat ) <http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/enforcement/pap_pos_101124statementpenalties.pdf> 
accessed July 1, 2011 
762 Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008, 2008 c.13  contains lengthy transparency 
requirements on enforcement ( See s.64 ) but this Act is binding to OFWAT, only with respect to s.72-
73: “Duty not to impose or maintain unnecessary burdens” 
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which concerns Thames Water763 and United Utilities.764 Responses from the utilities 
and their representations expressing disagreement or objection with respect to facts, 
circumstances and methodologies raised by OFWAT are also available in the public 
domain, as a matter of good practice.765  
5.3.8. Investment 
Determination of a utility’s investment priorities can be a contentious issue. 
As discussed in Chapter 2 (Analytical Framework), prices, network expansion, 
drinking water quality and the environment are the four main concerns of the 
regulatory trade-off. In EU countries such as England, there is little discretion with 
respect to drinking water quality and effluent standard and with almost full coverage, 
network expansion is not as contentious as in developing countries, although sewerage 
networks that are over capacity are still a problem and require investment to expand 
and upgrade.  
Thus, having almost more full (almost more full – unusual to put all these 
together!) coverage does not mean that there will be no other trade-offs with respect to 
 
763 The notice is divided into several sections, among others: Identification of  relevant regulatory 
provisions, facts and matters giving rise to the contravention, penalties, OFWAT’s reasons for 
considering it appropriate to impose a penalty, assessment of the amount of the penalty and summary of 
representations received by OFWAT and OFWAT’s response to these representations. Notice of 
Ofwat’s proposed variation to its proposal to impose a penalty on Thames Water Utilities Limited 
(Ofwat) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/enforcement/enforcenotices/not_fne_tms_propfine090108.pdf> 
accessed June 7, 2011 
764 , Notice of Ofwat’s proposal to impose a penalty on United Utilities Water Plc 
765 Wright, C., Memorandum: United Utilities Water Proposed Penalty – Representations of United 
Utilities Water (“UUW”) (2007) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/enforcement/enforcenotices/res_stk_nwt_penaltynotice_220607n
wt_annex.pdf> accessed July 1, 2011 
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investment made. There are still pressures to curtail carbon emissions, repair leakages, 
invest in sewers and lower charges. Utilities’ duties to invest in sewerage is, as 
discussed by Hendry, a qualified duty, as it must be balanced against other duties as 
discussed above.766 The Marcic litigation at the House of Lords epitomises this 
balancing principle. Marcic had his property flooded due to lack of investment in 
sewerage in his neighbourhood by Thames Water. Neverthless, the Court held that the 
duty to invest is not absolute as it must be balanced against other duties, constrains 
consumer recourse within available regulatory remedies and overrules other private 
law actions.767 This signifies that utilities’ investment decisions in sewerage 
investment has winners and losers. Since litigation efforts have been overruled, the 
most appropriate way is to integrate the losing stakeholders in the participatory 
mechanism where they can voice their concerns. A prerequisite for this is for the 
utilities and the regulatory bodies to disclose reasonings behind their decision not to 
invest in sewerage capacity expansion and to outline and explain to the losing 
stakeholders how their concerns are taken into account and reflected in future utilities’ 
investment policy.    
The next important issue is leakage. In a report commissioned by English 
regulatory bodies, it was revealed from a stakeholder survey that leakage and 
 
766 Hendry, ‘An Analytical Framework for Reform of National Water Law’ p. 322 
767 Marcic v Thames Water Utilities Ltd [2003] UKHL 66 (04 December 2003) ;  See sections 5.3.6 
(Service Level and Customer Service) and 5.3.7 (Non Compliance) above 
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excessive profits are among the three main concerns about water utilities.768 For the 
companies, leakage repairs and profit do not always come together. 
It is occasionally cheaper for companies that have a surplus of water resources 
(and therefore a low marginal cost) to “treat and leak” water rather than to repair the 
leakages.769 There is no problem with this practice until bulk water resources become 
scarce, for example, due to drought, as occurred in Yorkshire in 1995.  
The drought that struck Yorkshire in 1995 was rather unanticipated as it was 
preceded by a wet winter leading to a maximum groundwater level and fully 
recharged reservoirs.770 The utilities, Yorkshire Water Services (YWS), had been 
paying high dividends to its parent companies instead of allocating the funds to 
manage its headroom771 properly.772 With leakage level high and customer awareness 
programmes failing to constrain demand773 YWS had no other option but to enforce 
 
768 Corr Willbourn Research & Development, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY of Deliberative Research 
concerning Consumers’ Priorities for PR09 for the Water Industry Stakeholder Steering Group, (2009) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/pr09phase1/pap_rsh_pr09conspriorexecsumm.pdf> accessed 
May 10th, 2011 p.12 The report continues: “All respondents felt that the rate of leakage was 
unacceptable. ..While  some  respondentswere willing to accept a slight… increase in bills to fund leak 
repairs the majority felt that the cost of repairs should be met from profits until the leakage is reduced 
considerably.”  See p. 17 
769 Bakker, An uncooperative commodity: Privatizing water in England and Wales p. 90 
770 Bakker, K.J., ‘Privatising water, producing scarcity. The Yorkshire drought of 1996’ 76 Economic 
Geography 4 
771 Headroom is a margin between supply and demand. According to OFWAT, ‘Target Headroom’ is 
the minimum amount of headroom  needed to meet demand, “taking into account supply and demand 
uncertainty such as the temporary loss of a water resource” Security of supply 2006-07 – supporting 
information (Ofwat) <http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/reporting/rpt_sos_2006-
07secofsupplyinfo.pdf> accessed May 17, 2011 
772 Bakker, ‘Privatising water, producing scarcity. The Yorkshire drought of 1996’ 
773 There was public discontent towards Yorkshire Water even before the drought occurred, among 
other matters related to the pollution of the River Aire and the failed campaign of a consumer activist to 
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emergency drought orders which authorised them to, among other actions, ban all non 
essential water uses774 and abstract water from other sources.775 These had significant 
implications for the environment which prompted the authorities to artificially aerate 
some rivers and conduct ‘fish rescue’.776  
The legal obligation to repair leakages, however, is never straightforward 
since “treat and leak” can be more economical than repairing leakage, and this is also 
true in legislative terms. The WIA under s.37 (1) requires utilities to arrange for (a) 
the supplies of water to premises in their respective supply area777 and for (b) 
“maintaining, improving and extending the water undertaker’s water mains and other 
pipes”778. However, the provision continues “as are necessary for securing that the 
undertaker is and continues to be able to meet its obligations under this Part”.779 
OFWAT’s ‘translation’ of this provision is to impose the policy which requires 
utilities to fix leakage, to the extent that the cost for doing so is less than the cost of 
not fixing it, which is calculated from environmental damages and the cost of 
developing new water sources to offset the leak.780   
 
become elected onto the utilities’ board. See Haughton, G., ‘Private profits–public drought: the creation 
of a crisis in water management for West Yorkshire’ 23 Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 419 The utilities’ declining popularity may have contributed to the failure of the customer 
awareness programme designed to curtail water demand. 
774 Water Resources Act 1991 s 76 
775 Water Resources Act 1991 s 77  
776 Bakker, ‘Privatising water, producing scarcity. The Yorkshire drought of 1996’ 
777Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s 37 (1) (a) 
778 Ibid s 37 (1) (b) 
779Ibid s 37 (1)  
780‘Leakage’ (Ofwat)  <http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/consumerissues/rightsresponsibilities/leakage/> 
accessed May 19th. This approach is called SELL, which stands for the “Sustainable Economic Level 
of Leakage”‘PR09/20: Water supply and demand policy ’ (Ofwat, 2008)  
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Prior to determining final prices, companies are obligated by OFWAT to 
submit their “final business plans” (including other information such as the June 
Return).781 This document contains investment programmes that companies are 
making in the following five years after the Price Determination.This includes, for 
example, network expansion, maintenance of ageing assets, including climate change 
management plans.782 Each company publishes their draft business plans on their 
website and OFWAT compiles a link to them in its’ website.783  
The Leakage target of each company is a part of the 5 Year Price 
Determination (published by OFWAT). OFWAT sets the target for each company 
yearly in terms of megalitres per day (Ml/d).784 In the present system, the leakage 
target is  part of the security of supply index (SOSI) which is also used by OFWAT to 
impose price limit to companies. If a company fails to fulfil its SOSI level785 as has 
been targeted in the Final Price Determination, OFWAT will count this as a shortfall 
 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/pr09phase2/pr09phase2letters/ltr_pr09_watersupdempol> 
accessed May 19, 2010; By the time this thesis is written, OFWAT reports that all companies’ level of 
leakage will be at a sustainable level. See also United Kingdom, Providing Best Practice Guidance on 
the Inclusion of Externalities in the ELL Calculation: MAIN REPORT, Appendix 2 (part 1), (2011) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/pap_pos_pr09supdempolapp2-1.pdf> accessed May 19th, 2011 
781 Ofwat, ‘Overview of the Business Plan Information Requirements for PR09’ (Ofwat)  
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/pr09phase1/pap_con_bpr09inforeq.zip> accessed August 20, 
2011 
782 Anglian Water, ‘PR09 Final Business Plan, Part A: The Company Strategy’ (Anglian Water)  
<http://www.anglianwater.co.uk/_assets/media/Proposed_business_plan.pdf> accessed August 18, 2011 
783 Ofwat, ‘Periodic review 2009: water & sewerage companies' final business plans - one page 
summaries’ (Ofwat)  <http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/pr09phase3/sub_fbp_pr09partasumm> 
accessed August 20, 2011 
784 Ofwat, ‘Future water and sewerage charges 2010-15: Final determinations’ (Ofwat)  
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/pr09phase3/det_pr09_finalfull.pdf> accessed August 20, 2011 
See Table 19: Leakage assumptions 2010-11 to 2014-1 
785 Ofwat, ‘Security of Supply’ (2011)  <http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/publications/securityofsupply> 
accessed November 28, 2011 
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and penalise the companies by not including it as ‘expenditure’ in the next periodic 
review which means that the cost will be borne by the company themselves. 
Alternatively, if the matter is considered serious, OFWAT can interpret the company’s 
failure to repair leakage as a violation of s 37 (1), which provides them with the 
authority to invoke enforcement action (under ss. 18, 19 and 22 A – see Section 5.3.7. 
on Error! Reference source not found.). Companies sometimes disagree786 with 
OFWAT’s interpretation, but choose to accept s.19 enforcement (undertaking) rather 
than being fined by OFWAT.   
Announcement of a company’s failure to achieve its leakage target is an 
important step as it may create pressure on the company to fulfil its target. OFWAT 
may “name and shame” the companies in its annual report,787 or through a separate 
press release.788 The 2009-2010 report names six companies for failing to meet their 
 
786 In a letter to OFWAT Chairman accepting s.19 undertaking, RWE Thames Chief Executive stated: 
“Although it in no way diminishes the agreement to which I have referred, as you know we cannot 
accept that the current situation is such to constitute a contravention of s.37”. Jeremy Pelczer, Leakage 
and Security of Supply, Undertaking Under s.19 Water Industry Act 1991 (2006) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/enforcement/not_fne_tms_undleaksossec19.pdf> accessed May 
23, 2011 
787 Announcement of leakage target was included in OFWAT’s Security of supply, leakage and water 
efficiency issued annually. Currently, company’s leakage performance is reported in the Service and 
delivery – performance of the water companies in England and Wales”.  
788 Ofwat, Ofwat: Meeting the demand for water, Twenty–fourth Report of Session 2006–07   (2007) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmpubacc/286/286.pdf> accessed June 
13, 2011 p.13 
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leakage target and explains that OFWAT has increased their reporting requirement.789 
The report was widely quoted on the media.790  
Disclosure of the companies’ draft business plans will enable stakeholders to 
assess and participate in determining priorities for their neighbourhood whereas 
disclosure of companies’ leakage conditions enables stakeholders to assess if their 
supply security is threatened and subsequently determine the course of action that is 
acceptable to them. If the leakage rate is inefficient, more investment will have to be 
undertaken. This course of action may mean that less money is allocated to pay 
dividends and/or charges would increase.  
If a regulator perceives that the investment will have to be financed by customers 
through price increases, disclosure could help to increase the acceptability of a price 
increase. If, on the other hand, companies fail to achieve their leakage target, 
disclosure would enable customers and other stakeholders to persuade the regulator to 
take action against the utility to force them to comply and finance it with their own 
budget.    
5.3.9. Price Determination 
 
789 United Kingdom, Service and delivery – performance of the water companies in England and Wales 
2009-10 (2010) <http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/reporting/rpt_los_2009-10.pdf> accessed June 
13, 2011 p.7 
790 See, for example, Mark King & agencies, ‘Quarter of water companies neglecting leakage duties, 
says Ofwat’ Guardian (Thursday 28 October 2010 ) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/money/2010/oct/28/quarter-water-companies-leakage> accessed June 13, 
2011 also ‘Six water companies 'fail to hit leakage targets'’ (BBC.co.uk, 2010)  
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11641600> accessed June 9, 2011 
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Legislation regulates price review in broad terms, referring to it together with 
other matters as “Determinations made under conditions of appointment”.791 The 
company’s licence further regulates this in more detail, by stipulating the intervals for 
price reviews792 and limiting the increase of standard charges or the “K” factor.793  
There were four phases794 to the 2009 Price Review (PR-09), and ranges from 
March 2007 to September 2010. In the first stage, OFWAT publishes a long-term 
strategic direction statement and the companies give response. Various consultations 
on OFWAT’s approach and methods for the Price Review, the information 
requirements and stakeholder research are conducted. At the end of the first phase 
OFWAT issues the final price review methodology and information requirement.795 In 
the second phase, companies submit their draft business plan (the PR 09 requires a 25 
year outlook) in addition to their annual “June Return” data. A joint research on 
customers’ views of their draft business plan is carried out. OFWAT will publish a 
summary of the company’s draft business plan and its overall view of the company’s 
draft. At the end of phase 2, OFWAT issues the reporting requirement for the final 
business plan.796 
 
791Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s 12 
792 , Instrument of Appointment by the Secretary of State for the Environment of Thames Water Utilities 
Limited as a water and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 1989 Condition B (Charges) para 1.2 
793 Ibid Condition B (Charges) para 1.1 
794 Ofwat, ‘Price Review 2009’ (Ofwat)  <http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/pr09faqs> accessed 
February 17, 2012 
795 Ofwat, ‘Price review 2009 timeline’ (Ofwat)  
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/prs_web_pr09timeline> accessed February 17, 2012 
796 Ibid 
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At the beginning of phase 3, companies submit and publish their final business 
plan and their “June Return” data.797 OFWAT publishes the draft determination for 
comment and holds meetings with companies and CC Water to discuss the draft. At 
the end of phase 3, the final determination is published. At the beginning of phase 4, 
companies can either decide to accept OFWAT’s decision or refer their objection to 
the Competition Commission.798 If no referrals are made, OFWAT approves the 
charging scheme. Finally, the new price limit will take effect and the whole process is 
evaluated. In all of these phases, information and documents are published by both 
OFWAT and the companies.  
Legislation acts generally as a facilitator to transparency in price reviews (see 
section 5.3.5). All of OFWAT’s research and inquiries, framework and methodology 
for price review, consultations, information requirement, companies draft business 
plan, CCWater stakeholder’s research and the Determination (both the draft and final 
Determination) are available on either OFWAT’s website or the companies’. The June 
Returns which are submitted by the companies annually to OFWAT and feed into the 
Price Review are also published on OFWAT’s website. It has been OFWAT’s policy 
since 2008 to keep companies accountable by publishing their annual returns soon 
after they are submitted every June, each year.799 In practice, before publishing the 
 
797 Ibid 
798 Ibid 
799 Ofwat’s strategy – taking a forward look (2008) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/aboutofwat/reports/forwardprogrammes/rpt_fwd_ofwatstrategy.pdf> 
accessed May 24, 2011 
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June Return, OFWAT sends letter to the companies that it intends to publish the June 
Return, with commercial in confidence information being excised.800  
5.3.10. Redress 
Every stakeholder involved in the regulatory process should be entitled to 
redress mechanisms. The role of transparency is to make sure that those in need of 
justice understand where to access it and that the process is accountable. Redress 
mechanisms are available to both the regulated companies and customers.  
5.3.10.1. Redress for the regulated companies 
Regulated companies have access to a redress mechanism if they are not 
satisfied by the price determination, sanction or penalty imposed by OFWAT and by 
other regulatory decisions such as mergers. As discussed above, OFWAT may impose 
financial penalties on the utility for contravention of its licence condition or for failing 
to achieve performance standards.801 Companies can appeal to the High Court if they 
do not accept the penalty imposition by OFWAT, or with respect to its amount and 
date of payment.802  
Companies can also disagree with the Price Determination made by OFWAT 
for reasons such as the need to invest more in assets or in conducting operation and 
 
800 Ofwat, ‘Publication of the June return 2009’ 
801Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s 22A (1) (a) 
802Ibid s. 22E (1) 
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maintenance programmes.803 The right for such ‘appeal’ is actually not direct as the 
company cannot directly commence proceedings against OFWAT at the Competition 
Commission. What the legislation does is to enable the companies to require 
OFWAT’s Director to refer the case to the Competition Commission804 and this 
facility is further elaborated in the Licence condition.805  
Finally, the companies can appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) 
against any merger decision made by the Competition Commission. As previously 
discussed (see section 5.2.1. above) the OFT is tasked with referring water companies’ 
mergers to the Competition Commission806, except if they are excluded.807 The CC 
can decide to entirely prohibit the proposed merger or impose partial prohibition or 
compel divestiture. When the companies disagree with this decision, they can appeal 
to the CAT for a review, which in turn may either dismiss the application, or quash the 
whole or part of the decision.808  The UK competition law provides other recourse for 
 
803 This was the reason behind Bristol Water’s rejection of OFWAT’s Price Limit for the 2010-2015 
period. See Bristol Water, ‘Bristol Water Rejects Ofwat Price Decision’ (Bristol Water,)  
<http://www.bristolwater.co.uk/news/mainNews.asp?newsID=551> accessed May 31, 2011 
804Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s 12 (2) and (3) 
805 , Instrument of Appointment by the Secretary of State for the Environment of Thames Water Utilities 
Limited as a water and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 1989 Condition B (Charges)  
806Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s. 32. Among the considerations made by the CC is whether the 
merger will hinder OFWAT’s task in comparing different water enterprises against the benefits of the 
merger to consumer. See schedule 4ZA of ibid1991. See also Hendry, ‘An Analytical Framework for 
Reform of National Water Law’ p. 359 
807Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s.33  
808 Enterprise Act, s 120 
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the companies to appeal to the CAT against the decision of the regulator, as evidenced 
by Albion’s case against the third party access pricing decision of OFWAT.809 
5.3.10.2. Redress for customers 
Customers are entitled to service standards as outlined in the GSS Regulation 
(see section 5.3.6).810 Complaints about bad service should be directed to the 
companies, which in many cases would entitle customers to receive a certain amount 
of money within the limits as prescribed by the GSS Regulation. Although customers 
can contact CC Water at any stage of their complaints, only when they have exhausted 
measures available at the water company will  CC Water or  OFWAT carry out 
measures to settle their dispute.  
OFWAT has the power to settle disputes on some matters.811 Some of the 
disputes are settled by OFWAT by making “Determinations”.812 “Determinations” 
 
809 Albion was seeking to use Dwr Cymru’s network to supply water. However, the access price offered 
was considered unfair and excessive. In its review, OFWAT reinforced Dwr Cymru’s pricing through 
its Decision. Albion appealed to CAT which held Dwr Cymru to be in abuse of its dominant position 
and the pricing “unfair and excessive”. See Albion Water Limited v Water Services Regulation 
Authority, Case Nos: 1034/2/4/04 (IR)1046/2/4/04, Judgment 9 April 2009 [2009] CAT 12 The appeal 
was granted under s.46 and 47 of the Competition Act 1998 c 41. See also The Competition Act 1998 
and Other Enactments (Amendment) Regulations 2004, SI 2004 No. 1261 and Competition Act 1998 
Application in the Water and Sewerage Sectors (Ofwat 2000) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/legacy/aptrix/ofwat/publish.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/ca98application.pdf/$FI
LE/ca98application.pdf> May 21st, 2012  
810 The Water Supply and Sewerage Services (Customer Service Standards) Regulations 2008 
811 This includes disputes on expenses incurred when making connections with mains,  conditions 
imposed by water utilities before a connection is made,  requirements for metering,  the terms and 
conditions for non domestic customers,  financial requirements to connect to a sewer or lateral drain,  
location and timescale for providing sewer or lateral drain,  appeals regarding the adoption of private 
sewers,  refusal of the right to connect to public sewer,  the cost to connect to public sewer,  right to be 
charged by reference to volume,  and the laying of pipes on private land. See respectively Water 
 
 
 218 
made under s.30A by OFWAT are considered to be final and enforceable “as if it 
were a judgment of a county court”.813  
OFWAT maintains a record of every dispute brought to it. A Report on a GSS 
Dispute typically consists of several parts: OFWAT’s power to issue the 
Determination,814 the factual background and chronology, the relevant part of the GSS 
regulation applicable, the views of the disputants and OFWAT’s considerations and 
Determination.815 Although the value of each case may be economically insignificant, 
these Reports are important in two respects. First, it creates incentives for companies 
to comply since it makes clear that even seemingly economically insignificant 
disputes will be processed. Second, it creates a sense of fairness among the disputants 
as the reasoning of the Determination and the relevant legal provisions are considered.   
 Customers can also refer their problem to  CC Water in their area. The Water 
Act 2003, amending the WIA 1991, provided wide authority to  CC Water to conduct 
investigations into customer complaints, except for some situations which are within 
 
Industry Act 1991 (England) sections 45 (6A), 47 (3A) and (3B), 49 (3) (b), 56, 99, 101, 105 (1) (Not 
all sewers belong to the companies, some of them are owned by individual or “Private Sewers”. The 
owners of such sewers or lateral drains may ask the company to ‘adopt’ the sewers – or they can object 
to the company’s initiative in adopting their sewer. This clause provides mechanism to settle any 
dispute arising from  such adoption. Also sections 106 (4); 150A (6b), 107 (4A),144A (4), 181 (1) and 
(2)  
812Ibid s 30A  
813Ibid s 30A (5) (b) 
814 SI 2008 No. 594 s 17 
815 Ofwat's Final Report on a Dispute Between Dr Lashley and Anglian Water About Entitlement to 
Payment Under the Guaranteed Standard Scheme (GSS) (2005) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/consumerissues/complaints/determinations/gss/det_gss_200911lashleyanh.p
df> accessed May 28, 2011 
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OFWAT’s authority to investigate,816 or constitute an offence.817 If the matter can be 
solved under OFWAT’s power to make Determinations,  CC Water can refer such 
matter to OFWAT if the complainant agrees.818 CC Water is not required to 
investigate if the water companies have not been given a reasonable opportunity to 
address the complaint.819 In practice, customers are required first to exhaust remedies 
provided to it by the companies.820 Despite its wide powers to conduct investigation, 
unlike OFWAT which announces the results of its enquiries, there is no clarity as to 
CC Water’s investigations procedure and its results. 
Access to the Ombudsman is available for customers who are not satisfied by 
OFWAT’s or CC Water’s performance, including that relating to complaints or 
disputes. The Ombudsman makes sure that complaints about water services are 
addressed to CC Water before it is brought to them.821 DWI, DEFRA and the 
Environment Agency may also receive complaints in accordance with their respective 
jurisdiction. 
5.4. Corporate Governance 
 
816Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s.29 (3) and (4) These are matters such as the alleged violation of 
licence condition, imposition of penalty, the laying of pipes or conducting sewerage work on street,.   
817Ibid s. 29 (5). This matter should be referred to the Secretary of State or the Welsh Assembly (for 
Wales) 
818Ibid s. 
819Ibid s 29 (8) (b) 
820‘How do I complain about my water and/or sewerage company?’ (CC Water,, 2010)  
<http://ccwater.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/417> accessed May 31, 2011 “If you have 
followed your company's complaints procedure but remain dissatisfied, you can ask us to look at your 
complaint.  We will tell you how we can take your matter forward and what resolution, if any, you can 
expect from your company” 
821 ‘Gas, electricity and water’ (Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman,)  
<http://www.ombudsman.org.uk/make-a-complaint/if-we-cant-help/gas-electricity-and-water> accessed 
May 31, 2011 
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The Companies Act of 2006 imposes tough disclosure rules on companies. As 
water and sewerage undertakers have to be in the form of a company,822 they are also 
covered by this rule. Transparency has always been a part of the corporate governance 
debate. The problem with this is that the original idea of “corporate governance” has 
primarily been centered upon the relationship between management and shareholders 
while leaving other stakeholders such as consumers as somewhat ‘outsiders’ to the 
company.823 Consumers of a utility company, on the other hand, hold a very important 
stake in the company. Their stakes may not be in the form of shares, but a guaranteed 
purchase of the utility product. On the other hand, the product itself, water, is essential 
to the consumer and cannot be substituted with other goods. In a regulated natural 
monopoly setting, a water consumer has no choice but to buy from the company and 
the company has no choice but to sell to them.  
 
 
5.4.1. Corporate structure and the Board   
The 2006 Companies Act (CA 2006) obligates companies to maintain 
registers, among others, a register of directors824 containing their names825, date of 
birth, their service address826 and other identities, which should be available for 
 
822Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s. 6 (1) 
823 Hannigan, B., Company Law (Oxford University Press 2009) p.115 
824 Companies Act 2006 c.46 s.162 (1) 
825 Ibid s.163 and 164 
826 Ibid s.163 (1) (b) 
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company members at no charge or by any other person in accordance with a 
prescribed fee.827 The directors’ residential addresses,828 however, should be kept in 
the register but not disclosed, unless under certain circumstances.829   
Rules on appointment under CA 2006 are very general, and are concerned 
primarily with age.830 For removal before the term of office is ended, a resolution is 
required831 and a director can defend himself against such removal at the meeting.832 
There is no requirement of ex-ante public disclosure, but there is a duty to notify  
Companies House when a person ceases to become a director.833 This register of 
directors at  Companies House is available for public access for a fee.  
The Companies Act also obligates companies to keep a register of 
members,834 containing their names and addresses,835 their shareholdings836 – 
including the type of shares and the amount paid,837 which must be kept available for 
inspection (free of charge for members and for a fee for anyone else).838 Refusal to 
disclose must go through an application to the court by the company which decides 
 
827 Ibid s.162 (5) 
828 Ibid s.165   
829 Ibids.240, 243 (2), See also The Companies (Disclosure of Address) Regulations 2009, SI 2009/214 
830 Companies Act 2006 c.46 ss 154-161 
831 Ibid s.168 (1) 
832 Ibid s.169 (3) 
833 Ibid s.167 
834 Ibid s.113 (1) 
835 Ibid s. 113 (2) 
836 If companies issue shares based on classes and designation, or vary rights attached to sharers, or 
create a new class of shares, information containing their class and designation and its variations must 
be notified to the registrar See ibid ss.636-640 
837 Ibid s.113 (3) 
838 Ibid s.116 (1) 
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that the request is “not sought for a proper purpose”.839 There is also a restriction for 
persons who obtain such information not to disclose it to another person who would 
use it for “a purpose that is not a proper purpose”.840  What is deemed to be a 
“proper” or “improper” purpose is not explained on the CA 2006, but it has been 
suggested that those which are intended for fraud, intimidation or harassment, mass 
mailings or which relate to the offering of securities are improper.841 Ultimately, this 
is something that the Court must decide on a case by case basis.  
A large chunk of information shall be included in the “Directors’ Report”, the 
contents of which are similar from company to company  although small companies 
can be exempted from some disclosure duties.842 The Director’s Report must contain 
the identities of directors, the company’s principal activities and a business review. 
The implementing regulation to the CA 2006843 adds some more information to be 
disclosed, among others, the company’s asset value and political donations and 
expenditure.844 For quoted companies there are obligations to include directors’ 
salaries and remuneration policy, some details of its service contracts and, if the shares 
 
839 Ibid s.117 (3) 
840 Ibid s.119 (2) There is no strict definition as to what purpose is considered “not proper”, but  
841 Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators, ‘ICSA Guidance on Access to the Register of 
Members: Proper Purpose Test’ (2007)  
<http://www.icsa.org.uk/assets/files/pdfs/Groups/Registrars/ICSA%20Guidance%20on%20Access%20
to%20Register%20of%20Members.pdf> accessed June 7, 2011 
842 Companies Act 2006 c.46 s. 415A (2), Under s.417 (1) small companies are exempted from the 
obligation to create a business review under its Director’s Report  
843 SI 2008/410 The Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) 
Regulations 2008  
844 SI2008/410, Schedule 7 
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which are traded have voting rights, the rights, privileges and limitations attached to it 
such as restriction on transfer of securities.845  
Such information is included in companies’ “Annual Accounts and Reports” 
which must be circulated to companies’ members, holders of debentures and any other 
parties entitled to receive notices of the general meetings. The duties for disseminating 
the report for quoted companies are extended: its annual account and report must be 
available on a website, the access to which must be free of charge.846 
 
5.4.2. Related party transaction  
Under the CA 2006, directors have a duty to avoid CoI847 and to declare 
interest in a planned848 or existing849 transaction or arrangements at directors’ 
meetings or through written850 or ‘general’ notices.851 There are obligations that 
companies must note with respect to related undertakings and preparing group 
 
845 SI2008/410, Schedule 8 
846 Companies Act 2006 c.46 s.430 (3) 
847 Ibid s.175 (1) 
848 Ibid  s.177 (1) 
849 Ibid  s.182 (2) 
850 Ibid  s.184 The notice will be regarded as  forming a part of the directors’ next meeting and the 
document forms a part of the minutes of the meeting  
851 Ibid  s.185 This applies only when given at directors’ meeting. This is also applicable when the 
parties affiliated with the director are deemed to have an interest in that transaction. See s.252 on the 
explanation of affiliated persons 
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accounts.852 Disclosure853  of companies’ accounts is required if material transactions 
are entered into with related parties not “under normal market conditions”.854 
OFWAT takes further measures to ensure that the utilities it regulates are 
appropriately ring-fenced and transact in an arm’s length manner. This is conducted 
by imposing some ring-fencing requirements directly in the company’s licence 
condition855 and by issuing a series of Regulatory Accounting Guidelines (RAG). The 
RAGs themselves are not binding per se but facilitate compliance as they are used by 
the companies as a reference when submitting their regulatory accounts.856 
Submission of the regulatory accounts is a part of the licence condition857 and the 
failure to comply with this requirement may trigger penalty sanctions.858 
 
852 Ibid  s. 409 
853 The Large and Medium sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations', 
Statutory Instrument, SI 2008/410 para 72 (1). The SI obligates disclosure of the nature of related party 
relationships and amount of transactions. 
854 See also Accounting Standards Board, Amendment to FRS 8 Related Party Disclosures: Legal 
Changes 2008  (2008)   which has a higher threshold as it requires disclosures of all related party 
transactions, even if  made under normal market conditions 
855 , Instrument of Appointment by the Secretary of State for the Environment of Thames Water Utilities 
Limited as a water and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 1989 Condition F: Accounts and 
accounting information. In para 1.1 of Condition F, it is stipulated that the purpose of the licence 
condition is to separate the financial affairs of the ‘Appointed Business’, to ensure that no cross subsidy 
between the regulated company and its “Associated Companies” exist and to ensure that any transfer of 
assets or financial support to its associated companies does not affect the regulated companies’ function 
as an undertaker.  
856 They are occasionally referred to in the licence condition. See ibid Condition B para  13.3 (3) and 
Condition F para. 6.8 (i) 
857 Ibid Condition F: Accounts and accounting information, para 9.3 obligate companies to send 
regulatory accounts to OFWAT’s Director ‘as soon as reasonably practicable’ and in any event no later 
than July 15 of each year.   
858 Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s.22A  
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A Related Party Transaction is  part of the data that utilities submit to 
OFWAT in their June Return, forming Chapters 30 and 31 (“Transactions with 
Associated Companies”).859 These chapters were drafted in accordance with RAG 
5.04 on Transfer Pricing. 860 Chapters 30 and 31 reiterate the company’s duty – under 
its Licence Condition F861 – to trade at arm’s length from associate companies to 
ensure that no cross subsidy occurs and requires the companies’ directors to provide a 
statement of compliance with the condition F.862 Unfortunately, however, information 
submitted under Chapters 30 and 31 is labeled “Commercial in Confidence”.863  
In most statements issued by the utilities (for example, Sutton & East 
Surrey,864 United Utilities865 and Yorkshire Water866) to accompany the public 
domain version of the June Return data, companies categorise Chapters 30 and 31 
under category 1 (on the categorisation of excised information see section 5.3.5 above 
“OFWAT’s general policy on disclosure”), that is, information which if disclosed in 
 
859 Ofwat, Chapters 30 & 31: Transactions with Associated Companies, June return reporting 
requirements and definitions manual 2011, Issue 1.0 - January 2011. The definition of ‘Associated 
Companies’  refer to Financial Reporting Standard 8 and International Accounting Standard 24 
860 Guideline for transfer pricing in the water industry; Regulatory Accounting Guideline 5.04 (Ofwat 
2007) <http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/gud_rag_5transpric_504.pdf> accessed June 9, 2011 
861 , Instrument of Appointment by the Secretary of State for the Environment of Thames Water Utilities 
Limited as a water and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 1989 Condition F 
862 Ofwat, Chapters 30 & 31: Transactions with Associated Companies, June return reporting 
requirements and definitions manual 2011, Issue 1.0 - January 2011 Companies are also required to 
enact procurement procedures which comply with RAG 5.04. The chapters also provide guidelines on 
how to record and report transactions with associated companies. See p.3 
863 Ibid p.1 
864 Sutton and East Surrey Water PLC, Annual Report to the Water Services Regulatory Authority June 
2010, Public Domain Submission  <http://www.waterplc.com/userfiles/file/JuneReturn2010.pdf> June 
9, 2011  
865 United Utilities, June Return 2006: Statement to Accompany the Public Domain Version 
866 Yorkshire Water, June Return 2007: Statement to Accompany the Public Domain Version 
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conjunction with other materials (on the June Return data), will have an effect on 
share prices.867 Northumbrian Water,868 in the 2007 June Return, considers such 
information to fall under both category 1 and 2 (category 2 is for information which 
the affected organisation or individual disagrees to disclose) while Thames Water,869 
in its 2006 June Return, considers such information to fall under category 4, that is, 
that the excised information can give potential competitors or a third party a 
commercial advantage. The invocation of such categories by the companies therefore 
appears to be arbitrary as there is little consistency between them with respect to the 
same information, i.e. related party transaction.  
One of the purposes of related party transaction disclosure in utilities’ 
regulation is to enable customers to track the inflow and outflow of money from the 
regulated utility to an associated company and to level the playing field for 
prospective entrants. If related party transaction information is withheld, consumers 
and other interested parties will not be able to track possible transfer pricing. Excision 
of the June Return data by the companies, however, is not a guarantee that OFWAT 
will hold the information if it is being requested through the FoI or EIR regimes. 
Presumably, OFWAT will argue that such information is exempted under  FoI, hence, 
the information cannot be released. A public interest towards disclosure can be 
argued, however, if there is a strong suspicion of cross subsidy among the associated 
 
867 This is relevant only with respect to companies listed on the capital market 
868 Northrumbian Water Limited, June Return 2007: Statement to Accompany the Public Domain 
Version 
869 Thames Water Utilities LTD, June Return 2006: Statement to Accompany the Public Domain 
Version 
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companies and OFWAT is deemed not to have performed its duty to investigate 
properly.    
5.4.3. Corporate restructuring 
The regulator generally has two concerns over the restructuring of a regulated 
utility: (1) the question of probity, capacity of the new owner and its role in a 
regulated utility, and, if the restructuring involves the delisting of publicly traded 
shares, (2) the effect of utilities’ “going private” on the loss of comparative 
information and the absence of capital market pressures on managerial efficiency.  
   In the UK, OFWAT has no power to block acquisition (although it can refer 
it to the Competition Commission - see section 5.2.1.5). Hence, the reputation of the 
new owners and its perceived capacity in the water industry will have no impact on 
the legality of the acquisition.870 Thus, the only thing the English regulator can do is 
to manage utilities’ licence conditions and require them (as part of the licence 
condition) to provide undertakings from their ‘ultimate controller’.871 Consultations 
are employed so that OFWAT will have sufficient information in modifying the 
utility’s licence and in understanding the customer’s view.872 This requires the 
 
870 One of the consultation responses, for example, questions the multi-layered structure of ‘Macquarie 
Investors’ and doubts their ability to be responsible, reliable and accountable utility owners. See 
Blaiklock, T.M., Consultation: “The Completed Acquisition of Thames Water Holdings plc. by Kemble 
Water Limited” (Consultation Response) (2007)   
871 This is in order to tackle the complexities of layers of ownerships  
872 CC Water’s response was: “We fear that Thames Water will be seen as a cash cow to be milked for 
all it is worth…  The ownership structure for Thames Water is unwieldy, its corporate governance 
proposals seriously flawed, and the financing arrangements deeply suspect”. CC Water, Consultation: 
“The Completed Acquisition of Thames Water Holdings plc. by Kemble Water Limited” (CC Water 
Thames' Response) (2007)  . 
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publication of “consultation papers” containing detailed information surrounding the 
restructuring.873  
With respect to new ownership, OFWAT’s regulatory safeguard is in securing 
various undertakings from the utility’s UK holding company.874 The undertakings 
cover (i) the supply of all information from the holding company to the regulated 
utility necessary to comply with its licence condition, (ii) a requirement to refrain 
from any action that will cause the regulated utility to breach its licence condition and 
any other statutory obligations, and (iii) guarantee that the regulated utility has no less 
than one independent non executive director with specific qualifications.875 
If the restructuring causes the delisting of shares (as was the case with 
Thames' acquisition by RWE), the stock exchange public disclosure rules will no 
longer apply and the company’s performance will no longer be scrutinised by analysts 
and shareholders. This will, according to OFWAT, “.remove the Director’s ability to 
compare the market’s ratings [of the company] with other listed owners of licensed 
water and sewerage utilities [and] would also affect his ability to make judgments 
 
873 For example The Completed Acquisition of Northumbrian Water Limited, A Consultation Paper by 
Ofwat (2003) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/legacy/aptrix/ofwat/publish.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/nes_conspaper100603.p
df/$FILE/nes_conspaper100603.pdf> accessed June 13, 2011 The completed acquisition of Thames 
Water Holdings Plc by Kemble Water Limited, A consultation paper by Ofwat (2007) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/industrystructure/capitalrestructuring/pap_con_tms_acquisbytkemble.pdf?do
wnload=Download#> accessed June 13, 2011 
874 Water Industry Act 1991, Section 13 (1) Modification of the Conditions of Appointment of Thames 
Water Utilities Limited (2007) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/industrystructure/licences/amendments/lic_lmd_tms_confp20071108.pdf> 
accessed May 24, 2011 Condition P 
875 Ibid Condition P 
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about an appropriate cost of capital for the water and sewerage industries”.876 One 
of the basic assumptions behind water utilities’ divestiture was that water utilities’ 
management will not live a “quiet life” because of the threat of acquisition and that 
the market, as reflected by the value of stocks listed on the capital market, will provide 
input to OFWAT on the ‘true’ value of the company. The capital market and its 
institutions,877 therefore, is an important factor in regulation, without which OFWAT 
may lose information essential for regulating the companies.  
OFWAT’s response to this is to require the company to either publish its 
financial information as if it were listed and subject to the rules of the stock exchange, 
or re-list its shares or some class of its shares or the parent company of the regulated 
business list bonds or other financial instruments which would provide some market 
information, although less than a listed equity.878 Although not listed in the stock 
exchange, Thames publishes its interim and final financial accounts as if it were a 
listed company.879 This is reflected in its modified licence condition.880 Thames also 
 
876 The proposed takeover of Thames Water plc by RWE AG: A consultation paper by the Office of 
Water Services (Ofwat 2000) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/legacy/aptrix/ofwat/publish.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/thames_takeover.pdf/$F
ILE/thames_takeover.pdf> accessed June 13, 2011 p.5 
877 These includes the public shareholders, investment banks and appraisals 
878 , The proposed takeover of Thames Water plc by RWE AG: A consultation paper by the Office of 
Water Services p.5 
879 Thames Water, Thames Water Utilities Limited Interim report and financial statements for the six 
month period ended 30 September 2010 (2010) 
<http://www.thameswater.co.uk/cps/rde/xbcr/corp/2010-twul-interim-financial-statements.pdf> June 
13, 2011 p.8 
880, Instrument of Appointment by the Secretary of State for the Environment of Thames Water Utilities 
Limited as a water and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 1989 Condition F, 6A.5B 
 
 230 
retains bonds.881 The obligation to retain bonds – although subjected to a lesser 
disclosure and governance requirement compared to listed shares – will compel the 
companies to comply with some rules of the stock exchange.882 In its latest licence 
modification for Thames, OFWAT also impose a condition whereby utilities’ 
accounting statements and auditors’ reports sent to OFWAT (with some exceptions) 
are published together with its annual accounts (which are prepared under the 
Companies Act) and its copies be made available to customers upon request.883  
In Dwr Cymru’s restructuring, asset ownership of the new company was 
separated from its operation. The company owning the assets is Dwr Cymru’s parent 
company, Glas Cymru, a company limited by guarantee which raises finance through 
debts. The change from equity to entirely debt financing brought a number of 
important regulatory questions. Among others, OFWAT was concerned that the 
absence of shareholders means that there is no buffer for ‘shocks’ in case emergency 
financing is required, unless Dwr Cymru has adequate reserves884 and that resort to 
debt financing means that its credit rating must remain at least at an “investment 
 
881 Ibid Condition F, 6A.5C: “(effective 2 May 2001) The Appointee shall maintain a Bond and shall use 
all reasonable endeavours to retain its listing on the London Stock Exchange” . 
882, The proposed takeover of Thames Water plc by RWE AG: A consultation paper by the Office of 
Water Services p.5 
883, Instrument of Appointment by the Secretary of State for the Environment of Thames Water Utilities 
Limited as a water and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 1989 Condition F, 9.4 (2007 
Modification) Water Industry Act 1991, Section 13 (1) Modification of the Conditions of Appointment of 
Thames Water Utilities Limited (Ofwat 2005) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/industrystructure/licences/amendments/lic_lmd_tms_confp20071108.pdf> 
May 24, 2011 
884 The proposed acquisition of Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig by Glas Cymru Cyfyngedig, A consultation 
paper by Ofwat (2000) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/legacy/aptrix/ofwat/publish.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/glass_final.pdf/$FILE/g
lass_final.pdf> accessed June 13, 2011 p.12 
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grade”.885 Both of these problems were resolved through amendments of its licence 
condition, the former by obligating the companies to have adequate financial and 
management resources and certifying it to OFWAT,886 and the latter by obligating 
Dwr Cymru and companies issuing debt on its behalf to, at all times, maintain an 
investment grade rating.887  
Without shares listed on the capital market, however, there will no incentive 
for Dwr Cymru’s management to be competitive, as there is no threat of acquisition 
and pressures from shareholders. There may be pressures from lenders, but this could 
be limited in the form of securing the return of their investment and not to contribute 
to the long-term efficiency as shareholders would normally demand capital growth.888 
Appointment and dismissal of Dwr Cymru’s board – due to the absence of 
shareholders and acquisition pressures – will, therefore, depend solely on the 
mechanism provided by Glas Cymru, its parent company. OFWAT was concerned 
 
885 Companies with “investment grade” rating guarantees are considered to be able to meet its payment 
obligation. It is a BBB- rating or higher according to S&P’s standard or Baa3 according to Moody’s 
886, The proposed acquisition of Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig by Glas Cymru Cyfyngedig, A consultation 
paper by Ofwat p. 22. See also Dwr Cymru’s Licence, Instrument of Appointment by the Secretary of 
State for Wales of Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig as a water and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 
1989  Condition F, 6A.1(1) (a): “The Appointee shall at all times act in the manner best calculated to 
ensure that ithas adequate [..] financial resources and facilities”, also Condition F 6A.2A and 6b.2B (1) 
obligating Dwr Cymru’s directors to submit a certificate that it has the financial resources needed to 
carry out its task for the next 12 months accompanied by statements explaining the main factors 
justifying it and Condition F 6A.2B (2) obligating the directors to immediately notify OFWAT as soon 
as they become aware that they may be in financial difficulty 
887, Instrument of Appointment by the Secretary of State for Wales of Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig as a water 
and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 1989  Condition F, 6A.6(1) 
888, The proposed acquisition of Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig by Glas Cymru Cyfyngedig, A consultation 
paper by Ofwat p.15 
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that the Members of Glas Cymru might in the future be captured by a special interest 
group.889 
In response to the above problem, OFWAT’s strategy was to require Dwr 
Cymru to publish periodical financial information in line with London Stock 
Exchange Rules, as if its shares were listed there,890 to require that Glas Cymru 
maintain an incentive scheme to attract a highly qualified board and to have such a 
scheme be made publicly available and formalised in its Articles of Association.891 
This disclosure obligation is a part of OFWAT’s series of efforts to ‘intervene’ in Dwr 
Cymru and Glas Cymru’s corporate governance892 as a result of the loss of capital 
market pressures. Dwr – as with Thames following RWE’s acquisition – was also 
required to maintain the listing of a financial instrument893 and to publish its 
accounting statements with its annual accounts and the auditor’s report to OFWAT 
and the copies made available to customers.894  
Of all 10 water and sewerage companies only one, United Utilities, is,  at the 
moment of writing, a Plc. The rest are Ltds and one company, Yorkshire Water, is a 
 
889 Ibid p. 17 
890 Ibid p.19  , Instrument of Appointment by the Secretary of State for Wales of Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig 
as a water and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 1989  Condition F 6A.5B(1) 
891, The proposed acquisition of Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig by Glas Cymru Cyfyngedig, A consultation 
paper by Ofwat p.15   
892  Ibid. OFWAT requires Dwr Cymru’s board to have a majority of non executive directors and  to 
secure undertakings from Glas Cymru, that it will (i) consult OFWAT on any modification of its 
Articles of Association, (ii) provide information as reasonably required by OFWAT directors as to its 
activities and finances, (iii) provide necessary information to Dwr Cymru so that it can comply with its 
licence, and (iv) refrain from any action that will result in Dwr Cymru’s breach of its licence.   
893, Instrument of Appointment by the Secretary of State for Wales of Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig as a water 
and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 1989  Condition F 6A5C(1) 
894 Ibid Condition F 9.4 
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company limited by guarantee. Although United Utilities is a Plc, and therefore 
automatically subject to listing rules, its licence condition contains clauses requiring it 
to comply with London Stock Exhange listing rules as if it were a listed company,895 
presumably to ensure continuity of information publication and reporting in the event 
of the company going private.  
5.5. Passive Disclosure Rules 
There are two pieces of primary legislation granting rights to citizens in order 
to obtain information held by public bodies in England and Wales, upon request: The 
Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FoI Act 2000)896 and the Environmental 
Information Regulation 2004 (EIR).897 The legal history leading to the enactment of 
the two instruments is quite different; the former was perceived to be a ‘homegrown’ 
law while the latter was more  an implementation of a European initiative.  
The FoI Act 2000 was a result of years of initiatives. Birkinshaw notes that the 
idea of removing secrecy from the civil service can be traced back to the Fulton 
Report of 1966.898 The Official Secrets Act had been around since 1911. The Labour 
party attempted to introduce several Freedom of Information Bills from 1978 but had 
always failed because they lost the election or because the bill was rejected at a later 
stage. In 1997, the Government published the widely acclaimed white paper “Your 
 
895 Water Industry Act 1991 Section 13(1) Modification of the Conditions of Appointment of United 
Utilities Water Plc (2005) 
<http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/industrystructure/licences/amendments/lic_lmd_nwt_sec13081208.pdf> 
accessed February 4th, 2010 Condition F 1.1; see also 6A.5b; 6A.5(c)(1)  
896 FoI Act 2000 (England) 
897 Environmental Information Regulation 2004, SI 2004/3391 
898 Birkinshaw, P., Freedom of information (Cambridge university press 2010) p.118 
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Right to Know” which contained a very narrow exemption clause and the use of the 
‘substantial harm’ test.899  In 1998, another Bill was introduced and made it to the 
second reading in 1999, followed by a publication of the Government’s Draft in 1999. 
There was discontent surrounding the publication of the Bill as it contained wide 
exemption clauses and departed significantly from the earlier “Your Right to Know” 
white paper.900 On November 30, 2000, the FoI Act received royal assent and came 
into force in 2005.  
The EIR had been in force since 1992901, as a result of the Council Directive 
90/313/EEC.902 However, the Aarhus Convention903 was signed in 1998 to which the 
UK (and EC member countries) were  signatories. The EC later repealed Directive 
90/313/EEC and replaced it with Directive 2003/4/EC904, the content of which is 
adjusted to the Aarhus Convention.905 As a result, the UK had to transpose this new 
provision into its internal law. The government repealed the 1992 Environmental 
 
899 The idea was said to be so radical that the Minister who introduced the white paper was sacked in a 
reshuffle. See ibid p. 119 also Your right to know : the government's proposals for a Freedom of 
Information Act (Stationery Office 1997) 
900 Birkinshaw, Freedom of information pp.119-120 
901 Environmental Information Regulations 1992, SI 1992/3240 
902 Council Directive 90/313/EEC of 7 June 1990 on the freedom of access to information on the 
environment,  OJ L 158, 23.6.1990, p. 56–58 
903 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision Making and Access to Justice 
in Environmental Matters 25 June 1998 (Aarhus Convention) 38 International Legal Materials (ILM) 
(1999) 515 
904 Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public 
access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EE, O.J. L 041 , 
14/02/2003 P. 0026 - 0032 
905 Ibid See para 5 of its preamble: “Provisions of Community law must be consistent with that 
Convention [the Aarhus Convention] with a view to its conclusion by the European Community” and 
para 6: “It is appropriate in the interest of increased transparency to replace Directive 90/313/EEC 
rather than to amend it, so as to provide interested parties with a single, clear and coherent legislative 
text” 
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Information Regulation and the EIR (2004) is in force.906 Transposition of the EIR 
resulted in a dichotomy on the treatment of information by public authorities. The FoI 
Act 2000 lists ‘Environmental Information’ as exempt information.907 As such, the 
EIR, and not the FoI Act 2000, is more suitable to be used to request Environmental 
Information held by English Public Authorities. What differentiates ‘Environmental’ 
from non-environmental information has been elaborated in several ECJ cases.908 EIR 
Regulation 2(1) (a)-(f) is considered  an interpretation of what constitutes 
‘environmental information’.909 
In addition to the subject matter, the EIR is different from the FoI Act 2000 in 
many other respects. In terms of applicability, the EIR is said to be more far-reaching 
than the FoI, as it allegedly covers “privatised” water companies910 although, as we 
will discuss below, this is not necessarily true. In terms of exemption clauses, the FoI 
Act 2000 is indeed broader than the EIR. The EIR also does not recognise ‘absolute’ 
exemptions as all are subject to a public interest test, whereas, the FoI Act 2000 
recognises ‘absolute’ (where no public interest test is employed) and ‘relative’ 
exemptions.   
 
906 EIR 2004 (England) 
907 FoI Act 2000 (England) s. 39 
908 See C-321/96 Wilhelm Mecklenburg v Kris Pinneberg [1998] ECR I-3809 ; C-316/01 Eva 
Glawischnig v Bundesminister für soziale Sicherheit und Generationen [2001] ECR I-05995    
909 United Kingdom Department of Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), Environmental Information 
Regulations: Guidance on the boundaries between environmental and other information (2009) 
<http://archive.defra.gov.uk/corporate/policy/opengov/eir/guidance/pdf/boundaries.pdf>  p.5 
910 According to the DWI’s website: “Water Companies are themselves obliged to comply with the 
Environmental Information Regulations.” ‘Access to Information’ (Drinking Water Inspectorate, 2010)  
<http://dwi.defra.gov.uk/about/access-to-info/index.htm> accessed June 13, 2011 
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5.5.1. Applicability of FoI Act and the EIR to institutions involved in water 
services  
5.5.1.1. Applicability of FoI Act and EIR to regulatory bodies  
In England and Wales, entities can be covered911 by the FoI based on (i) the 
list of public authorities under Schedule 1 of the FoI Act 2000 or (ii) further 
designation by the Secretary of State (s.5 designation).912  
Schedule 1 of the Act specifies some of the public bodies which are covered 
by the Act913 but others are covered through more general terms. For example, the 
Schedule covers “Any government department”914 and this is meant to include both 
ministerial departments (such as DEFRA) and non-ministerial government 
departments, such as OFWAT and the EA. The Drinking Water Inspectorate would 
also fall under this definition, as  part of  DEFRA, although it has a distinct 
organisational structure and some degree of independence accorded to it by sectoral 
water regulations (see Section 5.2.1.6). The Consumer Council for Water, which is an 
executive non-departmental public body is specifically named by Part VI of Schedule 
1.915  
The EIR is (or was intended to be) much broader compared to FoI Act 2000 in 
terms of its coverage. The EIR covers (i) government departments,916 (ii) public 
 
911 FoI Act 2000 (England), s.3 on the definition of “Public Authorities” 
912 Ibid , s.5 
913 See Schedule 1, ibid , Part VI: Other Public Bodies and Offices: General.  
914 Schedule 1, para 1, ibid  
915 Ibid, Part VI: Other Public Bodies and Offices:General 
916 EIR 2004 (England), Regulation 2 (2) (a) 
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bodies listed in schedule 1 of the FoI Act 2000 (but with some exceptions),917 (iii) any 
other body that carries out functions of “public administration” 918, (iv) any other body 
or person under the control of the previous categories which has public responsibilities 
relating to the environment, or exercising functions of a public nature relating to the 
environment or provides public services relating to the environment.919 If an entity is 
not covered under the first category, it may be covered under the other categories. The 
third and fourth category have been the subject of controversy for water utilities.  
 
917 Ibid, Regulation 2 (2) (b). The special forces and any other special units are included (they are 
excluded under FoI Act 2000 (England) ), insofar as it concerns environmental information.  
918 EIR 2004 (England), Regulation 2 (2) (c) 
919 Ibid, Regulation 2 (2) (d) 
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Table 6: Application of FoI/EIR to Water Regulators 
Institution Function Legal Basis of 
Applicability 
OFWAT 
 
Regulation of the water 
industry in general: price 
setting, consumer 
protection, competition 
FoI Act 2000 s, 
3(1)(a)(i), 
Schedule 1, para 
1; EIR Reg 2(2) 
a  
Environment 
Agency 
 
Pollution control, 
management and 
conservation of water 
resources, issuance of 
abstraction licence and 
discharge permits 
FoI Act 2000 s, 
3(1)(a)(i), 
Schedule 1, part 
VI; EIR Reg 2(2) 
b 
Drinking Water 
Inspectorate 
(acts on behalf 
of DEFRA) 
Water quality regulator, 
technical audit on water 
companies, investigating 
consumer complaints and 
water quality incidents 
FoI Act 2000 s, 
3(1)(a)(i), 
Schedule 1, para 
1; EIR Reg 2(2) 
a  
Consumer 
Council for 
Water 
 
Representing consumers’ 
interests, taking 
complaints, investigating 
water industry on 
consumer complaints 
FoI Act 2000 s, 
3(1)(a)(i), 
Schedule 1, part 
VI; EIR Reg 2(2) 
b 
Competition 
Commission 
Accepting referrals on 
merger issues, 
adjudicating breaches of 
competition law 
concurrently with 
OFWAT 
FoI Act 2000 s, 
3(1)(a)(i), 
Schedule 1, part 
VI ; EIR Reg 
2(2) b 
Department of 
Environment, 
Food and Rural 
Affairs 
Standard setting, drafting 
of legislations and 
policies, appointment of 
regulators, industry 
restructuring 
FoI Act 2000 s, 
3(1)(a)(i), 
Schedule 1, para 
1; EIR Reg 2(2) 
a 
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The application of the UK FoI Act and EIR to the institutions above appears to 
be straightforward. All of them adopt model publication schemes as required by the 
FoI Act (s.19).  
5.5.1.2. Applicability of the FoI Act and EIR to private water companies 
Insofar as water utilities are concerned, controversies prevail. In the heyday of 
private sector participation (PSP) in public services, literature on the diminishing 
values of public law emerged. Earlier critics such as Minow argued that “Access  to 
information  about  services  and  results  also  decreases  if the  information  becomes  
private”.920 Meanwhile, Swyngedouw argued that water privatisation dispossesses the 
public from data and information that is normally available921 (See Section 2.1 
Literature Review).  
Realising that the focal point of power had shifted from the state to 
corporations, champions of access to information law such as Calland advocated the 
idea that corporations which are playing a quasi-public role should also be covered by 
access to information laws.922 Privatised water utilities, due to their natural monopoly 
 
920 Minow, ‘Public and private partnerships: accounting for the new religion’ 
921 “…the privatized nature of crucial parts of the water cycle diminishes the transparency of decision-
making procedures and limits access to data and information that could permit other social groups to 
acquire the relevant information on which to base views, decisions, and options” Swyngedouw, 
‘Dispossessing H 2 O: the contested terrain of water privatization’ 
922 Calland, R., ‘Transparency in a Profit Making World’ (Institute for Policy Dialogue, 2006)  
<http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/pub/Calland_Private_Sector.pdf> accessed February 29, 2010  
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and the essentiality of their product, are considered by him to be corporations of this 
kind and should, therefore, be covered by access laws.923  
This idea – to expand the coverage of FoI to privatised utilities –too, had been 
around in the UK and had regained public attention when the Secretary of State 
proposed to include other bodies to be covered by the FoI through its s.5924 
designation.925 In addition to the view that utilities including water are essential 
services, it was generally perceived by the respondents on the s.5 designation 
consultation that there is a public interest in obtaining information on the decisions 
made by those companies regarding how their services are delivered.926 The UK 
government considered that information about utilities are already available through 
regulatory bodies, which are subject to the FoI Act 2000. Thus, they considered that 
the current access rights were already adequate, without an urgent need to directly 
cover water utilities under the FoI act. Eventually, the UK Government abandoned the 
idea of including the utilities under the initial s.5 designation, although they plan to 
commence another consultation in order to include some or all of the utilities under 
 
923 Ibid 
924 FoI Act 2000 (England) s.5  
925 United Kingdom, Freedom of Information Act 2000: Designation of additional public authorities,  
Consultation Paper  CP 27/07 (2007) <http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/docs/cp2707.pdf> June 
23, 2011 
926 United Kingdom, Freedom of Information Act 2000: Designation of additional public authorities, 
Response to Consultation CP(R) 27/07, 16 July 2009  (2009) 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/docs/consultation-response-_section5.pdf> June 23, 2011 p.10 
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subsequent s.5 orders or to amend the FoI Act 2000 in some way so as to incorporate 
privatised utilities.927   
There is a stronger argument for including water utilities under the FoI Act’s 
coverage: the move towards risk based regulation. The UK Government’s argument 
that access to regulatory information is adequate is only relevant to the present day 
situation where OFWAT has wide powers in acquiring detailed information from 
utilities and does so, and subsequently publishes this.928 However, OFWAT is 
planning to move to a risk-based regulation and will no longer require utilities to 
submit their annual June Return. This will result in the significant decrease of 
regulatory information published by OFWAT. As discussed in the previous sections, 
OFWAT’s plan is to have utilities  publish their own regulatory account. Thus, the 
focal point for transparency in British water utilities regulation will slowly move from 
OFWAT to the regulated company. As the UK Government’s justifications for 
exempting utilities from the FoI Act will no longer be relevant in the near future, it is 
only appropriate that water utilities are included as a “Public Body” in the next s.5 
designation or through an FoI Act amendment. Failure to include water utilities under 
FoI coverage will result in the disconnection between “active” and “passive” 
disclosure policies. OFWAT will subject utilities to some active disclosure policies by 
obligating them to publish their regulatory account (and presumably other regulatory 
information). However, if the FoI Act is not applicable to them, there is no way that 
 
927 United Kingdom, Freedom of Information Act 2000: Designation of additional public authorities,  
Consultation Paper  CP 27/07  p.10 
928 See Section 5.3.4 “Means of Acquiring Information” and Section 5.3.5 “OFWAT’s General 
Disclosure Policy” above  
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the public would be able to verify detailed background information which underlies 
the companies’ reports.  
An important benefit from subjecting water utilities to FoI is the opportunity 
to dig out “residual” information. There are two classes of information in the 
regulatory process; on the one hand, information which is submitted to or is requested 
by the regulator in the course of the regulation (such as the June Return and other 
reports) and, on the other hand, information which utilities keep for themselves either 
because the regulator failed to detect it or because it is not required by law to be 
reported to the regulators. The benefit of subjecting utilities to the FoI Act will come 
from the ability to access this type of residual information. Nevertheless, only 
stakeholders with sufficient knowledge and resources will be able to dig out 
information which regulators have failed to discover or not sufficiently recovered by 
sectoral law. Industrial stakeholders, downstream market participants or sophisticated 
consumer organisations would be among the typical stakeholders that would expend 
time and resources in finding such information. This is evident from several FoI cases 
discussed below. 
 
Birkinshaw notes that utilities may want to reject the effort of extending FoI 
for  reasons of “unjustified state intervention, damage to profitability, undermining 
competitive capability, and producing an uneven playing field especially in relation to 
overseas competitors” .929 He continued: “In the absence of EU-wide initiatives those 
 
929 Birkinshaw, P., ‘Freedom of information and its impact in the United Kingdom’ 27 Government 
Information Quarterly 312   
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within the business sector would maintain: why should the UK business sector be 
hampered by legal requirements affecting only British industry?”930  
Unlike other utilities, however, many of the world’s and indeed the EU’s 
water utilities are state-owned and, therefore, could fall under FoI or similar access to 
environmental information laws given the application of the Aarhus Convention and 
Directive 2003/4/EC.931 Even within the UK there is Scottish Water, which is state-
owned, and is covered by the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act.932 Scottish 
Water – despite its FoI coverage – performs  quite well if compared to its English 
counterparts, which are not covered by FoI or EIR and charges customers even less  
than the majority of English water utilities.933  
The above evidence provides indications that imposing access to information 
laws on water utilities does not appear to hinder their ability to deliver quality services 
to customers. It may well be that imposing FoI on water utilities could jeopardise their 
overseas competitiveness, but this is primarily a concern for the utilities’ ultimate 
shareholders and not the local community which it services. Moreover, FoI also 
 
930 Ibid   
931 Directive 2003/4/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on public 
access to environmental information and repealing Council Directive 90/313/EE, O.J. L 041 , 
14/02/2003 P. 0026 - 0032 
932 Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002, 2002 asp 13 
933 Performance Report 2010 (Water Industry Commission for Scotland, 2010) 
<http://www.watercommission.co.uk/UserFiles/Documents/WICSPerformanceReport2010.pdf> June 
22, 2011 Scottish Water is benchmarked against other English and Wales water utilities. Its Overall 
Performance Assessment (OPA) score for 2010 fits well with the average English water utilities’s OPA. 
In terms of average household bills, Scottish water is among the lowest if compared to England and 
Wales water companies, with seven English companies charging higher than Scottish Water. Costs and 
performance 2008–09 (Water Industry Commission for Scotland, 2009) 
<http://www.watercommission.co.uk/UserFiles/Documents/WICS%20CostsPerformance%20final.pdf> 
June 22, 2011 
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provides safeguards in the form of exemption clauses (see the next section below), so 
it does not necessarily mean that once exposed to FoI, all information from water 
companies will can be disclosed.   
For EIR, its application or disapplication to water utilities is not 
straightforward. Similar to the FoI Act, whether water utilities should be covered is a 
contentious issue. However, because EIR relies on definition in determining the status 
of a public body, the issue is much more controversial than the FoI and has triggered 
several cases. “Public Authority” is defined by EIR, Regulation 2 (2) as:934 
government departments; 
any other public authority as defined in section 3(1) of the Act, disregarding 
for this purpose the exceptions in paragraph 6 of Schedule 1 to the Act, but 
excluding— 
(i) any body or office-holder listed in Schedule 1 to the Act only in relation to 
information of a specified description; or (ii) any person designated by Order 
under section 5 of the Act; 
any other body or other person, that carries out functions of public 
administration; or 
any other body or other person, that is under the control of a person falling 
within sub-paragraphs (a), (b) or (c) and—(i) has public responsibilities 
relating to the environment; (ii) exercises functions of a public nature relating 
 
934 EIR 2004 (England) 
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to the environment; or 
(iii) provides public services relating to the environment. 
Initially, it was thought by some authors that EIR would, without much 
controversy, be automatically applicable to water utilities.935 DEFRA guidance on 
EIR – reiterating the Aarhus Implementation Guideline – specifically mentions that 
private companies may fall under EIR 2(2) (c) or (d), and the guideline also provides 
private entities conducting “water management functions” or waste collection 
companies under contract with local governments as examples.936 The DEFRA 
guidance added a caveat though, that either the elements of “public administration” or 
“under the control” accompanied by any of the sub paragraphs (i), (ii) or (iii) of the 
above Regulation 2(2) has to be fulfilled. Interestingly, it adds that “under the control” 
could mean “a relationship constituted by statute, regulations, rights, licence, 
contracts or other means which either separately or jointly confer the possibility of 
directly or indirectly exercising a decisive influence on a body. Control may relate, 
 
935 See DWI’s website: “Water Companies are themselves obliged to comply with the Environmental 
Information Regulations.”, ‘Access to Information’;  Also Davis (2006): “The critical point for water 
companies is that, because they provide a service relating to the state of the environment within a 
statutory regulatory and licensing regime, they too are classed as public authorities for the purposes of 
the regulations and are subject to the obligations to disclose, on request, environmental information 
which they hold. This includes, for instance, their own cost-benefit analyses in relation to environmental 
protection measures.” Davis, R.W., ‘The Environmental Information Regulations 2004: Limiting 
Exceptions, Widening Definitions and Increasing Access to Information?’ 8 Environmental Law 
Review 51 and Al'Afghani, M.M., ‘The transparency agenda in water utilities regulation and the role of 
freedom of information: England and Jakarta case studies’ 20 Journal of Water Law 129 
936 Environmental Information Regulations 2004 detailed guidance (Defra 2005) 
<http://archive.defra.gov.uk/corporate/policy/opengov/eir/guidance/full-guidance/> January 5, 2010 
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not only to the body, but also to control of the services provided by the body” 
(Emphasis and Italics added).937 
These predictions, that the EIR will likely cover water utilities, had been 
partially strengthened by earlier analysis of the UK Information Commissioner (IC) in 
Sutton and East Surrey Water Plc (2008).938 The consideration on the case was that, 
since water companies are appointed by the Secretary of State (or indirectly by the 
Director General of Water Services), and can have their licence terminated, they are 
deemed to have been ‘appointed to administer the public water supply on behalf of the 
government’, and therefore fall within the definition of “carrying out the functions of 
public administration” under EIR Regulation 2(2)(c).939 Secondly, the IC also deemed 
that they can also be categorised as entities which, “under the control” of other public 
bodies, have public responsibilities relating to the environment940 (EIR Regulation 
2(2)(d)). OFWAT, according to the IC, is the other public body ‘controlling’ Sutton 
and East Surrey plc through specific duties to protect the environment under the Water 
Industry Act 1991.  
In 2010, however, the IC changed their position. This move was confirmed by 
the Upper Tribunal. The leading cases are Fish Legal vs Yorkshire Water Services and 
United Utilities (alleged Public Authorities), and Smartsource Drainage & Water 
Reports Limited. 941 Smartsource Drainage & Water Reports Limited,942 a company 
 
937 Ibid Guidance 2.19 
938 FER0118853  (Sutton and East Surrey Water Plc)  Information Commissioner's Office 
939 Ibid para 20 
940 Ibid para 20 
941 Respectively, FER0269130 and FER0272665. The original decisions are not available in the 
Information Commissioner’s Website. The ‘Decision Notice’ was sent to the applicant, Fish Legal, in 
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which provides services for water efficiency savings for customers,943 lodged an FoI 
request to 16 water utilities. The utilities granted the disclosure of some information 
but denied the others.944 The case was brought to the IC which decided that it has no 
jurisdiction945, and was later brought to the Upper Tribunal. The crux of the dispute is 
that the phrases “functions of public administration” and “under the control” of 
EIR Regulation 2(2)(c) and (d) respectively, are deemed not applicable to water 
utilities.  
 “Functions of Public Administration” 
 
the form of a letter. Presumably, this is because the IC considered that there had been no case. Case 
Reference Numbers FER0269130 & FER0272665 (Yorkshire Water Services and United Utilities), ICO 
Decision March 12, 2010  Information Commission The author has the copy.  
942 Smartsource Drainage & Water Reports Limited v The Information Commissioner, Upper Tribunal 
Case No. GI/2458/2010 The Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) 
943 If Smartsource can spot any saving, it will then inform consumers about ways to save their water 
bills, including recommending the installation of  water meter or efficiency devices. It will then arrange 
with water utilities to make changes. Smartsource takes commission in the amount of 50% of the 
consumer’s savings. Smartsource, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’ (SmartSource Drainage & Water 
Reports Limited)  <http://www.smartsourcewater.co.uk/faq> accessed June 27, 2011 
944 The information  requested to water and sewerage companies was: (1) asset mapping database; (2) 
water and sewerage billing records; (3) a list of all properties subject to “building over agreements”; (4) 
sewer flooding register; (5) water pressure register; (6) water quality reports; and (7) trade effluent 
register. Item (6) and (7) were disclosed, as there was a statutory basis under Part VIII of the Water 
Supply (Water Quality) Regulations 2000 (SI 2000/3184) and section 196 of the Water Industry Act 
1991, but the rest were denied as they do not consider themselves  public authorities under EIR. 
Smartsource Drainage & Water Reports Limited v The Information Commissioner, Upper Tribunal 
Case No. GI/2458/2010  paras 7-8 
945 In its 12 March 2010 letter, the IC considered that it has no jurisdiction over the case. The ‘Decision’ 
is not available on the ICO website and the author does not have its copy. Apparently, the IC sent a 
letter to the complainant instead of serving the copy of the formal decision notice. This was considered 
by the Upper Tribunal, which concludes that the letter is considered sufficient to be regarded as a 
Decision: “The fact that the Commissioner’s decision was set out by way of a letter, rather than in the 
official decision notice format, cannot be decisive. The letter ran to seven pages of detailed legal 
analysis, referring to both the legislation and relevant case law. We must have regard to the substance 
and not to the form.” See ibid para.14 The letter sent to Fish Legal (a copy is with the author) was also 
dated March 12, 2010 and ran sevenpages of legal analysis, as quoted above.  
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The phrase is found in EIR Regulation 2(2)(c) and the corresponding 
Directive 2003/4/EC Article 2(2) b946 which  reiterates verbatim the Aarhus 
Convention Article 2(2) (b).947   
One of the arguments forwarded for water utilities as performing “functions of 
public administration” are the facts that: (i)  they provide water and/or sewerage 
service, (ii) they carry out certain regulatory and enforcement functions in the 
management and operation of the infrastructure and in the management of water 
resources, and (iii) in doing so, they are not only servicing customers but also 
managing the environment. Water utilities are also (a) appointed statutory undertakers 
subject to licence conditions, (b) subject to comprehensive and detailed regulation, (c) 
compelled with a duty to provide universal service (which entails that they cannot 
choose customers, determine own prices or refuse to deal) and (d) in the event of 
failure, subject to  government  action to ensure continuity. To the appelant, these 
factors accounted altogether should mean that water utilities are performing ‘functions 
of public administration’ and are therefore a Public Authority under EIR.948  
Unfortunately, the Upper Tribunal rejected this argument. In their view, 
although water utilities are appointed statutory undertakers subject to licence, they are 
not created by statute but incorporated under the Companies Act, which makes them 
fundamentally a private company “independent of government, in the business of 
 
946 “any natural or legal person performing public administrative functions under national law, including 
specific duties, activities or services in relation to the environment” 
947 “any natural or legal person performing public administrative functions under national law, including 
specific duties, activities or services in relation to the environment” 
948 See Smartsource Drainage & Water Reports Limited v The Information Commissioner, Upper 
Tribunal Case No. GI/2458/2010  para 36, summarising the Appelant’s submission 
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supplying water and sewerage services to the public for profit”.949 With respect to the 
obligation of universal service, which entails that water utilities cannot pick and 
choose their customers, the Upper Tribunal responded that “there are other providers 
of services licensed under statute who lack the ability to pick and choose their 
customers (e.g. black cab drivers in London)”.950 The safeguarding of continuity and 
supply through a special administrative order by the High Court if companies are 
failing, was not regarded as the carrying out of public functions, “as the provisions in 
question do not envisage the State stepping in as a provider of last resort”, but merely 
to transfer the failing enterprise to another private sector provider.951 The Upper 
Tribunal rejected the proposition that water companies’ powers, for example, in 
imposing hosepipe bans, refusing to consent to trade effluent or their power to make 
by-laws, are indications of “functions of public administration”. These provisions are 
only ancillary to their primary purpose, which is commercial and is considered to be 
there merely to protect their assets. The core regulatory functions of “public 
administration”, resides with OFWAT and the Secretary of State.952 This “ancillary” 
theory was later confirmed by the First Tier Tribunal on The Duchy of Cornwall.953 
According to the tribunal, if the functions of public administration carried within the 
 
949 Ibid para 70 
950 Ibid para 73 
951 Ibid para 74 
952 Interestingly, when referred to the EC’s Water Framework Directive which reads: “Water is not a 
commercial product like any other but, rather, a heritage which must be protected, defended and 
treated as such” the Upper Tribunal choose to understand it not as “water is not a commercial product” 
but as “water is a commercial product, but a different one”. According to the Upper Tribunal, “In other 
words, it is both part of the heritage of our natural environment and a special commercial product.” 
Ibid para 77 
953 Bruton v IC and The Duchy of Cornwall & The Attorney General to HRH the Prince of Wales 
(EA/2010/0182)  
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body is “on the whole a secondary function which are related to and flow from the 
primary functions which are not functions of public administration” (i.e. commercial), 
then the body is not a public authority under EIR.954  
The Upper Tribunal also compared water utilities to Network Rail955 and 
found similarities and differences. The similarities are that they are both major 
utilities, operating under a licence, have some degree of commercial independence, 
subject to price regulation and do not enforce or set health and safety standards. The 
differences are that water utilities are accountable through their AGM, they receive no 
public funding (whereas Network Rail receives 70% government funding) and finally, 
they do not have government nominees on their board of directors.956 Because of this, 
the Upper Tribunal decided that water utilities have fewer characteristics of a public 
authority than Network Rail.957 
The Aarhus Guide actually provides indications that privatised water utilities 
could be exercising public administrative functions. Interpretation of ‘public 
administrative functions’ under Article 2 (2) (b) of the Aarhus Convention covers 
“Public corporations established by legislation or legal acts of a public authority 
under [the previous paragraph]”. It continues: “The kinds of bodies that might be 
covered by this subparagraph include public utilities and quasi-governmental bodies 
 
954 Ibid para 63 
955 Incorporating previous case decided by the Information Tribunal Network Rail Limited and the 
Information Commissioner (EA/2006/0061 and EA/2006/0062)  Information Tribunal 
956 Smartsource Drainage & Water Reports Limited v The Information Commissioner, Upper Tribunal 
Case No. GI/2458/2010  paras 66-67 
957 Ibid para 68 they also remark that some water companies are foreign-owned and can buy each other, 
subject to competition legislation. This is another factor which leads them to decide that they are less of 
public authorities compared to Network Rail 
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such as water authorities”. Unfortunately, the Upper Tribunal considered that referrals 
to utility companies in the Aarhus Guide are equivocal and only demonstrate that such 
assessments are fact and jurisdiction specific.958 With all of those considerations 
above, it decided that water utilities are not carrying out “functions of public 
administration”.959  
“Under the control of” 
The focus of the debate is whether the regulator and the government’s 
treatment to water utilities can be categorised as a “control” under EIR regulation 
2(2)(d).  According to the respondents, “control” should mean that the entity must be 
effectively a part of the government or the executive machinery.960 Taking the 
examples of pharmaceuticals for price control and pubs for licensing, they dismissed 
the idea that price control or licensing are enough to establish “control” under EIR 
Regulation 2 (2) (d). They added that “control” should mean that the controlling body 
is in the position to dictate both means and the outcome of the process, whereas the 
WIA 1991 only set the objectives, but not the means, to achieve it.961   
 
958 Ibid paras 39-40   
959 Ibid para 78 
960 Ibid para 81 
961 This is certainly not the case when water utilities are restructured. In some cases, OFWAT does 
impose some governance requirement such as bond listing in the capital market in order to subject them 
to corporate governance and disclosure rules or, alternatively, to require them to subject themselves to 
capital market disclosure rules as if their equities are listed there. See Section 5.4.3 on “Corporate 
restructuring”. This means that OFWAT not only determines the outcome, but somewhat also dictates 
the means for achieving them. 
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This view is similar to an earlier view of the IC in Fish Legal (Complainant) 
vs Yorkshire Water Services and United Utilities (alleged Public Authorities).962 In 
this case, the IC considered that close regulation by OFWAT, DWI and EA does not 
constitute “control” under EIR 2(2)(d) as regulation is described as a “supervisory 
framework” within which the utilities are given a degree of independence to deliver 
the service and that intervention will be carried out only when the utilities is or will 
likely to be in breach of its licence condition or relevant legislations.963 For the IC, 
control must amount to enabling the regulator to exert a “decisive influence”964 on the 
utilities. The fact that the utilities are free to undertake their own financing, borrowing 
and making investment decision is analogous to other UK companies which are 
subject to regulatory constrait from, for example, Companies House.965 The IC also 
commented on the utilities’ corporate governance in order to justify its arguments. It 
argued that, save some provisions relating to the appointment of non-executive 
directors, regulators or other public bodies have no right to appoint or veto the 
appointment of a director, and, therefore, there is no suggestion that public authorities 
may exert a controlling influence on a water company through board representation. 
Hence, according to the IC’s interpretation, the meaning of a “control” has to be 
 
962 Respectively, FER0269130 and FER0272665. The original decisions are not available on the 
Information Commissioner’s Website. The ‘Decision Notice’ was sent to the applicant, Fish Legal, in 
the form of a letter. Presumably, this is because the IC considered that there had been no case. Case 
Reference Numbers FER0269130 & FER0272665 (Yorkshire Water Services and United Utilities), ICO 
Decision March 12, 2010 The author has the copy.  
963 Ibid 
964 This is taken from the DEFRA Guidance (see above) , Environmental Information Regulations 2004 
detailed guidance 
965 Case Reference Numbers FER0269130 & FER0272665 (Yorkshire Water Services and United 
Utilities), ICO Decision March 12, 2010 
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narrowly constructed to signify influence towards the utility company’s day to day 
decision making, such as in financing and investment, or board appointments.  
Again, the Aarhus Guide provides a lengthy discussion, which was quoted by 
the Upper Tribunal: 
“An example from the United Kingdom may help to illustrate the relevance of 
this provision. There, public functions previously carried out by governmental 
authorities had been taken over through a privatisation process by public 
corporations. These included major providers of natural gas, electricity, and 
sewerage and water services. In the case of the water providers, they were 
highly regulated by the Government and kept financial accounting for these 
services separate from their other activities. In a court case in the United 
Kingdom about the applicability of European Community directives to such a 
water services company, the judge determined that such a service provider 
was an ‘emanation of the State’ and therefore covered by the directive.”966 
(Emphasis added). 
The case referred to by the Aarhus Guide above would be Griffin.967 It would 
appear from the Guide that the intention of the Aarhus Convention is to cover all 
privatised public utilities, and this too appears from another passage:   
“The definition [of a Public Authority under Aarhus Convention] is broken 
into three parts to provide as broad a coverage as possible. Recent developments in 
“privatized” solutions to the provision of public services have added a layer of 
complexity to the definition. The Convention tries to make it clear that such 
 
966 Aarhus Guide p.33 
967 Griffin v South West Water Services Limited [1995] IRLR 15 High Court;  Smartsource Drainage & 
Water Reports Limited v The Information Commissioner, Upper Tribunal Case No. GI/2458/2010  para 
84.   
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innovations cannot take public services or activities out of the realm of public 
involvement, information and participation.”968  
However, attempts to cover water utilities as a Public Authority under Aarhus 
tend to fail, because the paragraph above is closed with this one: “Implementation of 
the Convention would be improved if Parties clarified which entities are covered by 
this subparagraph. This could be done through categories or lists made available to 
the public”.969 Those paragraphs above had been stamped by the Upper Tribunal as 
equivocal and that the last sentence was “restating the question”, rather than 
answering them.970 This was an unfortunate judgment since the Aarhus Guide through 
the above paragraphs is quite clear in exemplifying that the Convention intended to 
deal with access to information to privatised public services  
The DEFRA guidance, although it reiterates the Aarhus Guide in many of its 
passages, tends to put emphasis more on the context and case by case analysis of the 
situation. It suggests, for example, that the existence of a contract between a 
government body and a private company may or may not bring the company under 
EIR971. The DEFRA Guide, citing Griffin, explains that “Public utilities, for example, 
are involved in the supply of essential public services such as water, sewerage, 
electricity and gas and may fall within the scope of the EIRs” but added that 
significant legislative changes and development of the electricity and gas industry 
since Foster was decided (and referred to in Griffin) would probably have led to a 
 
968 Aarhus Guide p.32 
969 Aarhus Guide p. 33, see also Smartsource Drainage & Water Reports Limited v The Information 
Commissioner, Upper Tribunal Case No. GI/2458/2010  para 107 
970 Ibid para 84 
971, Environmental Information Regulations 2004 detailed guidance Chapter 2, para 2.20 
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different outcome if it was decided at the present time.972 Presumably, the DEFRA 
guidance was referring to the unbundling and in-the-market-competition of the British 
electricity and gas sector and maintains that such restructuring may fundamentally 
alter the definition of the incumbent company as a public authority.  
Although Griffin had incorporated part ii of the Foster973 test (which is “under 
the control of the state”) and had accepted that water utilities are covered by this test, 
the Upper Tribunal choose not to rely too much on it. This is because Griffin’s 
preliminary analysis was that the question is not whether the body is “under control” 
of the state but whether the “public service” is, and that the legal form, the 
commercial concern, the consideration as to whether the State has day-to-day control 
of the utilities or whether the body is a state agent were all considered irrelevant. For 
the Upper Tribunal, Griffin was asking a different question and that its context – 
safeguarding worker’s rights when later employed by non-governmental bodies – is 
different from the case at hand.      
The Upper Tribunal elaborated that the purpose of the Aarhus Convention is 
to capture the government and the executive functions in various guises.974 Privatised 
water utilities are not within this category and are treated at arm’s length from the 
state’s machinery. For the Upper Tribunal, regulation is about “formulating policy and 
strategy, determining outcomes, setting standards, making and enforcing rules and 
 
972  ibid Chapter 2, para 2.22 
973 Case C-188/89. A. Foster and others v British Gas plc. European Court reports 1990 Page I-03313 
European Court of Justice 
974 The tribunal refers to para 30 of the Aarhus Guide, explaining ranges of governmental activities 
 
 256 
issuing guidance975 whereas ‘control’ must go beyond that, so as to imply command 
and compulsion, and making decisive influence on the companies’ polices, not only 
by designating the ends, but also with the means to achieve them.  
5.5.2. Exemption clauses 
One of the striking differences between active and passive disclosure rules is 
that, because the latter establishes a right of access to information in general, there 
would be a need to qualify such generalities by making exceptions. On the other hand, 
this does not usually occur in active disclosure rules. 
In the UK FoI Act, there are two categories of exemptions: absolute and 
qualified. For absolute exemptions,976 a balancing test is not mandatory, whereas for 
relative exemptions, it is applied. There are two kinds of balancing test under the UK 
FoI Act: the balancing test which contains both a ‘harm’ test and ‘public interest’ test 
and those which contain only a ‘public interest’ test.  
The UK FoI Act contains a number of exemption clauses, which are quite 
broad, but only four are considered most relevant977  to water utilities’ regulation. 
 
975 Smartsource Drainage & Water Reports Limited v The Information Commissioner, Upper Tribunal 
Case No. GI/2458/2010  para 95 
976 S.2 of the English FoI Act regulates that exemptions under sections 21, 23, 32, 34, 36 (insofar as it 
relates to information held by the House of Commons or the House of Lords), 40 (in some cases), 41 
and 44 are absolute, which means that no public interest tests are employed.  English FoI Act 
977 Fitch and Graham considered four exemptions in the FoI Bill which they consider to be most 
relevant for utilities regulation: decision-making and policy formulation, information relating to 
enforcement action, information obtained in confidence and information of a commercial nature. See 
Fitch, M. and C. Graham (1999). "The draft Freedom of Information Bill—implications for utilities." 
Utilities Law Review 10(6): 257-261.   
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these are information relating to enforcement action; information provided in 
confidence; commercial information; and decision making and policy formulation. 
5.5.2.1. Law enforcement  
The analytical framework (chapter 2) discussed the importance of 
transparency with respect to violation, by the utilities, of service levels or other 
regulatory arrangements, and any investigation or penalty made by the regulator in 
response to such violation. As explained in section 4.3.7 “Error! Reference source 
not found.” above, OFWAT had been quite transparent in its practice of investigation 
and enforcement, by announcing the steps it made against water utilities’ non-
compliance and the rationale of its enforcement actions.  
However, there have been instances where a regulator might be perceived as 
delaying investigation, or when it eventually takes place, not properly using its 
authority to penalise the utilities. This was the conclusion made by the Public 
Accounts Committee of the House of Commons when OFWAT was perceived to have 
failed to immediately take action against Thames Water’s leakage target.978  
While OFWAT or other regulators may be announcing their enforcement 
actions on their website, a transparency regime could be beneficial to understanding 
the details behind such enforcement, or alternatively, the rationale on why 
 
978 “Since 2000 Thames Water has persistently missed its leakage targets, but OFWAT took no 
enforcement action until 2005–06, and even then did not apply its new powers to impose financial 
penalties. OFWAT should take enforcement action against companies who do not meet their targets by 
applying the maximum financial penalties, and it should clarify its legal position should it wish to use a 
stronger sanction such as revoking a company’s licence.” Ofwat, Ofwat: Meeting the demand for water, 
Twenty–fourth Report of Session 2006–07     p.6 
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enforcement appears to be inadequate. Exemption clauses in the FoI Act 2000 and 
EIR, however, may restrict this from occurring by providing exemptions for law 
enforcement and investigation.979 We shall deal with the FoI Act 2000 exemption 
first, and then the EIR. 
FoI Act 2000 
Section 30 and 31 exempt investigation and law enforcement in general. The 
former relates to specific investigatory or prosecutorial functions of a public authority 
and the latter does not relate to that function but applies simply when certain 
information is held. Section 31 is therefore broader than s.30.   
 Section 30 of the FoI Act 2000 exempts information related to investigations 
and proceedings conducted by a Public Authority if such information had been or is 
being held by a Public Authority for the purpose of investigation. As such, it also 
covers closed and abandoned investigations conducted by public authorities.980 The 
term ‘investigation’ here is quite broad, as it covers information related to questions as 
to whether a person should be charged with an offence, whether a person charged with 
an offence is guilty or if it amounts to criminal and/or civil proceedings.981  
 
979 English FoI Act, s. 30 (Investigation and proceedings) and s. 31 (law enforcement),  
980 “Information held by a public authority is exempt information if it has at any time been held by the 
authority for the purposes of…” (Underline added) s.30 (1) FoI Act 2000 (England) The exemption for 
criminal investigations, criminal proceedings and confidential source (Information Commissioner 
Office 2009) 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/freedom_of_information/detailed_specialist_guides/s
30_exemption_for_investigations_and_proceedings_v3.pdf> July 1, 2011 
981 FoI Act 2000 (England)  s. 30 
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OFWAT has wide investigation and enforcement powers982. Tose which relate 
to ‘offences’, for example, are the unauthorised use of an undertaker’s network,983 the 
supply of water unfit for human consumption,984 and water contamination.985 The 
term ‘charged with an offence’,986 is not defined in the Act. In practice, the ICO 
expanded this into anything that could lead to the commencement of criminal 
proceedings including police cautions.987  
What about ‘regulatory offences’ or penalties, such as that which can be 
imposed by OFWAT through WIA s.22 A?  It has been suggested that the distinction 
between criminal and ‘regulatory’ offence is unhelpful, and the latter may lead to 
criminal offences of one kind or another.988 Hence, it is likely that the investigation 
leading to a penalty decision may be covered by this exemption. This analysis may not 
be required however, since s.30(2)(iii),989 referring to s.31(2), lists various types of 
investigation including those the purpose of which is to ascertain whether any person 
has failed to comply with the law and those which evaluate if “circumstances which 
would justify regulatory action in pursuance of any enactment exist or may arise”. 
 
982 This is imposed in the licence condition, for example, see para 8-9, Instrument of Appointment by the 
Secretary of State for Wales of Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig as a water and sewerage undertaker under the 
Water Act 1989  
983 Collins, A. and Fairchild, R., ‘Sustainable food consumption at a sub-national level: an ecological 
footprint, nutritional and economic analysis’ 9 Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning 5s.66I-L,  
984 Ibid s.70 
985 Ibid s.73 
986 FoI Act 2000 (England)  s.30(1)(a) 
987, The exemption for criminal investigations, criminal proceedings and confidential source 
988 See para 3.43: Should criminal offences and regulatory offences be distinguished? United Kingdom, 
Criminal liability in regulatory contexts : a consultation paper (The Law Commission Consultation 
Paper No 195 2010) 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/docs/cp195_Criminal_Liability_consultation.pdf> July 1, 
2011 
989 This section refers to the FoI Act 2000 (England)  s.31(2) 
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These phrases would effectively cover investigations undertaken through all layers of 
enforcement action by OFWAT, including (s.19), the ‘enforcement order’ (s.18) and, 
financial penalties (s 22 A).990  
Section 30 contains a public interest test and is a ‘class exemption’ where the 
harm test is not necessary, although in practice, for the purpose of constructing the 
public interest argument, the harm from disclosure may need to be argued. The right 
to fair trial is generally accepted as a public interest which needs protection from 
disclosure.991  
If information is not exempt under s.30, then it may be exempt under s.31,992 
and this section contains a harm test, which needs to be argued by the public authority. 
Section 31 comprises of a lengthy list, from the prevention or detection of crime, the 
administration of justice, when authorities need to ascertain as to whether any person 
has complied with law as well as any justifications for conducting regulatory action.  
EIR 
The EIR provides exemption for disclosure of information which “adversely 
affects” (i) the course of justice, (ii) the ability of a person to receive a fair trial and 
(iii) the ability of a public authority to conduct an inquiry of a criminal or disciplinary 
 
990 Water Industry Act 1991 (England)  19, 18 and s22A 
991 , The exemption for criminal investigations, criminal proceedings and confidential source 
992 S.31 (1): “Information which is not exempt information by virtue of section 30 is exempt 
information if its disclosure under this Act would, or would be likely to, prejudice”. 
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nature.993 A public interest test is mandatory to all exemptions made under EIR, 
including this one.994  
The term “adversely effect” means that there should be a harm test and the 
threshold for non-disclosure is a high one.995 The term “course of justice” has been 
interpreted widely so as to include law enforcement.996 “Proper administration of the 
law” such as prevention, investigation or detection of crime, and apprehension or 
prosecution of offenders is also deemed to come within the exemption,997 as well as 
legal professional privilege.998  
The application of this type of exemption to a water utilities regulator is likely 
to be similar to the FoI, the difference being the former obligates a harm test with a 
high threshold, whereas s.30 of the FoI Act 2000 contain no harm test and s.31 
contain a harm test but with a lower threshold, compared to the EIR.   
5.5.2.2. Commercial Information 
FoI Act 2000 
 
993 EIR 2004 (England) Regulation.12 (5) (b) This exemption applies when the public authority is not 
exercising its legislative or judicial function, as bodies exercising those functions are beyond the scope 
of EIR’s applicability See ibid Regulation 3 (3) 
994 Ibid Regulation 12 (b) 
995 See Archer v The Information Commissioner and Salisbury District Council, EA/2006/0037  
Information Tribunal para 51 
996, Environmental Information Regulations 2004 detailed guidance Guidance 7 
997 Ibid Guidance 7 
998 Freedom of Information Act, Environmental Information Regulations: The exemption for legal 
professional privilege (Information Commissioner Office 2008) 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/freedom_of_information/detailed_specialist_guides/l
egal_professional_privilege.pdf> July 1, 2011 
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There are two sub categories under commercial interest exemption: (i) trade 
secrets and (ii) prejudice to the commercial interests of any person (including the 
public authority holding the information).999 For trade secrets, there is a duty to 
confirm or deny if such information is being held, whereas for commercial interests, 
such duty can be removed, if there is a prejudice to the disclosure of the requested 
information.1000 That also means that the trade secret exemption is a class-based one, 
requiring no harm test, whereas the commercial interest exemption requires it. In both 
cases, there is a public interest test. Both exemptions are aimed at protecting 
competitive advantage.1001 
While what may constitute as a trade secret is somewhat clear,1002 
“commercial interest” is extremely broad. Birkinshaw notes that the usual term 
employed is “commercial confidences” which signifies some degree of confidentiality 
 
999 FoI Act 2000 (England) , s.43 
1000 FoI Act 200, s.43(3) 
1001 For Trade Secret: Information may be commercially sensitive without being the sort of secret which 
gives a company a competitive edge over its rivals (p. 3) and for Commercial Information: commercial 
interest relates to a person’s ability to participate competitively in a commercial activity, i.e. the 
purchase and sale of goods or services. (p.4) Freedom of Information Act Awareness Guidance No. 5, 
Commercial Interests (Version 3) (Information Commissioner Office 2009) 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/~/media/documents/library/Freedom_of_Information/Detailed_specialist_guide
s/AWARENESS_GUIDANCE_5_V3_07_03_08.ashx> July 1, 2011 
1002 According to the Law Commission: “We consider a provisional definition of the term “trade 
secret”. We think the term should apply to information (i) which is not generally known, (ii) which 
derives its value from that fact, and (iii) as to which its “owner” has indicated (expressly or impliedly) 
his or her wish to preserve its quality of secrecy”. Law Comission of Great Britain, Legislating the 
criminal code : misuse of trade secrets ; a consultation paper (H.M.S.O. 1997) para 1.29 See also 
Birkinshaw, Freedom of information p.168. Meanwhile, the ICO guideline employs four item tests:” (i) 
Is the information used for the purpose of trade, (ii) Is it obvious from the nature of the information or, 
if not, has the owner made it clear that he or she considers releasing the information would cause them 
harm or be advantageous to their rivals? (iii) Is the information already known? (iv) How easy would it 
be for competitors to discover or reproduce the information for themselves?” , Freedom of Information 
Act Awareness Guidance No. 5, Commercial Interests (Version 3) 
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and that in other legislation1003 the term used is “prejudiced to an unreasonable 
degree”.1004 This is not the case with the FoI Act 2000 where prejudice alone is 
sufficient. 
As a part of the exercise in determining “prejudice”, the ICO guideline 
suggested that the level of competition within the industry needs to be weighed. 
“Where a company enjoys a monopoly over the provision of the goods or services in 
question it is less likely that releasing the information will have a prejudicial impact on 
that company.”1005 
Since cases involving OFWAT are quite rare1006 it would be useful to weigh 
another case under the FOISA1007, which concerns a water utility.  
S.33 (1) (a) and (b) (respectively trade secret and commercial interest) of the 
FOISA mimic the UK FoI Act 2000 s.43 (1) and (2) governing the same things, the 
exception being that the FOISA adds the words “prejudice substantially” with respect 
to commercial interest exemption, whereas the English FOI Act contains only the 
word ‘prejudice’. In theory this could mean that the FOISA’s threshold for non-
 
1003 Clean Air Act 1993, s. 37; Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations 1999, sch. 8, para. 18 See 
Birkinshaw, Freedom of information p.169 
1004 Ibid p.169 
1005, Freedom of Information Act Awareness Guidance No. 5, Commercial Interests (Version 3) p.6 
1006Case search – up to 2011 – on the English FoI Commissioner’s website reveals only one result 
which involves OFWAT, the case  concerns ‘legal professional privilege. See FS50273866 (Water 
Services Regulation Authority)  Information Commissioner's Office The exemption under s 42(1) was 
upheld by the IC. Case search at the Information Tribunal reveals ‘none’.  
1007 Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002, 2002 asp 13 
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disclosure is higher than its English counterpart with the result of more information 
being released,1008 but whether this is true in practice needs further elaboration.  
This case is also relevant for the English experience because Scottish Water 
(SW) is a regulated company (with Water Industry Commission for Scotland or WICS 
as the regulator) despite the fact that it is owned by the government.1009  WICS also 
uses the RPI-X incentive based regulation in determining prices and also benchmarks 
SW’s performance with their England and Wales counterparts.  
In MacRoberts and the City of Edinburgh Council,1010 The Scottish FoI 
Commissioner had to consider whether city councils should release a copy of the list 
of the properties in respect of which the council collects water and waste water 
charges on behalf of Scottish Water. MacRoberts, the complainant (a firm of 
solicitors), does not require the details of the owner, proprietor or occupier of the 
premises.1011 The councils denied the request by citing a number of exemptions,1012 
one of them is “Commercial Interest”, under s.33(1)(b) of the FOISA, which mimics 
 
1008 The word ‘substantial’  is interpreted by authors as ‘significant’ or ‘weighty’ See Carter, M. and 
Bouris, A., Freedom of information : balancing the public interest (Constitution Unit, School of Public 
Policy, UCL 2006) p. 81  
1009 See Hendry, ‘An Analytical Framework for Reform of National Water Law’ for a complete account 
of the Scottish water industry 
1010 Decision 056/2006 MacRoberts and the City of Edinburgh Council  Scottish Information 
Commissioner  
1011 Ibid para 3 
1012 The council also used trade secret exemption, but was dismissed by the Scottish FoI Commissioner 
since it is obvious that such information does not constitute ‘unique pricing calculation’ or secret details 
of product and services, plus the fact that such information is distributed across local authorities in 
Scotland and that it is actually possible to discover such information through council tax data register, 
albeit entailing a considerable cost. Ibid See paras 82-86 
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s.43(2) of the UK FoI Act 2000, except with respect to the use of the word 
“substantial” as discussed above. 
SW made representation on the case, and argued that under Water Industry 
Scotland Act (WISA), it may levy charges, at a reasonable fee, to obtain copies or 
extracts from the records it keeps. 1013 It further explains that it fixes the charges for 
property search certificate, in the amount of 40 GBP, and that amount is routinely paid 
by search companies or solicitors wishing to know whether a property is connected to 
SW’s water supply, sewerage, whether they are charged using household, business or 
metered rates and whether any mains are located in a property, which may impact any 
future building plans.1014  
The first question to be assessed was whether there is “substantial prejudice to 
commercial interest”.  
Although not elaborated in detail on the case, MacRoberts actually concerns 
two different markets, first, is the market of information provision in which SW would 
benefit from disclosure and second, the market in natural monopoly of water supply, 
which may suffer prejudice because of disclosure due to the increase of charges. The 
prejudice from disclosure towards SW would be in the form of loss of income in the 
first market. This may also affect customer charges on the second market.  
 
1013 Water Industry (Scotland) Act 2002, 2002 asp 3 See s.58 (5) (b) 
1014 Decision 056/2006 MacRoberts and the City of Edinburgh Council paras 40 and 41. SW does not 
charge land owners who inspect records related to their own properties. They also do not charge 
inspections which are aimed at minimising damages to pipelines due to construction works on the site 
area. See para 44 
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The Scottish FoI Commissioner suggested that such a service (of SW 
providing property search certificates) is conducted “in competition” with search 
companies.1015 Actually it is not exactly clear how this came to be, since, if all 
information generated by search companies comes from SW, then SW will not be in 
direct competition with the search companies. What is true is that the provision of 
such information entails a search cost resulting from the use of GIS map data and 
access to records of connection consents.1016 It was argued that the charge imposed to 
the public helped them to relieve the burden of its operational cost.1017  
However, the Scottish FoI Commissioner agreed that SW’s commercial 
interest would or would be likely to be “substantially” prejudiced.1018 The Scottish FoI 
Commissioner does not calculate the exact amounts of economic losses if access is 
free and so the term ‘substantial’ seemed to be taken for granted.  
The second question is the public interest test. There is clearly a public interest 
in maintaining exemption, since it contributes to decreasing SW’s operational cost 
which may eventually lead to a reduction of actual price charges incurred to 
customers. There may also be a public interest in disclosure, since it reduces search 
costs incurred by search companies or other individuals.  
There is a public interest in both markets (the market of information and the 
market of water supply), however, the Scottish FoI Commission was not satisfied that 
the Public Interest from disclosure of information – which would be directly enjoyed 
 
1015 Ibid para 40 
1016 Ibid para 90 
1017 Ibid para 98 
1018 Ibid para 92 
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by companies – would outweigh the Public Interest in charges enjoyed by 
customers.1019  It believes that SW is legally entitled to reap the benefit of information 
that it provides according to the charging schemes as approved by WICS and that the 
beneficiaries, if the information is released, will only be the commercial 
companies.1020  
It is interesting that the Scottish FoI Commissioner seemed inclined to dismiss 
the argument that benefit to the search companies from disclosure would be a “public 
interest”. The public interest test would require “the consideration of whether or not 
release of the information would be in the interests of the public as a whole.1021 For 
the Scottish FoI Commissioner it seems a benefit to the search companies is not “the 
public as a whole”, therefore not the “public interest”, it would only be an “individual 
interest or […] sectional interest to particular groups in society”.1022 Some writers 
argue that there is a lack of justification for a natural monopoly industry to possess 
commercial confidentiality1023 and that such is considered an oxymoron.1024 In 
 
1019 “I am of the view that, on balance, it would not be in the public interest for the information to be 
released given that the harm caused to Scottish Water’s commercial interests could impact upon water 
and sewerage charges issued to the public. I am satisfied that the public interest in increasing 
competition in the narrow area of the supply of information is not sufficient on its own to outweigh the 
public interest in avoiding a likely increase in charges.” para 100 ibid  
1020 Ibid para 97 
1021 Ibid para 98 
1022 Ibid para 98 See also Feintuck, " The public interest" in regulation which suggests public interest in 
regulation as a “linkage between constitutional values and semi-autonomous legal and regulatory 
systems” conducted by restraining capital and individualistic values and justifying social regulation and 
existing independently from the economic argument of market intervention.  
1023 “Consumer’s International argued in TC 224 that in a natural monopoly there is no justification for 
commercial confidentiality during the life of a contract, and we were not convinced that it is necessary 
even during a period of competitive tender, which is the justification usually presented.” See Simpson, 
R., ‘Down and dirty: providing water for the world’ 14 CONSUMER POLICY REVIEW 146 TC 224 
(Technical Committee 224) is the ISO committee in charge of setting the standard for water and waste 
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England, a DTI Green Paper also considered that that information about a monopoly 
business should generally be disclosable, whereas for markets opening up to 
competition, the extent of disclosure required should be correlated with the degree to 
which a company has market power.1025 It is suggested that the more market power a 
player has, the more barriers should there be to non disclosure.1026 
All of those statements above might hold true, but not categorically true, since 
consumers’ interests or  public interest could be asserted through non-disclosure, as 
MacRoberts had demonstrated above. One must pay careful attention, however, that 
the public benefit of non-disclosure argued by the Scottish FoI Commissioner above 
arises because of an implicit assumption that the certificate fees are passed on to the 
 
water service. Note that Simpon’s argument here correlates with long-term contracts (concessions, lease 
or the like) and not fully divested companies.  
1024 “In the case of the water companies, electricity distribution systems and local phone networks, the 
grounds for secrecy are especially suspect: these are monopolies which can make no serious claim that 
a competitor can use the information. But even where competition exists, this cannot justify 
concealment. "Commercial secrecy" is an oxymoron: secrecy is the enemy of free trade, information the 
lubricant of commerce”. Palast, G., Oppenheim, J. and MacGregor, T., Democracy and Regulation: 
How the Public Can Govern Privatised Essential Services (Pluto Press 2002) p. 185  
1025  Department of Trade and Industry, A Fair Deal for Consumers: Modernising the Framework for 
Utility Regulation at Proposal 7.6 
1026 Baldwin and Cave, Understanding regulation: theory, strategy, and practice p.308. See also DGT 
Submission at para 5.20:  “This approach would accord with the DGT's present policy of greater 
disclosure where justified by the relevant company's market power or dominance. Publishing such 
information would help competition to develop as the imbalance in information is reduced and new 
entrants can take more rational investment decisions.”   See also 'Review of Utility Regulation, 
Submission by the Director General of Telecommunications ' OFCOM, 
http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/oftel/publications/1995_98/index.htm accessed February 11, 
2010  
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consumer, in the form of lower prices. 1027 SW can do so, because they have no private 
shareholders to serve. Hence, the fact that SW is publicly owned played a role.   
Had SW been a privately-owned company, as many of the water utilities in 
England are, would there be a public interest in maintaining exemption? Probably not, 
since the income from charging the release of information and records could be 
channeled to the shareholders through dividend, while the cost for information 
gathering is still charged to the customers. In this case, maintaining exemption would 
only serve sectional interest to particular groups in society”1028, namely, water 
utilities’ private shareholders.1029   
 
1027 “The release of such information under FOISA would, or would be likely to, significantly harm the 
finances of Scottish Water in relation to its property search services and this loss of income could in 
turn have the unintended consequence of driving up water and sewerage prices which would be to the 
detriment of the public at large.”Decision 056/2006 MacRoberts and the City of Edinburgh Council 
para 97  
1028 Ibid para 98 See also Feintuck, " The public interest" in regulation which suggests public interest in 
regulation as a “..linkage between constitutional values and semi-autonomous legal and regulatory 
systems” conducted by restraining capital and individualistic values and justifying social regulation and 
existing independently from the economic argument of market intervention. Coppel argued that the 
scope of the Public Interest in the FoI Act 2000 (England)  may not be as wide as those normally 
considered in ordinary courts. The Public Interest for exemption is constrained within that particular 
exemption, that is to say, if the exemption concerns commercial information or confidential obligation, 
the Public Interest that needs to be considered can be limited to either a person’s commercial 
information or duty of confidence. See Coppel, P., ‘The Public Interest and the Freedom of Information 
Act 2000’ 10 Judicial Review 289 and , Your right to know : the government's proposals for a Freedom 
of Information Act para 3. However, this is only true for weighing “..the public interest in maintaining 
the exemption…” but not in weighing  “..the public interest in disclosing the information” (both 
sentence taken from s.2(2)(b) of the FoI Act 2000 (England) ). While the former is specified and can be 
curtailed in each exemption, the latter is wider. 
1029 That is, if the English Information Commissioner, Tribunals or the Courts consider shareholders as 
only ‘a particular group of the society’, and not ‘the public as a whole’. The UK FoI Act 2000 
(England)  does not define “Public Interest”, presumably, in order to achieve flexibility in its case-by-
case application. There is no clarity on who the “Public” actually are. Guidelines only suggest that  
generally there is a public interest to disclosure, but this must be weighed against public interest in non-
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Is downstream competition not a public interest? MacRoberts1030 was 
accusing Scottish Water of exploiting its statutory monopoly on water and water 
information.1031 The question of competition was mentioned, but it was not 
considered to be relevant and not the lex lata1032 since the case was adjudicated in 
2006 whereas retail competition for non-household customers was intended to be 
opened in 2008.1033  
Presumably, there would be a Public Interest towards increasing competition 
only if the disclosure on the first market (the market of information in the form of a list 
of properties) will have benefit of increasing competition on the second market (the 
market of water supply).  This distinction is important because disclosure in the first 
market (market of the commodified information) may or may not increase 
 
disclosure (See Exemptions guidance, Public interest test (Ministry of Justice 2011) 
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/freedom-and-rights/freedom-of-information/foi-exemptions-
public-interest.htm> July 07, 2011). The IC guideline on Public Interest is also less helpful. It only 
suggests that “The term “the public interest” is not defined in either the FOIA or the EIR. However 
something which is “in the public interest” may be summarised as something which serves the interests 
of the public”. See Information Commissioner Office, Freedom of Information Act, Environmental 
Information Regulations: The public interest test  (Information Commissioner Office 2009) 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/~/media/documents/library/Freedom_of_Information/Detailed_specialist_guide
s/FEP038_PUBLIC_INTEREST_TEST_V3.ashx> July 1, 2011     
1030  The fact that the complainant is a solicitor’s firm, without any clarity on its direct interest towards 
downstream competition will make consideration of public interest resulting from downstream 
competition difficult, although officially, the identity, motivation and position of the complainant is 
irrelevant for the purpose of examining public interest in FoI. The consideration might be different if the 
complainant is a company like Smartsource. 
1031 Decision 056/2006 MacRoberts and the City of Edinburgh Council para 99 
1032 “Although the retail market for non-domestic customers is being opened up to competition from 
2008, I must consider the law as it now stands” ibid para 99 
1033 The Water Services etc. (Scotland) Act 2005, 2005 asp 3 acts as the legal basis for licensing for the 
retail companies. See also Parker, F., ‘The legalities of competition in water markets - comparing 
Scotland with England and Wales’ 18 Journal of Water Law 167  
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competition in the second market (market for water supply). This argument also 
depends on the statutory mandate for opening up water services to competition.  
It is to be noted that in some practices of  English FoI, the functioning of 
competition has been noted as a public interest. This occurred in procurement related 
cases in which there is a public interest in protecting fair market competition in public 
sector contracts (Welsh Development Agency)1034 and in encouraging private sector 
participation in procurement (Her Majesty’s Revenue And Customs (HMRC).1035 In 
one case, the IC mentioned the public interest to protect a newly liberalised state-
owned company (The Royal Mail).1036 However, in all of these cases, the public 
interest towards the functioning of a competitive market is served by maintaining the 
exemptions.   
However plausible it may seem, arguing the functioning of a competitive 
market as the rationale of Public Interest disclosure might be a difficult one. This is 
because in most cases, Public Interest in disclosure has normally been argued only in 
terms of promotion of accountability, transparency, participation, or its general impact 
 
1034 There is “an inherent public interest in ensuring that companies are able to compete fairly and in 
ensuring that there is fair competition for public sector contracts”.  Welsh Development Agency Case, 
Reference FS50097376 retreived on November 18, 2009 from 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/decisionnotices/2006/decision_notice_fs50097376.pdf  
1035 “However the Commissioner recognises that there is also a strong public interest in encouraging the 
wider involvement of the private sector in public procurement, to increase competition”.  Her Majesty’s 
Revenue and Customs. Reference FS50157117, para 57 retrieved on November 18, 2009 from 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/decisionnotices/2009/fs_50157117.pdf  
1036 The information is commercially sensitive.  Royal Mail no longer has a monopoly over postal 
delivery and must now operate in a fully liberalised market place.  Disclosure of the requested 
information is likely to harm its competitive position. The Royal Mail Case. Reference: FS50126145, 
para 18 (i), retrieved on November 18, 2009 from 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/decisionnotices/2007/fs_50126145.pdf  
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on the improvement of the quality of public discussion.1037 As was argued in 
MacRoberts, the direct beneficiary from the disclosure by an “upstream” utility 
company is likely to be the “downstream” companies, not the public as a whole.  
Public Interest towards disclosure may arise, only if such disclosure would improve 
the development of competition, which leads to the expansion of consumer choice.  
In order to invoke the proper working of competition as a Public Interest in 
disclosure, the following factors might need to be considered: 
1. The causality between disclosure and enhancement of consumer choice. 
Unless the new market is matured, however, this may be difficult to 
ascertain. 
2. The existence of specific legislation mandating liberalisation; competition 
in the market, or retail competition. The Cave Review was asked to be 
considered in Smartsource but was dismissed as the Upper Tribunal is 
concerned only with the water industry as it is today, “not as it may look in 
the future”. 1038  Retail competition was also considered in MacRoberts but 
was dismissed as it was considered not to be the law as it stands today.1039  
3. Interpretation of specific sections in the legislation, which leads to the 
conclusion that disclosure would be required. This will help with 
 
1037 Information Commissioner Office, Freedom of Information Act, Environmental Information 
Regulations: The public interest test    
1038 Smartsource Drainage & Water Reports Limited v The Information Commissioner, Upper Tribunal 
Case No. GI/2458/2010  para 73 
1039 “Although the retail market for non-domestic customers is being opened up to competition from 
2008, I must consider the law as it now stands” Decision 056/2006 MacRoberts and the City of 
Edinburgh Council para 99 
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contextualising Public Interest. It is likely that liberalisation would be 
conducted through legislative reforms, and followed by “active disclosure 
rules” such as the publication of trade prices,1040 and the publication of the 
regulator’s methodology in assessing the value of a loss of comparator.1041 
But there may be information required by potential entrants which is not 
tackled by sectoral regulation. The role of FoI/EIR will be in picking up 
what was left by sectoral rules, for example, in a bid to improve an 
entrant’s decision whether, where and how to enter the market.1042  
EIR  
EIR Regulation 12(5)(e) exempts information if its disclosure ‘would 
adversely affect’ the confidentiality of commercial or industrial information where 
such confidentiality is provided by law to protect a legitimate economic interest.1043 
Like any other EIR exemption, a Public Interest test is mandatory. A four-stage test 
from Bristol City Council1044 is invoked by the ICO guideline1045 in determining if the 
 
1040 The Cave review calls for the publication of trade price information in order to reduce the barriers 
of trading : “To achieve this, legislation should enable the Environment Agency to collect and publish 
trade prices to provide greater information to traders about the potential value of licences (p.116, 
‘Recommendation Three’)  Cave, Independent review of competition and innovation in water markets: 
final report 
1041 Ibid p. 89 He explained: “The benefits of a transparent assessment methodology are in giving 
merging parties much greater regulatory certainty about the criteria, weightings and methodology that 
OFWAT would use in the evidence that it submits to the Competition Commission”. p. 91 
1042 With respect to upstream bulkwater supply, Cave commented that there are significant barriers of 
entry: “there are significant information asymmetries, alternative suppliers often have little information 
on which to decide whether, where and how to enter”;  ibid p.46 
1043 EIR 2004 (England) Regulation 12 (5) (e) 
1044 Bristol City Council v IC and Portland and Brunswick Squares Association, EA/2010/0012 
Information Rights Tribunal para 8 
1045 Confidentiality of commercial or industrial information, LTT160 (Information Commissioner's 
Office 2010) 
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exemption is engaged. It comprises of the questions: (i) Is the information commercial 
or industrial in nature? (ii) Is the information subject to confidentiality provided by 
law? (iii) Is the confidentiality provided to protect a legitimate economic interest? And 
(iv) Would the confidentiality be adversely affected by disclosure? The test is 
cumulative.  
The striking difference between FoI and EIR is that the EIR attached 
confidentiality to commercial information, whereas confidential obligation is a 
separate exemption under FoI. Such confidentiality can only arise out of common law, 
contract or statute. Because of this, we will evaluate EIR Regulation 12(5)(e) further 
in another section below.  
The EIR also contains a separate clause specifically exempting Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR) information (subject to the harm and public interest test). The 
understanding of IPR covers anything from copyright, patents and trade secrets to new 
chemical constituents.1046 For FoI only, trade secret was categorised specifically, 
whereas the other types of IPR will come under “commercial information” or 
“obligation of confidence”.  
Customers’ databases (for the parts which are not covered by Data Protection 
legislation, but contains some form of ‘database’) and utility underground network 
assets data may be covered by this exemption. 1047 However, as the threshold for harm 
 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/foikb/SectionsRegulations/FOIPolicyConfidentialityofcommercialorindustriali
nformation.htm> July 8, 2011 
1046 , Environmental Information Regulations 2004 detailed guidance Guidance 7 
1047 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, 1988 c. 48 s. 3A protects database, insofar as they are 
original 
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is higher than the FoI Act 2000 and there is a Public Interest test, the IC has been quite 
generous with respect to disclosures.1048  
In Ofcom1049, the IC was also generous, granting the applicant’s request to 
disclose the details of mobile phones base stations. Ofcom had actually provided a 
website to search base station antennas in the UK, but lacked the details requested by 
the applicant.1050 Due to a disagreement on employing the public interest tests1051, the 
 
1048 See the two recent cases involving the University of East Anglia Climatic Research Unit University 
of East Anglia ( FER0282488)  Information Commissioner's Office University of East Anglia 
(FER0280033)  Information Commissioner's Office 
1049 Ofcom (FER0072933)  Information Commissioner's Office 
1050 ‘Sitefinder, Mobile Phone Base Station Database’ (Ofcom)  
<http://www.sitefinder.ofcom.org.uk/search> accessed July 7, 2011 The website (currently, as of July 
2011) uses Google Map overlay to locate antennas and it provides information as to the height of the 
antenna, frequency range, transmitted power and the operator running it. Most of the information 
requested by the Applicant in January 2005 is available through one by one search at  Ofcom’s 
Sitefinder website. However, the applicant, which was an Information Officer for NHS Scotland, 
requested the whole information, up to the details of the Grid Reference, which is not provided by the 
Sitefinder website. 
1051 Two EIR 2004 (England) exceptions were deemed to have been engaged: public security under 
Regulation 4(2(b) and intellectual property rights Under Regulation 4(2)(e)), while the rest had been 
struck down at the lower courts, this includes exception under EIR Regulation 12(5)(e). The issue  was 
whether the Public Interests for maintaining the exceptions needs to be balanced cumulatively before 
being weighted against the Public Interests for disclosure 
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case went all the way up to the UK Supreme Court, 1052  which eventually referred it 
to the ECJ1053 for a preliminary ruling.  
5.5.2.3. Confidentiality obligation 
FoI 
Section 41 of the FoI Act 2000 exempts information if it was obtained by the 
public authority from any other person (including another public authority) and the 
disclosure of which by the public authority holding it would constitute a ‘breach of 
confidence’ actionable by that person.1054 As s.41 contains the conjunctive ‘and’, both 
the elements of ‘obtained’ and the likelihood of breach of confidence should occur. 
This exemption is absolute, which means, no balancing test is required. However, a 
public interest can be employed as a court defence for a breach of confidence. 
One of the criticisms against this exemption in the FoI Bill was that it gives 
too much flexibility and control on the part of utilities to declare information as 
 
1052 Office of Communications (Respondent) v The Information Commissioner (Appellant)  The 
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom; “The Supreme Court therefore refers to the Court of Justice this 
question: “Under Council Directive 2003/4/EC, where a  public authority holds environmental  
information, disclosure of which would have some adverse effects on the separate interests served by 
more than one exception (in casu, the interests of public security served by article 4(2(b) and those of 
intellectual property rights served by article 4(2)(e)), but it would not do so, in the case of either 
exception viewed separately, to any extent sufficient to outweigh the public interest in disclosure, does 
the Directive require a further exercise involving the cumulation of the separate interests served by the 
two exceptions and their weighing together against the public interest in disclosure?”” Ibid para 15 
1053 ECJ Advocate General supported the majority view held by the UK Supreme Court and 
recommends the ECJ  decide that “the directive requires a further exercise involving the cumulation of 
the separate interests served by the two exceptions and their weighing together against the public 
interest in disclosure.” Case C-71/10, Office of Communications v The Information Commissioner, 
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, delivered on 10 March 2011 European Court of Justice 
1054 FoI Act 2000 (England) , s.41 
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confidential.1055 This may confuse regulators in separating those which are 
‘commercial in confidence’ and those which are not.  
One can imagine several scenarios where regulators ‘obtain’ information 
about utilities, for example, passively, by way of voluntary submission of information 
from the utilities or obligatory submission due to licence conditions1056  or 
statutory1057 requirements, and actively through the process of information gathering 
by the regulator in the course of an investigation.1058 However, a contract concluded 
between a Public Authority and a third party does not constitute information 
‘obtained’ by it.1059 
 
1055 Fitch and Graham above. The UK’s Information Commission guidelines acknowledge the 
‘flexibility’ and contextual nature of the law on confidence in common law. Freedom of Information 
Act Awareness guidance 2: Information provided in confidence. Available at 
http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/freedom_of_information/detailed_specialist_guides/co
nfidentialinformation_v4.pdf accessed in November 11, 2009 
1056 , Instrument of Appointment by the Secretary of State for the Environment of Thames Water Utilities 
Limited as a water and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 1989 Condition M 
1057Water Industry Act 1991 (England) s 202.   
1058 For example, Instrument of Appointment by the Secretary of State for Wales of Dwr Cymru 
Cyfyngedig as a water and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 1989  Condition J. Under para 7 
of Condition J, companies are required to submit, annually,  Levels of Service Information and Service 
Target Reports, accompanied by certificates and signed by auditors. When an investigation as to 
whether the companies had actually achieved its targets or whether the certificates provided to OFWAT 
are accurate, OFWAT (subject to prior notice and at a reasonable hour) has the right to inspect 
properties and premises occupied by the utilities and make photocopies or extract records and carry out 
measurements and tests. (paras 8 and 9)  
1059 See Derry City Council v Information Commissioner,  EA/2006/0014  Information Tribunal Para 32 
(c) and (d) “the correct position is that a concluded contract between a public authority and a third 
party does not fall within section 41(1)(a) of the Act.” Also Hendry, ‘An Analytical Framework for 
Reform of National Water Law’ para 34 “Consequently the Contract terms were mutually agreed and 
therefore not obtained by either party” 
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A three-step test was developed in Coco v A.N. Clark (Engineers) Limited1060 
in order to determine the essential elements that will cause an actionable breach of 
confidence, and these are:  (i) the necessary quality of confidence (i.e. the information 
is not publicly known), (ii) the confider is receiving information in which obligation 
of confidence can be inferred and (iii) disclosure not authorised by discloser may 
amount to damage to confider. This test is well adopted by the IC in its guidance,1061 
as well as case-law.1062  
In MacRoberts, the Scottish FoI1063 Commissioner adopted the three step 
test.1064 The Commissioner concluded that  list of properties served SW, whose 
charges are collected by local authorities, had been compiled by SW and is, therefore, 
not  publicly known information. This deems to satisfy the first limb of the Coco test 
above. It was revealed that the agreement between SW and the Council contained a 
confidentiality clause1065 and that SW threatened to sue the Council if it released 
 
1060 Coco v A.N. Clark (Engineers) Limited [1968] F.S.R. 415 Anne Lyons   
1061 Awareness guidance 2, Information provided in confidence (Information Commissioner Office 
2009) 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/~/media/documents/library/Freedom_of_Information/Detailed_specialist_guide
s/CONFIDENTIALINFORMATION_V4.ashx> July 1, 2011 also FOI Policy Knowledge Base, Test of 
confidence, LTT93 (Information Commissioner Office 2009) 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/foikb/PolicyLines/FOIPolicyTestofconfidence.htm> July 1, 2011 
1062 See for example Derry City Council v Information Commissioner,  EA/2006/0014 para 34;  
1063 The provision in FoISA, s.36 (2) is similar to the English FoI s.36(2). According to FoISA s.36(2): 
Information is exempt information if (a) it was obtained by a Scottish public authority from another 
person (including another such authority); and (b) its disclosure by the authority so obtaining it to the 
public (otherwise than under this Act) would constitute a breach of confidence actionable by that person 
or any other person. Similar to the English FoI s. 41, s.36(2) of the FoISA is also an ‘absolute’ 
exemption (see s.2(2)(c) of the FoISA). This means that no balancing test is required for s.36(2)  
1064 Decision 056/2006 MacRoberts and the City of Edinburgh Council para 70.   
1065 Ibid The clause prohibits the release of any information relating to the agreement.  Data supplied by 
SW to the Council and Data provided and received by the Council in relation to billing and collection of 
charges are also confidential. Para 67. The United Kingdom, Scottish ministers code of practice on the 
 
 
 279 
information to MacRoberts.1066 Respectively, this was deemed to satisfy the second 
and third limb of the Coco test. Finally, the public interest defence towards disclosure 
was also considered in MacRoberts1067, which leads to the conclusion that it is not 
adequate to trump the Public Interest in maintaining exemption.  
EIR 
The Information Tribunal in Ofcom considered the confidence test in Coco. 
The Information Tribunal found that some detailed information about individual base 
stations had been released through another channel, without any confidentiality duty 
attached to it, through a roll-out programme organised between the mobile operator 
association and local planning authority.1068 The information disclosed to local 
planning authorities is not exactly as requested by the applicant, but it is possible to 
match up information disclosed in the roll-out programme and that which is disclosed 
 
discharge of functions by public authorities under the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 : 
laid before Parliament on the pursuant to section 60(5) of the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 
2002 (Scottish Executive 2004) <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/publications/2004/09/19894/42619> 
January 5, 2011 at para 44 reads:  “Any acceptance of such confidentiality provisions must be for a good 
reason, be capable of being justified to the Commissioner and include the proviso that information 
which is not, in fact, exempt under the terms of the Act or whose disclosure is required on public 
interest grounds, may have to be disclosed regardless of any agreement.” This was considered by the 
Scottish FoI Commissioner (see Para 69 of MacRoberts), only to be noted that the contract was in force 
before the Scottish FoI Code of Practice becomes valid. The Code of Practice at para 44 above is 
actually aimed at Public Sector Contracts and hence, to manage the relation between a contractor and a 
public authority and not to address the relation between two public authorities.   
1066 Decision 056/2006 MacRoberts and the City of Edinburgh Council 
1067 This ranges from “enhancing the scrutiny of decision-making processes and thereby improve 
accountability and public participation”, “contributing to ensure that Council or Scottish Water are 
adequately discharging their functions” and “contributing to the effective oversight of the expenditure of 
public funds and that the public obtain value for money”. None of these was considered an adequate 
defence. Ibid para 76  
1068 The Office of Communication (Ofcom) vs Information Commissioner and T-Mobile (UK) Limited, 
EA/2006/0078  Information Tribunal paras 4, 9, 55, 64 
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in the Sitefinder website. This significantly erases the quality of confidence which 
would otherwise be attached to the information.1069 This would entail that even if the 
information is protected as a database and/or copyright, it still has to be disclosed, 
since it has no more quality of confidence.1070   
5.5.2.4. Policy Formulation and Internal Communication 
S.35(1)(a) of the English FoI Act exempts “formulation” or “development” of 
government policy from FoI disclosure1071 and s.36 exempts information which, if 
released, will prejudice the effective conduct of public affairs. The difference between 
s.35 and s.36 is that the latter contains a prejudice test (as well as a public interest test) 
whereas the former contains only a public interest test. The rationale for exempting 
the information, however, is more or less similar, namely, to protect the quality of 
public policy.1072 When information is not caught under s.35, it may be caught under 
s.36. 
 
1069 Ibid para 64 
1070 Ibid para 66 
1071 This section is to be read in conjuction with s.36  
1072 Awareness guidance 25, Section 36: Effective conduct of public affairs (Information Commissioner 
Office 2008) 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/freedom_of_information/detailed_specialist_guides/
effectiveconductofpublic%20affairs.pdf> July 1, 2011 Awareness Guidance 24: Policy Formulation, 
Ministerial Communications, Law Officers’ Advice, and The Operation of Ministerial Private Office 
(Information Commissioner Office 2008) 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/freedom_of_information/detailed_specialist_guides/f
ormulationofgovernmentpolicy.pdf> July 1, 2011 
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The term ‘policy’ in s.35 (1) (a) is deemed to have been well understood in 
practice.1073 The term ‘government policy’ is intended to cover any policies coming 
out of Whitehall and Westminster including policies endorsed by individual ministers, 
although they have not been signed inter-departmentally.1074   
Timing appears to be a crucial issue in this exemption as it seeks only to 
protect ‘formulation or development’ of government policy and not after it has been 
concluded and implemented. The Information Tribunal has rejected the idea that a 
policy is like a ‘seamless web’, in that it is a continuing process. The Tribunal 
considers that there is a beginning and an end to a policy’s formulation and an interval 
between the end of the formulation and its development.1075 What signals the end of 
the formulation period is then a question of fact and must be considered in a case by 
case basis. This could be a mere Parliamentary announcement, or a Bill receiving 
Royal Assent.1076    
What this means is that the current policy making activities on the 
restructuring of the English water industry, apart from papers and reports already 
released to the public, may be exempted from FoI disclosure. Until the water white 
 
1073 “Policy making is the process by which governments translate their political vision into 
programmes and actions to deliver ‘outcomes’ – desired changes in the real world” Blair, T. and 
Cunningham, J., Modernising Government (1999)   p.15 Waller, P., Morris, R.M. and Simpson, D., 
Understanding the formulation and development of government policy in the context of FOI (2009) 
<http://www.ico.gov.uk/upload/documents/library/freedom_of_information/research_and_reports/ucl_r
eport_government_policy_in_the_context_of_foi.pdf> July 11, 2011 p.15  
1074 Waller, Morris and Simpson, Understanding the formulation and development of government policy 
in the context of FOI p.15 
1075 Ibid Para 75 (v) 
1076 LTT62 
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paper is turned into legislation1077, the deliberation forming the policies may not be 
able to be disclosed using FoI. Deliberation between OFWAT’s board members may 
also be exempted either under s.35 or s.36.1078 
The danger of this exemption is that it may provide influence to a particular 
party in shaping policies through lobbying. There is, however, a Public Interest test to 
both s.35 and s.36. The Public Interest that has been considered includes (i) the 
understanding of the role of lobbyists, its mechanics and the relationship between 
government and a particular lobbyist including the influence they exert, (ii) the 
scrutinising of the probity of public officials and (ii) in providing the opportunity to 
present opposing views during policy development.  
EIR Regulation 12 (4) (e) protects internal communication from disclosure. 
The rationale of the clause and the Public Interest consideration is similar to FoI Act 
2000 s. 35 and s. 36, as discussed above. EIR 12 (4) (e) obligates no harm test.  
5.6. Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter elaborates the complexity of English water services’ regulatory 
system. It starts with providing an overview of the English model, a brief history of its 
evolution, the role of the present day regulatory institution and how it may be re-
regulated in the future. The next section discusses the regulatory decision making 
process at work. It begins by evaluating the transparency of the licencing process in 
 
1077 A white paper turned into legislation is one of the examples which signals that a formulation stage 
has ended. See Waller, Morris and Simpson, Understanding the formulation and development of 
government policy in the context of FOI 
1078 Fitch and Graham, ‘The draft Freedom of Information Bill-implications for utilities’   
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England and Wales, analysing how OFWAT members are selected and removed and 
how transparently they can manage conflicts of interest. Section 4.3.4 explains how 
OFWAT acquire information from utilities and section 4.3.5 explains OFWAT’s 
policy in disclosing information it had obtained for regulatory purpose. One notable 
experience of the English system is that the regulator is granted wide discretion to 
disclose regulatory information if it is in the public interest. This section also 
highlights that OFWAT’s categorisation of excludable information developed out of 
practice and that in its implementation there is lack of consistency. What this signifies 
is that despite the categorisation of excisable information, both OFWAT and the 
utilities themselves are not really certain as to what information would be harmful for 
them if disclosure is to be made.  
The next section explains that service level information in England is 
announced transparently in primary and secondary law and utilities’ publications. 
Matters of non-compliance with service levels are dealt with transparently by 
OFWAT. If penalties against utilities are to be invoked, OFWAT will clarify the 
points of law and fact where violations occurred and provide rationale as to why it 
arrives at a certain “Determination”. In the matter of utilities’ investment, section 
4.3.8 elaborates the two main concerns in investment issues: sewer flooding and 
leakage. In terms of sewer flooding, the thesis explains that there are stakeholders who 
are worse off due to a utilities’ decision not to expand its sewerage capacity. The role 
of transparency is in enabling stakeholders to voice their concern and in scrutinising 
and influencing investment priorities. As for leakage, disclosure is required for 
meteorological data and its link with a utility’s decision in building new reservoirs or 
reducing leakage in conjunction with the amount of revenue allocated for dividend 
payments. All of this information will hold utilities accountable for their investment 
decisions. The thesis also explains the stages of price determination in the English 
system and how the redress mechanism works for consumers and the companies.  
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The thesis also looks at corporate governance mechanisms in English water 
utilities. There is adequate transparency on corporate structure and board 
accountability mechanism if they are listed companies, but most transparency 
mechanisms are geared towards “members” and not the public. Information on related 
party transaction is excised, so there is no way for the public to scrutinise them except 
if they are disclosed through the FoI regime. As discussed, there is no consistency to 
the rationale of why they should not be disclosed. In the last part of corporate 
governance discussion, the thesis describes OFWAT’s approach to company 
restructuring and the delisting from capital markets. When utilities are delisted, they 
are no longer bound by certain disclosure rules. However, the lessons learned from 
England is that OFWAT still requires utilities to obey capital market rules as if their 
shares are listed there and at times also require utilities to lists their bonds.  
Finally, on the passive disclosure rule side, the thesis demonstrates that the 
FoI rules are inapplicable to English water utilities. This, however, is subject to 
change because the FoI Act enables the Secretary of State to decide otherwise. Courts 
held that the EIR is also inapplicable to water utilities, but this is much less 
straightforward than for FoI because its applicability is determined by interpretation of 
statutory provisions. As such, it cannot be easily reformed too.  Finally, on FoI 
exemptions, the thesis demonstrates the relationship between market power, 
ownership status (public/private) and its implications for disclosure. The thesis also 
came up with suggestions on how a public body should deal with disclosure cases 
involving the question of liberalisation in the water sector. See Annex I for the 
application of the analytical framework to England’s case study. 
In the next chapter the thesis will discuss how transparency is practised and 
enabled in a different regulatory setting. Jakarta’s water utilities are publicly owned 
but engaged in private sector participations in the form of concessions. A regulator is 
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installed to monitor and mediate disputes. Thus, Jakarta embodies a ‘hybrid’ model 
where regulation by contract is applied, but with the help of a regulatory body. The 
next chapter will explain that the complexities of the regulation by contract 
mechanism in Jakarta may mean that it is less transparent compared to the full 
divestiture model in England.  
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6. JAKARTA  
6.1. Overview of the legal and institutional framework 
6.1.1. Central and Local Regulations 
Water services in Indonesia are regulated by a combination of rules enacted at 
central and local levels. The primary legal basis for water services and resources 
management in Indonesia is the Undang Undang No.7 2004 on the management of 
Water Resources (Law 7/2004) passed by the central government. 1079 Out of 100 
articles in Law 7/2004, only one article, article 80, is specifically dedicated to water 
services. The rest deals primarily with water resources management. In addition to 
Law 7/2004, the central government also issued an implementing regulation, the 
Peraturan Pemerintah No. 16 Year 2005 on the Development of Water Supply System 
(GR-16).1080 Numerous decrees and guidelines have also been issued by Ministries of 
the central government but the guidelines do not constitute binding legal obligations.  
Due to regional autonomy, water services become the responsibility of 
regional governments. Article 16.h of Law 7/2004 confirms this by requiring 
municipalities and regencies to be responsible for fulfilling the minimum daily basic 
need for water of its population.1081 The article does not detail whether this covers 
water for both sanitation and hygiene or whether it also encompasses sewerage 
services, neither does it contain any minimum quantity of drinking water that a 
regional government must guarantee.  
 
1079   Undang Undang No. 7 Tahun 2004 Tentang Sumber Daya Air 
1080  Peraturan Pemerintah No. 16 Tahun 2005 Tentang Pengembangan Sistem Penyediaan Air Minum  
1081 UU No. 7 Tahun 2004 (Water Resources Law)  
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As the central government regulates water services only in general terms, 
there is more space for detailed regulation on a local level. This is performed for the 
most part through regional by-laws which are enacted by local parliaments. 
Regulation by regional-by laws must adhere to the principles laid down by higher 
forms of enactments and central government rules, such as Law 7/2004 and GR-16. 
However, in practice, conflict is often found between regulation and policies at central 
level and local level, especially common is conflict between guidelines issued by 
Ministries at central level and regional by-laws. When in contradiction with higher 
rules such as a law (enacted by the House of Representative at the central level) or a 
Government Regulation (a form of delegated legislation by the executive), regional 
by-laws and the other types of local rules could be annulled or revoked through a 
judicial review.   Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum or PDAM (regional-owned 
waterwork companies – see below for more explanation) are established through 
regional by-laws. In addition to enacting PDAM’s statutes, some regions also use 
regional by-laws to regulate water supply standards and customer service.1082 This is 
also the case with, Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia. Jakarta, a city with a population of 
10 million, regulates its regional-owned waterwork utility PAM Jaya through two 
regional by-laws.1083    
 
 
1082 Peraturan Daerah Kota Bogor No. 4 Tahun 2004 Tentang Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum Tirta 
Pakuan Kota Bogor Peraturan Daerah Kota Bogor Nomor 5 Tahun 2006 Tentang Pelayanan Air Minum 
Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum Tirta Pakuan Kota Bogor 
1083 Peraturan Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta No. 13 Tahun 1992 Tentang Perusahaan Daerah Air 
Minum Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta (PAM Jaya) and Peraturan Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta No. 
11 Tahun 1993 Tentang Pelayanan Air Minum di Wilayah Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta 
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6.1.2. Jakarta’s Water businesses 
Jakarta’s water businesses are comprised of a bulk water supplier, a regional-
owned water utility company and two retail water companies, operating in the eastern 
and western parts of Jakarta, divided by the Ciliwung river.  
6.1.2.1. Government-owned entities 
6.1.2.1.1. Perum Jasa Tirta II 
The bulk water supplier, PT Jasa Tirta II (PJT II), is a government-owned 
company with separated assets and liabilities from the state budget. The company was 
originally established in 1967 through a Governmental Regulation (GR) with the 
mandate to manage the Jatiluhur reservoir, dam and hydropower.1084 The statute has 
been amended several times through various GRs, its latest being Government 
Regulation No. 7 Year 2010 (GR 7/2010) which also determines the PJT II’s 
accountability line to ministers.1085 The PJT II serves the bulk water needs of several 
regions including Jakarta. However, not all of Jakarta’s bulk water needs are sourced 
from PJT II. Some are also derived from rivers and transfer from other provinces.  
The purpose of PJT II according to GR 7/2010 is the provision of bulk water 
supply for drinking water, electricity, farming, industry, ports and other needs 
 
1084 PT Jasa Tirta II, ‘Latar Belakang Pembentukan PT Jasa Tirta II’   
<http://www.jasatirta2.co.id/pjtII.php?x=perusahaan&z=4babbbe88528a4346941e6300ae74486&y=det
ail> accessed December 15, 2010   
1085 Peraturan Pemerintah No.7 Tahun 2010 Tentang Perusahaan Umum (Perum) Jasa Tirta II 
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requiring utilisation of water resources.1086 The company is also in charge of 
managing a hydropower facility, the Juanda hydropower located at the Jatiluhur dam, 
and other small hydropower facilities on its river basins.1087 The company is allowed 
to conduct other business activities such as tourism, consulting and land use 
services.1088  
6.1.2.1.2. PAM Jaya 
PAM Jaya is a regional SOE owned by the Jakarta Regional Government, 
established under Jakarta Regional by-law 13 Year 1992 (By-law 13/1992).1089 
According to By-law 13 Article 5, its purpose is to “fulfill the population’s need of 
drinking water in an effort to increase social welfare, to increase the income of the 
regional government and to be involved in developing the regional economy”. Article 
6 specifies PAM Jaya’s “main” purpose, which is “to conduct all efforts directly 
related to the provision and distribution of drinking water, which fulfills the 
prerequisite of  good health and to provide good services to the community by 
adhering to the company’s economic principles”.1090  Article 7 further enumerates that 
in order to carry out its purpose under the previous article, the company has the 
obligation to, among others, put effort into providing drinking water in accordance 
with the programme outlined by the regional government; develop, manage and 
maintain water treatment plants, bulk water sources, water storage facilities; develop 
 
1086 Ibid Article 4 
1087 Graham, C. and Prosser, T., Privatizing public enterprises : constitutions, the state, and regulation 
in comparative perspective (Clarendon Press 1991) Article 2.  
1088  ibid The list of river basins managed by Perum Jasa Tirta II is on Article 3 
1089 By Law 13/92  
1090Ibid Article 6. It is not clear  what the article means by “the company’s economic principles”. 
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and maintain public hydrants, water terminals and water tanks, install water mains and 
distribution pipes, conduct survey and data collection for the purpose of setting water 
tariffs, provide services for water connections from and for the society, companies, 
housing, hotels and others; document water meters, conduct billing and collect 
receivables in accordance with prevailing laws and regulations; enforce action against 
illegal users; provide drinking water for municipal facilities, assist the governor in 
regulating, licensing and controlling drinking water facilities conducted by third 
parties, provide licences and monitor installations in Jakarta territory and to develop 
its human resources and employees’ welfare in order to increase public service.1091  
By-law 13/1992 also determines the capital of PAM Jaya, which is separated 
from the Jakarta government’s budget and assets.1092 The company may increase its 
capital in accordance with prevailing regulations.1093 The company’s capital may be 
derived from the accrual of internal funds (presumably through interest rates or other 
gains); capital injection from regional government funds; government and third party 
aid; and loans, including offshore loans.1094 
The corporate governance structure of PAM Jaya is stipulated under By-law 
13/1992. The company organ consists of directors, a supervisory body and an internal 
supervisory body.1095  There are rules on the appointment and dismissal of the utility’s 
 
1091Ibid Article 7. The article does not stipulate what sorts of permits/licenses PAM Jaya issues and the 
mechanism for obtaining them 
1092 Ibid, Art 8 
1093 Ibid 
1094 Ibid, Article 10 
1095 Ibid Articles 11, 20 and 28 
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directors and the supervisory bodies.1096 The utility is barred from conducting certain 
activities, such as entering into cooperation with third parties for more than one year, 
without the approval of Jakarta’s regional governor. PAM Jaya’s statute requires that 
a cooperation agreement with the length of more than one year shall require the 
governor’s written approval. Nevertheless, it is silent as to the regulation of scope and 
types of cooperation. A concession agreement, for example, has a considerable length 
and scope. By-law 13 does not regulate specifically on this type of cooperation. 1097  
Table 7: Recapitulation of laws and regulation establishing Jakarta’s Water Business 
No. Corporation Function/Area Legal basis of 
incorporation  
 Perum Jasa Tirta II Government-owned bulk water 
supplier, not only for Jakarta 
province but also for other 
provinces on the western part of 
the Java Island  
SOE Law 
19/2003, GR 
74/2010 
(Statute of PT 
Jasa Tirta II) 
 Perusahaan Daerah 
Air Minum Jakarta 
(PAM Jaya)  
Regional government; Regional 
government-owned retail water 
service for the whole Jakarta 
region 
Regional SOE 
Law No.5/1962, 
Regional by-
law 13/1992 
(Statute of Pam 
Jaya), By Law 
11/1993 
 PT PAM 
Lyonnaise Jaya 
(Palyja) 
Concessionaire of PAM Jaya, 
responsible for retail water 
supply in the eastern part of 
Jakarta 
Corporation 
Law 40/2007, 
Company’s 
Deed of 
Establishment 
 
1096 Ibid Article 17 and 26 
1097 Ibid Article 15. Other types of activities requiring written consent from the governor are 
encumberance of assets, obtaining offshore and onshore loans and acquisition of shares in another 
companies   
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 PT Aetra 
(formerly PT 
Thames PAM 
Jaya) 
Concessionaire of PAM Jaya, 
responsible for retail water 
supply in the western part of 
Jakarta 
Corporation 
Law 40/2007, 
Company’s 
Deed of 
Establishment 
6.1.2.2. The Cooperation Agreement 
The other institutions involved in providing Jakarta’s drinking water are PT 
Aetra (formerly TPJ) and PT Pam Lyonnaise Jaya (Palyja). Both of them are private 
companies established under the Corporation Law. Before embarking on the legal and 
regulatory environment in which these institutions operates, it is important to explain 
the historical setting which led to the involvement of the private sector in Jakarta’s 
water supply.  
There is a vast literature addressing the problems of the Jakarta water 
concession, among other Bakker1098, Kooy1099, Iwanami1100, Argo1101, Jensen1102, 
 
1098 Bakker, K., ‘Conflicts over water supply in Jakarta, Indonesia’ in B Barraqué and E  Vlachos (eds), 
Urban Water Conflicts, an analysis on the origins and nature of water-related unrest and conflicts in 
the urban context (UNESCO Working series SC-2006/WS/19. 2006) Bakker, ‘Trickle Down? Private 
sector participation and the pro-poor water supply debate in Jakarta, Indonesia’  
1099 Kooy, M.É., ‘Relations of power, networks of water: governing urban waters, spaces, and 
populations in (post) colonial Jakarta’ (University of British Columbia 2008) 
1100 Iwanami and Nickson, ‘Assessing the regulatory model for water supply in Jakarta'’ 
1101 Argo, T.A., ‘Thirsty downstream: the provision of clean water in Jakarta, Indonesia’ (University of 
British Columbia 2001) 
1102 Jensen, O., ‘Troubled Partnerships: Problems and Coping Strategies in Jakarta’s Water 
Concessions’ (4th Conference on Applied Infrastructure Research Berlin) <http://www.infraday.tu-
berlin.de/fileadmin/documents/infraday/2005/papers/jensen_Troubled_Partnerships_Problems.pdf>  
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Ardhianie1103, Nugroho1104, Braadbaart1105 and Lanti1106, including investigative 
reports from Harsono.1107 All of these literatures provide negative accounts of 
Jakarta’s water privatisation, both from the point of view of its governance process 
and the concession’s overall performance. Except for Lanti’s paper, however, none of 
them pays specific attention to possible legal and regulatory solutions.  
In late 1991, the World Bank and a foreign aid organisation from Japan 
provided a loan to PAM Jaya, in order to repair and expand its infrastructure.1108 Soon 
after the loan was provided, the World Bank approached the Indonesian government 
to allow private sector participation in Jakarta’s water system. In 1995, the coverage 
of PAM Jaya was only 45%, 30% of which receives intermittent supply1109. In 1996 
the percentage of Unaccounted for Water was more than 55%. Due to these problems, 
more investment was needed in order to expand its coverage.1110 The government at 
that time thought that inviting the private sector would result in lower tariffs and bring 
 
1103 Hadipuro, W. and Ardhianie, N., Amandemen Kontrak Konsesi Air Jakarta (2008)   
1104 Nugroho, R., Dilemma of Jakarta Water Service Post Public Private Partnership (PPP) (2009)   
Nugroho, R., Reasons Not To Privatize Water Undertaking (2010)    
1105 Braadbaart, O., ‘Privatizing water. The Jakarta concession and the limits of contract’ A World of 
Water Rain, Rivers and Seas in Southeast Asian Histories 297 
1106 Lanti, A., ‘A regulatory approach to the Jakarta Water Supply concession contracts’ 22 International 
Journal of Water Resources Development 255 
1107 Harsono, ‘When Water and Political Power Intersect’ Harsono, A., ‘Water and Politics in the Fall of 
Suharto’ The Center for Public Integrity <http://www.publicintegrity.org/water/report.aspx?aid=52> 
accessed 11 October 2006 
1108 See Harsono, ‘When Water and Political Power Intersect’ Harsono, ‘Water and Politics in the Fall 
of Suharto’ 
1109 See Jensen, ‘Troubled Partnerships: Problems and Coping Strategies in Jakarta’s Water 
Concessions’  
1110 Lanti, ‘A regulatory approach to the Jakarta Water Supply concession contracts’ 
 
 294 
investment to repair leaked networks, and so put an end to the city’s ailing water 
infrastructure.1111 
Thames acted first1112 by forming an alliance with Sigit Harjojudanto who was 
the son of the ruling President Soeharto1113 in exchange for a 20% ownership of the 
project company. This move was later followed by Suez in forming an alliance with 
the Salim group, also an associate of the former President Soeharto.1114   
Soeharto’s regime was a centralised regime. The central government decided 
what was considered best for the regions, including Jakarta. Neither the local Jakarta 
parliament nor the Governor at that time dared to challenge Soeharto’s order. Without 
any public tender and to the disappointment of the World Bank1115, Soeharto finally 
agreed to privatise Jakarta’s water supply in 1995 and subsequently ordered the 
Ministry of Public Work at that time to divide Jakarta into two service regions 
bordering the Ciliwung river.1116 One part was to be given to his son Harjojudanto and 
 
1111 See Braadbaart, ‘Privatizing water. The Jakarta concession and the limits of contract’  
1112 Harsono, ‘When Water and Political Power Intersect’ Harsono, ‘Water and Politics in the Fall of 
Suharto’   
1113 According to Harsono: “It [Thames] formed an alliance with Harjojudanto, a notorious gambler 
among Jakarta's elite circle with no experience in the water business. Thames set up an Indonesian 
subsidiary and gave him a 20 percent interest. For Thames, forging an alliance with a Suharto was a 
question of realpolitik. “At the time, any company dealing with Indonesia would have to deal with 
almost some element of the Suharto family because of the way the government was set up,” said Peter 
Spillett, head of environment, quality and sustainability for Thames.”  Harsono, ‘When Water and 
Political Power Intersect’.   
1114  “Access to politics is essential. The water business is always political, Bernard Lafrogne, a Suez 
representative in Jakarta, told me. [Harsono] See ibid  
1115 See Braadbaart, ‘Privatizing water. The Jakarta concession and the limits of contract’ 
1116 Braadbaart suggests that it was Sigit who persuaded his father, President Soeharto, to privatise 
Jakarta’s water. Ibid  
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Thames, and the other half was to be provided to the Salim group and Suez.  The 
negotiation process took two years.  
However, PAM Jaya and its employees had a direct interest in the 
privatisation plan and so initially resisted the concession contract.1117 PAM Jaya has a 
strategic position as the owner of water infrastructure assets and has been the operator 
of the services since its inception and will be the institution that receives the assets 
back from the concessionaires after the contract periods end. Only after pressure from 
the central government did PAM Jaya finally accept the plan.1118  
As Braadbaart notes, the contract was signed with the most important 
contractual risks borne by PAM Jaya: (1) currency risk, (2) gradual tariff increase and 
projected sales and (3) bulk water supplies. One of the most fatal blows to the 
contractual design is linking the security of these risks to the private sector’s 
performance. In the event that PAM Jaya failed to secure the risks, the private sector 
would not be obligated to materialise its commitments.1119    
 
1117 Jensen quoted a story where a PAM Jaya director at that time, Rama Boedi, refused to attend the 
signing ceremony. The interest of  PAM Jaya in resisting privatisation, however, cannot be interpreted 
as entirely benevolent.  Jensen, ‘Troubled Partnerships: Problems and Coping Strategies in Jakarta’s 
Water Concessions’ Jensen, O. and Blanc-Brude, F., ‘The Handshake: Why do Governments and Firms 
Sign Private Sector Participation Deals? Evidence from the Water and Sanitation Sector in Developing 
Countries’ SSRN eLibraryWith PAM Jaya still objecting to a number of issues, the contract was signed. 
Braadbaart, ‘Privatizing water. The Jakarta concession and the limits of contract’  
1118 It was also Sigit (President Soeharto’s son) who took the issue to his father when negotiations with 
PAM Jaya and the Governor’s office almost ended in a deadlock. Soeharto then set the cut-off date for 
the negotiation process. Braadbaart, ‘Privatizing water. The Jakarta concession and the limits of 
contract’  
1119 In one interview, a member of the JWSRB demonstrated the private sector’s and their lawyer’s 
stance that the contract is not measured by performance. Hence, there is an inherent lack of incentive for 
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PAM Jaya’s strategic bargaining position at that time is reflected in the 1998 
contract and the 2001 contract restatement: PAM Jaya is both a party to the contracts 
with the concessionaires and a “regulator” at the same time, responsible for 
monitoring and supervising the contractual provisions.1120 Its consent, jointly with the 
concessionaire,1121 is also required to withdraw revenue from tariff collection from the 
escrow account. 
In 1998, following the Asian monetary crisis, riots broke out. The executives 
and expatriates of these concessionaires fled to Singapore to seek refuge, while Palyja 
(the Suez subsidiary) left only one person in charge of its management.1122 Fearful of 
poisoning and contamination, the director of PAM Jaya demanded that the 
concessionaires relinquish control of their operations and pressed them to hand the 
company back to the public.1123 The concessionaire agreed that the company’s 
operation would be transferred but was furious with the pressure to end the concession 
 
the private sector to achieve service level targets in the contractual design. Personal Communication, 
Field Interview with Stakeholders, Jakarta, January 11, 2011    
1120 This conflicting role – as a regulator and a party to the contract at the same time – is not advisable in 
common regulatory structures. Regulators need to be independent in order to have an arm length’s 
relationship with politicians and the regulatee. Therefore, they are often accorded a specific mandate 
through legislation and have their budget and salary structures separated from the executive branch. See 
Smith, ‘Utility regulators: the independence debate’. Compare Jakarta’s regulatory structure and 
independency of the regulatory bodies with Victoria (Section 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 above) and England 
(Sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 above)  
1121 Cooperation Agreement Between PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 
1122 See Harsono, ‘Water and Politics in the Fall of Suharto’ Harsono, ‘When Water and Political Power 
Intersect’  
1123 Harsono, ‘Water and Politics in the Fall of Suharto’ Harsono, ‘When Water and Political Power 
Intersect’ 
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contract. Finally, the executives fled back to Jakarta and threatened to bring the case 
to international arbitration.1124  
In May 1998, Soeharto stepped down and was replaced by the Habibie 
government. Due to the UK’s and France’s diplomatic lobbies and fearing that further 
conflict with multinationals would drive away foreign investment, the Habibie 
government agreed to keep the concession contracts and, in turn, both Suez and 
Thames agreed to renegotiate the terms of the contracts.1125 In the aftermath of 
Soeharto’s downfall, his cronies were hunted down for corruption charges and were 
becoming the target of public resentment. Both the Salim group (who partnered with 
Thames) and Harjojudanto (partnered with Suez) then became a liability rather than 
an asset. The concessionaires finally decided to terminate their ties with the former 
President Soeharto’s cronies, each having to pay dearly the price to repurchase the 
shares and other severance fees. 
Although both TPJ and Palyja  lost income for two consecutive years 
following the financial crisis1126, both companies did not decide to terminate their 
contracts although the contracts do provide for the concessionaire to be repaid for the 
investment it made during the lifetime of the contract – the so called ‘termination fee’. 
Jensen theorises that the concessionaires thought that this would be unlikely due to the 
government’s financial situation following the 1998 monetary crisis. Had the 
concessionaires decided to exit during that period, they might have left the country 
 
1124 Harsono, ‘Water and Politics in the Fall of Suharto’ Harsono, ‘When Water and Political Power 
Intersect’ 
1125 Harsono, ‘Water and Politics in the Fall of Suharto’ Harsono, ‘When Water and Political Power 
Intersect’ 
1126 Jensen, ‘Troubled Partnerships: Problems and Coping Strategies in Jakarta’s Water Concessions’  
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without anything other than a substantial loss. Another factor could be the 
multinationals’ own corporate strategy in the region.1127 With 300 or more water 
utilities operating and around 230 million residents, Indonesia is a potential market 
and thus it is probably not a good idea to end a dispute with arbitration. The other 
signatories to the concession, the Jakarta Governor and PAM Jaya, also have an 
interest in preserving the concession, as depicted on the following table: 
Table 8: Jakarta's Water Concession, actors and their interest (Jensen, 2005)1128 
Actor Interest 
Pam Jaya Maximise status/employment/budget/scope of 
responsibility 
Reduce financial indebtedness 
Minimise chances of intervention by local or central 
government 
Governor Maximise domestic political support 
Minimise chances of central government intervention 
Maintain international reputation 
Palyja/Aetra 
(formerly 
TPJ) 
Maximise returns over the life of the contract 
Comply with firm’s international strategy 
Minimise current losses 
Minimise financial risk 
 
In 2001, the concessionaires, PAM Jaya and the Jakarta government, amended 
the terms of the contracts. Two identical Cooperation Agreements were prepared, one 
between PAM Jaya and TPJ (now Aetra) and the other between Palyja and PAM Jaya. 
Both contracts contain the signature of Jakart’s Governor at that time, Sutiyoso. The 
 
1127 Ibid 
1128 Ibid 
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2001 restatement contract then captured and preserved the power structure of the 1998 
contract, with the exception that another player was added on to the regulatory system, 
albeit with a vague mandate and responsibility: the Jakarta Water Sector Regulatory 
Body (JWSRB). The conflicting roles of PAM Jaya, JWSRB and the Jakarta 
Governor jointly as a regulator will be discussed in the next sub-section.    
Five years later, in 2006, the companies sold a substantial portion of their 
shares. Suez sold 49% of its shares to Astratel and Citigroup and Thames completely 
withdrew from its Indonesian business, selling 95% of its shares in TPJ to a 
Singaporean consortium, Aquatico and the other 5% to Alberta Utilities. TPJ later 
changed its name into “Aetra”.   
6.1.2.3. Aetra   
Aetra (formerly TPJ) was a subsidiary of Thames but later Thames withdrew 
and sold all of its shares to a Singaporean consortium, Aquatico.1129 The ultimate 
owner of Aetra through Aquatico is said to be Recapital Advisors (80%) and Glendale 
Partners (20%). Both companies own Aquatico through layers of Special Purpose 
Vehicles (SPV): Arrosez (Recapital) and Praeo (Glendale), both of which are British 
Virgin Island SPVs.1130 
 
1129 PT Aetra,   <http://www.aetra.co.id/ID/ir_pemegang_saham.htm> accessed February 12, 2011 
1130 Sawitri, A.S., ‘Committee questions Acuatico's suitability as tap water operator’ The Jakarta Post 
(Jakarta, 11/30/2006) <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2006/11/30/committee-questions-
acuatico039s-suitability-tap-water-operator.html> accessed February 12, 2011 Sawitri, A.S., 
‘Regulatory body casts doubt on takeover bid’ The Jakarta Post (Jakarta, 12/14/2006) 
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2006/11/30/committee-questions-acuatico039s-suitability-tap-
water-operator.html> accessed February 12, 2011 
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Due to the use of SPVs, PAM Jaya, and the Jakarta Regional Government 
who awarded the Cooperation Agreement to TPJ (later Aetra) were unable to find the 
link between TPJ and its ultimate owners. Only after the Jakarta Regional 
Government threatened to block the transfer of shares, legal opinion from the buyer’s 
lawyers was presented, certifying the link of ownership from Aquatico to TPJ. It is not 
known if the Jakarta Regional Government had been able to obtain all true and 
certified copies of the company’s deeds, including the two British Virgin Island SPVs, 
Arrosez and Praeo, in addition to legal opinion. Aetra’s 2009 annual report does not 
contain any reference to the two British Virgin Island SPVs above.1131 
Figure 4: Aetra’s ownership structure   (Ardhianie, No Year)1132 
 
TPJ later changed its name to Aetra and issued several types of bonds in the 
capital market, to be matured respectively, in 2011, 2013 and 2015.1133 Due to this 
 
1131 PT Aetra Air Jakarta, Laporan Tahunan PT Aetra Air Jakarta Tahun 2009 (2009) 
<http://www.aetra.co.id/docs/LaporanKeuanganAetra2009.pdf> February 12, 2011 
1132 Ardhianie, N., Kontroversi Penjualan PT Thames Pam Jaya (TPJ) (Amrta Institute for Water 
Literacy No Year)   
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bond issue, Aetra is bound to comply with Indonesian capital market regulations. The 
participation of Aetra in the capital market is supposed to be able to transform its 
corporate governance structure and enables more transparency compared to other 
utilities which are not bound by capital market rules.   
  
6.1.2.4. Palyja   
Palyja is incorporated under the Corporation Law. Fifty-one percent (51%) of 
Palyja’s share is owned by Suez Environnement. The other 30% is owned by Astratel 
Nusantara, an arm of the Indonesian-based Astra group which concentrates on 
infrastructure business, while the other 19% is owned by Citigroup financial.1134 
During an interview, the author was informed that Palyja does not use any 
intermediaries in its shareholdings with Suez Environnement.1135  
6.1.3. Sectoral rules and regulatory institutions applicable to Jakarta water 
businesses 
6.1.3.1. Ministry of Home Affairs,  Ministry of Public Works, The National 
Planning Agency  
 
1133 PT Aetra, ‘Obligasi’ (2008)  <http://www.aetra.co.id/ID/ir_obligasi.htm> accessed February 12, 
2011 
1134 PT PAM Lyonnaise Jaya, 2009 Annual Report (2009) 
<http://id.palyja.co.id/__wysiwyg/filemanager/files/AnnualReport2009website.pdf>  
1135 Personal Communication, Field Interview with Palyja, Jakarta, January 10, 2011    
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The Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) is in charge of anything related to 
regional autonomy. This includes the drafting of Governmental Regulations 
implementing the regional autonomy laws and the arrangement of fiscal 
administration policy at  regional level. For the water sector, the regulatory product 
issued by the MOHA includes the guidelines for tariff setting1136, financial 
accounts1137 and performance assessment.   
The Public Works Ministry is responsible for assisting regional governments 
in developing water supply systems in its respective regions. A section of regional 
government called “Dinas Pekerjaan Umum” (Public Works Agency) works in 
coordination with the Public Works ministry. The ministry also recently set up a 
consultative body to speed up the developments in the water supply system, the BPP-
SPAM.1138 In practice, the BPP-SPAM is involved as a representative of the central 
government in assisting regional governments in its negotiation with the private sector 
in Private Sector Participation (PSP) projects.    
Various forms of foreign assistance and projects made under foreign loans 
must go through the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas). Although in 
theory the regions are free to enter into loan agreements with foreign parties, in most 
situations, an endorsement from the National Planning Agency would be necessary. 
The agency also formulates long-term and medium-term national strategic 
development planning on both water resources and services sector.   
 
1136 Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 23 Tahun 2006 Tentang Pedoman Teknis dan Tata Cara 
Pengaturan Tarif Air Minum Pada Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum    
1137 Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 61 Tahun 2007 Tentang Pedoman Teknis Pengelolaan 
Keuangan Badan Layanan Umum Daerah    
1138 See Peraturan Pemerintah No. 16 Tahun 2005 (GR-16), Chapter VI 
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There is no full coverage of water services and tap water is not potable, which 
means that there are tensions and trade offs in utilities’ investment decisions between 
network expansion and higher water quality. Piped water accounts for only 18.38% of 
total households (in 2006), while the rest, 43.57% of households, access water through 
‘protected’ sources.1139 The overall percentage of households with ‘improved’ access 
to a water source (both rural and urban, pipe and non piped) in 2009 is 47.71%, which 
signifies that more than half of the total households have unimproved access.1140   
The 2010 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJM) covering a four 
year period from 2010 to 2014, pledged to increase piped coverage to 32% by 
2014.1141 The formulation of these national long- and medium-term policies is 
conducted bottom-up, from the lowest level of government, that is villages, up to the 
municipal and central government. The practical implication of these policies is that 
loan and grant funds must be channelled according to policy requirements.    
6.1.3.2. Jakarta Regional Government 
The Jakarta Regional Government is both a signatory to the Cooperation 
Agreement and the regulator of the contract. Jakarta Regional By-law 13 Year 1992  
states states that:  
 
1139 Indonesia; Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Bappenas), Rencana Pembangunan Jangka 
Menengah Nasional 2010-2014 (2010)   II.5-10 and II.5-11 
1140 Indonesia; Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Bappenas), Report on the Achievement of 
Indonesia’s Millennium Development Goals 2010 (2010)  Access through unprotected dug well, 
unprotected spring, small cart with tank/drum and tanker truck; surface water (river, dam, lake, pond, 
stream, channel, irrigation channel) and bottled water are considered “unimproved”. 
1141 Indonesia; Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional (Bappenas), Rencana Pembangunan Jangka 
Menengah Nasional 2010-2014  Tabel 5.12 Buku II Bab 5 
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“The Directors [of PAM Jaya] must obtain a written approval from the 
Governor on the following matters:” (i) entering into cooperation [with a third party] 
for a period longer than one year, (ii) obtaining onshore or offshore loans, (iii) 
acquiring, transferring or encumbering any immovable properties, (iv) acquiring the 
shares of another company and (v) in performing any other substantial matter in 
connection with PAM Jaya’s management and operation”.1142  
Article 13 and the other provisions do not provide any clue as to what it meant 
by ‘substantial matter’. Presumably, the signature of the Jakarta Governor on the 
Cooperation Agreement is to fulfil the requirement of approval in the above article 
and not as a party to the concession agreement. If this interpretation is correct, this 
would mean that the Jakarta Governor and its apparatus are not bound by the 
contractual provision – including the confidentiality clause – unless they sign another 
follow-up confidentiality agreement.  
The role of the Jakarta Regional government as a regulator to the contract is 
mainly derived from Regional By-Law 13 as discussed above as well as Law No. 
7/2004 and GR-16, although the application of these two national laws has some 
complication of its own.This will be discussed further later. As discussed above, under 
Law No. 7, regional governments are obliged to fulfil their population’s daily basic 
needs for water. GR-16 further said that regional governments must formulate policy 
and strategy to develop the water supply system in their territory, through  public 
consultation.1143  They must also enact minimum standards of service for the 
 
1142 By Law 13/92 , Article 15.1 
1143 Peraturan Pemerintah No. 16 Tahun 2005 (GR-16), Article 24.  
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undertakers to comply with1144, conduct performance monitoring and evaluation, issue 
licences1145 and ensure the continuity of bulkwater supply.1146  
The most salient regulatory feature is its power in determining tariffs. Article 
60(7) of the GR-16 stipulates that tariffs – when services are contracted out –are 
determined by the head of regional governments (the Jakarta Governor in this case), 
“based on the agreement to supply drinking water”.1147 The question to be asked is 
whether the contract between Palyja/Aetra and the Jakarta regional government 
respectively are covered by Article 60, in which case, it thus provides the authority of 
the Jakarta government in regulating tariffs. Article 60, unfortunately, does not 
stipulate what is meant by ‘agreement’.  
A clue to what Article 60 meant by ‘agreement’ may come from Article 
64.1148 Article 64 (1) reads “the cooperatives and/or privately owned business 
enterprise may participate in the development of drinking water provision system in 
regions which is not yet covered by services provided by SOE or regional SOEs”. 
The article may have two different interpretations: it may appear either to suggest that 
Private Sector Participation is allowed only for Greenfield projects, in regions which 
are entirely not covered by SOE, or, it may suggest that PSP is allowed for both an 
entirely Greenfield project and in regions where SOE coverage is already present, but 
full coverage is not yet achieved. If the second is to be taken, this would mean that the 
 
1144 Ibid,  Article 34.2.   
1145 Ibid, Article 65.3.  
1146 Ibid, Article 59.1.  
1147 Ibid, Article 60.7.  
1148 Ibid, Article 64.  
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Article advocates the unbundling of the utility service, by allowing network 
extensions to be provided by the private sector.  
The fifth paragraph of Article 64 reads:  “The cooperatives and/or the private 
sector which are granted the rights through an action as stipulated in paragraph 3, 
enters into agreement in providing drinking water with the government or the 
regional government, in any case relevant.”1149  Hence, GR-16 (Article 64.5) 
envisages that agreement shall be entered into between the regional or central 
government and the private sector on the condition that ‘no coverage’ exists.1150 This 
reflects a change of government policy in contracting water services, from business to 
business to business to government. None of the two conditions above is fulfilled on 
the 2001 concession contract. First, the 2001 Cooperation Agreements are not made 
between Palyja/Aetra with the Jakarta Regional Government but with PAM Jaya (a 
business to business arrangement)1151 and secondly, it is clear that the contract is 
 
1149 Ibid, Article 60.  
1150 Ibid, Article 64.1.   
1151Jensen stated that where a concession agreement was entered into between the incumbent utility and 
the concessionaire, where the incumbent has the role in monitoring the contract, it often ends in failure. 
The interest of the incumbent utility is in diametric opposition with the interest of the concessionare. 
Jensen, ‘Troubled Partnerships: Problems and Coping Strategies in Jakarta’s Water Concessions’. 
Entering into a cooperation contract through a business-to-business (B2B) scheme is often done to 
evade scrutinies from the local parliament and cumbersome procurement rules which entail high 
transaction cost. One of ADBs consultancy reports literally suggests a B2B model between Indonesian 
waterwork companies/PDAM and the private sector in order to avoid involvement of the local 
parliament and minimise procurement cost. See Hermawan, I., Supporting and Facilitating PDAMs and 
Pemdas embarking on the path of corporatization and regionalization (October, 2008)    
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applicable in a region where an SOE service – which is PAM Jaya – is already 
present.1152  
The contradiction of (some) Private Sector Participation rules under GR-16 
with the Jakarta Cooperation Agreement is because the rule was made and entered 
into force many years after the Cooperation Agreement was executed. Article 77 of 
GR-16 states that all previous agreements, contracts and licences entered into or 
issued before the entry into force of GR-16 prevails.1153 However, Article 76 of the 
GR-16 stipulates that an implementing regulation issued prior to GR-16 will prevail, 
only when it does not contradict GR-16 provisions.1154 This brings potential legal 
challenges to the validity of Regional By-law 13 which is used as a legal basis for 
PAM Jaya and the governor in signing the Cooperation Agreement.  
Neither Article 76 nor 77 provides the solution to our previous question. 
Unless GR-16 is amended so that the applicability of GR-16 with respect to previous 
contracts becomes clear1155, the legal problems surrounding the legitimacy of the 
 
1152 The contract is applicable in regions which have already been served and not yet served by PAM 
Jaya when the contract is entered into 
1153 Peraturan Pemerintah No. 16 Tahun 2005 (GR-16), Article 77 
1154 Ibid, Article 76   
1155 The Water Law 7/2004 transitional provision at Article 98 also does not obligate licenses which 
were granted prior to the entry into force of the water law to be adjusted. See UU No. 7 Tahun 2004 
(Water Resources Law) Article 8. According to Justice Maruarar Siahaan in his dissenting opinion:  
“The transitional provision set forth in Article 98 of the a quo Law which does not regulate the 
adjustment to provisions of new Law, can be used as a justification for permits which had been granted 
prior to the application of Law Number 7 Year 2004, although it is highly contradictory to the new 
paradigm concerning the right to water as Human Rights….. Article 33 Paragraph (3) of the 1945 
Constitution requires that the state’s control on water resources shall apply without waiting for the 
termination of the aforementioned permits. This is based on the logic that if the right to live, with 
respect to which water constitutes the requirement that cannot be delayed or decreased for any reason 
whatsoever, therefore Article 98 of the a quo Law without adjustment with new Law is clearly 
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Cooperation Agreement’s service area and the applicability of PSP rules under GR-16 
will remain.  
As will be discussed in the next sections, arriving from the contractual point of 
view, the private sector and the regulatory body also have the opinion that national 
laws such as the Water Law 7/2004 and GR-16 are inapplicable to the Jakarta 
concession. This prompts the question as to whether regulation by contract may 
impede sectoral reforms.   
6.1.3.3. Ministry of Health 
The Ministry of Health regulates drinking water through The Minister of 
Health Regulation 492 of 2010 (Permenkes 492), the attachment to which contains the 
detailed bacteriological, chemical and physical requirements of healthy drinking 
water.1156 The Permenkes 492 covers drinking water distributed through pipes, bottled 
water, water tanks and any water used for the production of food and beverages.1157  
As previously noted, a ministerial regulation is not binding as ‘laws and 
regulations’ and considered only as some form of guideline. However, GR-16, at 
Article 6(1), requires that any distributed drinking water must “comply with quality 
standards regulation issued by the ministry in charge of public health”. Furthermore, 
in GR-16, there is a general obligation for undertakers to comply with quality 
 
contradictory to the 1945 Constitution.” Judicial Review of Law Number 7 Year 2004 regarding Water 
Resources, Judgment of 13th July 2005, No. 058-059-060-063/PUUII/2004 See Maruarar’s dissenting 
opinion at page 69-70 of the official English Translation 
1156 Peraturan Menteri Kesehatan Republik Indonesia No. 492/Menkes/PER/IV/2010 Tahun 2010 
Tentang Persyaratan Kualitas Air Minum    
1157 Ibid Article 2 (1) 
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standards1158 and to specify such quality standards  in the contract between them and 
the customers1159.  
With the referral from GR-16, the quality standards on Permenkes 907 
becomes binding on all water undertakers, be that a government entity, state or 
regional-owned enterprise or the private sectors. More importantly, the requirement 
that the contract between the water undertaker and the consumer stipulates the 
drinking water quality standards derogates any private agreement between them.   
6.1.3.4. Jakarta Water Sector Regulatory Body (JWSRB) 
Following the 2001 contract renegotiation, the JWSRB was set up; its purpose 
is, among others, to mediate disputes between the concessionaires and PAM Jaya and 
to monitor the enforcement of contractual provisions. According to the Cooperation 
Agreement Clause 51, The JWSRB “shall have the functions and powers set out in the 
Decree of Governor of DKI Jakarta Province as attached in Schedule 20, as may be 
amended in the future by a Regional Regulation of DKI Jakarta, including without 
limitation” in (i) coordinating relevant governmental agencies in order to implement 
the Cooperation Agreement and; (ii) to monitor: the implementation of the contract, 
the services to customers, the closure of deep wells, tariff increases, subsidy 
programme, performance of PAM Jaya; (iii) developing dispute settlement 
mechanisms between concessionaires and customers  and (iv) to mediate 
 
1158 Ibid See also Peraturan Pemerintah No. 16 Tahun 2005 (GR-16) at Article 68(2)a 
1159 Peraturan Pemerintah No. 16 Tahun 2005 (GR-16) at Article 64(6)b 
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disagreement or dispute between the concessionaire and PAM Jaya, before referring 
such dispute to expert panel or arbitration.1160   
Since clause 51 contains the phrase “including without limitation”,   the clause 
could be interpreted to mean only to list down the features of regulatory powers that 
the JWSRB must have, but not in limiting it. Furthermore, the clause refers to a 
Governor’s Decree No. 95 Year 2001 attached in the contract schedule, “as may be 
amended in the future by a Regional by law of DKI Jakarta”.1161 Future amendments 
may include broader regulatory powers, such as   preventing the misuse of a dominant 
position, protecting consumer and community interest in terms of charges and service 
levels, ensure that customers benefit from improved efficiency as well as ensuring 
“the provision of an efficient and economically sustainable water supply”.1162 This 
follows that the powers and functions of the JWSRB are stipulated in a Governor’s 
Decree enclosed as the contract’s schedule, and the provision regulating such powers 
and functions may be amended, but its amendment must be conducted through a 
regional by-law (‘Regional Regulation’ is the term used in the contract). At the time 
of writing, no Regional By-law stipulating those powers has been enacted. 
Further complication arises, however, because Jakarta’s Governor’s Decree 
No. 95 Year 2001 on the formation of the Jakarta Water Services Regulatory Body 
has been revoked and replaced by Jakarta Governor Regulation 54 Year 2005 
 
1160Cooperation Agreement Between PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 Clause 51 
1161 Keputusan Gubernur Propinsi DKI Jakarta Nomor 95 Tahun 2001 Tentang Pembemtukan Badan 
Regulator Pelayanan Air Minum (Revoked-Ed)    
1162 Cooperation Agreement Between PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 Clause 51.2 
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concerning Drinking Water Regulatory Body.1163 The 2001 contract at Clause 51 
requires that amendments affecting the power and function of the regulatory body be 
made through a regional by-law, which indeed constitutes a higher rule1164 compared 
to a Governor’s decree or regulation as it requires the consent of Jakarta’s regional 
parliament. From a contractual perspective then, Clause 51 of the Cooperation 
Agreement points to a non-existent rule (the revoked Governor’s Decree 95/2001) and 
its replacement rule, Governor Regulation 54 Year 2005, is not valid since it is not a 
regional by-law. This situation challenges the validity of the JWSRB as a regulatory 
institution. This could mean that the JWSRB is actually operating without any 
regulatory mandate from the state and relies completely on the 2001 contract.  
For some authors, such as Shugart and Balance, JWSRB may not even fit the 
conventional understanding of a ‘regulator’ as it does not have proper legal mandate 
and does not have the power to issue or enforce licences or exercise a meaningful 
discretion.1165 For other commentators however, JWSRB may be regarded as a 
“transitional” regulator which paves the way for a more independent body in the 
 
1163 Replaced by Peraturan Gubernur No. 54 Tahun 2005 Tentang Badan Regulator Pelayanan Air 
Minum Article 18.2and then replaced again by Peraturan Gubernur DKI Jakarta No.118 Tahun 2011 
Tentang Badan Regulator Pelayanan Air Minum  
1164 Undang Undang No.10 Tahun 2004 Tentang Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang Undangan Article 
7 
1165 According to them, regulators shoud have these characteristics: (1) be established and  given its 
mandate by law – not just by the terms of contract between the public authority and the company, (2) be 
a permanent body established for the entire course of the PSP, (3) exercise its authority by issuing, 
adjudicating and/oror enforcing licences, (4) have discretionary power on public policy issues, and not 
merely monitoring or veryfiying compliance and (5) play no role in the selection of the personnel. See 
Shugart, C. and Ballance, T., Expert Panels: Regulating Water Companies in Developing Countries 
(South Asia Forum for Infrastructure Regulation (SAFIR) 2005) 
<http://www.safirasia.org/SafirPDF/rsrc403.pdf> accessed January 6, 2012   
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future.1166 This understanding appears to fit with that of the Cooperation Agreement, 
since it stipulates that the JWSRB shall be accorded with more regulatory power in 
the future1167 (it does not say when), by way of regional legislation, for preventing the 
misuse of dominant position, protecting consumer interests and ensuring sustainability 
of water supplies.  
6.1.3.5. Ministry of Environment/Bappedal 
The Ministry of Environment (at central level) is responsible for licensing 
activities across the boundaries of provincial governments. This may include the 
licensing of water abstraction and sewage discharge activities across provincial 
boundaries. The Ministry also has residual enforcement power to take action against 
regional environmental problems if it considers that the regional government does not 
take the matter seriously.1168 
Jakarta’s Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan Daerah (Bappedalda 
Jakarta) is responsible for monitoring and enforcing environmental activities for the 
Jakarta region. This includes the licensing of abstraction and discharge activities by 
 
1166 See Eberhard, ‘Infrastructure regulation in developing countries: an exploration of hybrid and 
transitional models’ Eberhard, A., The Independence and Accountability of Africa’s Infrastructure 
Regulators: Reassessing Regulatory Design and Performance (South Africa: University of Cape Town 
2006)   
1167 The contract at Clause 51.2 stipulates that the parties intended that the JWSRB shall have trhe 
functions of preventing the misuse of dominant position, protecting consumer and community interest 
in terms of charges and service levels, ensure that customers benefit from improved efficiency as well 
as ensuring “the provision of an efficient and economically sustainable water supply”. All of these 
functions have to be enabled by legislation. These have not  materialised up to now.  Cooperation 
Agreement Between PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 
1168 Bedner, A., ‘Consequences of Decentralization: Environmental Impact Assessment and Water 
Pollution Control in Indonesia’ 32 Law & Policy 38 
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Palyja and Aetra and the supervision of Environmental Impact Assessments by the 
two companies.  
6.1.4. General administrative and economic rules applicable to Jakarta water 
utilities 
In addition to sectoral rules on water services above, the water businesses 
must also comply with general administrative and economic rules. The law on public 
services and the law on freedom of information are the two newly enacted legislations 
in administrative law spheres, relevant to water businesses. Unfortunately, because the 
law has been in force only recently, there is a lack of case law to be analysed. 
The Public Service law1169 regulates public services delivery, both when they 
are delivered by the state or a state-owned enterprise, and when services are 
contracted out to the private sector. Ombudsman offices, at regional or central level, 
are tasked by the law to enforce against substandard delivery of public services. The 
ombudsman has the power to recommend to the government that certain government 
officials be replaced or fined, for failing to deliver services properly.  
The Public Service law imposes some transparency requirements on private 
sector participation, such as the publication of key contractual terms and imposition of 
mandatory minimum standards of services in the contract with the private sector.1170 
The applicability of the Public Service law to private sector participation is 
nevertheless a subject of debate. The enforcement reach of the ombudsman offices are 
 
1169 Undang Undang No. 25 Tahun 2009 Tentang Pelayanan Publik 
1170 Ibid Article 13.b and its elucidation 
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limited to government officials and state employees, and certainly not private sector 
employees. As such, the current legal system needs to invent another accountability 
mechanism for private sector deliveries.  
 The law on “Openness and Freedom of Information” (the FoI Law) is also 
applicable to water businesses.1171 The FoI Law has been enforced only recently in 
2010 and the national FoI Commission has also been recently formed. As such, there 
is not much case law to be analysed. The applicability and operation of the FoI Law to 
water businesses will be presented in depth in section 6.6.   
The Law on Competition and the Prohibition of Unfair Business Practices1172 
has been enforced for some years, through the arm of the Competition and Business 
Supervisory Commission, and cases related to water services have been dealt with 
under this law.    
Table 9 Recapitulation of Primary Regulatory Institutions Overseeing Jakarta Water 
Businesses 
 
 
Area Institutions Primary Legal Basis Regulatory 
Product(s) 
General 
policy/ 
direction  
Department 
of Public 
Works 
 
Law 7/2004 
GR 16/2005 
 
 
Non binding 
guidelines: 
 
 
 
1171 Undang Undang No.14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik 
1172 Undang Undang No.5 Tahun 1999 Tentang Praktek Monopoli dan Persaingan Usaha Tidak Sehat 
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The National 
Planning 
Agency  
 
 
Ministry of 
Home 
Affairs 
(MOHA) 
 
 
 
 
 
Law 32/2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MOHA Rules 
2/2007; 3/1998; 
7/1998; MOHA 
Decree 50/1999 
Financial 
management 
Ministry of 
SOE 
 
 
 
 
Jakarta 
Regional 
Government 
 
Ministry of 
Home Afairs 
Law 1/2004 on State 
Budget   
Law 32/2004 
 
 
 
Law 5/1962 
 
Regional By-laws  
 
 
Law 32/2004 
Financial reporting 
guidelines 
Review of annual 
reports, corporate 
plans and business 
plans 
 
By-law 13/1992, 
By-law 11/1993 
 
 
Guideline on 
PDAM’s 
accounting system 
(MOHA Decree 
18/2000)  
Drinking 
Water 
Ministry of 
Health 
 
 
 
 
Jakarta 
Regional 
Government 
Law 7/2004 
GR 16/2005 
 
Drinking Water 
Quality Standard, 
The Minister of 
Health Regulation  
492/2010 on 
Drinking Water 
Quality 
Pricing, 
Licensing  
Jakarta 
Regional 
Government 
Law on DKI Jakarta  
Law 7/2004  
GR 16/2005  
MOHA Decree on 
Tariff Setting 
Guidelines 
Governor’s Decree 
on Tariff 
Increase/PTO 
 
Operational licence 
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Monitoring of 
performance 
Jakarta 
Water Sector 
Regulatory 
Body 
(JWSRB) 
 
 
PAM Jaya 
 
Jakarta 
Regional 
Government 
 
Jakarta Governor’s 
Decree Cooperation 
Agreement 2001 
Guidelines 
 
 
 
 
 
 
None 
 
Governor’s Decree 
Environmental 
protection, 
waste water 
discharges 
Ministry of 
Environment/ 
Bappedal 
 
Badan 
Pengendalian 
Dampak 
Lingkungan 
Daerah DKI 
 
 Some enforcement 
mechanism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Discharge Licence 
Consumer 
dispute 
JWSRB 
(Mediation 
effort) 
 
The Court 
   
 
 
 
Court’s Decision 
Freedom of 
Information 
Regional 
Ombudsman 
 
Freedom of 
Information 
Commission 
Freedom of 
Information Law 
2009 
Recommendation   
 
 
Regulation and 
Decision  
Competition 
(Central 
Government 
Jurisdiction) 
Komisi 
Pengawas 
Persaingan 
Usaha 
(KPPU)  
 Law No.5 Year 
1999 
Decision 
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6.2. Policy in involving the private sector  
6.2.1. Regulation at the central and local level 
When the Cooperation Agreement was entered into in 1997, Indonesia was a 
centralistic state and all decisions pertaining to regional matters – that includes water 
services in Jakarta and elsewhere – were determined by the central government. After 
Soeharto’s downfall, the decentralisation programme started. The central government 
was only left responsible for dealing with several matters including: defence, 
monetary policies, diplomacy, the judiciary and matters concerning the recognition of 
religion.1173 Water services regulation is included as a part of governmental function 
decentralised to the regions. The regions then have full control in deciding the 
question of ownership and the regulatory models  they wish to apply, subject to 
constraints provided by national legislations.. 
That being said, central government’s policies and regulations still influence 
(or to some extent even constrain) the regional government’s powers in determining 
ownership and regulatory models for water utilities. Except for regional by-laws, 
every legal product listed on Table 9 in the previous section is a regulation enacted by 
the central government. It is a commonplace that inconsistencies between central and 
local regulations are found.  
The decisions of the Indonesian Constitutional Court also shape policy making 
in this area. The Indonesian Water Resources Law No.7 Year 2004, which became the 
legal basis of water services regulation is – according to the Court –  ‘conditionally 
 
1173 Indonesia, ‘Undang Undang No.32 Tahun 2004 Tentang Pemerintahan Daerah’ 
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constitutional’.1174 The practical implication of this is that the law could be revoked by 
the Constitutional Court in the future if its’ implementing regulation or practices 
contradict the principles of the Court’s decision in the Judicial Review. The Court’s 
review does contain some prescription as to the model, operation and principles of 
water utilities regulation with which the regional governments must comply.1175  
Law 7/2004 regulates drinking water only broadly. It obligates the 
governments, central, provincial or local depending on the competences, to be 
responsible for developing drinking water provision systems. GR-16 implements the 
decentralisation principle by directly obligating regions, both municipalities (city 
government) and regencies (rural government) to provide drinking water for the 
communities in their territory.1176 Such a duty is absent for the provincial and central 
government. The duties of the central (GR-16 Article 38) and provincial governments 
(GR-16 Article 39) are restricted to implementing policies and facilitating the 
provision of bulk water.  
6.2.2. Ownership and regulatory model 
Water Law 7/2004 does not specify what sort of ownership and regulatory 
model it envisages. However, it does appear to place a priority on public ownership as 
reflected in Article 40.1177 In para.3, article 40 states that “State Owned Enterprises 
 
1174 See  Judicial Review of Law Number 7 Year 2004 regarding Water Resources, Judgment of 13th 
July 2005, No. 058-059-060-063/PUUII/2004 
1175 Al’Afghani, M.M., ‘Constitutional Court's Review and the Future of Water Law in Indonesia’ 2 
Law, Environment and Development (LEAD) Journal (2006) 
1176 See Peraturan Pemerintah No. 16 Tahun 2005 (GR-16) Article 40 para.c 
1177 Out of 100 Articles in Water Resources Law, only Article 40 is dedicated specifically to Drinking 
Water Provision. The reluctance to regulate is partially due to regional autonomy and the threat of 
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and Regional Owned Enterprise are the undertakers1178 of drinking water provision 
system”. In para.4 of Article 40 it is stated that “Cooperatives, privately-owned 
business enterprises and the [members of the] society may participate in the 
undertaking of the development of drinking water provision system”.  
The original Bahasa Indonesia of Article 40.4 of Law 7/2004   para.4 reads: 
“Koperasi, badan usaha swasta, dan masyarakat dapat berperan serta dalam 
penyelenggaraan pengembangan sistem penyediaan air minum”. Both of the 
underlined phrases relate to important concepts and as such must be carefully 
translated into English.  
The underlined phrase, “Badan Usaha swasta” is commonly, loosely 
translated, into English as ‘the private sector’ while “Koperasi” is a direct equivalent 
to  continental Europe’s “cooperatives”, a for-profit but gemeinschaft legal entity. The 
author considers the translation of “badan usaha swasta” into “private sector” as 
somewhat incomplete as the term ‘private sector’ embodies a wide array of non state 
actors such as corporations, NGOs, firms and foundations, including cooperatives. 
 
invalidation from the Constitutional Court. See Al'Afghani, M.M., ‘Indonesia needs a strong water 
services law’ The Jakarta Post (Jakarta) <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/08/31/indonesia-
needs-a-strong-water-services-law.html> accessed December 23, 2010 and recent OECD Report 
referring to this analysis at Ch.5.6. OECD, OECD Investment Policy Reviews - INDONESIA (2010) 
<http://www.oecd.org/document/26/0,3343,en_2649_34893_46225306_1_1_1_1,00.html> December 
23, 2010 
1178 The original Bahasa Indonesia of Article 40.3 of Law 7/2004 reads: “Badan usaha milik negara 
dan/atau badan usaha milik daerah merupakan penyelenggara pengembangan sistem penyediaan air 
minum”. The underlined phrase “merupakan penyelenggara” is the subject of the discussion here. 
Others have translated the underlined phrase as “will be the organizers of” and “shall carry out the 
development of..” (LEAD Translation). “Penyelenggara” is a noun, which can be translated into either 
Organizer or Undertaker, whereas, “merupakan” is a statement of being. The author regards that “are 
the undertakers of” is the closest expression in English that reflects the original Indonesian phrase. 
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The term “badan usaha” means “business enterprise”, while “swasta” means 
“private”. The author therefore chose to translate badan usaha swasta into “privately-
owned business enterprises”.  
Secondly, the term dapat berperan serta could also be problematic if 
translated improperly. Authors such as Butt and Lindsay translated the above phrase 
into “can play a role” 1179, however, this appears to signify weaker meaning than its 
orgininal Bahasa Indonesia phrase. The author believes that the proper translation is 
“may participate”, which is also used by the Constitutional Court’s English translation 
of the Judicial Review.   
What differentiates Water Law Article 40 para.3 from para.4? Why 
distinguish the role of SOE or Regional-Owned SOE (para.3) from the other 
categories in para.4 such as the cooperatives, privately-owned business enterprises and 
the [members of the] ‘society’? Para 3 suggests that SOEs and regional SOEs are the 
water services undertakers. Does this means that those in para.4 are not and cannot be 
the undertakers themselves, although they may ‘participate’ in the undertaking of 
water services?  
This vagueness occurs due to strong disagreement over private sector 
participation during the drafting and enactment process of Water Law 7/2004.1180 In 
 
1179 See Butt, S. and Lindsey, T., ‘Economic Reform when the Constitution Matters: Indonesia's 
Constitutional Court and Article 33’ Vol. 44, No. 2 Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies. The 
official English translation of the Constitutional Court’s Judicial Review of the Water Law, however, 
used the term “may participate”. See Judicial Review of Law Number 7 Year 2004 regarding Water 
Resources, Judgment of 13th July 2005, No. 058-059-060-063/PUUII/2004 at page 57.  
1180 Al’Afghani, ‘Constitutional Court's Review and the Future of Water Law in Indonesia’ 
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order to avoid invalidation by the Constitutional Court, the drafters of Water Law 
7/2004 choose a softer language as stipulated in Article 40.4. Comparing Article 40.4 
of the Water Law 7/2004 with GR-16, one of the dissenting judges at the 
Constitutional Court’s Judicial Review of the Water Law dubbed Article 40 para 4 as 
a “disguised privatisation” [italicised and underlined by author]: 
Article 40 Paragraph (3) of the Water Resources Law states that State-owned 
enterprises and/or regional government-owned companies shall be the 
administrators of the development of drinking water provision system. The 
role of cooperatives, private business entities and community in the 
development of Drinking Water Provision System is not to take over the 
responsibility of the Government/Regional Government through the State-
Owned Enterprises/Regional Government-Owned Enterprises as stated in 
Elucidation of Article 40 paragraph (4). Therefore, Article 40 Paragraph (4) 
constitutes a disguised privatisation as indicated [by] Government Regulation 
No. 16 Year 2005 which is the implementation of Article 40 of the Water 
Resources Law.1181  
Para.3 of Article 40 of the Water Law appears to imply that a water utility has 
to be in the legal form of a State or regional-owned enterprise, set up under the Law 
on SOE1182 or the Law on Regional SOE1183, and not any other form of legal entities 
even when they are fully controlled by the government.1184 This, of course, does not 
deter the possibility for the shares of the SOE or regional SOE being transferred, 
 
1181 Dissenting opinion of Judge Mukhtie Fadjar, Judicial Review of Law Number 7 Year 2004 
regarding Water Resources, Judgment of 13th July 2005, No. 058-059-060-063/PUUII/2004 at p.58 of 
the English translation  
1182 Undang Undang No. 19 Tahun 2003 Tentang Badan Usaha Milik Negara 
1183 Undang Undang No.5 Tahun 1962 Tentang Perusahaan Daerah 
1184 This is a rather elusive ‘entrenchment’ of public ownership if compared to Victoria (See section 
4.2.1 above). The entrenchment in Victoria is more straightforward as it obligates that water services be 
delivered by a “Public Authority”.  Constitution Act 1975, No. 8750 of 1975, Version No. 196 s.97 (1) 
(2)  
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partially, to private entities. As long as their legal status remains an SOE or a regional 
SOE, it appears to be allowed by para.3.1185 Secondly, as full divestiture would 
change the legal status of  SOEs into normal corporations, this would bar them from 
providing the service. Hence, para.3 also implies that full divestiture of all incumbent 
water utilities are prohibited.  
This begs the question: given the omnipresence of SOEs and Regional SOEs, 
what role do the entities in para.4 play in ‘participating’ in the provision of drinking 
water services? Law 7/2004 is silent about this, but there are some clues in GR-16.   
Article 64 (1) of GR-16 stipulates “cooperatives and/or privately owned 
business enterprises may participate in the development of drinking water provision 
system in regions which are not yet covered by services provided by SOE or regional 
SOEs”.1186As discussed in the previous chapter, this paragraph causes confusion 
about whether private sector participation is allowed only for an entirely Greenfield 
project or also in regions where SOEs or Regional SOEs are already present, but have 
yet to achieve universal coverage. If the latter interpretation is taken, then GR-16 can 
be deemed to allow some sort of network unbundling.1187  
The third paragraph of Article 64 of GR-16 stipulates that any involvement of 
the cooperatives or privately-owned business enterprises as mentioned above should 
be done through a proper procurement procedure, as stipulated under prevailing laws 
and regulations. The fifth paragraph of this article stipulates that following such 
 
1185 UU No. 7 Tahun 2004 (Water Resources Law) Article 40 
1186 Peraturan Pemerintah No. 16 Tahun 2005 (GR-16) 
1187 As explained above, the bulkwater provision is already unbundled. Such a phrase could mean that 
unbundling beyond bulkwater provision is also allowed, for example, in retail or treatment plants. 
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procurement, the cooperatives or privately-owned business enterprises shall enter into 
agreement with the government.  
Under GR-16, such agreement between regional government and the provider 
shall contain, at least, provisions regulating (i) service coverage, (ii) technical 
standards (quality, quantity and water pressure), (iii) preliminary tariffs and tariff 
formula, (iv) contract period and (v) the rights and obligations of the parties.1188 When 
the contract period is over, it is required that all of the assets and equipment are 
transferred to the central or regional government in a functional condition.1189 With 
this clause, it becomes clearer that the government envisages an “x-operate-transfer” 
model of private sector participation in the water services sector. 1190  
As GR-16 only states that the involvement of the private sector should go 
through the “proper procurement procedure”1191, the regime for PSP in water supply 
thus falls under the general procurement regime, albeit with some guidelines from 
sectoral rules, such as from the Minister of Public Works1192 and BPP-SPAM. Article 
65.6 of GR-16 requires further regulation to be enumerated through a ministerial 
regulation. Permen PU-18 elaborates technical guidelines, feasibility studies and a 
contractual model of PSP in more considerable detail. The technical guidelines were 
adopted from International Water Association (IWA) recommendations while the 
 
1188 Peraturan Pemerintah No. 16 Tahun 2005 (GR-16) Article 64.6 
1189 Ibid Article 64.7 
1190 The “X” could mean “build” or “repair”  
1191 Peraturan Pemerintah No. 16 Tahun 2005 (GR-16) Article 64.5 
1192 Indonesia, Peraturan Menteri Pekerjaan Umum No.18/PRT/M/2007 Tentang Penyelenggaraan 
Pengembangan Air Minum Sistem Penyediaan Air Minum (2007)   
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procurement contract model appears to be adopted from an earlier version of a 
National Model of Procurement Document.  
To conclude, Water Law 7/2004 and GR-16 are not direct with respect to the form of 
ownership and regulatory models that should be implemented in Indonesia, although, 
by analysis, they both appear to prefer a contractual model of private sector 
participation.1193 The rules does not stipulate what sort of PSP model is allowed, it 
only suggests that it must be in the form of a contract. Such contracts should be 
entered into with the government (municipal, provincial or central, depending on the 
case) and not with the PDAM. Such contracts should be awarded through sound 
public procurement procedure, in line with principles of public procurement found in 
prevailing laws and regulations. There are possibilities that this interpretation would 
be rejected by the Court should the Water Law be petitioned for another Judicial 
Review in the future.    
This vague, inconsistent and half-hearted legal framework has resulted in an 
inherent lack of regulation of Indonesia’s water services. To this extent, PSPs are 
governed primarily by contract without any “umbrella” regulation in control of such 
contracts. As will be demonstrated by the case of Jakarta’s concession, reliance on 
contracts alone without sufficient umbrella regulation will have implications for the 
transparency of its services.  
 
 
1193 Other models include: full divestiture or joint venture. Full divestiture is not possible as discussed 
above but joint venture is not highlighted by the rules. See Section 2.2 on models of PSP 
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6.3. The decision to procure  
As a prerequisite of good governance, contractual models of water services as 
implemented in Victoria and Indonesia are usually preceded with a procurement. This 
is not the case with England which fully divested its water utilities. This section will 
analyse how procurement rules are applied to the water sector.   
The Independent Expert on the Human Right to Water and Sanitation, in her 
2010 report, highlighted the need to have a “democratic, participatory and 
transparent process” in the decision to delegate water services.1194 She added that one 
of the main prerequisites of genuine participation would be the “disclosure of 
adequate and sufficient information and actual access to information, referring in 
particular to the instruments that delegate service provision”.1195 In the context of 
Jakarta, this would be the disclosure of procurement plans and key procurement terms 
prior to the bidding process and selection of concessionaires.  
When the Cooperation Agreement was signed in 1997, it was not subjected to 
any procurement rule. A simple procurement rule did exist at that time as a part of 
regulation implementing the state budget1196, but was circumvented. The decision to 
procure in Jakarta’s water services was made unilaterally by the Government through 
lobbies made by multinationals towards Soeharto’s son and cronies. The first rule 
 
1194 de-Albuquerque, Report of the independent expert on the issue of human rights obligations related 
to access to safe drinking water and sanitation, A/HRC/15/31 
1195 Ibid 
1196 Keputusan Presiden Nomor 11 Tahun 1973 tentang Pedoman pelaksanaan Anggaran Pendapatan 
dan Belanja Negara tahun 1973/1974 (Presidential Decree No. 11 Year 1973 on the Guidelines of 
Implementation of the 1973/1974 State Budget). This rule is not specifically dedicated to procurement 
but merely contains guidelines on how to spend state budget.  
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dedicated to public procurement was enacted in 2000 through a Presidential 
Decree1197 and has, ever since, been amended and reformed, through the help of 
international financial institutions.  
Contracting out of water services by regional government or state and 
regional-owned enterprises is currently covered by Presidential Regulation 54 Year 
2010 on Procurement of Goods and Services (PR-54).1198 The said procurement rule 
will be applicable if the contract ends and the Jakarta Government decides to continue 
inviting the private sector to participate. PR-54 is applicable to any circumstances 
except in the event of emergency. PR 54/2010 requires that governmental institutions 
(budget users – see the next section for definition) formulate a yearly procurement 
plan.1199 PR-54 requires that an abridged form of procurement plan, consisting of at 
least information concerning the names and address of the budget user, the work 
package to be carried out, the location of such work and an estimate of the total cost of 
such a project, be announced to the community on its website and/or official 
procurement board.1200 
Had similar provisions been applied to the Jakarta Concession, the process 
would have been more transparent as the government could have opened up more 
opportunities for the private sector to participate. 
 
 
1197 Keputusan Presiden No. 18 Tahun 2000 tentang Pengadaan Barang/Jasa Instansi Pemerintah 
1198 Peraturan Presiden No.54 Tahun 2010 Tentang Pengadaan Barang/Jasa Pemerintah The 
procurement rule is applicable to State- and Regional-Owned Enterprises, see   Article 2.b.   
1199 Ibid Art 22.3.(c)   
1200 Ibid Art 25.2 and 3 
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6.3.1. Committees/Task Force 
The procurement system under PR-54 is a decentralised one. Unlike Victoria, 
Indonesia recognises no single procurement office. PR-54 thus organises procurement 
through several public offices: the budget user or its proxy, commitment-making 
official, procurement unit/procurement official, project-beneficiary official and the 
internal supervisory unit. Most of these offices are held on an ex-officio basis. These 
forms of organisation apply to central and regional governments equally.  
A budget user is the official authorised to use the budget. He is tasked with 
formulating the general plan for procurement; announcing publicly the general plan of 
procurement on  the website; appointing the commitment-making official, 
procurement official and project beneficiary official; selecting the winning bidder; 
supervising implementation of the budget plan and record keeping of procurement 
documents; including mediating disputes between commitment-making official and 
procurement unit/procurement official.1201 In a regional government, budget users are 
usually appointed by the head of regional government (a Mayor or Governor). With 
such a structure, the Mayor or Governor is the highest line of accountability in the 
procurement process of a regional government.  
The commitment-making officials are tasked with specifying the details of the 
procurement plan: technical specification of goods and services to be procured, 
drafting self-estimated price and drafting the initial version of the contract. The 
commitment-making official is also tasked with issuing the letter of appointment for 
 
1201 Ibid Art 8 A budget user can delegate its responsibilities to a proxy. See Art 1 (6) 
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the winning bidder (however, it is the budget user that selects the winning bid, the 
commitment-making official only issues the letter), signing the contract, executing the 
contract, reporting the results of the procurement to the budget user or his proxy, 
performing the contract, transfering the procurement results to the budget user or his 
proxy, reporting the project progress trimonthly and preserving all procurement 
documentations.1202 PR-54 stipulates the prerequisites to be appointed as a 
commitment-making official: they ought to have integrity, discipline, responsibility 
and possess technical and managerial qualifications  to perform the task, never have 
been involved in any collusion, nepotism and corruption practices, sign the integrity 
pact and be certified in procurement skills.1203  
Procurement units must be formed by government institutions, and 
procurement through such units is obligatory for goods above IDR 100 million or 
services above IDR 50 million.1204 The unit shall consist of working groups, each 
comprising of at least three  persons and could be more depending on the complexity 
of the task. The working group can be assisted by an expert whose task is in giving 
explanations of technical terms, in case a contestation is raised by a bidder.1205 
Members of the procurement unit should understand the purpose of the procurement 
and its specific role in the procurement process. They must also have comprehension 
of the content of the document, methods and procedure of the procurement. They must 
 
1202 Ibid Art 11 
1203 Ibid Art 12 
1204 Ibid Art 17.g. For goods procurement with amounts lower than IDR 100 million or lower than IDR 
50 millions for services, it needs only to go through the  ‘procurement official’. This type of 
procurement has a more or less similar procedure but is not discussed in depth as the value of 
contracting out in water services is envisaged to be a lot more than this.   
1205 Ibid Art 14 
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have expertise in procurement and sign the integrity pact. The procurement unit is 
tasked with drafting the plan for selecting the service provider, enacting procurement 
documents, determining the amount of guarantee, announcing the commencement of 
procurement on its websites and the national procurement portal, evaluating the 
qualification of service providers through pre-qualification or post-qualification 
procedure, and conducting technical, administrative and price evaluation against 
incoming offers. The procurement unit must also respond to contestation.1206  
Conflict of interest (CoI) is regulated under PR-54 and encompasses both CoI 
among the members of the procurement unit and the official appointing them and CoI 
which arises due to the position of a supplier as a planner and supervisor on the same 
project. For the first category, PR-54 stipulates that members of a procurement unit 
shall not have any family relationship with the official who appointed them as a 
member of the unit.1207 For the second category, the PR-54 forbids a supplier to 
participate in procurement if it had previously been appointed as either supplier or 
planner in such a project.1208 As regards CoI between procurement unit and suppliers, 
PR-54 stipulates that all parties involved in the procurement should “avoid and 
prevent conflict of interest”1209 and that they should avoid and prevent abuse of 
authority and collusion which leads to the detriment of state finances. Elucidation of 
the PR-54 further clarifies that conflict of interest under the above provision means 
that parties involved in procurement shall not lead a double role (for example, on the 
one hand being a director at the supplying company and on the other hand acting as a 
 
1206 Ibid 
1207 Peraturan Presiden No.54 Tahun 2010 Tentang Pengadaan Barang/Jasa Pemerintah Art 17 
1208 Ibid Article 19 (4) 
1209 Ibid Article 6(e) regarding “Procurement Ethics”.  
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member of the procurement committee) or ‘affiliation’, which may arise out of 
marriage or familial relation, or is in control of or managing (directly or indirectly) the 
supplier company or through controlling shareholding (defined as more than 50%).1210 
6.3.2. Tendering Process  
6.3.2.1. Expression of Interest  
Many authorities consider the announcement of tender from the authorities to 
be the pinnacle of transparency in procurement. For example, the Independent Expert 
on the Human Rights to Water concludes that “the subsequent process of tendering, 
bidding and contract negotiation also must be transparent”.1211 Bovis considers that 
the transparency of the contracting authority’s determination to procure will trigger 
competition as it will be reflected in prices presented by the the bidders to the 
authority.1212 Meanwhile, the EC Public Works Directive utilises “contract notices” 
and requires the publication thereof in order to guarantee competition.1213 
 
1210 Ibid Elucidation of PR-54/2010, Article 6 (e). A person who becomes a director and/or 
commissioner and companies which are involved in the same procurement is also considered to lead a 
“double role”. See Para B  
1211 de-Albuquerque, Report of the independent expert on the issue of human rights obligations related 
to access to safe drinking water and sanitation, A/HRC/15/31 
1212 Bovis, C., EC public procurement: case law and regulation (Oxford University Press 2006) at p.153 
1213 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public 
service contracts O.J. L. 134, 30.4.2004, p. 114–240  in particular see Preamble, para. 36: “To ensure 
development of effective competition in the field of public contracts, it is necessary that contract notices 
drawn up by the contracting authorities of Member States be advertised throughout the Community. 
The information contained in these notices must enable economic operators in the Community to 
determine whether the proposed contracts are of interest to them. For this purpose, it is appropriate to 
give them adequate information on the object of the contract and the conditions attached thereto.” 
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Under PR-54, announcement of procurement through the procuring 
institution’s website, official announcement board and the national procurement portal 
is obligatory for all modes of procurements: tender1214, simple tender1215, direct 
appointment1216, public selection1217 and simple selection1218, the purpose of which is 
to allow those with corresponding qualifications to apply. This announcement must be 
done after the institution’s budget plan is approved by the Ministry of Finance or its 
“Daftar Isian Pelaksanaan Anggaran” (Budget Implementation Form) is approved by 
the regional parliament.1219 In the case where such form has not been approved but its 
budget plan has been approved, then the procuring agency needs to state such a 
condition on its announcement. For limited tenders, the names of the bidder must be 
announced.1220 Announcements through daily newspapers are allowed for limited 
tender, but such newspapers must have a wide circulation.  
PR-54 divides assessment methods into the pre-qualification and post-
qualification assessments. Procuring agencies may select both or either one of these 
methods. Except for direct appointment1221, the pre-qualification method is 
commenced before proposals are submitted by the providers1222 with an aim of 
 
1214 Peraturan Presiden No.54 Tahun 2010 Tentang Pengadaan Barang/Jasa Pemerintah Art 36.3 
1215 Ibid Art 37.3 
1216 Ibid  
1217 Ibid Art 42.2 
1218 Ibid Art 43 
1219 Ibid Art 73.1 and 2 
1220 IbidArt 74 
1221 Ibid Art 56.5 
1222 Ibid Art 56.3 
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providing a list of providers or a shortlist of contestants.1223 Submitted documents 
must be evaluated within two working days after submission.  
Within 28 days1224 before the deadline for the lodging of the offer proposal 
(which will be discussed in the next sub section), the commitment-making official 
must have determined the self-estimated price (or otherwise known as Owner’s 
Price/OP) of the procured goods or services which total value should then be 
announced by the the procurement unit.1225   
6.3.2.2. Request for Proposal 
Unlike the common law legal system of procurement, the Indonesian 
procurement does not recognise offer and acceptance phases forming the basis of the 
contract.1226 Hence, there is no exact RFP stage which can be interpreted as a form of 
‘offer’ from the government to the providers. What is presented instead is a stage 
called “Pemasukan Dokumen Penawaran” or lodging of offer proposal by the 
providers to the procurement unit. PR-54 determines that the provider may alter the 
offer proposal before the deadline of submission.1227 The offer proposal consists of 
technical specification and price, responding to the government’s announcement on 
expression of interest or prequalification1228 assessments (where applicable). The 
 
1223 Ibid Art 56.6 
1224 Ibid Art 66.4 
1225 Ibid Art 66.2 
1226 Art 1338 of the Civil Code simply stipulates that a contract is formed based on consensualism  
1227 Peraturan Presiden No.54 Tahun 2010 Tentang Pengadaan Barang/Jasa PemerintahArt 78.3 
1228 When prequalification is taken as the method of procurement, the National Procurement Model 
Document requires that information concerning ” qualification assessment and proposed pre-qualified 
bidder(s) shall not be disclosed to the applicants of the prequalification or other parties, which do not 
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lodging method could be performed using a one folder, two folder or  two stage 
method, depending on the type of the project1229 
All offer proposals will then be evaluated by the procurement unit using one 
of several possible methods outlined by PR-54. The PR differentiates assessment 
method for procurement of goods1230 from that of consultancy services. 1231 Each of 
these methods should be employed to respond to specific project situations.  
6.3.2.3. Selection of preferred bidder 
Result of the selection of preferred bidder should be announced through the 
agency’s website and official announcement board.1232 Tender participants may 
contest this decision when they find (i) violation of procurement procedure as 
stipulated in PR-54, (ii) conspiracy leading to unfair competition, (iii) abuse of 
authority by procurement unit or other officials.1233 This complaint must be made in 
writing and can be drafted jointly with other bidders.1234 Such a letter must be directed 
to the procurement unit and its copies directed to the commitment-making official and 
budget user or its proxy within five days after announcement of the winning bid is 
 
relate to the process of prequalification”. See Center for Public Procurement Policy Development, 
Model National Procurement Document (2007)  , Chapter II. Instruction to Prequalification Applicants 
(ITPA), para 17.1  
1229 Peraturan Presiden No.54 Tahun 2010 Tentang Pengadaan Barang/Jasa PemerintahArt 47 
1230 Ibid Art 48 
1231 Ibid Art 49 
1232 Ibid Art 80 
1233 Ibid Art 81 
1234 Ibid Art 81.1 
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made.1235 The procurement unit must provide a written response against all points of 
claim within five working days after the letter is accepted.1236  
If the bidders found that the response from the procurement unit is not 
satisfactory, it may lodge an appeal. Such an appeal is directly addressed to the 
Minister or Head of Regional Government, depending on the case, within five days 
after the response of contestation is received.1237 The appellant bidder must provide a 
guarantee in the amount of 2/1000 of the total owner’s price estimate (OP) or a 
maximum of IDR 50 million.1238 This appeal ultimately freezes the whole 
procurement process.1239 The Minister or Head of Regional Government, depending 
on the case, shall provide a response to the appeal within 15 working days after the 
appeal letter was received.1240 If the Minister/Head of Regional Government declares 
the appeal to be correct, then it shall order the procurement unit to conduct a re-
evaluation or restart the whole process from the beginning and the guarantee payment 
shall be refunded to the appellant.1241 If the response is the reverse, then the 
Minister/Head of Regional Government shall order the procurement process to 
continue and the guarantee payment is kept with the treasurer.1242 
Lastly, the national model of procurement document requires that information 
on the process, evaluation of bids and recommendation leading to the determination of 
 
1235 Ibid Art 81.2. 
1236 Ibid Art 81.3 
1237 Ibid Art 82.1 
1238 Ibid Art 82.3 
1239 Ibid Art 82.4 
1240 Ibid Art 82.6 
1241 Ibid Art 82.7,8,9,10 
1242 Ibid Art 82.7,8,9,10 
 
 336 
the winner as summarised on the Bid Evaluation Report and shall not be disclosed to 
the bidders or any other party until the contract is signed.1243  
6.3.2.4. Execution of the contract 
The final version of the draft contract must be reviewed by the commitment-
making official before being signed.1244 PR-54 also imposes a performance guarantee 
for contracts worth more than IDR 100 million, in the amount of 5% of the total 
contract value or the OP value, depending on the final pricing of the bid.1245 Such 
guarantee must be paid in full after the appointment letter from the commitment-
making official is obtained and before the contract is signed.1246  
Signing is only possible after budget form is approved by the House and 
within 14 days after the appointment letter is signed by the commitment-making 
official.1247 Legal advice from an advocate is required for contracts worth more than 
IDR 100 billion.1248 The PR-54 requires that the counterpart is represented by its 
directors, as evident by its Articles of Association, although other parties may sign the 
contract as long as a proper power of attorney from the director is presented.1249  
The commitment-making official may unilaterally terminate the contract if the 
late performance fee has reached 5% of the total contract value, non-performance or 
 
1243 Center for Public Procurement Policy Development, Model National Procurement Document 
Procurement of Works with Qualification, Chapter II: Instruction to Bidders, para 27.1 
1244 Peraturan Presiden No.54 Tahun 2010 Tentang Pengadaan Barang/Jasa PemerintahArt 86.1 
1245 Ibid Art 70.1 and 4 
1246 Ibid Art 70.3 
1247 Ibid Art 86.3 
1248 IbidArt 86.4 
1249 IbidArt 56.5 and 6 
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improper performance by the provider which is not fixed on due time, or if the 
provider has been proven to be involved in corruption, collusion as determined by the 
authorities, and if there are claims of procedural failures, claims of corruption, 
collusion and nepotism and violation of healthy competition in procurement as 
confirmed by the authorities1250.  In those events, the performance guarantee will be 
liquidated and the provider will be put on the government’s ‘blacklist’.1251 
6.3.3. Publication of contracts 
None of the articles in PR-54 regulate the publication of contract. The law on 
Public Service1252 and the Law on Freedom of Information1253, which are higher 
forms of rule than the PR-54, both require that contracts are published by government 
agencies. However, PR-54 does not refer to the requirement of contract publication 
under both laws, although it was enacted after both laws were approved by the House 
of Representative. The only law that was referred to by PR-54 is the law on state 
budget 1/2004.  
The Independent Expert in its report noted that it is crucial that “The terms of 
reference and the final contract should be made available for public scrutiny and 
commenting. Commercial confidentiality must not jeopardize the transparency 
requirements provided for under the human rights framework”.1254 It is an extreme 
 
1250 The authorities here could mean anything from competition commission to the police and the court. 
Elucidation of Article 93 of the PR-54 is silent on this matter 
1251 Peraturan Presiden No.54 Tahun 2010 Tentang Pengadaan Barang/Jasa PemerintahArt 93.2 
1252 Undang Undang No. 25 Tahun 2009 Tentang Pelayanan Publik Article 13 (1) (b), (d) and (e) 
1253 Undang Undang No.14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik, Article 11.1 (e) 
1254 de-Albuquerque, Report of the independent expert on the issue of human rights obligations related 
to access to safe drinking water and sanitation, A/HRC/15/31 
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omission that PR-54 did not refer to the Freedom of Information and Public Service 
Law, especially with respect to the requirement to publish contract. Procurement 
should have served the public service value of transparency and not simply be a 
method by which the government may obtain value-for-money in its purchasings. In 
fact, the national model of procurement documents which were developed with the 
help of the Asian Development Bank imposes confidentiality requirements on  the 
providers.  
According to the standard model procurement contract, Clause 3.2:1255 
The Contractor, Subcontractor (if any) and Personnel without prior written 
approval from the CO, shall be forbidden during the Contract Period and for 
a certain period of time afterward as determined in the SCC, to: 
(a) use the Contract Document or any other document/information produced 
by the contractor work for purposes other than for the execution of this 
Contract;  
(b) disclose the above said documents/information to any third party. 
In the above standard clause, disclosure by the provider would be prohibited 
unless approved by the commitment-making official (CO), who is the principal or 
owner/user of project.1256  
 
1255 Center for Public Procurement Policy Development, Model National Procurement Document 
Procurement of Works with Prequalification, General Conditions of Contract, clause 3.2 . Similar terms 
apply to other types of procurement: services, consultancies and goods. This confidentiality may be 
extended after the contract period has ended. See “Special Conditions of Contract” on each model 
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Under the national model of procurement, the provider’s employees and 
personnel are also required to exercise confidentiality. Clause 4.4 reads: 
With reference to Clause 3.2 GCC, all personnel are required to maintain 
confidentiality regarding their work. If required by the CO, the personnel may 
at any time be required to take an oath of confidentiality.1257 
The national model of procurement does not impose corresponding 
obligations of confidentiality on the authorities.1258 This provides latitude of discretion 
for the authorities to disclose information. However, other contracting parties are 
bound to the confidentiality provision. In several instances, it is the public authority 
and not the provider who objects to the disclosure of contracts and other information.  
Confidentiality at the prequalification stage and during the bidding process 
and evaluation has a purpose to stimulate competition among the tenderers. After the 
winner has been determined, however, there is no compelling justification to prevent 
information about the winning bid, including its contractual arrangements, from being 
disclosed.  
Finally, the existence of a confidentiality clause in the contract shall not 
prevent the operation of other laws, such as the freedom of information and public 
service laws, which mandates the disclosure of contracts between a Public Body and a 
third party. The Victorian procurement policy allows confidentiality clauses to be 
used, but requires such clauses to be complemented with another clause that will 
 
1256 Ibid Procurement of Works with Prequalification,  General Conditions of Contract, clause 1.22 
1257 Ibid Procurement of Works with Prequalification,  General Conditions of Contract, clause 4.4 
1258 Ibid   
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exempt the applicability of the confidentiality provision in the event of a Freedom of 
Information request. The purpose of this design is to avoid the authority from being 
held liable in disclosing information supplied by provider (See sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 
above).  
Indeed, the obligation of confidentiality on the existing Model of National 
Procurement Document is directed solely towards the provider and not the authorities. 
This is somewhat an improvement when compared to previous contracts which put the 
confidence obligation equally between providers and the authorities, such as Jakarta’s 
Cooperation Agreement. But there can be occasions where such providers are also a 
Public Body under the Indonesian Freedom of Information Law which subjects them 
to some transparency rules, including disclosure of contracts and responding to a 
freedom of information request as they are entities entrusted with governmental 
functions. Without an exemption clause on their contract, they are bound to 
confidentiality duty towards the authorities and can be held liable for its breach.    
6.4. Regulatory Decision making 
6.4.1. Licences 
The only type of licences enumerated in the Water Law and GR-16 are (i) 
“operational” licences for internal use, (ii) “licences” for other uses and (iii) 
environmental licences in the form of abstraction and discharge licences. Other than 
licences issued under sectoral water rules, industry regulation and the Company 
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Law1259 require the companies and cooperatives to obtain commercial licences1260 
from the ministry of trade.   
Companies, cooperatives or communities may undertake their own water 
supply system for internal use insofar as they are permitted to do so by the regional 
government. The procedure to obtain such permission is, however, unclear.  
Article 65 of GR-16 reads: 
Para.3 : “Provisions [of water service] by the cooperatives and privately-
owned business enterprises [in order to fulfill their own needs] must be 
conducted based on licence issued by the government or regional government 
in accordance with its authority under prevailing laws and regulations”.  
This is further reiterated in Article 40 which stipulates that regional 
governments “issue licenses for drinking water provisions system in its regions”.1261 
In para.5 of Article 65, the GR-16 only stipulates that the guidelines and procedures of 
licensing will be regulated by a Ministerial Regulation.  
Article 75 of GR-16, which regulates administrative penalties stipulates: 
Para.1: “Privately-owned business enterprises and cooperatives who violate 
the terms of  […], including Article  65(3)… are subjected to sanction in the 
form of written warning”  
 
1259 Undang Undang No.40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas 
1260 Undang Undang No. 3 Tahun 1982 Tentang Wajib Daftar Perusahaan Article 11 
1261 Peraturan Pemerintah No. 16 Tahun 2005 (GR-16),   Art 40.k The elucidation of this article only 
stipulates that licences shall be issued in accordance with prevailing laws and regulations. This is the 
only part of ibid elucidation which contain the word ‘licence’. Others are silent about it.  
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Para.2: “Privately-owned business enterprises, cooperatives and community 
members who, after three warnings as mentioned in the previous article were 
issued, fail to comply and repair its services then its commercial licence would 
be revoked”.  
The logic of Articles 65 and 75 combined would be as follows: if an entity 
fails to obtain a licence (for internal provision of water supply as stipulated under 
Article 65.3) then, its licence would be revoked (Article 75 para 2). The only problem 
with this interpretation is that it is not backed by clarification on the types of licences. 
Article 65.3 talks about licences issued by the government or regional government but 
the mechanism for applying such licences is not really clear. Article 75.2 suggests that 
the failure to obtain the ‘licence’ in Article 65.3 will lead to the revocation of the 
entity’s commercial licence. It is possible that this article is meant to refer to general 
operational licences issued by the Ministry of Trade and Industry which is regulated 
by another law. Unless this is clarified, however, this is only a matter of interpretation.  
Although article 65.5 of GR-16 requires further regulation to be enumerated 
through a ministerial regulation, the implementing regulation of GR-16, the Minister 
of Public Works Regulation No.18/PRT/M/2007 on Drinking Water Provision 
(Permen PU-18), does not elaborate the procedure of licensing.  
Two lessons on transparency can be learned from this bad practice of legal 
drafting.1262: First, if GR-16 Article 75.2 meant to refer to another law regulating 
 
1262 See the definition provided by Mock in section 2.1.5:  Regulation is transparent “If someone subject 
to the law can understand what is expected of her, can understand and comply with the commands of 
the law, and can foresee the consequences of compliance or noncompliance”. Mock, ‘An 
Interdisciplinary Introduction to Legal Transparency: A Tool for Rational Development’. Compare also 
with the licensing regimes in Victoria (section 4.3.1) and England (section 5.3.1) 
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commercial licence, then it should explicitly refer to it. Second, the type and 
mechanism for the private sector to apply and obtain the ‘licence’ in Article 65.3 
should have been clearly defined. There should be a clear procedure on how the 
licence could be applied, what the prerequisites are for obtaining them, what the 
licence conditions are, on what terms they can be revoked, suspended or modified and 
the maximum administrative cost for the licence application. Without these elements 
being properly defined, it will only create incentive for arbitrary interpretation by the 
officials which will eventually foster corruption and increase public spending due to 
court proceedings.    
6.4.2. Is the Jakarta Water Cooperation Agreement a concession (konsesi)?  
For some authors, a concession [the italicized word is to denote the term in its 
legal1263 sense] is a combination of licences, permits and dispensations followed by a 
set limited ‘governmental authority’ to the concessionaire.1264 Earlier Indonesian 
administrative law writers such as Prajudi had already warned that concession is 
 
1263 In its casual sense, a concession (along with affermage, management contract, etc) is often describe 
as “models” of private sector participation in infrastructure services. The emphasis is on the business 
model. Concession, the World Bank said, “…gives a private operator responsibility not only for the 
operation and maintenance of assets but also for financing and managing investment. Asset ownership 
typically rests with the government from a legal perspective, however, and rights to all the assets, 
including those created by the operator, typically revert to the government when the arrangement 
ends—often after 25 or 30 years.”  See Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, Approaches to 
private participation in water services : a toolkit p. 10 What is rarely discussed by the World Bank is 
that concession is a legal term which denotes also an institutional arrangement which might be different 
from one continental country to another. The term concession in Indonesian Administrative Law is 
broader than the casual term used by the World Bank, because it involves a ‘delegation’ of 
governmental powers. See also section 2.2 on types of PSP including concession. 
1264 Atmosudirdjo, P., Hukum administrasi negara (Ghalia Indonesia 1981) at p.98-99 See also 
Pudyatmoko, Y.S., Perizinan: Problem dan Upaya Pembenahan (Grasindo 2009) quoting Prajudi, at p. 
10 
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vulnerable to legal abuse.1265 Prajudi gave examples where concessionaires could be 
given governmental authority, which may even enable them to relocate villages 
[presumably depending on the terms of the concession], including, to operate an 
airstrip, form an internal security unit and develop networked infrastructure such as 
roads, electricity and telephone lines.1266 This, Prajudi said, could eventually cause 
socio-political problems. As such, concession contracts require a thorough due 
diligence and investigation towards the company’s bona fides, not only in terms of its 
financial, but also political and moral reputation.1267  
Syarifudin1268 considers that the undertaking delegated to the private sector in 
concession contracts is essentially a governmental duty. One of the consequences of a 
concession contract is, therefore, that the concessionaire could be considered as a 
public official acting on governmental duties.1269 However, contemporary author 
Simatupang is of the opinion that the Jakarta Cooperation Agreement is not a 
‘decision’ reviewable by the Administrative Court.1270  
There is another type of contract entered into by the government with the 
private sector which is not considered to be a form of concession, as it is not perceived 
to be exercising a governmental function. These are the ordinary types of contracts 
 
1265 Atmosudirdjo, Hukum administrasi negara at p.98-99 
1266 Ibid at p.98-99 
1267 Ibid at p 98 
1268 Syafrudin, “Perizinan Untuk Berbagai Kegiatan”, unpublished paper, as quoted by Pudyatmoko in 
Pudyatmoko, Perizinan: Problem dan Upaya Pembenahan 
1269 Marbun, S.F., Peradilan administrasi negara dan upaya administratif di Indonesia (UII Press 2003) 
p.60 
1270 Simatupang, D.P., Jawaban Tentang Konsesi (Email Correspondence 2011)   
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entered into by authorities in the course of its daily functions. Hadjon1271 et al stated 
that governmental authority as a legal person may enter into agreements with other 
legal persons or natural persons, be that in the form of sale and purchase, lease 
agreement, work services or it can even bequeath its property. These types of 
contracts are not subject to public law, although the mechanism in which they are 
entered into may be constrained by public law regulating the use of state budget or 
assets.1272 Although such contracts can be preceded by administrative decision, the 
Law on Administrative Court stipulates that such an agreement (and the initial 
decision to contract-out) does not fall under its jurisdiction.1273  
Meanwhile, Simatupang is of the opinion that despite the delegation of powers 
from the government to the private sector in Jakarta (for example, the power to 
disconnect from network), the contract remains an ordinary private contract not 
reviewable by the Administrative Court and the decision made by the concessionaire 
remains a private decision.1274  
The categorisation of types of contracts will have implications for 
transparency. If a contract is considered a concession (in the ‘legal’ sense of the term), 
 
1271 Hadjon, P.M. and others, Pengantar Hukum Administrasi Indonesia (Introduction to Indonesian 
Administrative Law) (Gadjah Mada University Press 1993) p. 166-167 
1272  ibid p. 166-167 
1273 Undang Undang No. 5 Tahun 1986 Tentang Peradilan Tata Usaha Negara Article 2.b. This article 
precludes “civil acts” but the elucidation refers to ordinary sale and purchase agreements containing no 
delegation of public services. 
1274 Simatupang, Jawaban Tentang Konsesi . However, in several cases involving fines imposed by the 
State Electricity Company to its customers, the Supreme Court ruled that despite the fact that the 
contract signed between the Company and its customers are standard private contracts, the imposition of 
fines is subject to the Court’s jurisdiction as the power to impose fines has its source in Government 
Regulations. See Bedner, A., Administrative courts in Indonesia: a socio-legal study (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2001) p.69    
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doctrinally, the contract is then a form of licence and the concessionaire is in exercise 
of a public function and can even be considered as a public official whose decision – 
by way of delegation from the government– is regarded as an administrative decision. 
By implication, such a contract will be considered a public document and should, 
therefore, be disclosed to the public. If, on the other hand, the contract is regarded as 
an ordinary contract entered into by the government in the course of its daily function, 
it falls entirely under private law and does not fall under the competence of the 
Administrative Court. The rules on public procurement carry no effect as to the form 
of the contract. Both concession contracts and ordinary contracts can be generated 
through public procurement.  
Is the Jakarta water cooperation agreement between PAM Jaya and Palyja and 
between PAM Jaya and Aetra a concession contract or an ordinary private contract? 
Although the agreement has been referred to in literatures1275 and the media as the 
“Jakarta Concession”, the official title of the agreement between PAM Jaya and 
Palyja/Aetra is actually the “Cooperation Agreement” (Perjanjian Kerja Sama). This 
is because the term used in the PAM Jaya statute1276 which regulates and grants 
 
1275 For example in Braadbaart, . 'Privatizing water. The Jakarta concession and the limits of contract' A 
World of Water. Rain, Rivers and Seas in Southeast Asian Histories 297 also  Jensen, O., ‘Troubled 
Partnerships: Problems and Coping Strategies in Jakarta’s Water Concessions’ (4th Conference on 
Applied Infrastructure Research 
) <http://www.infraday.tu-
berlin.de/fileadmin/documents/infraday/2005/papers/jensen_Troubled_Partnerships_Problems.pdf> 
February 11, 2011 , even the regulator’s whitebook: Lanti, A. and others, The First Ten Years of 
Implementation of the Jakarta Water Supply 25-Year Concession Agreement (1998-2008) (Jakarta 
Water Supply Regulatory Body (JWSRB) 2009) , also Lanti, ‘A regulatory approach to the Jakarta 
Water Supply concession contracts’   
1276 By Law 13/92  Article 45 
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capacity to its directors to engage with third parties is through the mechanism of a 
“Cooperation Agreement”. 
The content of the ‘Cooperation Agreement”, however, enabled Palyja and 
Aetra to enter into legal relationships with the customer “acting both in its own right 
and for and on behalf of [Pam Jaya]”1277, and required that such customer contracts 
be adjusted in accordance with the Cooperation Agreement and allowed the 
disconnection of the flow of water to customer on behalf of PAM Jaya,1278 including 
acting in emergency situations1279 which may entail disruption of water services. 
Given such powers provided to the private providers, the argument that the contracts 
between PAM Jaya and Palyja and Aetra are a concession by nature is appealing.1280  
Success of a concession depends on institutional capacity, especially a well-
developed body of jurisprudence on concession problems and the role of the 
administrative court in performing legal evaluation to the concession project1281 and in 
protecting and defending the public interest. What is absent in Indonesia is a well-
developed jurisprudence on concession (and on other administrative law contracts!) 
 
1277 Cooperation Agreement Between PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 Clause 19.8 
1278 Ibid Clause 28.5.c 
1279 Ibid Clause 36.2 
1280 Management of public service under French Law can be carried out through rentals (l’affermage), 
public management contracts (la gérance), direct state control (la régie), or concession. Hurstel, D. and 
Pecquet-Carpenter, M., ‘Public Interest and Private Management: Incompatible Partners?’ in S. Cotter 
and D. Campbell (eds), Comparative Law Yearbook of International Business 1995 (Kluwer Law Intl 
1995). According to Llorens, concession under French law contains six elements:  The purpose of the 
public service covered under the contract; The delegation of the public service to a co-contracting 
party; The means of remuneration of the concession holder; The responsibility of initial investment 
costs; and The duration of the contract. See   Francois Llorens, The Current Definition of Public Service 
Concession in Internal Law, Strasbourg Law School, as quoted by Hurstel and Pecquet-Carpenter 
above.  
1281 Ibid 
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and the limited role of the administrative court which, unlike the French Conseil 
d’Etat, cannot function as ‘quasi-regulator’ or ‘super-regulator’.1282 The Conseil 
d’Etat can perform regulatory functions such as resolving consumer contracts or even 
modifying contractual terms1283 but Indonesian Administrative Courts are constrained 
from doing so.1284 If a claim is proven, the judgment can only contain one of the 
following obligations: “rescission of the litigated administrative decision, the issuance 
of an administrative decision in case of a constructive refusal, or the rescission of the 
litigated decision and the issuance of a new decision..”1285 Even the original 
administrative decision will never be ‘quashed’ by the Indonesian Court.1286 What the 
Court does is simply obligate the public official to revoke, renew, adjust or issue a 
new administrative decision. 
Unlike the ideal concessions,1287 the delegation of public service functions in 
the Jakarta Water Supply Cooperation Agreement contract is not enabled through 
 
1282 Stern, J., ‘The relationship between regulation and contracts in infrastructure industries’ CCRP 
Working Paper No: 1 
<http://www.city.ac.uk/economics/dps/CCRP%20Working%20Papers/newjs2.pdf> accessed February 
12, 2011 
1283 Ibid 
1284 A case can either be rejected, proven, dismissed or declared as lapsed. See Undang Undang No. 5 
Tahun 1986 Tentang Peradilan Tata Usaha Negara Article 97.7 and Bedner, Administrative courts in 
Indonesia: a socio-legal study p. 128 
1285 Bedner, Administrative courts in Indonesia: a socio-legal study section 19, p. 128. This is based on  
Undang Undang No. 5 Tahun 1986 Tentang Peradilan Tata Usaha Negara Article 97.9 
1286 Bedner, Administrative courts in Indonesia: a socio-legal study p.128 
1287 This is not to suggest that there is an ideal way for delegating public service to the private sector. 
Even in France, where the judiciary is more resourceful and has had centuries of experience with PSP, 
delegation of public service to the private sector has been highly criticised for lacking  contractual 
clarity, inadequate or non-existent supervision, and lack of information to consumers. See report by 
Cour des Comptes, 1997, ‘La gestion des services publics locaux d'eau et d'assainissement’, Paris, Les 
Editions du Journal Officiel, January, as cited by Elnaboulsi, J.C., ‘Organization, management and 
delegation in the French water industry’ 72 Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics 507. 
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strong oversight by the Administrative Court. In fact, the Cooperation Agreement 
contains a clause which refers any dispute between PAM Jaya and the concessionaires 
to international arbitration. This dispute settlement clause – ideally – cannot prevent 
an ordinary citisen from filing a suit before the Administrative Court against any 
decision made by the concessionaires or PAM Jaya but, to a certain extent, does limit 
the state’s control and oversight of the delegation of its public service.1288 Finally, the 
use of confidentiality provisions on the Cooperation Agreement which covers both the 
contractual documents itself and any regulatory information generated therefrom, 
appears to contradict the original concept of a concession, which is, to advance public 
interest by the use of “private” hands.  
Hence, although the Jakarta Cooperation Agreement contains the element of 
public service delegation from PAM Jaya to the concessionaires, the contract design 
departs from the original idea and intention of a concession. Instead of overarching 
state control, public interest oversight is limited by the use of confidentiality 
 
Elnabousi continued: “The lack of transparency is identified as a major problem by the report. The 
move to delegation was rarely properly evaluated. Contracts are ambiguous. Sub-contracting goes to 
sister companies in the same group without competition, and procedures are exempted from 
procurement rules. As a result, says the report,'The lack of supervision and control of delegated public 
services, aggravated by the lack of transparency of this form of management, has led to abuses'.”  
1288 In order to succeed, concessions and other modes of delegation of public service to the private 
sector require strong state presence, enabled by the legal and contractual framework. According to 
Elnabousi: “Thus, the only real source of municipality bargaining power is the threat to revoke 
delegation in favour of direct management. In fact, local authorities must be able to exert a particular 
strong credible threat to mitigate the risks of ex-post opportunism. French administrative law provides 
such credible threat because local communities are authorized to alter certain contractual terms or to 
suspend the contract: a breach of the contract's terms or a strategic use of contract incompleteness can 
lead to an immediate and irreversible penalty (i.e., the loss of the market held by the private company) 
only on the grounds of public interest.” See ibid International arbitration clause on Jakarta’s Water 
Supply Cooperation Contract effectively renders Jakarta regional government toothless. With them 
being unable to make worthy threats, ex post opportunism may flourish.  
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provisions and referral to international arbitration bodies. The drafters of the contract 
also fail to calculate Indonesia’s Administrative Court’s lack of institutional capacity 
in adjudicating such contracts.  
6.4.3. Selection and removal of regulator  (JWSRB) 
As explained in the previous section, the governance structure of Jakarta’s 
water services following the Cooperation Agreement becomes complicated. The 
Jakarta Water Service Regulatory Body (JWSRB) has no sufficient mandate to 
regulate and does not have the power to issue penalties or fines to the concessionaire. 
Its role is limited only to mediating disputes, organising coordination with 
bureaucratic offices and advising the Jakarta Governor on tariff issues. Final prices are 
determined by the Jakarta Governor and monitoring and supervision of contracts is 
done by PAM Jaya. Nevertheless, the Cooperation Agreement suggests that in the 
future JWSRB should be reinforced through a Regional By-Law.1289 This move opens 
up opportunities for JWSRB to gain more regulatory authority.  
The organisation of JWSRB is arranged simultaneously by two instruments 
which often overlap: the Jakarta Governor’s Regulation1290 and the Cooperation 
Agreement of 2001.1291 The provision on selection and removal of economic 
regulators is contained in Pergub-118. Members are appointed by the Governor and 
 
1289 Cooperation Agreement Between PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 
1290 Peraturan Gubernur DKI Jakarta No.118 Tahun 2011 Tentang Badan Regulator Pelayanan Air 
Minum  
1291 Cooperation Agreement Between PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 
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can be removed from their position.1292 The prerequisites of becoming a member of 
the regulatory body are: an Indonesian national 35-65 years of age, passed the fit and 
proper test, never been convicted of crime, declared bankrupt or under guardianship, 
has not been working for the concessionaire within the two years prior to its 
membership in the regulatory body and who will provide an undertaking that they will 
not be working for the concessionaires two years after its appointment, and finally, it 
is preferable that they have specific experience in drinking water provision, either 
from the technical, legal, financial or customer relations’ perspectives, and is known 
among the professionals.1293 The provision concerning undertaking is an improvement 
from the earlier version of the rule which does not regulate ‘revolving door’ 
properly.1294 Nevertheless, it is not clear on the actual effect of such ‘undertaking’ if it 
is violated.  
  Pergub-118 stipulates that the selection process will be conducted by the 
Jakarta investment authority, which may impose additional prerequisites (presumably, 
as long as it does not contradict with what has been stipulated in the Pergub 118).1295 
An announcement must be made to the public explaining that a selection is to be 
commenced together with the details of the task, responsibility, prerequisites of 
appointment, authority and their rights as a member of the JWSRB.1296 A professional 
 
1292Peraturan Gubernur DKI Jakarta No.118 Tahun 2011 Tentang Badan Regulator Pelayanan Air 
Minum  Art 12  
1293  ibid Article 11 
1294 Ibid See Article 9 which puts the prerequisite of “will not be working for the concessionaire” as 
conditions of appointment. See also the previous rule Peraturan Gubernur No. 54 Tahun 2005 Tentang 
Badan Regulator Pelayanan Air Minum 
1295 Peraturan Gubernur DKI Jakarta No.118 Tahun 2011 Tentang Badan Regulator Pelayanan Air 
Minum  Article 12 
1296 Ibid Article 13 
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consultant – presumably under contract with the Jakarta investment authority – should 
be hired to assess the candidates.1297 The Pergub-118 does not enumerate the format 
and timing of an announcement except that it requires that it should be made before 
the appointment.   
Membership of the regulatory body ceases when a member resigns, is 
mentally or physyically ill for more than three consecutive months, is deceased, his 
term of office has ended or he violates the laws and regulations.1298 Pergub-118 
stipulates that a member of the regulatory body who violates laws and regulations can 
be temporarily suspended by the Governor1299 for a period of a maximum of six 
months. Membership of the regulatory body can be reinstated by the Governor if the 
alleged violation is unproven.1300 
Almost similar to OFWAT, who must present its resource account to the 
comptroller1301, the JWSRB is also obligated by Pergub-118 to propose its 
expenditure plan to the Governor, through PAM Jaya.1302 Interestingly, although the 
Governor is the party who approves the regulator’s expenditure plan, the regulator is 
accountable and must deliver its expenditure accountability report to PAM Jaya, 
which actually is also a regulated entity.1303 Futhermore, it is PAM Jaya that is tasked 
 
1297 IbidArticle 13 
1298 Ibid Article 14 
1299IbidArticle 14 
1300 Ibid Article 15 
1301 See section 5.3.2 above on OFWAT’s accountability mechanism 
1302 Peraturan Gubernur DKI Jakarta No.118 Tahun 2011 Tentang Badan Regulator Pelayanan Air 
Minum  Article 20(4) 
1303 IbidArticle 22(3) 
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with evaluating the regulator’s expenditure report.1304 The role of the Governor is 
constrained to legalising and providing acquit de charge to the report, after and based 
on the evaluation report made by PAM Jaya.1305 This overlap signifies the power 
game between actors of the concession. Thus, although JWSRB’s finance is secured 
through direct allocation from the escrow account, its budgetary planning is not 
independent since the ‘regulator’ is accountable to and supervised by the regulatee.  
6.4.4. Conflict of interest 
Except for Article 11 which provides that one of the prerequisites for 
appointment is that the person “has not been working for the concessionaire within 
two years prior to its appointment in the regulatory body” and Article 14.1.d 
forbidding members of the regulatory body be formally employed by another 
institution, there are no other provisions in  Pergub-118 on conflict of interest. The 
prohibition on holding other formal employment might be difficult to materialise and 
at the same time be ineffective in preventing conflict of interest. As outside 
appointments may or may not cause conflict of interest, the best mechanism to prevent 
and avoid conflict of interest is through disclosure rules, as practiced is England. In 
Chapter III, this thesis discussed that Victoria’s ESC members are allowed to hold 
other positions. Since the members of the regulatory body are not government 
employees, no other public law rules are applicable to them. 
6.4.5. Means of Acquiring Information 
 
1304 Ibid Article 22(3) 
1305 Ibid Article 22(3) 
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As previously discussed, Jakarta’s water services are suffering from 
ambiguous regulatory arrangements. JWSRB’s real mandate under the Cooperation 
Agreement is only in conducting, monitoring and mediating disputes.1306 PAM Jaya 
also has a regulatory role in supervising1307 and even in enforcing penalties1308  
against their private partners. PAM Jaya obviously has a conflict of interest in this sort 
of regulatory structure, as it is both a regulator (equipped with sanctioning power by 
the contract) and, at the same time, also a party to the contract. In addition, there is the 
role of the Governor (with the approval of the regional parliament) who is in charge of 
determining tariffs.1309 
This fragmented regulatory structure has implications for information flow. As 
a party to the contract and a ‘regulator’, most reporting duties imposed on the private 
sector under the contract are towards PAM Jaya. PAM Jaya, for example, has powers 
to investigate, review, assess and evaluate the private partner’s performance,1310 and 
inspect and take copies of the assets register.1311 It is also entitled to “obtain 
information and data” from the private partners,1312 acquire online access to all 
information and data,1313 and obtain monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, annual and  
 
1306 Cooperation Agreement Between PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 Clause 51 
1307 Ibid Clause 9.1. PAM Jaya has the right to: “investigate, review, assess and evaluate the 
performance of the Second Party of its obligations under this Agreement so as to cause the Second 
Party's achievement of the Technical Targets and Service Standards” 
1308 Ibid Clause 31  
1309 Ibid Clause 26 
1310 Ibid Clause 35.2.a 
1311 Ibid Clause 13.4.c 
1312 Ibid Clause 35.2.b 
1313 Ibid Clause 35.2.d 
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five-yearly reports.1314 There is also obligation for the concessionaire to submit 
reports, quarterly, monthly, semi-annually andfive-yearly  (or five annual?) reports. 
 There is also an obligation by the concessionaire to ‘maintain transparent 
accounts’ and the corresponding right of PAM Jaya – at any time – to audit such 
accounts,1315 and to enable other relevant governmental bodies to conduct audits and 
access, at all reasonable times, “all relevant books and records”.1316 There is no 
clarification on what is meant by a ‘transparent’ account. There is no distinctive 
regulatory account. The contract only refers to the Indonesian standard generally 
accepted accounting principles.1317 Meanwhile, there is only one clause in the contract 
empowering the JWSRB with an audit power and the concessionaires’ coresponding 
obligation to   “provide all requested information and data” for the purpose of such 
audits.1318  
Since PAM Jaya has a conflict of interest in the regulatory structure, it may 
have an interest not to share all regulatory information it receives from the private 
partners with JWSRB. Often there are disagreements between the JWSRB and PAM 
Jaya. The regulatory structure creates incentives to PAM Jaya not to disclose 
information to the public which will be explained in the next section.  
 
1314 Ibid Clause 35.3 Unfortunately, the content of such reporting obligation is not outlined in the 
contract as they are stipulated in the “Procedure on Performance Supervising and Evaluation System 
Agreement” which is confidential and not available to the author. 
1315 Ibid Clause 50.1.a 
1316 Ibid Clause 50.2 
1317 Ibid Clause 16.3 
1318 Ibid Clause 50.1.b 
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Therefore, JWSRB lacks regulatory powers to acquire information and may 
not receive adequate input of information from its counterpart, PAM Jaya, due to 
PAM Jaya’s interest in non disclosure. As a result, despite its relatively reformist 
stance, JWSRB only has a little information to be disclosed to the public. 
   
6.4.6. General Disclosure Policy 
Jakarta’s regulatory bodies are constrained from disclosing information arising 
out of the concession due to the confidentiality clause on the Cooperation Agreement. 
This has been the primary impediment towards transparency.   
The clause obligates the parties to keep all information arising out of the 
contract confidential, unless both of the parties agree otherwise. Through some 
informants, the author is able to confirm that the confidentiality clause reads as 
follows1319: 
47.1 General Provisions 
The parties, officers, directors, experts and/or personnel and agents of each 
Party are obliged to maintain the confidentiality of all commercial and 
technical information which they possess and has been obtained from each 
Party, and are forbidden from using the information except for the purposes 
intended in this Agreement, except for that categorized as: 
(a) information which was already controlled/possessed by one Party, unless it 
should have been known by such Party that such information constitutes 
confidential information of the other Party; 
 
1319 Ibid Clause 47.1 and 2 
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(b) information which was public knowledge at the time it was revealed under 
this Agreement; and 
(c) information which became public knowledge after being revealed under 
this Agreement. 
 
47.2 Disclosure of Confidential Material 
(a) The Parties may disclose the confidential information referred to in Clause 
47.1 to a third party for the purpose of implementation of this Agreement, with 
the stipulation that a written agreement has been made before the information 
is disclosed to ensure that the third party receiving the information will 
maintain its confidentiality and only use the information for the purpose for 
which it was disclosed. 
(b) In the event of a disclosure of information as intended in Clause 47.2(a), in 
the interest of the implementation of this Agreement, the disclosure must first 
be approved by the other Party. 
Without any waiver clause or Freedom of Information override, such a clause 
impedes the application of the FoI Law. In Victoria’s water project, the confidentiality 
clause is complemented by a waiver clause, which requires compliance with FoI Act 
or other legislations (see section 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 above).  
First, it is relevant to ask: who are bound by this provision? The Cooperation 
Agreement mandates that all parties (Pam Jaya and the concessionaires) and people 
affiliated with them (this includes directors, experts, personnel) shall “maintain the 
confidentiality of all commercial and technical information which they possess and 
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has been obtained from each Party”.1320 It is to be noted that the term ‘party’ here 
refers to the concessionaires and PAM Jaya. It is interesting to ask if the regulatory 
body (JWSRB) and officials at the Governor’s office can also be bound by this clause. 
Strictly speaking, as a non-party, they cannot be directly bound by the contract. 
However, as the regulatory body is instituted under the contract, they adopt some of 
the principles stipulated therein, and this includes the policies to preserve 
confidentialities. This prompts a question on the transparency impact of the hybrid 
model.1321   
Secondly, it is relevant to discuss the breadth of this provision. Which 
information is covered by the confidentiality clause? One must note that the term 
“commercial and technical information” covers a wide range of information. In 
practice, this clause effectively shields all information acquired by PAM Jaya through 
reports and investigation towards the concessionaires. In other research conducted by 
the author, not only regulatory information is treated as confidential, but also the 
Cooperation Agreement itself. 1322 The regulator considers that the contract 
confidentiality clause extends into the contract document itself. This was confirmed 
by a field interview with Palyja, which also interprets that the confidentiality clause is 
meant to cover both information arising out of the contract and the contract itself.1323 
 
1320 Ibid Clause 47.1 
1321 For discussion on “hybrid” model of regulation see Eberhard, ‘Infrastructure regulation in 
developing countries: an exploration of hybrid and transitional models’ See Sections 1.4.2, 1.5.5 and 2.1 
1322 Al'Afghani and others, Transparansi Lembaga-lembaga Regulator Penyediaan Air Minum Di DKI 
Jakarta 
1323 Interview with Palyja in Jakarta, January 10, 2011. Palyja regard that the confidentiality clause may 
provoke suspicion and erode public trust. 
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Finally, this stance was confirmed by an official FoI request1324 made by an NGO to 
PAM Jaya. The NGO request demanded that PAM Jaya disclose (a) Jakarta Water 
Cooperation Agreements along with its amendments, (b) results of financial audits 
conducted by the state audit agency and (c) financial projections used in determining 
water tariffs. However, PAM Jaya, through a letter1325 cited the summary of clause 47 
above and refused to disclose the requested information, including the Cooperation 
Agreement itself. Thus, the private sectors, JWSRB and PAM Jaya all have one voice 
in this matter: the confidentiality clause extends to the concession contract itself. The 
case, at the time of this writing, is currently being appealed to the National Freedom 
of Information Commission.1326 
This restriction from disclosure under Clause 47 has four qualifiers: (1) 
disclosure can only be made to “third parties”, (2) disclosure can only be made with 
the purpose of implementing the Cooperation Agreement, (3) the disclosing party and 
the third party must enter into a confidentiality agreement prior to the disclosure and, 
(4) all parties to the Cooperation Agreement must agree to the disclosure.1327 Public 
disclosure of any regulatory information acquired by PAM Jaya is then virtually 
impossible, as the contract requires any third parties to enter into confidentiality 
agreement with the disclosing party. The qualifiers are only designed to disclose 
 
1324 Reza, M., Permintaan Dokumen dan Informasi Kontrak Konsesi Layanan Air Minum Jakarta 
(Freedom of Information Law Request for Documents and Contractual Information Concerning 
Jakarta's Water Services Concession), Letter No.019/KIP/V/2011 dated October 31, 2011 (KRuHA 
2011)   
1325 Daryanto, Jawaban Surat KRuHA (Letter No. 581/DIV.T&P/XI/2011 dated November 8 2011 on 
PAM JAYA's response to FoI Request by KRuHA) 
1326 Rizal, Tanda Terima Pendaftaran Pengajuan Sengketa Informasi No. A26/RSI/P/XII/KIP/2011, 
KRuHA vs PDAM DKI Jakarta, 07-12-2011 (Komisi Informasi Pusat (KIP) 2011)   
1327 Cooperation Agreement Between PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 Clause 47.2 
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information to specific third parties, such as accountants and auditors but not the 
public. 
Furthermore, this clause serves primarily the interest of the concessionaire, 
although it is formulated to apply to both parties. This is because all regulatory 
information tends to flow from the concessionaires to PAM Jaya through the reporting 
duties and investigative powers as discussed in the previous section, and not the other 
way around. It is PAM Jaya who has the obligation to be accountable in its dealings 
with third parties, including the concessionaire, and therefore might be required to 
disclose some regulatory information. 
Pergub-118, which is the primary legal basis for the establishment of the 
regulatory body outside the Cooperation Agreement, stipulates that the JWSRB is 
obligated to maintain confidentiality of all information and can only utilise 
information for the purposes of mediating disputes between the contracting parties.1328 
This is despite the fact the Pergub-118 refers to the Indonesian Freedom of 
Information Law. In addition, JWSRB enacted its internal code of conduct on 
participation and transparency, the Regulatory Body Rule No. 2 Year 2007 on the 
Mechanism and Procedure of Transparency in Jakarta’s Water Services.1329 Since 
JWSRB’s initial mandate is weak, the rule has no legitimate binding power, although 
in practice it is used as a basis for JWSRB’s operation.  Despite the word 
 
1328 Peraturan Gubernur DKI Jakarta No.118 Tahun 2011 Tentang Badan Regulator Pelayanan Air 
Minum  Article 5.b . Note that the JWSRB’s primary function is mediating disputes. See section 6.1.3.4 
above. The JWSRB lacks the power normally accorded to independent regulatory bodies, such as in 
determining tariffs or imposing penalties. This article appears to be drafted in light of that purpose.  
1329 Peraturan Badan Regulator Pelayanan Air Minum DKI Jakarta No. 02 Tahun 2007 Tentang 
Mekanisme Dan Prosedur Transparansi Pelayanan Air Minum Jakarta   
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“transparency” in the rule’s title, the rule makes no mention of public disclosure of 
regulatory information.   
To conclude, although the JWSRB and its officials and agents are not a party 
to the contract, the regulation which establishes them incorporates the contract’s 
confidentiality principles. As a result, public disclosure of regulatory information 
becomes impossible.  
This is in contrast with other regional-owned waterwork companies which do 
not engage with private sector participation, such as Bogor. Unconstrained by any 
confidentiality obligation to another party, Bogor, a city 60 kilometers south of 
Jakarta, regulates in its regional by-law that the utility must provide periodical 
performance reports for the purpose of transparency, to the public.1330   
6.4.7. Service Levels and Customer Service 
Service levels and customer service in Jakarta’s water supply are regulated 
through several rules which often overlap. The first layer is GR-16 and its 
implementing regulations enacted by the central government, which includes 
regulations from the Ministry of Health on drinking water quality1331 and rules from 
the Ministry of Public Works1332 on drinking water supply provision system. 
 
1330 Peraturan Daerah Kota Bogor Nomor 5 Tahun 2006 Tentang Pelayanan Air Minum Perusahaan 
Daerah Air Minum Tirta Pakuan Kota Bogor Article 3 (2) (c) 
1331 , Peraturan Menteri Kesehatan Republik Indonesia No. 492/Menkes/PER/IV/2010 Tahun 2010 
Tentang Persyaratan Kualitas Air Minum  
1332 Indonesia, Peraturan Menteri Pekerjaan Umum No.18/PRT/M/2007 Tentang Penyelenggaraan 
Pengembangan Air Minum Sistem Penyediaan Air Minum 
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In the second layer, there is the 1993 pre-concession Jakarta regional by-law 
on “Drinking Water Services in Jakarta Region” (By-law 11)1333 and several 
regulations issued by the governor, such as Pergub-1181334 regulating the JWSRB and 
some other Governor‘s regulations on automatic tariff adjustments. In the third layer, 
there is the Cooperation Agreement1335 along with its addendum and annexes, which 
contain prescriptions on service levels to which the concessionaire must adhere. 
These rules often overlap and contradict each other. As previously discussed, 
both the regulator and the concessionaire believe that GR-16 is not applicable to the 
Cooperation Agreement. 
6.4.7.1. GR-16 
GR-16 obligates cooperatives and privately-owned business enterprises 
involved in drinking water provision to follow planning, management, monitoring and 
evaluation guidelines issued by the minister and to provide the regional or central 
government with information on their service delivery.1336 Article 67 of the GR 
guarantees all customers the right to obtain drinking water services which fulfil the 
quality, quantity and continuity standards1337, to obtain information on the structure 
and the amount of tariffs and bills, to lodge a lawsuit for any harm resulting from the 
 
1333 By Law 11/93 
1334 Peraturan Gubernur DKI Jakarta No.118 Tahun 2011 Tentang Badan Regulator Pelayanan Air 
Minum  
1335 Cooperation Agreement Between PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 
1336 Art 66, Peraturan Pemerintah No. 16 Tahun 2005 (GR-16) Ministerial guidelines are available but 
not sufficiently clear Indonesia, Peraturan Menteri Pekerjaan Umum No.18/PRT/M/2007 Tentang 
Penyelenggaraan Pengembangan Air Minum Sistem Penyediaan Air Minum 
1337 Art 67.1, Peraturan Pemerintah No. 16 Tahun 2005 (GR-16) 
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service, to obtain compensation against any negligence in service delivery and to 
obtain sewerage services or on-site sanitation services. 1338  
Water services providers are obligated to (a) guarantee services based on the 
prescribed standards, (b) provide information to all interested parties on any 
occurrences or specific circumstances which have the potential to alter the quantity or 
quality of service and to (c) provide information on the implementation of service.1339 
GR-16 does not provide examples ofwhat sort of circumstances have the possibility of 
altering service levels. However, the wide formulation of the clause would mean that 
all sorts of deviation from service levels, including disruptions or contamination, 
would require the water utility to inform and warn customers.  
Under the Freedom of Information Law there is also an obligation to announce 
to the public any information which may threaten the ‘livelihood’ of many people and 
the ‘public order’.1340 Such information must be disclosed in manners accessible to the 
community and in an understandable language.1341 According to the government 
drafter of the Indonesian FoI Law UU No. 14/2008, ‘livelihood’ is to be understood as 
the ‘society’s needs’ and ‘public order’ is to be understood as ‘concerning a person’s 
life’.1342 This formulation renders it certain that vital information concerning 
contamination of water supplies falls under this clause.   
 
1338 Ibid 
1339 Art 68, ibid 
1340 Undang Undang No.14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik, Article 10 
1341Ibid 
1342 See Anotasi Undang Undang Nomor 14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik, Edisi 
Pertama, Komisi Informasi Pusat, 2009, p.136 
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6.4.7.2. By-law 11 
By-law 11/1993 stipulates that the Jakarta Governor appoints PAM Jaya as a 
caretaker in undertaking the provision and distribution of drinking water1343 and that 
PAM Jaya has the obligation to provide the service to the community.1344 By-law 11 
regulates the prerequisites for connecting to the mains network1345 and the boundaries 
on liability for maintenance of assets.1346 The consumer’s rights and obligations are 
also regulated in By-law 11/93, however, they put weight on consumer’s obligations 
towards the utilities and not their rights.  
GR-16 and Water Law 7/2004 could be implemented in the regions when they 
have been incorporated in regional legislations. Nevertheless, the by-law has never 
been amended since its enactment in 1993, thus, it is disconnected from GR-16 and 
Water Law 7/2004.1347 
 
1343 Article 2.1 By Law 11/93 
1344 Article 2.2 ibid 
1345 Inter alia, that the request to connect has to be in writing, Article 4.2. Other prerequisites are listed 
in Article 7 ibid 
1346 Consumers are responsible for pipes existing in their parcels of land, although prior checking by 
PAM Jaya is obligatory, Articles 7.b and 8 of ibid 
1347 The concession might be one of the reasons why the by-law has never been amended to ensure 
compliance with  national legislations in the water sector. Changing the by-law would require changing 
key terms in the concession contract which directly affects the contract’s economics. The cost for 
renegotiation is high, meanwhile, the government’s and the parties’ concern is to keep the contracts 
afloat, by insulating it from sudden changes. This begs the question of whether regulation by contract, 
and concession especially, will have the effect of restraining sectoral reform. See Al'Afghani, M.M., 
‘When It Comes to Water Services, Jakarta Is Living in the Distant Past’ The Jakarta Globe, October 
16, 2011 <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/opinion/when-it-comes-to-water-services-jakarta-is-living-
in-the-distant-past/471774> accessed May 24, 2012 also Al'Afghani, M.M., ‘Anti-Privatisation Debates, 
Opaque Rules and ‘Privatised’ Water Services Provision: Some Lessons from Indonesia’ in Alan Nicol, 
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6.4.7.2.1. Consumer obligations and liabilities 
Consumers are responsible for the installation and examination of the 
auxillary reticulation network (pipa persil) in accordance with PAM Jaya’s 
standards1348 and the maintenance of the auxillary reticulation network including the 
replacement thereof1349. It must also allow utilities’ officials to access buildings and 
land occupied by them for the purpose of maintenance of water meter and 
networks1350. Furthermore, consumers are responsible for the repair of the main 
reticulation network within [or below] consumers’ land and buildings which occurred 
due to consumers’ omissions or actions1351 and to care for water meters in their lands 
or buildings1352. Customers are obliged to pay a connection fee, the amount of which 
will be determined by the Director of PAM Jaya,1353 and to pay a guarantee fee, the 
amount of which will be determined by the Director of PAM Jaya. 1354 Consumers are 
also obligated to pay their monthly fees at the venue determined by PAM Jaya1355 and 
to pay late fees if payments are not made within five days after the billing date1356.  
In addition to the above, By-law 11 contains a list of prohibitions, for 
everyone and not just consumers,,for example, the prohibition of disrupting or 
 
Lyla Mehta and Jeremy Allouche (eds), IDS Bulettin: ‘Some for All?’ Politics and Pathways in Water 
and Sanitation, vol 43.2 (Institute of Development Studies, Wiley-Blackwell 2012) 
1348 By-law 13/1992 Article 7 
1349 By-law 13 Art 8 
1350 Article 9.1 and 2, By Law 11/93  
1351 Article 9.3, ibid 
1352 Article 10, ibid 
1353 Article 14 .1 and 2, ibid 
1354 The guarantee fee can be refunded when they cease to become customers. Article 15, ibid 
1355 Article 21.1 ibid 
1356 Article 21.2, ibid 
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destroying piped networks, tampering with metering devices, bypassing water meters, 
or changing the diameter of installed pipes, distributing or selling water from their 
home tap or directly (illegally) connecting to the main network.1357 Such prohibitions 
come with criminal provisions of up to three months of imprisonment and shall be 
classified as a ‘crime’ under the criminal code1358 as well as administrative penalties 
in the form of ‘revocation of connection licence’1359 and compensation fees equal to 
the volume of water stolen, the amount of which will be determined by PAM 
directors.1360 
Customers who do not pay within five days after the due date will be 
temporarily disconnected1361 and those failing to pay within one month after the due 
date will be permanently disconnected.1362 In both cases, re-connection is possible 
after the indebted amount and the late fees are paid.1363 
During field interviews, it was revealed that PAM Jaya had pressed Palyja to 
enforce disconnection provision on By-law 11.1364 PAM Jaya had blocked Palyja’s 
revenue in the escrow account for failing to enforce the by-law. Palyja maintained, 
however, that disconnection does not create an incentive for people to pay since they 
 
1357 Article 24 ibid 
1358 Article 25 ibid 
1359 Article 27ibid 
1360 Article 28 ibid 
1361 Article 21.3, ibid 
1362 Article 21.4, ibid If permanent disconnection occurs, the network and water meter will be sealed. 
1363 Article 21.5 and 6, ibid 
1364 The field interviews cannot reveal the motivation of PAM Jaya in using its power to block the 
escrow. It is possible that it is the only means for PAM Jaya to force the renegotiation of the 
Cooperation Contract. However, this was done to the detriment of Palyja and eventually the consumer, 
since it prevents Palyja from conducting repair work or investing in assets. Personal Communication, 
Field Interview with Palyja, Jakarta, January 10, 2011 
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do not have the financial capacity to pay. 1365  The parties eventually agreed to enforce 
the by-law in specific regions of Jakarta, for a limited six month period.   
6.4.7.2.2. Consumer ‘rights’ 
According to By-law 11, consumers have the right to ask for examination of 
their water meter1366 and to complain against inaccurate water metering, however, 
such complaint does not in any way suspend their obligation to pay their monthly 
water tariffs1367 and in the event the inaccuracy is proven, the payment should be 
measured based on the average water use in the previous three months1368 or PAM 
Jaya will arbitrarily decide the estimate of amount that should be paid.1369 In the event 
that overcharging or undercharging occurred, the payment should be compensated the 
coming month.1370 
By-law 11 at Article 24 lists several activities which are considered violations 
and “crimes”, such as tampering with water installations, reselling or distributing 
water outside the customer’s property and stealing water from the pipes. All these 
crimes come with harsh monetary, administrative and criminal punishments. One of 
the consumer “rights” is to object to the Governor against monetary penalties 
determined by the PAM Jaya Director. The decision of the Governor with regards to 
this objection, according to By-law 11, is “binding” and no other possibility of access 
 
1365 Ibid 
1366 Article 20.1 By Law 11/93 
1367 Article 19.1 and 2, ibid 
1368 Article 19.3, ibid  
1369 Article 19.4, ibid  
1370 Article 19.5 ibid 
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to justice is presented 1371, although actually, access to the Court in general is 
guaranteed in national legislation.1372  
It is a very disturbing fact that the only rights guaranteed by By-law 11 are the 
right to complain against an incorrect water meter to PAM Jaya and the right to object 
to penalties to the Governor. There are no clauses regulating the provision of water for 
vulnerable groups and the economically weak, no provision on payments in arrears 
and no provision stipulating the customer’s right to enjoy uninterrupted water services 
at a specific quantity, quality and pressure. This is in contradiction with higher laws 
such as GR-16 and Water Law 7/2004. However, since water services are a 
decentralised matter and national legislations mandate regional government in its 
implementation, it is By-law 11 and the Cooperation Agreement (discussed below) 
that is deemed to be the prevailing law.  
6.4.7.3. The Cooperation Agreement 
The Cooperation Agreement obligates the concessionaires to meet certain 
service levels1373. Concessionaires are given the liberty to determine the means and 
method for delivering the service standards as set on the contract schedule.  There is 
also an obligation to conduct sampling and testing of water quality in accordance with 
standards agreed by the Ministry of Health, complemented by the obligation to deliver 
the test results to PAM Jaya, every month. PAM Jaya is allowed to exercise its own 
testing on the condition that it does not hinder the concessionaire’s daily operation. 
 
1371 Article 28.3 ibid 
1372 Undang Undang Pokok Kekuasaan Kehakiman No. 48 Tahun 2009 
1373 Cooperation Agreement Between PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 Schedule 8   
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The parties may refer examination to an independent expert should disagreement 
concerning compliance of water quality arise.  
Service levels1374 consist of ambient water quality standards, drinking water 
standards, pressure at customer connection, maximum response time to answer phone 
calls, attendance time to respond to complaints, time for completion of repairs, and the 
obligation to connect in areas where mains are available. Categorisation of these 
standards is made available on  JWSRB’s website1375, but the details have never been 
officially disclosed by the authorities and the concessionaire.  
Hence, there is no way for customers in Jakarta to know the services to which 
they are entitled, despite the obligation under GR-16 that private water undertakers are 
obligated to provide information on the implementation of service.1376 In 2007, the 
regulatory body insisted to the media that the Cooperation Agreement contains a 
clause mandating compensation to consumer in the amount of IDR 50000 
 
1374 Ibid Clauses 31.1 and 31.2 
1375 Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body, ‘Kinerja Operator’ (JWSRB)  
<http://www.jakartawater.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=96&Itemid=257&lan
g=en> accessed August 18, 2011 
1376 Peraturan Pemerintah No. 16 Tahun 2005 (GR-16) does not expressly obligate the disclosure of the 
service standard itself, only its implementation is obligated to be disclosed. The obligation to disclose 
service standard is implied.  Ibid Article 68.2 (a) guarantee services based on the prescribed standards, 
(b) provide information to all interested parties on any occurrences or specific circumstances which has 
the potentialto alter the quantity or quality of service and to (d) provide information on the 
implementation of service. The Public Service Law also obliges Public Bodies to inform the content of 
any cooperation agreement entered into between them with third parties to the communities. The 
information should at least explain important issues which should be known to the community such as 
the type of the outsourced project, identity of the provider, the contract period, and the work 
commenced by the provider in accordance with service standard. Undang Undang No. 25 Tahun 2009 
Tentang Pelayanan Publik Article 13.1.b and its elucidation 
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(approximately USD 5) if a disruption occurs for more than one day. A member of the 
regulatory body stated: 
“The JWSRB has requested, over the last 6 months, that customer rights 
should be published. However, the operators always refuse. Without 
publication on the mass media, Jakartans will never know their rights with 
respect to service disruption”.1377 
Note that JWSRB is constrained from publishing the contract due to a 
confidentiality clause1378 and its statute1379 which – pursuant to the contract – 
prohibits the disclosure of regulatory information.  
Such a stance was also supported by the JWSRB Chairman at that time, 
Ahmad Lanti, who suggested that disclosure of consumers’ rights would enable the 
community to file class action suits in order to obtain such compensation.1380 The 
PAM Jaya Director, however, denied that such a compensation scheme exists.1381  
The Cooperation Agreement obliges the concessionaire to complete repairs 
following any interruption, at a maximum, within 24 hours after it occurs. Failure to 
comply with such a requirement may trigger a penalty and, in addition, the obligation 
to pay compensation to consumer.1382 Schedule 15 reads: 
 
1377 Statement of Dr. Riant Nugroho as quoted by Kompas See ‘Hak Pelanggan Disembunyikan 
(Customer's Rights are Concealed)’ Daily Kompas (Jakarta, November 27, 2007). On Personal 
Communication with the author, Dr. Nugroho confirmed such statement. 
1378 Cooperation Agreement Between PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 Clause 47 
1379 Peraturan Gubernur DKI Jakarta No.118 Tahun 2011 Tentang Badan Regulator Pelayanan Air 
Minum  Article 5b  
1380 ‘Hak Pelanggan Disembunyikan (Customer's Rights are Concealed)’ 
1381 Ibid 
1382 Cooperation Agreement Between PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 Schedule 15 
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“Every Customer who complains in writing to the Second Party shall be 
entitled to a rebate in the next month's Customer bill of 10% of the Customer's 
bill for the month in which the complaint arose - with a minimum rebate of Rp. 
10,000 and a maximum rebate of Rp.50,000. 
If a Customer claims compensation in excess of Rp.50,000, the Customer shall 
only be entitled under this Schedule to a maximum of Rp.50,000 with the 
balance of any claim to be settled by mutual agreement between the Second 
Party and the Customer or through some other mediation, arbitral or court 
process.  
Rebates will be made directly to the Customer in the next 
month's Customer bill, without affecting project revenue.” 
When water quality is not in compliance with the prescribed standard, the 
Cooperation Agreement obliges the parties to hold ‘discussions’ “for the purposes of 
establishing the reason for the non-compliance”.1383 Only when it is found that the 
concessionaire is at fault will it be responsible to repair the service and pay a penalty. 
The italicised clause above implies that non-compliance is permissible if it is not due 
to the first party’s fault. 1384 
With only three healthy rivers flowing to Jakarta (out of 19), the supply of 
bulkwater is in a critical situation. During certain seasons silt causes damage to water 
 
1383 Ibid Clause 21.g.  
1384 There are probabilities that the supply of bulkwater decreases in terms of quality and quantity. Such 
a condition is beyond the reach of concessionaire’s abilities. This clause protects the concessionaire 
from being penalised for failures in bulkwater supplies. See ibid Clause 11 
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pumps and treatment installations and eventually causes disruptions.  As the contract 
places the risk of bulkwater supply on PAM Jaya, the clause above often effectively 
shields the concessionaire from its obligation to pay penalty fees caused by the 
disruption. 
In 2009, news emerged that Aetra offset  183 billion IDR worth of penalty 
fees to PAM Jaya. Even with such offset, PAM Jaya still owes Aetra another IDR 237 
billion, which if not paid, will be billed by the time the concession ends in 2022. 1385 
Thus, as a result of the “water charge” system and bulkwater insecurity, PAM Jaya 
has a large amount of debts towards the private partners. If customers are 
compensated, the funds generated from penalty payments will not be able to offset the 
repayment of such debts. 
There is no obligation to disclose non-compliance by the concessionaire and 
the JWSRB has no discretionary power to do so. The confidentiality clause also 
impairs PAM Jaya from disclosing information on non-compliance. 
6.4.7.4. Comparison with Bogor 
 
1385 In the Jakarta concession system, PAM Jaya pays the concessionaires based on the volume of water 
sold to consumers calculated through an indexation formula, taking into account exchange rate and 
inflation rate (this is called “water charge”). Tariff, on the other hand, is set by the Governor, and is 
divided into several bands, depending on the customer’s economic situation.  If collection of tariff 
payment is unable to meet the water charge, PAM Jaya owes money to the Concessionaire (“shortfall”). 
Apparently, the set-off was to pay the amount of shortfall PAM Jaya owes to Aetra. What is not known 
is whether there are portions of money for consumers in that transaction. The concession contract 
obliges that compensation to consumers are paid directly.  See  ibid definition of “Water Charge” and 
clause 35 
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In order to avoid the presumption that such a problem is typical in developing 
countries where there is a general lack of governance, it is relevant to briefly provide 
another Indonesian case study. Bogor is a municipality 60 km south of Jakarta where 
the company is publicly owned. The city’s population is a lot smaller, 750,000, 
compared to Jakarta’s 10 million. Unlike Jakarta, which relies on 1992 and 1993 by 
laws, and has never reformed these even after the concession was concluded, Bogor’s 
water services by-laws were modified in 1996 and 2006. The 2006 amendment is a 
particularly distinctive one as it contains many guarantees on service levels and 
customers’ right. The regional autonomy, which delegates the management of 
drinking water services to regional governments, might have been the driver for these 
reforms. This can be seen from the tendency in several other regions to conduct 
utilities’ reform after  autonomy was introduced in 2001.1386 
In Jakarta’s by-laws there is a duty to serve connection requests from industry, 
residential, tourism, etc.1387 imposed on the regional-owned waterwork company 
that is a partner of the concession contract to the private sector. However, there is no 
duty directly imposed on the private sector to connect the customer. In Bogor, there 
is a general duty ‘to serve’ water services for Bogor residents and a specific duty to 
extend the network to regions with inadequate groundwater quality.1388 
 
1386 See regional by laws enacted in various regions, for example, Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Sragen 
No. 8 Tahun 2004 Tentang Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum Kabupaten Sragen Peraturan Daerah 
Provinsi Kalimantan Barat No. 2 Tahun 2006 Tentang Pendirian Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum 
Provinsi Kalimantan Barat Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Takalar No. 15 Tahun 2003 Tentang 
Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum Peraturan Daerah Kendal No. 13 Tahun 2011  Peraturan Daerah 
Kabupaten Maros No. 4 Tahun 2011 Tentang Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum 
1387 By Law 11/93 
1388Peraturan Daerah Kota Bogor Nomor 5 Tahun 2006 Tentang Pelayanan Air Minum Perusahaan 
Daerah Air Minum Tirta Pakuan Kota Bogor Article 3 hereinafter “By Law 5 (Bogor)”  
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In terms of service levels, the Jakarta by-laws refer to to the Ministerial Decree on 
drinking water quality1389; but in practice, changes to the Decree are not 
automatically applicable. Due to the concession, changes in water quality regulation 
must be negotiated with the private sector. On the other hand, any changes to water 
quality regulation are directly applicable in Bogor. The Bogor regional by-law also 
contains provisions regulating service disruptions, the general obligation for the 
regional waterwork company to supply water with a certain quality, continuity and 
quantity (except on the event of force majeure) and a 24-hour call centre and 
mailbox for customer service.1390 These service levels are clearly stipulated in the 
Bogor regional by-law and are therefore published. As discussed in the previous 
section, in Jakarta, the service levels are regulated in Schedule 81391 of the 
Cooperation Agreement and is a part of contractual confidentiality.  
 
In terms of customers’ rights, the only ‘right’ available under the Jakarta regional 
by-law is the ‘right’ to object to an incorrect water meter to PAM Jaya1392, the 
‘right’ to object to the imposition of penalties by the Governor and the ‘right’ to 
request an examination of a water meter – discussed earlier. Even these are not 
directly formulated as rights. The word used is ‘may’ (i.e. “dapat mengajukan 
keberatan” / i.e. ‘may’ propose objection). The Cooperation Agreement contains 
some stipulation on customers’ rights including compensation payments for 
 
1389 By Law 11/93 Article 19.1 
1390 Article 5, ibid 
1391 Cooperation Agreement Between PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 Schedule 8 
1392 Article 15, By Law 11/93  
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violation of service level standards in “Schedule 15” of the contract as argued by the 
regulator, but this schedule, as it forms a part of the contract, is also confidential.   
 
On the other hand, the Bogor regional by-law contains provisions 
guaranteeing the right to (i) obtain results on the examination of water quality, 
accuracy of metering device, calculation of water bill, (ii) obtain explanation of the 
agreed terms when submitting new connection requests, (iii) obtain information on the 
structure and amount of tariff, (iv) receive a 50% discount on monthly fee if water 
supply is disconnected for three consecutive days without prior notice, (v) receive 
discount if the water company fails to respond within three days after a leakage 
occurs, which causes elevation of customers’ bills, (vi) obtain replacement of water 
meter if the installed meter is not working and (vii) to convey their complaints on 
water bills, water distribution, quality and other matters related to water services.1393 
All of these rights and compensation mechanisms are stipulated in the by-law and, by 
default, a published document.  
6.4.8. Investment  
The contract stipulates for a five-year investment programme and an annual 
Investment and O/M programme.1394 The five-year programme must be agreed by 
PAM Jaya but the yearly investment and O/M programme requires only to be 
discussed with them.1395 The obligation to invest and extend the network is also 
 
1393 Article 20, Peraturan Daerah Kota Bogor Nomor 5 Tahun 2006 Tentang Pelayanan Air Minum 
Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum Tirta Pakuan Kota Bogor 
1394 Cooperation Agreement Between PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 Clause 9.4.F 
1395 Ibid Clause 9.1.F 
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formulated in terms of “technical targets”1396, detailed in schedule 81397 of the 
contract, which consists of the volume of water billed, production of potable water, 
non revenue water, number of connections and the ratio of service coverage1398. The 
companies have full discretion on how to implement them.1399 By the end of the 
contract period, the contract target is 100% of coverage, which means that all of 
Jakarta should be connected to the water network.1400  
Bakker maintained that the system in Jakarta is implicitly ‘anti-poor’ as it 
conveys disincentives to both providers and the poor to connect to the network.1401 
The disincentives for the poor to connect according to Bakker are:  
“insecure tenure, the need for flexibility of payment, convenience, status and 
high ‘transaction costs’ which includes the infrastructure costs to build storage 
because networked water supply is only intermittent; line-ups and time off work to pay 
bills (for those without bank accounts and regular income); fear of time required to 
deal with mis-read meters and over-charging)”.1402  
The concessionaire also faces some disincentives in connecting to the poor. 
On the face of it, the system of water charges which pays the concessionaire based on 
the volume of water they sold (in accordance with indexation formula and other 
 
1396 Ibid Clause 9.4.B 
1397 Ibid, Clause 20 
1398 Ibid, Schedule 8 
1399 Ibid Clause 9.4.B 
1400 Ibid, Schedule 8 Aetra’s coverage in 2007 was 66.08% while its target was 74%. See Lanti and 
others, The First Ten Years of Implementation of the Jakarta Water Supply 25-Year Concession 
Agreement (1998-2008)  
1401 Bakker, ‘Conflicts over water supply in Jakarta, Indonesia’ 
1402  ibid p. 115 
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variables) should not influence their decision to connect. This assumption was 
confirmed by the private sector during an interview in Jakarta.1403 Bakker found that 
disincentives occur because the poor are covered by the lowest tariff band and the 
income generated by extending the network to them falls below the production 
cost.1404 Connecting to the poor means reducing PAM Jaya’s capability to collect 
more revenue and this will eventually affect PAM Jaya’s ability to pay1405 water 
charges to the concessionaires.1406 Other disincentives built in to the system are due to 
the disorderly distribution of homes which raises the transaction costs, and lack of 
land tenure.1407  
Expansion to poor areas with lack of land tenure has been inhibited by the 
presence of mafia-like1408  organisations controlling public hydrants, which benefit 
from very high prices for the amount of water sold from these taps to the poor. 1409 
The flow of money from these activities could also be used to capture policy-making 
in network expansion to the poor. Bluntly said, not connecting to the poor benefits 
both the concessionaire (by reducing the risk of non payment from PAM Jaya and the 
 
1403 The private sector commented that, due to the in built system of water charge, they extend the water 
network solely due to demand considerations. PAM Jaya's Concessionaire, Personal Communication 
with the Private Sector (January 11, 2011)   
1404 According to Bakker’s research in May 2005, the lowest tariff is IDR 500 whereas the production 
cost is approximately IDR 3,000 
1405 See also the discussion on PAM Jaya’s debts above 
1406 Bakker, ‘Conflicts over water supply in Jakarta, Indonesia’ p.123 
1407 Ibid p.128 
1408  Lovei, L. and Whittington, D., ‘Rent-extracting behavior by multiple agents in the provision of 
municipal water supply: a study of Jakarta, Indonesia’ 29 Water Resources Research 
1409 ‘Pay Up: How the Water Mafia Controls Access’ (The Jakarta Globe, 2009)  
<http://thejakartaglobe.com/waterworries/pay-up-how-the-water-mafia-controls-access/319989> 
accessed February 3, 2010 
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high risk of transaction cost by connecting to the poor) and also benefits complicit 
officials through high rent-extraction from selling water from public taps. 
A transparent system would enable the public to comment and participate in 
network expansion and investment plans.1410 Achievement of the concessionaire’s 
technical targets is published partially (but not routinely) by the regulatory body on its 
website1411 and is discussed widely in books published by them.1412 However, what is 
urgent for the citizen is the plan itself, the outcome of which will have a direct effect 
on their livelihood. In an interview with Palyja1413, they pointed out that they 
voluntarily submitted an investment plan every three months before year-end to PAM 
Jaya although it is not required by the contract. This is a good practice but, 
unfortunately, this submission is not followed by a public disclosure from PAM Jaya 
or the regulatory body to the public. There are also no adequate mechanisms for the 
public to be able to obtain, comment and participate in the concessionaire’s 
investment plan.  
6.4.9. Tariff 
A regulation from the Minister of Home Affairs issued in 2006 (Permen 23) 
stipulates that “transparency and accountability” are one of the principles of tariff 
 
1410 In many instances, the high cost of transaction in making the connection can actually be reduced 
through public work conducted by the poor themselves. 
1411 Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body, ‘Kinerja Operator’ 
1412 Lanti and others, The First Ten Years of Implementation of the Jakarta Water Supply 25-Year 
Concession Agreement (1998-2008) 
1413 Interview with Palyja, Jakarta, January 10, 2011 
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setting.1414 It requires tariffs to be ‘affordable’ to those having wages equal to the 
regional minimum wage or not comprising more than 4% of the monthly average 
community’s income.1415 Permen 23 also stipulates that the calculation and enactment 
of tariffs must be transparent and accountable.1416 “Transparency”, according to 
Article 7 of the Permen 23 is to be achieved by “clearly delivering information related 
to the calculation and enactment of tariffs to stakeholders” and by “wholeheartedly 
capturing stakeholders’ aspirations in connection with the calculation and enactment 
of tariffs”.1417 “Accountability” in turn, is to be materialised by “using calculations 
which can be easily understood and can be justifiable to the stakeholders”.1418 
The components of costs1419 (including the data to justify such components), 
types of revenues1420, types of tariffs1421, steps in calculating tariffs including the 
procedures and mechanisms for tariff enactment, are all stipulated in Permen 23. The 
procedures and mechanisms on tariff enactment include the requirement to conduct 
consultations with customer’s representatives and forums and through various media 
 
1414 , Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 23 Tahun 2006 Tentang Pedoman Teknis dan Tata Cara 
Pengaturan Tarif Air Minum Pada Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum Article 2.e. 
1415 Ibid Article 3 
1416 IbidArticle 7 
1417 Ibid Article 7.2 
1418 Ibid Article 7.2 
1419 Ibid Article 12, 13, 14 
1420 Ibid Articles 15, 16  
1421 Ibid Articles 17, 18; It was also revealed on the interview that some customers complained over 
arbitrary removal from tariff band. Interview with Non Governmental Organizations, Jakarta, 
December 20-30, 2010    
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in order to obtain their feedback.1422 This should be done before the proposal is 
submitted to the mayor/governor.  
Unfortunately, a Ministerial Regulation is not considered as a “Peraturan 
Perundang Undangan” under the Indonesian legal system and as such has no binding 
force in the regions.1423 In order to enforce the ministerial regulation, some regions 
often enact their own by-law and refer to the Permen on the Konsideraans part of the 
by-law.1424  
In Jakarta, presumably because of the Cooperation Agreement, the room for 
regulating becomes narrower and that leaves the city with a by-law which, after being 
enacted in 1993, has never been amended or reformed. Regulators and the private 
sector themselves maintained during interviews that Permen 23 and other guidelines 
issued by the central government do not apply to the Jakarta concession.1425  In 
practice, the governing law on tariff setting in Jakarta is limited to  By-laws 11 and 13 
and the Governor’s Decision on automatic tariff adjustment.   
 
1422 , Peraturan Menteri Dalam Negeri No. 23 Tahun 2006 Tentang Pedoman Teknis dan Tata Cara 
Pengaturan Tarif Air Minum Pada Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum Articles 21.2 
1423 Undang Undang No.10 Tahun 2004 Tentang Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang Undangan 
1424 A regional by-law issued by Bogor Municipality invokes the 1998 Ministerial regulation on tariff 
setting Peraturan Daerah Kota Bogor No. 4 Tahun 2004 Tentang Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum Tirta 
Pakuan Kota Bogor Peraturan Daerah Kota Bogor Nomor 5 Tahun 2006 Tentang Pelayanan Air Minum 
Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum Tirta Pakuan Kota Bogor. Konsideraans is a part of a legislation which 
refers to and cites relevant rules 
1425 Personal Communication, Field Interview with Palyja, Jakarta, January 10, 2011 
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By-law 11 stipulates that the amount of drinking water tariffs shall be 
determined by the Jakarta Governor,1426 after being approved by the Ministry of 
Home Affairs.1427 The calculation of tarrifs is based on the classification of consumers 
multiplied by the volume1428 of water used by the consumer.1429 Details on the cost 
structure are not known to the public although the component of the water charge1430 
is announced by the regulator. As discussed in the previous section, By-law 11 does 
not contain any provision on disclosure or public participation on tariff setting.  On 
the contrary, in Bogor, the regional by-law requires tariff setting to be based on the 
principles of affordability, justice, quality, cost recovery, efficiency, transparency, 
accountability and conservation.1431  
6.4.10. Redress 
In By-law 11/1993, other than the consumer’s right to ask for examination of a 
water meter,1432 the right to complain against inaccurate water metering, the 
compensation of which, if hard to measure, will be arbitrarily discussed by PAM 
 
1426 By Law 11/93 Article 16.1 
1427 Ibid Article 16.2 this provision reflects the legal situation before regional autnonomy was 
introduced. Prior to 2001, every regional by-law had to be approved by the central government through 
the Ministry of Home Affairs, including rules which are politically sensitive, such as determination of 
water tariffs. After regional autonomy was introduced, this requirement no longer existed. The Jakarta 
regulator and the private sector maintain that Jakarta is not covered by PP-16 and Water Law 7/2004 
and therefore should be covered solely by By-law 11 – which obligates determination of tariffs through 
the approval of MOHA. This brought confusion and potential legal challenges to tariff decisions.  
1428 Ibid Article 18  
1429 Ibid Article 17  
1430 The formula used in water charge and water tariff is available at JWRSB’s website 
http://www.jakartawater.org/ (accessed January 5, 2010) 
1431 Peraturan Daerah Kota Bogor Nomor 5 Tahun 2006 Tentang Pelayanan Air Minum Perusahaan 
Daerah Air Minum Tirta Pakuan Kota Bogor Article 15 
1432 By Law 11/93 Article 20.1   
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Jaya,1433 and the right to object to the Governor against PAM Jaya’s penalty decision 
for some type of violations and ‘crimes’, there are no references whatsoever to any 
other redress mechanism. The Governor’s Decision on penalty for water theft, 
according to the by-law, is “binding”.1434 This is actually incorrect since redress to the 
Courts was, and is, possible through the law on judicial powers.1435 Failure to clarify 
access to justice for consumers in By-law 11 is a grave omission. This is contrary to 
the case of Bogor, which regulates referrals to arbitration and alternative dispute 
resolution as a redress mechanism. 1436 
6.5. Corporate Governance 
Two types of companies involved in the water services sector will be 
evaluated; PAM Jaya: the regional State-Owned Enterprise and PT Aetra and PT 
Palyja as concessionaires, both privately-owned companies.  
PAM Jaya, the owner of Jakarta’s water services assets and a party to the 
concession contract, is a regional-owned SOE established under Regional SoE Law 
UU No.5/1962. Its corporate governance is regulated under the 1962 act and By-law 
13/1992 which also acts as PAM Jaya’s statute.  
 
1433 Ibid Article 19.4   
1434 Ibid Article 28.3  
1435 Undang Undang Pokok Kekuasaan Kehakiman No. 14 Tahun 1970 Undang Undang Pokok 
Kekuasaan Kehakiman No. 48 Tahun 2009 When By-law 11/1993 was enacted, Indonesia was under an 
authoritarian rule and the Court, although available, was not the custom for settling dispute. Access to 
Court at that time was actually available through Law No. 14 Year 1970 on Judiciary Power (This law 
has been revoked. The prevailing rule is Law No. 48 Year 2009). Everyone could, in theory, have 
brought the case to Court if they disagreed with the arbitrary determination by PAM Jaya in 
compensating its substandard service or by the Governor’s decision on water theft penalty.  
1436 Article 22.4, By Law 5 (Bogor)  
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Palyja and Aetra are both privately-owned companies. Their corporate 
governance is regulated primarily by UU No. 40 Year 2007 on Corporations. Both 
have issued bonds which are actively traded on the Indonesian Stock Echange (IDX). 
As long as they remain listed in the IDX, they are obligated to comply with capital 
market regulations, UU No.8/1995, as well as rules enacted by Indonesian Capital 
Market Supervisory Agency (Bapepam) and the stock exchange rules.1437 The capital 
market rule contains a number of corporate governance requirements with which the 
companies need to comply. 
 
6.5.1. The Board and its accountability 
6.5.1.1. Pam Jaya 
PAM Jaya’s corporate structure comprises of a Board of Directors, a 
Supervisory Body and an internal audit task force which reports directly to the 
President Director. Directors are appointed by the Governor.1438 The Governor can 
temporarily suspend the directors from their position, but permanent removal must be 
conducted through an assessment by the Supervisory Body,1439 which will then 
 
1437 Palyja and Aetra fit the definition of “Issuer” under UU No.8/1995. UU No.8 in Article 1, para 6 
states: “An Issuer is a Person who makes a Public Offering”, para. 15: “A Public Offering is an offer to 
sell Securities to the public, made by an Issuer in ways stipulated in this Law and its implementing 
regulations” and para 5: “Securities are promissory notes, commercial paper, shares, bonds, evidences 
of indebtedness, Participation Units of collective investment contracts, futures contracts related to 
Securities, and all derivatives of Securities”.  
 
1438 By Law 13/92  Article 17.1 
1439 Ibid Article 18 
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delivers its recommendation to the Governor for a decision. The Governor will have 
the final say unless the director decides to appeal to the Ministry of Interior.1440   
The directors are responsible to the Governor, and must deliver the “profit and 
loss account” to the Governor, through the Supervisory Body.1441 The “profit and loss 
account” is the only accountability report that the directors need to deliver to the 
Governor. By-law 13 also contains no obligation of parliamentary supervision. There 
are no obligations for the Governor to table this “profit and loss account” to the 
parliament. This weak reporting mechanism is due to Indonesia’s anachronistic 
regulation on regional SoEs. The primary legislation on SoEs has not been reformed 
since 19621442 and the statute governing PAM Jaya has not been reformed since it was 
enacted in 1993.   
The Supervisory Body is chaired by the Governor himself (or a person 
appointed to represent him)1443 and its members are appointed from  Jakarta’s 
government officials.1444 The President Director coordinates the Board of Directors 
and is responsible to the Governor of Jakarta.1445 There is no requirement for the 
names of the BoD and the Supervisory Board to be disclosed to the public, but since 
they are appointed by a Governor’s Decision1446, in theory, the document should be in 
the public domain and the public should have access to their names. In practice, the 
 
1440 Ibid Article 18 
1441 Ibid Article 39 and 40  
1442 Undang Undang No.5 Tahun 1962 Tentang Perusahaan Daerah 
1443By Law 13/92  Article 25.1 
1444Ibid, Article 24.1 
1445 Ibid, Article 12 
1446 Ibid, Article 17.1 
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names of the directors – but not the members of the Supervisory Body – are available 
on JWSRB’s website.1447 This is unfortunate since the Supervisory Body is tasked and 
empowered with the authority to supervise, audit and monitor PAM Jaya and even has 
the power to request explanations from the directors in all matters related to PAM 
Jaya’s operations, and in requesing the Directors to be present at their meetings.1448 
The Supervisory Body shall conduct meetings once every three months and such 
meetings should be recorded.1449 There is no obligation that such minutes of meetings 
should be available to the public, but an FoI request for the minutes is possible.  
PAM Jaya’s Directors can be dismissed by the Governor for several reasons, 
such as when they “act or behave” to the detriment of PAM Jaya, or the Jakarta region 
or the state.1450 The termination must be preceded with a temporary suspension by the 
Governor, through a letter stating the rationale of such suspension.1451 By-law 13 
states that such a letter must be directed to the person being suspended, other members 
of the Board of Directors and the members of the Supervisory Body. The by-law also 
regulates that a special session needs to be convened by the Supervisory Body, that 
the person being suspended be given the opportunity to defend himself and that 
theSupervisory Body recommend the decision to the Governor, i.e. whether the person 
shall be terminated or not.1452 The person is given the right to object to the decision to 
the Minister of Home Affairs, who has the authority to overturn the Governor’s 
 
1447  PAM Jaya, ‘Direksi PAM Jaya’ (PAM Jaya, )  <http://www.pamjaya.co.id/Direksi.html> accessed 
March 3  
1448 By Law 13/92 , Article 22 
1449 Ibid, Article 23.4 
1450 Ibid, Article 18. 2. b and c 
1451 Ibid, Article 18.3 
1452 Ibid, Article 18.4 
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Decision.1453 In a case where the decision of the Governor on the suspension is 
overturned by the Minister, the said director should be publicly rehabilitated.1454  
In all stages of suspension, information as to the rationale of suspension and 
those related to the special session are only disclosed internally among the members 
of the board of supervisors, The Governor and the Minister of Home Affairs. This is 
quite understandable since the disclosure of such processes may contradict the 
‘presumption of innocence’ principle. The name(s) of the new director, if the 
suspension is approved, will presumably be made available to the public since such 
change of directorship needs to be enacted through a Governor’s Decision, which is a 
public document. There is no obligation to disclose the rationale behind the 
Governor’s Decision. 
PAM Jaya shall deliver its budget plan to the Governor to obtain approval, the 
Governor is deemed to have approved the plan if, within three months after its 
submission, he does not express his objections and refusals.1455  
By-law 13 also obligates PAM Jaya to deliver its profit/loss account to the 
Governor, which shall be evaluated by the state auditor or public accountants, based 
on prevailing accounting rules. The report will be legalised by the Governor once it is 
audited and such legalisation indemnifies PAM Jaya’s Directors against future 
liabilities.1456  The regional SOE Law also requires the Governor to appoint an auditor 
and stipulates that the result of its audits shall be reported to the regional House of 
 
1453 Ibid, Article 18.4.e 
1454 Ibid, Article 18.5 
1455 Ibid, Article 38 
1456 Ibid, Article 40 
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Representatives.1457 Furthermore, the state budget law requires the Governor to report 
regional SOE’s financial accounts to the regional parliament, as part of its 
accountability report.1458  
Nevertheless, there is a discrepancy in accounting rules between those 
required by the regional SOE law and the state budget law. The former is simpler, 
requiring only a profit/loss account and this is the rule that prevails. Except for some 
accountability reporting mentioned before, there are no requirements to disclose 
regional SOEs’annual budget plans or their annual reports in By-law 13 and UU No.5 
although this is actually mandatory under the Public Service Law and the FoI Law.1459 
There are no other accountability obligations other than what is outlined above. Thus, 
the Governor’s accountability reporting with respect to PAM Jaya is limited only to 
reporting its profit and loss account, and not towards other aspects such as overall 
performance or the success of its concession arrangements.  
6.5.1.2. Palyja/Aetra  
The company organs in Indonesia consist of the General Meeting of 
Shareholders (GMS), the Board of Directors and the Board of Commissioners.1460 The 
Corporation Law obligates the Minister of Law and Human Rights to keep the register 
of companies1461, containing information on, inter alia, name and domicile, purpose 
 
1457 Undang Undang No.5 Tahun 1962 Tentang Perusahaan Daerah Article 27.1  
1458 Undang Undang 17 Tahun 2003 Tentang Keuangan Negara  
1459 Undang Undang No. 25 Tahun 2009 Tentang Pelayanan Publik Article 23.4 and Undang Undang 
No.14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi PublikArticle 9.2 and 9.3 
1460 Undang Undang No.40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas, Article 1 para. 2,4,5 and 6  
1461 Ibid, Article 29.1 
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and objective and business, activities, period of incorporation, and capitalisation; the 
Company’s full address, data on number and date of the deed of establishment  
(including its amendments) and the Minister’s ratification of the Company and the full 
names and address of members of the Board of Directors and members of the Board 
of Commissioners.1462 The Corporation Law obligates that such register of companies 
“shall be open to the public”1463 However, the company register is not automatically 
available in the public domain. In order for a person to obtain information about a 
company, it must log a request with the Directorate General on General Legal 
Administration and pay a fee.1464 
There is an obligation under the company law for the directors to produce an 
annual report but these are only delivered to the companies’ shareholders.1465  As 
Palyja and Aetra are listed companies (due to their bond issue), they are obligated to 
disclose their audited financial accounts annually to the public, through publication in 
newspapers.1466 However, there is no obligation to disclose their annual report to the 
public. 
 
Law 40 on Corporations obligates the rules for appointment, replacement and 
dismissal of members of the Board of Directors and Board of Commissioners to be 
stipulated ion the company’s Articles of Associations.1467 Anyone who is capable of 
performing legal actions is eligible to be appointed except if they, within five years 
 
1462 Ibid, Article 29.3 
1463 Ibid, Article 29.6 
1464 Peraturan Menteri Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Nomor M.HH-03.AH.01.01 Tahun 2009  
1465 Undang Undang No.40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas  Article 66 and 67 
1466 Capital Market and Financial Institutions Supervisory Agency (Bapepam-LK) Rule X.K.2 
1467 Undang Undang No.40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas, Article 15.f 
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before appointment, have been declared bankrupt; have been  members of a Board of 
Directors or a Board of Commissioners declared to be at fault in causing a Company 
to be declared bankrupt, or had been sentenced for crimes which caused losses to the 
state and/or were related to the finance sector.1468 This requirement, the law suggests, 
“is without prejudice to the possibility of the authorised technical agencies 
determining additional requirements”.1469  The GMS shall appoint members of the 
Board of Directors1470 and determine their remuneration.1471 Directors can be 
dismissed at any time by the GMS, through a resolution stating its rationale.1472 
Alternatively, the Board of Commissioners may suspend a member of the Board of 
Directors.1473 Such suspension must be confirmed or revoked by the GMS within one 
month.1474 There is no public disclosure rule for change of board members in the 
Company Law. However, for listed companies, Bapepam Rule XK1 obligates public 
disclosure and reporting to Bapepam for events, information or material facts, that 
may reasonably affect the price of securities or investors' decisions such as ‘a change 
in control or significant change in management’1475 
The corporation law obligates companies’ directors to compile an annual work 
plan before the start of the new financial year, which should also contain annual 
 
1468 Ibid, Article 83.1 
1469 Ibid, Article 83.2 
1470 Ibid, Article 94.1 
1471 Ibid, Article 96.1 
1472 Ibid, Article 105.1 
1473 Ibid, Article 106.1 
1474 Ibid, Article 106.4 
1475  Capital Market and Financial Institutions Supervisory Agency (Bapepam-LK) Rule XK1, Article 
2.f. 
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budgets for companies.1476  These plans must be delivered to the Board of 
Commissioners and/or the shareholders – depending on the company’s Articles of 
Association.1477 Annual reports should be delivered within a period of not more than 
six months after the company’s financial year ends and must contain a financial report 
and other types of report. The financial report must contain at least the last balance 
sheet for the financial year just ended in comparison with the previous financial year, 
a profit and loss statement, a cash flow report, a report on changes in equity and notes 
accompanying the financial report.1478 There is also an obligation on CSR reporting, a 
report on the details of problems which arose during the financial year which 
influences the company’s business activities; a report on the duty of supervision 
performed by the Board of Commissioners during the financial year just ended;. the 
names of the members of the Board of Directors and members of the Board of 
Commissioners and salaries and allowances for members of the Board of Directors 
and salaries or honoraria and allowances for members of the Board of Commissioners 
of the company for the year just ended.1479 
Certain companies, such as those collecting and/or managing public funds, 
issuing bonds or with assets of more than 50 billion Rupiah1480, must refer their 
financial report to public accountants to be audited. The law forbids the GMS to ratify 
 
1476 Undang Undang No.40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas Article 63 
1477  ibidArticle 63 
1478 Ibid Article 66 
1479 Ibid Article 66 
1480 Under this category are if: a. the Company’s business is to collect and/or manage the public’s funds; 
b. the Company issues acknowledgements of indebtedness to the public; c. the Company is a Public 
Company; d. the Company is a state-owned liability company; e. the Company has assets and/or a 
business turnover worth at least Rp. 50,000,000,000 (50 billion Rupiah); or f. it is obligatory under 
legislative regulations. See ibid 
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the financial report of such companies if it is not audited by public accountants.1481 
Within seven days of being ratified by the GMS, the law obligates the financial report 
to be published in one daily newspaper.1482 Members of the Board of Directors and 
Commissioners are jointly and severally liable to the aggrieved party for any 
misleading or inaccurate financial report they sign, except if they can prove that such 
losses is not due to their fault.1483 During an interview with Palyja, they informed that 
they deliver an annual report and investment plan to PAM Jaya every three months 
before year-end, although such is not required by the contract.1484  
6.5.2. Related party transactions and conflict of interest  
6.5.2.1. PAM Jaya 
Under By-law DKI 13/92 and Law 5/1962 on Regional SOEs, family ties 
among the directors, up to the third degree vertically or horizontally including 
husband/wife and in-laws, are prohibited.1485 The exception to this rule is only when 
the ties occur after appointment, the director(s) may continue to hold office after 
approval by the Governor based on the consideration of the Minister of Home 
Affairs.1486  Directors are also forbidden from holding another office [at another 
 
1481Ibid, Article 68 
1482 Ibid, Article 68.4 and 5 
1483 Ibid, Article 69.4 
1484 Interview with Mr. Philippe Pedrini, Palyja’s Contract Manager, Jakarta, January 10, 2011 
1485 By Law 13/92 , Article 16.2, Undang Undang No.5 Tahun 1962 Tentang Perusahaan Daerah, 
Article 13.1  
1486 By Law 13/92 , Article 16.3, Undang Undang No.5 Tahun 1962 Tentang Perusahaan Daerah, 
Article 13.2 
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institution];neither the Law nor the By-law explains which offices are prohibited.1487 
Directors are also prohibited from having a ‘personal interest’ in another business 
whose purpose is for profit, unless permitted by the Governor.1488 The lack of clarity 
on what is meant by ‘personal interest’ and ‘another business’ may mean that the 
directors are barred from activities such as investing in capital markets. The rules for 
‘related party’ and ‘double office’ are drafted in the same terms for the Board of 
Supervisors.1489 However, there is no clause prohibiting them from engaging in 
business activities. There is no public disclosure rule for potential or manifested 
conflict of interest.  
6.5.2.2. Palyja/Aetra 
Regulation on related parties under Indoesian Company Law is weaker than in 
Victoria or England. The closest to this is the term ‘personal interest’ which appears a 
few times in the Corporations Law, among others, on the provision regulating the 
exception towards limitation of legal liability for shareholders.1490 Evidence that 
directors do not have any conflict of interest in the action of management that causes 
losses to the company can free the directors from personal liability.1491 The members 
 
1487By Law 13/92 , Article 16.5, Undang Undang No.5 Tahun 1962 Tentang Perusahaan Daerah, Article 
13.4 
1488 By Law 13/92 , Article 16.4, Undang Undang No.5 Tahun 1962 Tentang Perusahaan Daerah, 
Article 13.3 
1489 By Law 13/92 , Article 24 
1490 Shareholders are not personally liable for legal relationships entered into on behalf of the Company 
and are not liable for the Company’s losses in excess of the shares they own except if he/she directly or 
indirectly exploit the Company in bad faith in his/her personal interest. Undang Undang No.40 Tahun 
2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas, Article 3 
1491 As is commonly found in Corporations Law around the world, directors in Indonesian corporations 
could be held personally liable – jointly and severally – for the company’s losses, except if they can 
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of the Board of Commissioners can also be personally liable for actions that causes 
losses to the companies, unless they can prove, among others, that they do not have 
any direct or indirect personal interest in the actions of management of the Board of 
Directors which caused the losses.1492 Existence of a conflict of interest bars the 
directors from representing the company in or out of court.1493 There are no public 
disclosure requirements for related parties and related party transactions under the 
company law.  
The Capital Market Law UU No. 8/1995 does not provide any definition of 
‘conflict of interest’, however, it defines ‘affiliation’ and obligates some reporting and 
disclosure on their transactions. Affiliation is defined as “a family relationship by 
marriage and descent to the second degree, horizontal as well as vertical; a 
relationship between a Person and its employees, directors, or commissioners; a 
relationship between two Companies with one or more directors or commissioners in 
common, a relationship between a Company and a Person that directly or indirectly, 
controls or is controlled by that Company”.1494 Rule IXE1 of the Bapepam LK 
 
prove that the losses were not caused through their fault or negligence, that they carried out the 
management in good faith and with prudence in the interests of and in accordance with the purpose and 
objectives of the Corporation, that they do not have a direct or indirect conflict of interest in the action 
of management that caused the losses; and that they took action to prevent the losses from arising or 
continuing. This provision exempting the directors from liabilities is cumulative, which means that all 
of its elements have to be fulfilled. This does not prevent other members of the board of directors and 
commissioners from filing suit on behalf of the company. Ibid, Article 97 
1492 Ibid, Article 115.5.b. The conditions so that they can be exempted from personal liability are 
cumulative: a. they have carried out their supervision in good faith and prudence in the interests of the 
Company and in accordance with the Company’s purpose and objectives; b. they do not have any direct 
or indirect personal interest in the actions of management of the Board of Directors which caused the 
losses; and c. they have given the Board of Directors advice to prevent the losses arising or continuing. 
1493 Ibid, Article 99.2 
1494 Undang Undang No. 8 Tahun 1995 Tentang Pasar Modal Article 1.1 
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(Capital Market Supervisory Agency) however defines ‘conflict of interest’ as “a 
difference between the economic interests of a Company and the personal economic 
interests of the director, commissioner, or the major shareholder of the Company in a 
Transaction that may inflict financial loss upon the Company because of unfair 
pricing”1495 The rule is subject to some exception, for example, if the subsidiary is 
99% percent owned by the parent company.  
Affiliated transactions (subject to some exceptions) have to be notified to 
Bapepam LK and disclosed to the public within two working days after they occur, 
accompanied by some explanations, inter alia, the justifications for commencing such 
transactions, the report from independent appraisal and the identities of the parties 
involved.1496 Transactions with conflict of interest (subject to some exemptions) must 
be approved by independent shareholders1497 in a general meeting of shareholders and 
confirmed in notarial deeds.  The notice of GMS must contain information on the 
object, value, parties, nature of conflict of interest, appraisal report concerning the 
transaction involved1498 and must be delivered through registered mail or fax in 
addition to newspaper announcements.1499 
 
1495 Capital Market and Financial Institutions Supervisory Agency (Bapepam-LK) Rule IXE1 Article 
1.e 
1496 Ibid Rule IXE1 para 2 (Latest amendment 25 Nov 2009) 
1497 IbidRule IXE1, Article 1.f: Independent shareholders are the shareholders who do not have any 
Conflict of Interest with respect to a particular Transaction and or who are not an affiliated Party of the 
director, the commissioner, or the substantial shareholders that have a Conflict of Interest on certain 
Transaction. 
1498 IbidRule IXE1, para 4.f 
1499 IbidRule IXE1, para 4.f 
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The purpose of this Bapepam LK rule is to provide room for the independent 
shareholders to voice their objections against transactions which may be detrimental 
to their investment value at the company. Independent shareholders have an economic 
interest that the company engages in fair transactions, and that the benefits from the 
transactions are passed onto them in the form of higher share value. In water utilities’ 
regulation, consumers (and potential consumers) also benefit from the utility’s arms-
length transactions as its benefits can be reflected in lower tariffs or taxes. However, 
unlike the English regulatory accounts1500 and licence condition,1501 the Bapepam LK 
Rule does not explicitly require the company to engage in an arm’s length manner. 
What it regulates is if the transaction(s) inflict financial loss on the company (the 
definition of CoI above) and hence is detrimental to independent shareholders.1502 
Insofar as independent shareholders approve such a transaction (presumably since 
they are compensated) nothing prevents that transaction from occuring, although such 
transactions would be detrimental to consumer.  
 
1500 , Guideline for transfer pricing in the water industry; Regulatory Accounting Guideline 5.04 also 
Ofwat, Chapters 30 & 31: Transactions with Associated Companies, June return reporting 
requirements and definitions manual 2011, Issue 1.0 - January 2011 
1501 For example, Instrument of Appointment by the Secretary of State for the Environment of Severn 
Trent Water Limited as a water and sewerage undertaker under the Water Act 1989 Condition F para 
6.1. “The Appointee shall ensure that every transaction between the Appointed Business and Associated 
Company (or between the Appointed Business and any other business or activity of the Appointee) is at 
arm's length, so that neither gives to or receives from the other any cross-subsidy.. In the Indonesian 
case, receiving cross subsidy would be allowed.  
1502 The author would like to thank Pramudya Oktavinanda for the discussion on the interpretation of 
Bapepam Rule IX.E.1  
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Company law requires companies to draft their financial account based on the 
generally accepted accounting standard.1503 The linkage between accounting 
standards and company laws are weak as, unlike Victoria1504, there is no direct 
mandate under company law that a particular body should enact and safeguard 
accounting standards with which companies must comply.1505 
The accounting standards, known as PSAK, require the disclosure of related 
parties.1506 Aetra report its related party transactions in its financial account, 
specifying the identities of the parties, their relationship with the company, the amount 
of the transaction and its nature1507 and this is published on its website. Palyja, 
however, only publishes its consolidated account1508 and there is only one line 
mentioning receivables to related parties.  
The Jakarta Cooperation Agreements provides flexibility for the 
concessionaires to arrange procurements with third parties. There is a general 
obligation to enter into fair, transparent and competitive procurement procedures 
under the contracts but this is not enumerated in more detail. Palyja commented that 
 
1503 Undang Undang No.40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas Article 66  (3). Elucidation of 
Article 66 (3) refers to accounting standards issued by the Indonesian Association of Accountants.  
 
1504 See s.334 Australian Accounting Standards Board, AASB 124, Related Party Disclosures  
 
1505 Undang Undang No.40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas Article 66  (3) and Elucidation of 
Article 66 (3). In addition, in compliance with Article 66(3) it carries no liability, except if they mislead 
or misreport their financial account (See Article 69 (3))  
1506 Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia, Pernyataan Standar Akuntansi Keuangan (PSAK) No. 07: 
Pengungkapan Pihak Pihak Berelasi (2010)   
1507 PT Aetra Air Jakarta, Financial Statement, December 31, 2010 and 2009 (2010)   Schedule 5 
1508 PT PAM Lyonnaise Jaya, Laporan Keuangan (2011)   
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they have their own internal procurement rule from Suez GDF.1509 Such a rule, if it 
exists, could be helpful in promoting efficient competition, but without sufficient 
regulation on procurement, its enforcement depends entirely on the utilities’ 
discretion.  
Given such regulatory structures, utilities procurement in Jakarta is not 
sufficiently regulated. Capital market rules obligate public disclosure and reporting to 
Bapepam for some affiliated transactions,1510 but this reporting rule occurs ex post 
facto (two working days after it occurs). Conflict of interest transactions obligate the 
approval of independent shareholders and requires disclosure through a GMS 
mechanism specifying the details of the intended transaction.1511 This requirement 
requires ex-ante disclosure but unfortunately is not applicable to Palyja and Aetra 
since they only list their bonds in the capital market and not their shares.  
Capital market disclosure rules are, therefore, only applicable conditional 
upon the type of instruments traded in the capital market; some disclosure rules – such 
as that requiring approval of independent shareholders and disclosure on the nature of 
the transaction to be approved – are applicable to listing of shares, but not for bond 
issue. The rules are also applied incidentally. Palyja and Aetra will be bound by 
disclosure rules as long as their bonds are still listed on the market. Once all of their 
bonds are matured, they will no longer be obligated to adhere to the rules. Responding 
to this possibility of a regulatory vacuum following the delisting of bonds, a proponent 
of private sector participation commented that more permanent regulation should be 
 
1509 Personal Communication, Field Interview with Palyja, Jakarta, January 10, 2011 
1510 Capital Market and Financial Institutions Supervisory Agency (Bapepam-LK) Rule IX.E.1 para 2.a 
1511 IbidRule IX.E.1 para 3 
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emphasised by the state.1512 Indeed, the capital market rules cannot be relied on to 
promote transparency without any additional utility regulation mechanism. In the UK, 
OFWAT utilises the capital market rule to promote disclosure by obligating utilities to 
adhere to it, irrespective of whether their shares or bonds are being traded (See section 
5.4.3 above).  
6.5.3. Corporate restructuring  
6.5.3.1. Pam Jaya 
PAM Jaya’s initial composition of capital is determined by By-law 13/92.1513 
There is no publicly accessible information as to whether PAM Jaya has ever raised 
its capital after its inception. By-law 13 does not stipulate that its capital is comprised 
of shares, hence, there is no issue about the identity of shareholders. All capital 
belongs to the  regional government.1514    
By-law 13 does not regulate any provision on company restructuring, 
however, the Law on Regional SOE1515 contains provisions on transfer of ownership 
and liquidation, but nothing on acquisition. Transfer of ownership of a Regional SOE 
under the law, interestingly, is only allowed to be conducted by cooperatives and not 
other legal entites.1516 Although the law does not provide any explanation on this 
restriction, it can be seen that the political situation in 1962 and the spirit of Law No.5 
 
1512 Interview with Gerard Payen and Jack Moss of Aquafed, Jakarta, January 28, 2010 
1513 By Law 13/92  
1514 Ibid, Article 8.1  
1515 Undang Undang No.5 Tahun 1962 Tentang Perusahaan Daerah 
1516 Ibid, Article 28.3 The article talk about transfer of entire ownership, not just a percentage of shares 
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was to curtail Western style corporate capitalism. The elucidation of Law No.5 clearly 
stipulates that the focus of Law No.5 shall be the development of the regions based on 
the principles of “Guided Economy”1517 and that this is reflected in the special 
position of the cooperatives.1518 Whether or not the political jurisprudence of 1962 is 
applicable to the current legal regime is a matter of debate. On a practical level, 
however, it is clear that PAM Jaya’s shares can only be transferred to cooperatives 
and not corporations. The Regional SoE Law does not regulate transparency 
mechanisms on share transfers or liquidation. 
6.5.3.2. Palyja/Aetra 
The merger of a company requires the approval of the GMS of a Merger Plan, 
containing the name, domicile of the company, procedures for share valuation, 
financial report and methods of settlements for the BoDs and BoCs and non approving 
shareholders.1519 There is no public disclosure requirement in corporation law. For 
listed companies, however, there are reporting and public disclosure obligations for 
mergers. A detailed merger plan for listed companies must be delivered to the 
company’s shareholders, 28 days prior to the GMS approving the merger.1520 An 
 
1517 One of Indonesia’s Founding Fathers, Mohamad Hatta, explained: “The basis of the people’s 
economy must be a common endeavor, which is implemented through the familial principle. What is 
meant by common endeavor based on familial principle are cooperatives. Cooperative of the Indonesian 
style, which provides the economic side to the old cooperative: ‘Gotong Royong’.” Hatta, Tafsir 
Ekonomi Terpimpin (Interpretation towards ‘Guided Economy’), Djambatan, Jakarta, 1967  
1518 Elucidation of Undang Undang No.5 Tahun 1962 Tentang Perusahaan Daerah, Preamble. See also 
elucidation of Article 28 
1519 Undang Undang No.40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas, Article 123 
1520 Capital Market and Financial Institutions Supervisory Agency (Bapepam-LK)Rule IX.G.1 
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abriged merger plan must be publicly disclosed through two daily newspapers.1521 
Companies are obligated to report to Bapepam LK (the capital market supervisory 
agency) on the occurrence of a merger within two days of it taking place.1522 Similar 
rules apply for acquisition of shares, if conducted by a legal entity, but not if the 
acquisition is done by natural persons.1523 The tender offer rule, which also contains 
some disclosure requirements, could also be applicable to some types of acquisitions, 
but is nevertheless not applicable to both Palyja and Aetra since only their bonds and 
not their shares are listed on the capital market.  
The acquisition of TPJ (the former name of Aetra) by a Singaporean 
consortium involved various layers of ownership and the use of Special Purpose 
Vehicles (see section 6.1.2.2 above). 1524 PAM Jaya has the ability to block the 
acquisition if it involves more than a 51% transfer of shares to third parties.1525 The 
layers of SPVs caused the ownership structure to become obscured. It is not likely that 
PAM Jaya and the Jakarta Government were finally able to obtain all the detailed 
information concerning the new owner. The assurance only came in the form of a 
“legal opinion” from the buyer’s lawyers, which certified the link between the 
 
1521 IbidRule IX.G.1 
1522 IbidRule XK1 
1523 Undang Undang No.40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas, Article 125 
1524  The ultimate owner of Aetra through Aquatico is said to be Recapital Advisors (80%) and Glendale 
Partners (20%). Both companies own Aquatico through layers of Special Purpose Vehicles (SPV): 
Arrosez (Recapital) and Praeo (Glendale), both of which are a British Virgin Island SPVs.  Sawitri, 
‘Committee questions Acuatico's suitability as tap water operator’ Sawitri, ‘Regulatory body casts doubt 
on takeover bid’ 
1525 Cooperation Agreement Between PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 Clause 7.2.a (iii) also 
Lanti and others, The First Ten Years of Implementation of the Jakarta Water Supply 25-Year 
Concession Agreement (1998-2008) and Ardhianie, Kontroversi Penjualan PT Thames Pam Jaya (TPJ) 
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acquirer and its ultimate owners. This is different from the UK regulatory practice of 
securing legally enforceable undertakings from the utility’s UK holding company.1526   
The Board of Directors is obliged to keep a register of shareholders 
encompassing their names and addresses, including the detail of shares registered and 
change of share ownership.1527 Corporation Law UU No. 47 does not obligate the 
public disclosure of such a register. There is an obligation under Capital Market Law 
UU No.8/1995 for shareholders owning 5% or more shares and for directors and 
commissioners owning shares in the company to report their share ownership and its 
changes.1528   
There is no requirement to disclose existing ownership and shareholders’ 
rights to the public under the Cooperation Agreement and the Jakarta Governor decree 
regulating the concession. Even today, the regulator has inadequate information as to 
the actual ownership of Aetra, other than what is clarified by the “legal opinion”.  
6.6. Passive Disclosure Rule 
6.6.1. Applicability of FoI Act to institutions involved in water services 
 
1526 Cooperation Agreement Between PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 Condition P 
1527 UU No.40/2007, Article 50.1.b regulates the detail of the number, serial number, and date of 
acquisition of shares held by shareholders and their classification in the event that more than one 
classification of shares has been issued, the amount paid up on every share, the name and address of an 
individual or legal entity who has a pledge over the shares or is the recipient of fiduciary security over 
shares and the date of acquisition of the pledge or registration of the fiduciary security 
 
1528 Undang Undang No. 8 Tahun 1995 Tentang Pasar Modal Article 87 
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Indonesian FoI Law, UU No.14/2008 is applicable to public bodies, which are 
defined  as: 
 “any branches of the executive, legislative and judiciary as well as other 
bodies whose functions and main tasks are related to the organization of the state, 
whose funds are derived partially or in entirety from the state and/or regional 
government’s budget, or non-governmental organizations insofar as part or all of its 
budget is derived from the state or regional government’s budget, community’s 
contribution and/or foreign funds”.1529  
It is thus quite clear that FoI Law UU No.14/2008 is applicable to all 
governmental bodies, including those involved in regulating water services such as the 
Department of Public Works, the National Planning Agency, Jakarta regional 
government and the Governor and the Ministry of Environment. What about the 
Jakarta Water Sector Regulatory Body (JWSRB)?  
Being an entity set up by a contract1530, the JWSRB claim that they are neither 
a branch of the executive, legislative nor the judiciary. They consider themselves a 
private body or, at the very least, a non-governmental organisation.1531 The JWSRB 
does regularly receive its funding directly from the collection of water tariff and not 
 
1529 Undang Undang No.14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik Article 1(3) 
1530 Cooperation Agreement Between PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 Clause 51 
1531 Al'Afghani and others, Transparansi Lembaga-lembaga Regulator Penyediaan Air Minum Di DKI 
Jakarta See box 1 “Status BR PAM Sebagai Badan Publik” (Status of JWSRB as  Public Body) 
summarizing field interviews with members of the regulatory body. If they are categorized as an NGO 
under the Indonesian FoI Law, they will be subject to lesser disclosure requirements. 
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the state budget. It is also questionable if the JWSRB’s present1532 functions in 
mediating disputes, supervising the contract and developing consumer dispute 
mechanisms, would categorise it as a Public Body. However, its future1533 functions 
in preventing the misuse of dominant position, protecting consumer interests and 
ensuring sustainability of water supplies are much more manifest in reflecting public 
functions.  
It is also important to note that JWSRB’s present functions, although not yet 
enabled by legislation, are enabled by a Governor’s Regulation.1534 The Regulation 
established that the members of JWSRB are appointed and removed by the Governor. 
Hence the JWSRB is accountable to the Governor and PAM Jaya and, in turn, the 
Governor is accountable to the local parliament. JWSRB’s regulatory function forms a 
part of the Governor’s accountability to the local parliament, as a direct accountability 
line between JWSRB and the parliament does not exist.  
Moreover, the rationale of the Governor’s Regulation is not only in 
materialising the contract but also in protecting the greater public interest which exists 
independently from the contract. This is well reflected in the preamble of the 
 
1532 See JWSRB’s “Present” Functions under Clause 51.1: coordinating governmental entities and 
conducting a supervisory role in the enforcement of the contract, closure of deep wells, tariff levels, 
enforcement of PAM Jaya’s rights and in developing consumer dispute mechanisms and in mediating 
disputes between PAM Jaya and its concessionaires.  
1533 The contract at Clause 51.2 stipulates that the parties intended that JWSRB shall have trhe functions 
of preventing the misuse of dominant position, protecting consumer and community interest in terms of 
charges and service levels, ensure that customers benefit from improved efficiency as well as ensuring 
“the provision of an efficient and economically sustainable water supply”. All of these functions have to 
be enabled by legislation. These have not materialised up to now.  Cooperation Agreement Between 
PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 
1534 Peraturan Gubernur DKI Jakarta No.118 Tahun 2011 Tentang Badan Regulator Pelayanan Air 
Minum  
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Governor’s Regulation which cites various legislations, including the laws on regional 
autonomy, the competition law and the law on consumer protection.1535 The 
Regulation also clarifies the purpose of the establishment of JWSRB, which is to 
safeguard the implementation of the concession contract in accordance with principles 
of transparency, justice and accountability and in guaranteeing service levels and 
affordability.1536 These aspects may give weight to the arguments that JWSRB is a 
public body. However, the Governor Regulation is by no means an adequate legal 
framework as it does not have much compelling power compared to legislation.1537 
Thus, the question of whether or not JWSRB is a Public Body will have to wait until a 
case is lodged with the FoI Commission.  
6.6.1.1. Applicability of the FoI Law to SOEs 
Whether or not an SOE should be covered by the FoI Law was one of the 
central issues debated in the parliament during the enactment process of the FoI Law. 
The government draft of the FoI Law did not include SOEs in the definition of ‘Public 
Body’ (although the parliament’s draft did)1538 for the reason that the separation of 
assets in an SOE reflects the transformation of such entity from public into private. 
The remaining public component in an SOE, the government maintained, is the 
portion of fund used for Public Sector Obligation or PSO.1539 Secondly, according to 
 
1535 IbidSee Preamble para 1-12 
1536 Ibid 
1537 Undang Undang No.10 Tahun 2004 Tentang Pembentukan Peraturan Perundang Undangan 
1538 Komisi Informasi Pusat Republik Indonesia, Anotasi Undang Undang Nomor 14 Tahun 2008 
Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik (1st edn, Indonesian Center for Environmental Law dan 
Yayasan Tifa 2009) 
1539 Ibid p.32-33 
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the government, an SOE must comply with various public sector rules, such as the 
laws on state budget, state finance, state auditor, corporation law, capital market law, 
etc., which make them more transparent than the private sector.1540 The Government’s 
arguments appear to be unsound as, on the one hand, they maintain that the separation 
of assets means that SOEs are governed by purely ‘private’ rules and, on the other 
hand, that SOEs are already transparent since in addition to being governed by 
‘private’ rules, the SOE is also regulated by the rules on public sector.  
The parliament’s draft which explicitly included ‘SOE’ in the definition of 
‘public bodies’ did not make it to the final reading and the agreed formulation of 
Article 1 (3) is what is mentioned in the beginning of this chapter.  The final draft of 
Article 1 (3) contains the phrase “whose funds are derived partially or in entirety from 
the state and/or regional government’s budget” which nevertheless could be 
interpreted to cover SOEs. Even though the term ‘SOE’ is missing in Article 1 (3) in 
the definition of a public body, Article 14 of the FoI Law specifies the list of 
information which must be published by an SOE: among others, its financial and 
annual report and the remuneration system of its executives.1541  
With this interpretation, there should be no debate that all SOEs, owned by 
both central government and regional government such as PAM Jaya, which were set 
up under UU No.5/19621542, fall under the definition of ‘public body’ under Article 1 
(3) of the Indonesian FoI Law. In addition, the Indonesian Information Commission 
 
1540 Ibid p. 32-33 
1541 Undang Undang No.14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik, Article 14 
1542 Undang Undang No.5 Tahun 1962 Tentang Perusahaan Daerah 
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Rule 1/2010 listed “Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum” (Regional Waterwork 
Companies) as a Public Body covered by the FoI.1543 
In practice, however, this can be problematic. Some lawyers admitted the 
applicability of the Indonesian FoI Law on the one hand, but argue that such 
applicability precludes information which is generated by the SOE in its dealings with 
the private sector as they should be entirely governed by ‘private’ rules. This was 
argued in  Lembaga Penelitian Aplikasi Wacana (“Applicant”) vs PT Blora Patragas 
Hulu (“Respondent”) concerning the disclosure of a Cooperation Agreement 
concluded between the Respondent and a private entity (“BHP”).1544 BHP was  one of 
the very first cases adjudicated by the Indonesian FoI Commission.  
The applicant, Lembaga Penelitian Aplikasi Wacana, a research NGO, sought 
to disclose the cooperation agreement between the Respondent, an SOE owned by 
Blora regional government PT Blora Patragas Hulu, and PT Anugrah Bangun Sarana 
Jaya (ABSJ), a purely private entity which manages 21%  of the Respondent’s 
participating interest in Cepu oil and gas block. 
The applicant required the cooperation agreement in order to provide input to 
the Blora regency and regional house of representatives on the plan to divest 49% of 
Blok Cepu’s participating interest to ABSJ. The respondent rejected the request to 
disclose the contract on several grounds, among others, that: (1) the obligation to 
disclose agreement with third parties under the Indonesian FoI Law does not apply to 
 
1543 Attachment I of Indonesian Information Commission Rule 1/2010, para.G 
1544 LPAW vs BHP, Keputusan Komisi Informasi Pusat No 001/VII/KIP-PS-A/2010, October 7th, 2010  
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them1545 and that only certain obligation of diclosures for SOEs are applicable1546 (2) 
the Cooperation Agreement between Respondent and ABSJ is a trade secret1547 (3) 
disclosure of Cooperation Agreements are exempted by the Indonesian FoI Law as 
“Information which shall not be disclosed pursuant to legislations”1548,  (4) the 
Applicant is not a party to the concession contract and therefore has no legal standing 
to request the contract document, (5) based on the Pacta Sunt Servanda principle 
under Indonesian Civil Code1549, the agreement shall be perceived as the lex specialis  
to the disclosure obligation arising under Indonesian FoI Law, (6) the Cooperation 
Agreement between Respondent and ABSJ is regulated under Book III of the 
Indonesian Civil Code and is not regulated by the Indonesian FoI Law, hence the 
Indonesian FoI Commission has no authority to adjudicate the case (7), the Criminal 
Code at Article 322 (1) restricts public officials in disclosing secrets, (8), the 
Corporations Law at Article 97(3) hold directors liable for the losses sustained by the 
company, hence the Respondent’s directors are justified in not disclosing the 
information, (9) by withholding the information, the respondent’s Directors are acting 
 
1545This is despite the fact that Undang Undang No.14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi 
Publik, Article 11.e stated that: “Public Bodies are obligated to provide information which should be 
available at all time, which covers ... The agreements entered into with third parties” 
1546 Ibid, Article 14 lists types of information which should be disclosed by regional SOEs and SOEs 
owned by the central government, among others, results of audit by external auditors, credit rating 
agencies, remuneration system for directors and commissioners and procurement mechanisms, but there 
is no obligation to disclose agreement with third parties under Article 14. The relation between Article 
11.e and Article 14 under the Indonesian FoI Law is not clearly established. It is posssible to argue that 
Article 11.e covers the disclosure obligation for all public bodies (including SOEs) whereas Article 14 
lists the additional obligation for SOEs. See also the parliamentary debate on the definition of ‘public 
body’ under Section 5.1.a above   
1547 Ibid, Article 17.b protects trade secrets 
1548 Ibid, Article 17.j. The applicant does not detail which Indonesian legislations forbids the disclosure 
of contracts 
1549 Indonesian Civil Code, the "Burgerlijk Wetboek" Article 1338 
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pursuant to the Business Judgment Rule as regulated by the Indonesian Company 
Law.1550 
The Indonesian FoI Commission eventually rejected all the Respondent’s 
arguments and decided the case on behalf of the Applicant. It decided that (1) regional 
SOEs are “Public Bodies”, and as a public body they must publish their contracts with 
third parties and that (2) the Respondent can only reject the request for disclosure if 
the information is allowed to be exempted. The FoI Commission made no detailed 
remarks about the applicability of FoI rules on private arrangements and whether the 
Respondent’s argument about the contract being regarded as a trade secret is justified.  
The above arguments from the Respondent illustrate how the blurring between 
public and private in the provision of public service is not completely resolved under 
the Indonesian legal system. The Indonesian FoI Law, by obligating public bodies to 
publish its agreement with third parties1551, has actually moved towards regulating the 
accountability of public services which are delivered through private sector 
participation. This, unfortunately, is not adequately followed by reforms in other 
legislations.  
A clear example of this trend is the recently enacted Public Service Law.1552 
The Law imposes tough sanctions on government officials, such as removal from 
 
1550  
1551 Undang Undang No.14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik, Article 11.e : “Public 
Bodies are obligated to provide information which should be available at all time, which covers …. The 
agreements entered into with third parties” 
1552 See also Al'Afghani, M.M., ‘Can public service law be applied to private sector?’ The Jakarta Post 
(Jakarta, July 14th, 2009) <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/07/14/can-public-service-law-be-
applied-private-sector.html> accessed February 20, 2010 
 
 409 
office1553 or termination of employment,1554 including compensation to victims.1555 
The only sanctions possible for ‘privatised’ undertakers are the suspension or 
revocation of licence.1556 Whereas some of the sanctions for government officials 
above can be rendered by their superior officers or the government department in 
charge of state employee, the Public Service Law is not clear on which authority can 
issue sanctions to private undertakers. In addition, licence management (suspension, 
revocation, annulment) by the government is likely to be the last resort since such 
revocation or suspension carries important economic and political ramifications, 
especially if the company is considered to be a revenue-generating and employee-
absorbing industry.  
To make matters worse, licence management is also inextricably linked to 
other forms of foreign investor remedy. Intervention from central government and the 
transaction cost of international arbitration would sufficiently deter regional 
governments from suspending or revoking licences. This has been proven true on the 
case of Jakarta Water Concession and enforcement of water pollution problems.1557 
What is required, therefore, is another form of legal accountability which makes 
private undertakers directly liable and responsible for violation of public service.1558 
 
1553 Undang Undang No. 25 Tahun 2009 Tentang Pelayanan PublikArticle 54.3 
1554 Ibid Article 54.8 and 54.9 
1555 IbidArticle 55.3 
1556 Ibid Article 54.20 and 54.11 
1557 Bedner, ‘Consequences of Decentralization: Environmental Impact Assessment and Water Pollution 
Control in Indonesia’ 
1558 This is contrary to what happened in England. In England, the move toward privatisation has 
triggered reactions in the form of protection of public service. See Prosser, ‘Public service law: 
privatization's unexpected offspring’. Indonesia is the opposite. It has just started to make the 
government accountable, after being exposed to a dictatorial regime for more than 30 years. However, 
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This would require either the strengthening of regulatory institutions such as JWSRB 
(as well as equipping them with quasi-judicial powers), empowering the 
ombudsman1559 with sanction-making power or enlarging the scope of the 
Administrative Court’s Decision.1560 Only then, can the lacunae in legal remedies 
which results from the delegation of public service law to private actors be resolved. 
Such a mechanism will also tie transparency mechanisms under the FoI Law to a 
broader accountability regime.   
 
6.6.1.2.  Applicability of FoI Law to Palyja and Aetra 
Are Palyja and Aetra “Public Bodies” under Indonesian FoI Law? This 
question can be approached from two directions. Firstly, by interpreting the part of 
 
the state is gradually (and partially) in ‘retreat’. The Public Service Law was drafted to make the 
government accountable, but is not tailored to make delegation of public service accountable. The law is 
unprepared  to accommodate accountability in a regulatory state.  
1559 The state can empower the regional ombudsman to directly impose sanctions, but unlike regulators, 
the ombudsman lacks specific knowledge of the industry. 
1560 Another scenario would be instituting the High Court to act as a super-regulator, but this would 
require a reform of the Law of Administrative Court that enables them to impose remedies in the form 
of issuing penalties without dwelling on an ‘administrative decision’.  At present, the Administrative 
Court can only decide that a case be rejected, proven, dismissed or declared as lapsed. See Undang 
Undang No. 5 Tahun 1986 Tentang Peradilan Tata Usaha Negara (Law on Administrative Court or 
“LOAC”) Article 97.7 and Bedner, Administrative courts in Indonesia: a socio-legal study p. 128 , also 
the discussion in section 5.4.8.2.3 above. When a case is proven, the only remedy would be one of the 
following “rescission of the litigated administrative decision, the issuance of an administrative decision 
in case of a constructive refusal or the rescission of the litigated decision and the issuance of a new 
decision” ibid section 19, p. 128. See  LOAC Article 97.9. A plaintiff can only obtain a financial 
remedy when the court decides the case to be ‘proven’ and subsequently ordered the legal fate of an 
‘administrative decision’ as mentioned above, accompanied by a form of compensation (See LOAC, 
Article 97.10). If the claim is unrelated to an administrative decision or a presumed adminiatrative 
decision, then there is no room for financial penalty.  
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Article 1(3) of the FoI law which reads “ or non governmental organizations insofar 
as part or all of its budget is derived from the state or regional government’s budget, 
community’s contribution and/or foreign funds1561 and secondly, by looking at Palyja 
and Aetra as a private entity exercising governmental functions through the 
concessions.   
6.6.1.2.1. Nature of the budget 
One method for applying administrative law to private entities is by looking at 
the origins of its financing. If an entity is financed partly or entirely through public 
funds, it may provide justifications for state bodies, such as the state audit body and 
the ombudsman, to exert its authority on the entities. Article 1(3) of the Indonesian 
FoI law provides that the Law is applicable to “non governmental organizations 
insofar as part or all of its budget is derived from the state and/or regional 
government’s budget, and contribution from the community, and/or foreign 
sources”.1562  
In the Jakarta concession system, PAM Jaya pays Palyja and Aetra based on 
the volumetric water sold to consumers multiplied by an indexation formula linked to 
other things such as exchange rate and inflation rate (”water charge”). If the tariff 
charged to consumers is unable to meet the water charge, PAM Jaya still needs to pay 
the remaining “shortfall”. If the payment of shortfall is made through the regional 
government’s budget, the FoI Law would apply. This would be a rare situation since 
PAM Jaya still owes the concessionaires a large amount of debt and any payments are 
 
1561  Undang Undang No.14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik, Article 1(3) 
1562 Ibid, Article 1(3) 
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made by offsetting PAM Jaya’s debt with the concessionaire’s penalty (see section 
5.4.8.2.3, the “Cooperation Agreement” above).  
Using the budget as a means of categorising an entity as a ‘public body’ faces 
some other challenges. It brings about several technical questions of amount, time-
frame and applicability to types of information.  
During the parliamentary debates, the government was cautious on how this 
article will be applied and queried whether entities with only minuscule financing 
from the public should be covered by this provision.  This also sparks another 
question: when the entity is no longer covered by public funds, will it still be listed as 
a public body? If the answer is no, there is then a question of time-frame: at which 
point in time will the FoI law be applicable to the entity, when they are receiving 
public funds? State budget funds could be disbursed for only one time, but used over a 
period of time. Finally, if the entity also operates commercially, using private funds, 
some information that it generates, in theory, results purely from private financing. 
The FoI law may not be applicable to this information. The law is silent with respect 
to the hybrid function of these entities and how the FoI Law can apply to that 
situation. Due to difficulties in categorising which information is derived from which 
funds, we can assume that once an entity becomes a public body, the FoI Law will be 
applicable to all sorts of information that it generates, whether it is related to the use of 
public funds or not.  
Furthermore, there is also confusion on what “non governmental 
organization” really meant; does it cover only NGOs in the commons sense of the 
term or also corporations and other private entities? KIP regulation lists a number of 
‘public bodies’ to which the Indonesian FoI Law would be applicable. PDAM (State-
owned regional water companies, PAM Jaya is also in this category) is listed as a 
Public Body, however, its concessionaires are not. The KIP regulation does not 
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overrule the possibility that other bodies not listed on the attachment of its rule can 
still be covered.1563 
At the time of writing, there has been no clarity on whether the proportion of 
public funds on the entities budget matters for the determination of such entity as a 
public body. The KIP regulation is silent on this matter and no case has been 
submitted to them which deal with such an issue. 
6.6.1.2.2. Nature of the concession 
Adapted from continental Europe’s administrative legal tradition, Indonesian 
doctrines in Administrative Law recognise several kinds of ‘licences’ that would 
allow the private sector to be involved in public service: Dispensasi (dispensation), 
Lisensi (licence, and Konsesi (concession).   
Atmosudirjo wrote that a concession is “suatu penetapan administrasi negara 
yang secara yuridis sangat kompleks karena merupakan seperangkat dispensasi-
dispensasi, izin-izin, lisensi-lisensi, disertai pemberian semacam “wewenang 
pemerintahan” terbatas kepada konsesionaris” (“an administrative decision which is 
legally very complex as it contains a set of dispensations, permits and licences 
followed by some kind of limited “governmental authorities” to the concessionaires) 
 
1563 Institutions, entities or organisations which fulfil the criteria of the Indonesian Freedom of 
Information Law but arenot yet listed as a Public Body under the attachment of this rule will still be 
considered as a Public Body under the Indonesian FoI Law.” "Lampiran I ttg Badan Publik Peraturan 
KI Nomor 1 Tahun 2010, para.H. 
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.1564 Since concessionaires hold some form of governmental powers, some authors1565  
even consider them to be “public officials” (See section 6.4.2). 
Since Palyja has been granted a monopoly to provide water to western Jakarta, 
and Aetra to the eastern part, together with the power to collect tariffs and decide on 
matters such as investment, network expansion and the connection and disconnection 
of customers from the water network, they are exercising a delegated governmental 
authority in the water services sector.  
Article 1(3) of the Indonesian FoI Law defines a Public Body as: “.any 
branches of the executive, legislative and judiciary as well as other bodies whose 
functions and main tasks are related to the organization of the state, whose funds are 
derived partially or in entirety from the state and/or regional government’s 
budget”.1566 Both Palyja and Aetra could fit under the part “as well as other bodies 
whose functions and main tasks are related to the organization of the state” as their 
main function is to deliver water services on behalf of the regional government.1567  
 
1564 Atmosudirdjo, Hukum administrasi negara p.98 
1565 See Indroharto, as quoted in Ridwan HR, Hukum Administrasi Negara, (Yogyakarta : UII Press, 
2003), p. 59 and SF. Marbun,  Peradilan Administrasi Negara dan Upaya Administratif di Indonesia,  
(Yogyakarta : Liberty, 1997), p.60. 
1566 Undang Undang No.14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik Article 1.3 
1567 Determination of the status of an entity as a public body can be conducted by looking at several 
criteria as follows: The legal entity obtains authority through attribution, delegation, mandate or 
concession, which objectives are in serving the public interest. Such authority can be derived from laws 
and regulations, entrustment of task from the government or such authority can also be derived from 
cooperation between the government and the entity in performing state functions. Komisi Informasi 
Pusat Republik Indonesia, Anotasi Undang Undang Nomor 14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan 
Informasi Publik p.39 
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If such logic is followed, Palyja and Aetra are public service institutions, their 
officials are therefore public officials acting on a delegated authority, their decisions 
on investment, connection and disconnection issues are administrative decisions 
(subject to reviews at the administrative court) and any documents resulting from their 
activities are public information.  
This interpretation, however, is rarely implemented in practice. Although 
concessions are common in Indonesia and have been implemented in almost every 
sector such as mining, oil and gas, forestry and infrastructure, concessionaires are 
always seen as a private entity. Concession contracts tend to be seen as purely private 
contracts and, in practice, any disputes resulting from them are often referred to a 
private court, not the administrative court.   
The following Table 10 summarises the applicability of the Freedom of Information 
Law to institutions involved in water utilities regulation:  
Institutions Role FoI Applicable? 
Department of Public Works, The National 
Planning Agency 
General policy/ 
direction   
 
Yes 
Ministry of SOE 
 
Governor 
Financial management Yes 
Ministry of Health Drinking Water 
Regulator 
Yes 
Jakarta Governor/Jakarta Regional 
Government 
Tariff determination  
Monitoring of 
performance 
Financial Management 
Operational licence 
 
Yes 
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Jakarta Water Sector Regulatory Body 
(JWSRB) 
Mediation and 
conciliation of 
consumer disputes, 
monitoring of 
performance, advisor to 
Jakarta Governor in 
tariff determination 
Very likely. 
JWSRB denied 
that it is 
applicable. 
Ministry of Environment/ 
Bappedal 
 
Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan 
Daerah DKI 
 
Environmental licences 
Enforcement of 
environmental matters 
Yes 
PT Jasa Tirta  Bulk Water Supplier Yes 
Perusahaan Daerah Air Minum Jakarta 
(PAM Jaya) 
Contract and 
performance 
monitoring 
Yes 
PT PAM Lyonnaise Jaya Retail water supplier No, although in 
theory it is 
possible 
PT Aetra Retail water supplier No, although in 
theory it is 
possible 
Perum Jasa Tirta Bulk water supplier Yes 
6.6.2. Exemption clauses 
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Unlike English and Victorian FoI, all of the exemption clauses in Indonesian 
FoI Law are subject to both the harm test and the public interest test. This can be seen 
from the structure of the FoI Law, which ties both the harm test and the public interest 
test in relation to every exemption clause as a standalone asas (principal) clause which 
covers all of the provisions.1568 
6.6.2.1. Law enforcement  
The Indonesian FoI Law recognises an exemption on law enforcement,1569  
but this covers only criminal law enforcement. Furthermore, the exemption is only 
applicable if a disclosure is deemed to obstruct criminal investigation1570, reveal the 
identity of witnesses or informants or endanger the safety of law enforcers or their 
infrastructure. Investigations into civil or administrative matters are not covered in the 
exemptions.  
As it can be considered a crime1571 to distribute drinking water which is unfit 
for consumption or jeopardise human health, cases on water contamination could be 
 
1568 The provision for harm and public interest tests is placed in Chapter II: Principle and Obligation, 
Article 2 (4) of the FoI Act. Undang Undang No.14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi 
PublikThis chapter is applicable to all provisions of the FoI Law. Compare this with FoI Act 2000 
(England) s.2 which differentiates the effect of exemption by distinguishing it from absolute and 
‘relative’ 
1569 Undang Undang No.14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik, Article 17.a  
1570 “Investigation” under Indonesian Criminal Justice System consists of two stages: penyelidikan, a 
stage where no suspect has been declared by the police and the case has not been determined as a 
criminal offence and penyidikan, a later stage where a suspect has been declared, the case is declared by 
the police as a crime and the dossier is being completed for a transfer to the prosecutor’s office 
1571 Peraturan Pemerintah No. 16 Tahun 2005 (GR-16) prohibits the distribution of water unfit for 
human consumption (see article 6.2) however there are no criminal liabilities attached to this. If 
contamination occurs, then it will be dealt with by ordinary criminal law, the investigation of which 
might be covered by FoI exemption. 
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covered by this exemption, as long as they are being investigated by the police and the 
disclosure of information related to the case may obstruct criminal investigation. 
Violation of another service level, as long as they are not under police investigation, is 
not likely to be covered by this exemption.  
6.6.2.2. Commercial Information 
The Indonesian FoI Law1572 exempts all sorts of Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPR) and information which, if disclosed, undermines the protection against unfair 
business competition.1573 The formulation of the FoI Law is unnecessarily wide as 
IPR covers a range of rights from patents, industrial designs and trade secrets to 
copyright. Some types of IPR such as patents and copyright already entail an element 
of publication and, as such, their exemptions are irrelevant. Some relevant IPR-related 
exemptions are for trade secrets, industrial design1574 and plant varieties.1575  
In the aforementioned BHP case1576 adjudicated by the Indonesian FoI 
commission, the respondent tried to argue that the Cooperation Agreement between 
BHP and ABSJ contained trade secrets and, therefore, should be exempted from 
disclosures. As the Respondent did not provide evidence for this, the FoI Commission 
 
1572 Undang Undang No.14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik Article.17.b 
1573 Ibid 
1574 The obligation of confidentiality is only enforced on employees of the Directorate General of 
Intellectual Property Rights, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, during the registration process 
pending announcement. See Undang Undang No. 31 Tahun Tahun 2000 Tentang Desain IndustriArticle 
23 
1575 The obligation of confidentiality is only enforced on consultants, employees of the Office on 
Protection of Plant Variety and the relevant government officials, the Ministry of Farming, during the 
registration process pending announcement See Undang Undang Nomor 29 Tahun 2000 Tentang 
Varietas Tanaman, Articles 13, 22, 23, 30.   
1576  
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rejected the Respondent’s claim that the contract contained trade secrets. As the 
majority of data submitted to the regulator is rarely traditional technological trade 
secrets but merely business information, the trade secret argument is rare in disclosure 
cases involving utility regulation.1577   
The second category in the exemption clause: “information which, if 
disclosed, undermines the protection against unfair business competition1578 is more 
relevant to be disclosed in light of water utilities’ regulation.  
Under Indonesian FoI, there is only one public interest clause (the terminology 
used in the FoI Law is the greater1579  interest) which applies generally throughout the 
whole law. The idea of “public interest”, however, is not well developed in the legal 
system, although some legislation does contain a public interest clause.1580 The system 
of codified law, where judges are considered only as interpreters of rules and shall 
refrain from making laws1581 probably constrains the development of the notion of 
“Public Interest”. 
The meaning of public interest is also influenced and constructed by the 
state’s ideology towards the market. In Judicial Reviews of the water law, oil and gas 
 
1577 See O'Reilly, J.T., ‘Confidential Submissions to Utility Regulators: Reconciling Secrets with 
Service’ 18 Ohio Northern University Law Review 217 
1578 Undang Undang No.14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik 
1579 Indonesian FoI Law, Art 2(4) and 19, The clause is not clear on what is meant by consequence and 
greater interest but its elucidation confirms that consequence refers to the interests which are protected 
under prevailing regulations and greater interest refers to public interest. Ibid 
1580 Indonesian Criminal Code Art. 14.h grant authority to public prosecutors to drop charges for public 
interest reasons  
1581 Mertokusumo, S., Mengenal Hukum, Suatu Pengantar (5 edn, Liberty 2003) 
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law1582 and the electricity law1583, it was revealed that market competition for vital 
services is not emphasised by the Indonesian Constitution. In its water law ruling, the 
Constitional Court affirms that regional waterwork companies (PDAM) should not 
position themselves as  profit-oriented companies.1584 
In terms of public utilities, therefore, the notion of a ‘public interest’ towards 
the functioning of the market is treated with great caution. This is not to suggest that 
competition is not protected. The Indonesian Competition Law states that “Business 
actors shall be prohibited from conspiring with other parties to obtain information 
regarding the business activities of their competitors classified as company secrets 
which may result in unfair business competition.”1585 Meanwhile under the FoI Law, 
exemption from disclosure is granted only if it undermines protection from unfair 
business competition.1586 The Elucidation of the Indonesian FoI clarifies that the 
clause aims to protect business practices which are dishonest, illegal or undermine 
 
1582 Judicial Review of Law Number 22 of 2001 Concerning Oil and Gas, Judgment of 15th December 
2004, No. 002/PUU-I/200  Constitutional Court of the Republic of Indonesia 
1583 Al’Afghani, ‘Constitutional Court's Review and the Future of Water Law in Indonesia’ The 
Constitutional Court revoked the Electricity Law for allowing the unbundling of electricity services. 
Such unbundling, according to the Court, relinquised price determination to the market mechanism and 
diminished the state power in intervening with prices. Such measure is in violation of Article 33 of the 
1945 Constitution. 
1584 Judicial Review of Law Number 7 Year 2004 regarding Water Resources, Judgment of 13th July 
2005, No. 058-059-060-063/PUUII/2004:  “PDAM has to position itself as the state’s operational unit 
to realize the state’s obligation as stipulated in Article 5 of the Water Resources Law, and not as the 
company which is economically profit-oriented” (Official Translation) 
1585 Undang Undang No.5 Tahun 1999 Tentang Praktek Monopoli dan Persaingan Usaha Tidak 
SehatArticle 23. Translation by the Indonesian Commission for the Supervision of Business 
Competition  
1586 Undang Undang No.14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik  Article 6.3.b and 17.b   
 
 421 
competition.1587 In order to maintain an exemption, therefore, respondents will need to 
argue that the information request is illicit, or motivated by commercial gains. 
The articles above will only apply if there is competition in the sector. Given 
that private operators are given a legal monopoly over certain regions by the regional 
government (and since direct competition is not foreseeable for the moment) claiming 
for public interest towards exemption may be difficult.1588 The idea that a concession 
is a form of licence and that the operators themselves as concessionaires are public 
officials mandated with some form of governmental authorities would weaken the 
argument towards secrecy. If a concession – by definition – is a public service, then 
any information generated from it would be public information, the non disclosure of 
which can only be justified if the public is put at harm. One of the public service 
functions of a concession is ‘institutional learning’1589. In addition to obtaining value 
for money for the delivered service, the regional waterwork companies or other water 
companies in another region need to learn from the concessionaire. Such a learning 
process requires a certain degree of openness. 
Competition for the market in the form of tender for an exclusive legal 
monopoly to distribute water can enjoy such protection and this is confirmed by the 
procurement rule. But once the tender process is over and the winner is pronounced, 
there is no more justification to keep the information secret. In fact, there is a demand 
 
1587 Ibid elucidation of Article 6 (3) b   
1588 See Decision 056/2006 MacRoberts and the City of Edinburgh Council and section 4.5.1.2. above 
1589 See Colin, J. and Lockwood, H., ‘Making innovation work through partnerships in water and 
sanitation projects’ (2002)  <http://www.bpdwaterandsanitation.org/english/docs/innovationsumm.pdf> 
accessed february 17, 2012 
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for accountability and transparency of the tender process in the form of an explanation 
by the tender committee as to the rationale of their decision.  
It is possible that a water company already entrusted with a legal monopoly 
feels that disclosure of its tender information is harmful since it decreases its 
competitiveness to bid for another project in another region. In this case, the task of 
the FoI Commission and the Court is to define and construct the meaning of ‘public 
interest’. On the one hand, there is the interest of the bidding company, to maintain its 
domination position by withholding information and, on the other hand, there is a 
public interest to open up the market to allow the delivery of public services at 
efficient cost. 
 
6.6.2.3. Confidentiality obligation  
Regulatory information can be submitted by the utilities to regulators on a 
confidential basis, which results in the obligation of the regulator not to disclose the 
information to a third party. In Indonesian FoI, there is no specific exemption on the 
confidentiality obligation as the law does not recognise a “duty of confidence”. In 
England, the duty to hold information confidential arises out of equity or contract.1590 
Nevertheless, under Indonesian Law, the obligation of confidence may arise out of 
contractual obligation1591  or be mandated by the regulatory statute. In Jakarta, 
 
1590 Coleman, A., The legal protection of trade secrets (Sweet & Maxwell 1992)), 12   
1591 All contracts are legally binding as law on the parties. Indonesian Civil Code, the "Burgerlijk 
Wetboek" Article 1338. 
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JWSRB is obligated under its mandate to maintain secrecy of all1592  information and 
must use information in the regulatory process only for the purpose of mediating 
potential disputes arising out of the concession. Similarly, PAM Jaya is bound by 
contractual confidentiality obligations1593  (See section 6.4.7. above “General 
Disclosure Policy) and has refused an FoI request to disclose the contract document 
and other regulatory information.1594 
 As demonstrated in BHP, Respondents often use obligation of contractual 
confidentiality to argue for exemptions. In this case they were trying to argue that 
disclosure of information will trigger liability by way of ‘breach of contract’ under the 
Indonesian Civil Code. Directors of a company, therefore, according to the 
Respondent, must be careful not to disclose information that would cause litigation 
and bring losses to the company. 1595   
The “MALE” (Maximum Access, Limited Exemption) principle under 
Indonesian Law requires that exemption can only be given under very limited and 
narrow exemption clauses provided in Article 17.  The FoI Law at Article 17.j. does 
provide exemptions for Information which shall not be disclosed pursuant to 
 
1592 Peraturan Gubernur DKI Jakarta No.118 Tahun 2011 Tentang Badan Regulator Pelayanan Air 
Minum , Art 6.b.   
1593 See Cooperation Agreement Between PAM Jaya and The Concessionaire, 2001 Clause 47   
1594 Daryanto, Jawaban Surat KRuHA (Letter No. 581/DIV.T&P/XI/2011 dated November 8 2011 on 
PAM JAYA's response to FoI Request by KRuHA) Reza, Permintaan Dokumen dan Informasi Kontrak 
Konsesi Layanan Air Minum Jakarta (Freedom of Information Law Request for Documents and 
Contractual Information Concerning Jakarta's Water Services Concession), Letter No.019/KIP/V/2011 
dated October 31, 2011 Rizal, Tanda Terima Pendaftaran Pengajuan Sengketa Informasi No. 
A26/RSI/P/XII/KIP/2011, KRuHA vs PDAM DKI Jakarta, 07-12-2011  
1595 The Corporation Law 40 Year 2007 at Article 97(3) hold directors liable for the losses sustained by 
the company. Undang Undang No.40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas 
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legislations. The FoI Commission and the Court may require that the referred 
legislation explicitly states which information is intended to be withheld. Since 
Indonesian Corporations Law does not mention any specific information that should 
be withheld from the public, Article 17.J. of the FoI Law cannot be used. A mere 
construction or interpretation that the company law infers non disclosure is not 
sufficient. 
The possibilities that litigation for breach of contract arises due to disclosure 
by government officials as a result of FoI requests, however, poses another problem. 
The FoI disclosure case and the breach of contract will be dealt with as a separate case 
involving different judges. The FoI case will be adjudicated by the FOI commission 
and in case of appeal either to an Administrative Court (if the respondent is a state 
entity) or a State Court (if the respondent is not a state entity),1596 while the breach of 
contract litigation or shareholders’ litigation will be dealt with by the private law 
chamber of the State Court. It is possible to submit evidence from the previous FoI 
tribunals to the private law proceeding, but since the Indonesian Judiciary recognises 
no stare decisis, there is nothing to prevent the judges in deciding otherwise and, in 
turn, inflicting damages on the company.  
Bearing this in mind, it is thus better to regulate FoI disclosure as  part of 
mandatory provision in the procurement contract, as shown by the Victoria case study, 
as this will deter ‘breach of contract’ litigation.   
6.6.2.4. Confidential Memorandum 
 
1596 Undang Undang No.14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik Article 47 
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Indonesian FoI has no specific exemption for policy formulation. Such 
exemption is possible if formulated in the form of a ‘confidential memorandum’ 
(Article 18 i).1597 The elucidation elaborates that such exemption is meant to protect 
“frankness and candour” in the decision making processes, the premature revelation of 
a future policy and success of an ongoing negotiation.1598 However, since the 
exemption is formulated in the form of a confidential memorandum, it cannot be 
applied to other forms of documents such as meeting notes. 
6.7. Chapter Conclusion 
Water services governance in Jakarta is interesting and complex. The Jakarta 
concession was granted in 1997 when Indonesia was led by an authoritarian regime 
without any procurement. Jakarta’s water services by-laws, enacted in 1992 and 1993, 
were not tailored for the concession and have never been amended to adjust to the 
concession scheme. Both by-laws are still in force today.  
Water law reforms were conducted in 2004 through the enactment of Water 
Resources Law 7/2004 and GR-16 on water services. Law 7/2004 contains only one 
provision on private sector participation in the water sector, at Article 40, the 
provision of which caused controversies which were among the subjects submitted to 
a judicial review at the Constitutional Court. Water Law 7/2004 was declared 
“conditionally” constitutional by the Court but a dissenting judge branded Article 40 a 
“disguised” privatisation. The Article – presumably because it is intended to be 
“disguised” – does not provide clarity on the legality and scope of private sector 
 
1597 Ibid Article 18 i 
1598 Ibid Elucidation of Article 18 i 
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participation in water services. GR-16, the secondary law which was supposed to 
clarify Water Law 7/2004 in terms of the scope and mechanism of PSP is also 
unhelpful and even added to the confusion. Nevertheless, these two national laws 
provide more transparency in terms of a tariff setting mechanism and also more 
protection to consumers. However, as discussed above, they are deemed inapplicable 
by both the regulator and the private sector. Jakarta’s regulatory structure is suffering 
from overlap between regulatory institutions. The JWSRB, which is supposed to be an 
independent regulatory body, does not have any of the powers normally enjoyed by its 
counterparts in England or Victoria. Under the contract, JWSRB has neither the power 
to enact prices nor the power to impose penalties on regulated entities. In fact, its only 
function is in mediating disputes (before they are referred to an alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism) and in providing recommendations on tariff increases to the 
Governor. PAM Jaya on the other hand – which is a regulated entity – has more 
power to ask for regulatory information from the concessionaire compared to JWSRB 
and also has the contractual power of supervising the concession as well as imposing 
penalties. Recent amendments to the JWSRB statute complicate the problem by 
requiring JWSRB to be accountable to PAM Jaya in terms of its budgetary planning. 
As PAM Jaya owes huge debts to the concessionaire, it will have less incentive to 
become transparent if the information concerns financial issue. This is proven by a 
newspaper polemic on the existence of a consumer compensation scheme between a 
JWSRB member and PAM Jaya Director.  
To add to the complexity of the Jakarta system is the unclear nature of the 
Cooperation Agreement: is it a purely private contract or a concessie which has the 
characteristics of a licence? The thesis has elaborated the opinion of Indonesian 
administrative law scholars from the past that perceive concessie as a form of licence 
combined with the delegation of governmental authorities. This, however, is not the 
contemporary view of scholars and, in additon to that, the law of the administrative 
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court has completely overruled government contracts as an administrative ‘decision’ 
reviewable by the Court. If the Cooperation Agreement is perceived as a purely 
private contract then the arguments for transparency will be less appealing.  
One of the primary disadvantages of the Cooperation Agreement is the 
existence of a confidentiality clause. The clause covers all regulatory information –in 
practice the clause is deemed to also cover the contract itself – and prevent the public 
disclosure of any regulatory information. Among the information covered is consumer 
rights to compensation (which were the subject of polemic), service level and 
investment mechanism. In both England, Victoria and even Bogor, a city 60 km south 
of Jakarta whose utilities are publicy-owned, this information is by default public. 
PAM Jaya is a public body and has the obligation to disclose information under 
Indonesian FoI Law. However, if PAM Jaya complies with the law, it can be held 
liable for a breach of contract. The regulatory body, JWSRB, as a non party to the 
contract, is not bound by the confidentiality provision. Nevertheless, JWSRB is 
created through the contract and embodies the confidentiality principles in it statutes – 
the statute is stipulated in a Governor‘s regulation. It is not clear if the FoI Law is 
applicable to JWSRB due to its hybrid character. Application of the analytical 
framework to a Jakarta case study is tabled in Annex 1. 
Through this chapter, the claim that PSP decreases transparency, at a glance, 
appears to be correct. However, the experience with England tells another story. Thus, 
it would take a side-by-side comparison of the analytical framework to understand and 
explain why England appears to be transparent and why Victoria, despite 
confidentiality provision in its contract, could still render its FoI applicable. These 
issues will be discussed in the next chapter.   
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7. LESSONS LEARNED 
This thesis starts with the Research Question: “How can Legal Frameworks 
enable Transparency in Water Utilities’ Regulation?” Three concepts which are 
central to the research question i.e. “Legal Frameworks”, “Transparency” and “Water 
Utilities Regulation” have been clarified in the preceding chapters.  These concepts 
help to form the analytical framework which is developed in Chapter II and is then 
applied to the whole thesis. 
 “Legal Frameworks” comprise of several categories. The first is sectoral 
versus general administrative rules applicable to water utilities’ regulation. Sectoral 
rules include the law on water services and private contracts between utilities and the 
government, whereas general rules include corporation law, procurement rules and 
access to information laws. The second category is the differentiation between ‘active’ 
versus ‘passive’ disclosure provisions found in the aforementioned sectoral and 
general rules. ‘Active’ disclosure provisions are the type of provisions obligating a 
person to disclose certain specific information to the public, whereas ‘passive’ 
disclosure provisions are the type of provisions which grant the public a general right 
of access to information to certain prescribed bodies, without specifying the details of 
the information that needs to be disclosed. These rules and the active and passive 
disclosure provisions contained within them form the analytical framework.   
“Transparency” is defined as “disclosure of information” to the public. 
Disclosure of information to regulatory bodies is not yet a complete “Transparency” 
in the context of the research question if the information is not disclosed further to the 
public. Such internal disclosure only makes information “available” to regulatory 
bodies. As the ‘active’ type provision above requires the disclosure of specific 
information, the Analytical Framework also determines the types of information in 
water utilities’ regulation that need to be disclosed actively to the public. These 
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comprise three general categories: policy in involving the private sector, regulatory 
decision making,  and utilities’ corporate governance, each of which specifies the 
information which is required to be disclosed. Meanwhile, the passive disclosure rule 
is evaluated in terms of its applicability to institutions involved in the water sector and 
the features of its exemption clauses. The overall application of the Analytical 
Framework to the case studies is recapitulated in Annex 1.   
As seen in Annex 1, each of the three jurisdictions compared has its own ways 
of enabling transparency in their efforts to regulate water utilities. Some of their 
methods can be transferable to other jurisdictions, while some are particular to the 
characteristics of their regulatory processes. The lessons learned from three 
jurisdictions are as follows.  
7.1. Policy in Involving the Private Sector 
 
Whether or not water services provision can be delegated to the private 
sector, the extent of such delegation, the body which has the power to delegate and 
how the delegation is carried out are sensitive issues in water utilities’ regulation. 
Such concern is embodied in General Comment 15 on the Human Right to Water 
which recommends “full and equal access of information” concerning water held by 
states or third parties and reports from the Independent Expert (now Special 
Rapporteur) of the Human Right to Water which emphasizes that any decision 
towards delegation should be democratic, participatory and transparent.1599 
Similarly, a human rights framework requires transparency in tendering, bidding and 
 
1599 See section 3.1, Ownership and Delegation to Private Sector above 
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the contract negotiation processes. The Independent Expert specifically outlined that 
“Commercial confidentiality must not jeopardize the transparency requirements 
provided for under the human rights framework”.1600  
 
For England, the question of delegation is resolved by Parliament. Through 
the 1989 Water Act, Parliament decided to fully privatise water utilities through 
assets divestiture. Since the UK Parliament is the highest political forum in the 
country, the enactment of the 1989 Water Act – which contained divestiture 
clauses–  is deemed to be sufficiently democratic. The follow-up questions of 
procurement and contract negotiation are to this extent less relevant to England 
which divested its assets through flotation, although such questions might be more 
relevant in the future due to further restructuring of the English water industry. Only 
in Victoria and Jakarta (as with many states around the world) where contracting is 
employed as an instrument of delegation,  the questions of procurement and contract 
negotiation are relevant. In these jurisdictions, the question of democracy arises 
because there is a distance between the Parliament, which is accountable to the 
public through elections and other means, and the decision to delegate water 
services. Both in Victoria and Jakarta, the decision to delegate water services lies 
within the discretion of the executives.  
  
 
 
 
1600 See section 3.1, (Analytical Framework) Ownership and Delegation to Private Sector above 
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7.1.1. The decision to delegate 
Both in Victoria and Jakarta, there is a legislative ‘entrenchment’ of public 
ownership. The Victorian Constitution mandates that a “public authority” 1601 which 
is accountable to the Minister be responsible for ensuring the delivery of water 
services. Meanwhile the Indonesian Water Resources Law prescribes that “State 
Owned Enterprises and Regional Owned Enterprise are the undertakers of drinking 
water provision system” although it adds that “Cooperatives, privately-owned 
business enterprises and the society may participate in the undertaking of the 
development of drinking water provision system”.1602  
 
Full divestiture of assets will not be compatible with the legal provisions in 
Victoria, since if the assets are divested, it will no longer fall under the definition of 
a “Public Authority”.  Full divestiture is also incompatible with Indonesian 
legislations as the law restricts water services delivery to State- or Regional-Owned 
Enterprises. However, Private Sector Participation (PSP) is possible since it is never 
directly prohibited by legislation in either jurisdiction. In both case studies the legal 
frameworks are unclear with respect to the allowable extent of PSPs. The most 
common PSP is implemented only in specific parts of the water cycle, such as a 
treatment plant in Victoria. However, some PSPs, such as the Jakarta’s Cooperation 
Agreement, range from treatment to distribution, completely removing the 
incumbent utility (PAM Jaya) from its operational duties and positioning it as a 
quasi-regulator and contract supervisor. As demonstrated in the preceding chapters, 
 
1601 See Victoria Chapter Section 4.2.1 (Determination of Ownership and Regulatory Model) 
1602 See Jakarta Chapter, section 6.2.2 (Ownership and Regulatory Model) 
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such PSPs have far reaching consequences towards public accountability. The 
regulatory reform in Indonesia is also ambiguous with respect to whether PSPs are 
allowed for non greenfield projects. The national law, GR-16, stipulates that 
cooperatives and/or privately-owned business enterprises may participate in the 
development of drinking water provision systems in regions which are “not yet 
covered” by services provided by SOE or regional SOEs. This provision is not clear 
on what is meant by “not yet covered”. There are several feasible scenarios: (1) 
regions with the presence of a regional water utility, but have not reached 100% 
coverage – which is a common case in Indonesia, (2) regions with  100% coverage 
but with under average service levels or (3) regions with 100% coverage but are 
considering the  expansion of their catchment or treatment facilities for future 
contingencies. It is not clear if PSPs would be allowed in those circumstances.  
Thus, despite the ‘entrenchment’ of public ownership in Victorian and 
Indonesian legislation, there is always scope for PSPs and this scope is vague. In 
order to provide clarity and transparency, legislation must be comprehensible, it 
must clarify the type of PSP allowed and differentiate the delegation procedure 
according to the scope of the water services cycle that it wishes to delegate. 1603 If 
most parts of the water services cycle (from treatment to distribution) are able to be 
delegated, it will have far reaching accountability consequences and as such may 
require specific procedures prescribed by the legislation which could be in the form 
of a referendum or a parliamentary approval. At present, both in Victoria and 
Jakarta, all decisions to delegate, irrespective of the scope of the water services 
cycle, are in the hands of the executive. 
 
1603 See the definition of transparency in Section 2.6 
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7.1.2. Procurement 
In Indonesia, all types of procurements must be announced through the 
procuring institution’s website, official announcement board and the national 
procurement portal tender. The purpose is to allow interested parties to bid. Prior to 
this, the regional parliament (or the Ministry of Finance officials in each region) 
must approve the institution’s budget plan.  The result of the selection of the 
preferred bidder is announced through the agency’s website and official 
announcement board. Finally, according to the national model on procurement, 
information on the bidding process up to the determination of the winner as 
summarised on the Bid Evaluation Report shall not be disclosed to the bidders or 
any other party until the contract is signed. There are no other transparency, 
accountability or public participation mechanisms.1604  
 
Similar to Jakarta (Indonesia), in Victoria the “Expression of Interest” should 
be published through the procurement website. In Victoria, however, there is more 
emphasis on public accountability and transparency of procurement. The National 
Guideline also mentions the need to ‘consider’ access, accountability and consumer’s 
rights. Accountability – including the applicability of the FoI Act to procurement is 
considered as “risk”, to be borne by the government but there is no adequate guidance 
on how it should be assessed and mitigated. Full disclosure is a general principle, but 
in order to protect competitiveness and sensitive information it only applies to the PPP 
 
1604 See Section 6.3 
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Contract and not during the bidding process. The Government should guarantee that 
information on project performance is available for  release after contract execution.  
An important lesson from Victoria is the effort to integrate the Freedom of 
Information Act with procurement. It requires private parties to agree that disclosure 
by way of FoI will not amount to a breach of confidentiality. 1605 In practice, this is 
formulated in a waiver clause which serves as an exception to the contract’s general 
confidentiality provisions. Such a waiver clause may be efficient in protecting 
liabilities arising out of contractual confidentiality, but will not be applicable to 
confidentiality obligations arising from outside the contract such as equity law.   
In both Victoria and Indonesia, there is a sense that transparency in 
procurement is still focused mainly on particular stakeholders, in this case the bidders 
and other market players interested in bidding, rather than the public. Thus, 
transparency is perceived only as a tool to facilitate fair competition and generate 
value for money in procurement. This kind of transparency lays emphasis on the 
disclosure of information required for those interested in bidding, such as the call for 
tender, the specification of the goods or services to be procured and the prerequisites 
for participating in tenders. On the other hand, the notion of “Public Interest” is 
certainly greater than the mere agenda to facilitate competition or in achieving value-
for-money for the project1606 and this may require disclosure of other kinds of 
information, such as the rationale and consideration of the procurement team on why 
it arrives at certain decisions. In this respect, Victoria fares better than Indonesia as 
 
1605 See sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 
1606 This is discussed in sections 1.4.3 and 2.1  
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there is already an  attempt to integrate FoI with procurement rules and there is an 
acknowledgement that the accountability problem is a kind of risk, although it still 
lacks an outlining of how it should be assessed and weighted. Victoria enables 
transparency in procurement not through legislation, but through guidelines, which 
influence the procurement process including the contract drafting. 
 
7.1.3. Publication of Contract 
In Indonesia, both the Law on Public Service and the Law on Freedom of 
Information require contracts entered into by the government with the private sector to 
be published. Similar requirements are imposed on Victorian Public Bodies as a 
matter of policy. However, although only a matter of policy, the requirement to 
disclose a contract in Victoria is enumerated in greater detail than in Indonesia. For 
example, the Victorian contract publication policy is clear in that it intends to publish 
in full and in readily accessible format, contracts over 10 million USD of value and 
requires only the publication of headlines of contracts worth more than 100,000 USD. 
In Indonesia there is no clarity on the policy of contract publication. The Indonesian 
FoI Law requires contracts to be published, but does not set the value threshold.1607 It 
would be burdensome to the bureaucracy if the FoI Law requirement is interpreted to 
mean that all contracts, including those having miniscule financial value, be published 
in full. The Indonesian Public Service Law on the other hand also does not provide 
clarity as it requires only the publication of key contractual terms.  
 
1607 See section 6.3.3  
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A good practice in Victoria – something that Indonesia could learn from – is 
the high level of integration of disclosure policies with general administrative law as 
well as sectoral law and policies, especially the procurement policy. The Indonesian 
procurement rule does not contain any clause mandating contract disclosure although 
legislations, the aforesaid FoI Law and the Public Service Law, do. This creates a 
disharmony between parliamentary legislations and the practice of procurement. In 
Victoria, the procurement guidelines specifically refer to the principles of the FoI Act. 
Premier Bracks’ contract publication requirements are also referred to in the 
Procurement Guideline.1608  
In addition, the contract disclosure policy in Victoria is also embodied and 
interlinked with public sector accounting. The Victorian Department of Treasury and 
Finance regularly issue Financial Reporting Directions to the public sector. The 
contract disclosure policy is embodied in FRD 12 A which also sets the guidelines for 
exclusion from publication by referring to FoI Act exemptions.1609  
Finally, there is a role for formal institutions: the Victorian Government 
Procurement Board (VGPB) and the Victorian Auditor-General. The VGPB as 
Victoria’s centralised procurement board administers and announces every call for 
tender in the Victorian public sector. At the same time, the VGPB also publishes 
contracts which result from the procurement. The Victorian Auditor General has wide 
powers under the Audit Act 1994 and also has the mandate to oversee the 
implementation of contracts disclosure policies. With such powers, the Auditor 
 
1608 See sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3  
1609 See section 4.2.3 
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General is able to have access to documents in the possession of agencies, conduct 
audits and report them to the parliament and the public.  
Nevertheless, the Victorian ways of managing government contract 
publication through a set of fragmented policies (the Policy Statement and Guideline, 
the Procurement Guidelines and FRD12A) have some compliance problems. The 
initial policy statement requires that any excisions from disclosure should be given 
explanations. This was not implemented in some instances as it is deemed to be 
required only by the policy statement and not by FRD 12A. If the contract publication 
requirement is embodied in statute as well as properly reflected in policies, its 
enforcement would have been more coherent. 
7.2. Regulatory Decision Making 
7.2.1. Licences 
Crucial to the transparency of licences are specifications on the types of 
licences, the criteria for application, the licences’ conditions and whether there is an 
obligation or policy to publish licences in the public domain. Water utilities might 
be subjected to various kinds of licences, but when this thesis uses the term 
“licence” it means ‘operational’ licences which contain some authorisation by the 
state for the water utilities to carry out the delivery of water services in its service 
area. The procedure for obtaining such operational authorisation including the 
publication of such authorisation in the form of licences is important due to the 
natural local monopoly nature of the water industry. 
 
Each of the three jurisdictions has a different understanding of what a 
‘licence’ is and, therefore, the role of licences varies from one jurisdiction to another. 
England – for the time being – is very much a licence-based regime, so the majority of 
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regulatory arrangements in the English water industry are stipulated in the utilities’ 
licences. Victoria makes less use of licences as it dissects their regulatory 
arrangements into several other instruments, the Statement of Obligation  and Water 
Industry Regulatory Order. Jakarta has a parallel and somewhat conflicting regulation: 
The “Cooperation Agreement” system which dates from 1997 and the new water law 
regime which has applied throughout Indonesia, including Jakarta, since 2004. Both 
the Jakarta contract system and the new Indonesian water law applicable to Jakarta are 
problematic in terms of its licensing.  
The type of licences applicable in the water services sector is clarified by 
legislation in England and in Victoria but not in Indonesia. The criteria for approving 
licences are also well defined in England and in Victoria but not so in Indonesia. This 
is because there are ambiguous provisions in Indonesian Water Law and its 
implementing regulations with respect to the extent to which private sector 
participation would be permissible.1610 Indonesia attempts to limit private sector 
involvement by allowing them to participate only in a region which is not yet covered 
by services provided by SOE or regional SOEs. This creates confusion as to whether 
the rule only intends to allow greenfield projects in water services or whether non 
greenfield projects can be allowed in some cases. In practice, a large amount of 
brownfield projects have been approved or are in the process of tender. The ambiguity 
leads to lack of clarity on the type of licences, the conditions attached to them, and 
ways to obtain them. This obviously opens up opportunities for corrupt dealings.  
 
1610 See section 6.2.2   
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OFWAT’s (England) licensing practices for appointment and variation of 
existing undertakers’ licences as well as for WSL licences are ideal ones. The 
criteria for approval and the licence’s conditions in England are well defined in the 
legislation. Thus, the private sector knows what is expected of them by the 
regulators. The English licensing practice has several important transparency 
mechanisms that could be implemented in other regions. The only problem is that 
there is no uniformity of transparency policies in licensing, some types of licences 
have more of a transparency threshold than others. The transparency mechanism in 
the English licensing regime is as follows. First, there is a statutory obligation for 
the regulator to issue guidelines on how to apply a licence (applicable to WSL 
licences). 1611 Second, for NAV licences there are obligations for applicants to ‘serve 
notice’ to authorities and existing appointees – although not the public and for 
companies intending to apply WSL licences there are public disclosure obligations 
through a website. Third, for NAV licences, there is also an obligation for OFWAT to 
publish and declare its intention of making an appointment and variations which must 
be published in a manner appropriate to bring attention to any affected persons and 
also in providing opportunities for any interested stakeholders to express their 
objections. For WSLs, there is also a scope for stakeholder participation. Legislation 
does not specify reason giving for NAV licences, but OFWAT has a policy to disclose 
the rationale behind the rejection of applications. Conversely, for WSL, there is a 
specific reason giving obligation imposed on OFWAT in the legislation, through a 
notice to unsuccessful applicants, although there is no requirement to publicly disclose 
it.  
 
1611 See section 5.3.1 above  
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Similar ex-ante publication requirements are also imposed on applicants in  
Victoria, where legislation provides that no persons can apply for a licence unless 
the Minister has published the call for the application in the Government Gazette 
and local newspaper. This kind of requirement is beneficial for minimising 
corruption. This mechanism is also important to make the public (and any 
competitors) aware that the government is planning to entrust the delivery of water 
services in their region to a local monopolist. In Victoria, applications for licences 
are required to be published in local newspapers, specifying the applicant’s name 
and the area intended to be covered by the licence and interested persons are invited 
to make submission.  
 
What is lacking in all jurisdictions are  ex-post legal requirements to publish 
licences, although in Victoria there are gazettal requirements to publish licences and 
the SOO must be available on each utility’s website and its copies must be prepared 
for inspection. For England, the lack of legal obligation to publish licences is 
mitigated by an OFWAT policy (which is enabled by the WIA s.201) on publishing 
licences.  
 
In Indonesia, neither the national regulation (under Water Law 7/2004 and 
GR 16/2005) nor the regional by-laws and the Cooperation Agreement provide 
clarity on the publication of licences. Another complicating problem in Jakarta, is 
the categorisation of the Cooperation Agreement with the private sector.  If the 
contract is regarded as a ‘concessie’ (concession but in the “legal” sense of the term) 
then it may be treated as if it is a licence and some of the decisions made by the 
concessionaire holders could be subjected to public scrutiny through judicial review 
by the Administrative Court. This does not apply if the contract is categorised as a 
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common private contract “made by the government in the course of its daily 
activities”. 1612 If the contracts are  kinds of licences, then the public would have 
more claims in asking for disclosure, because licences should be subject to public 
scrutiny and evaluation by the state. On the other hand, if it is regarded as a purely 
private contract, then there is more justification for non-disclosure.  
 
In later sections we will see that licence-based regimes are generally more 
transparent than contractual regimes. This is because in licence-based regimes, the 
regulatory arrangements are stipulated in licences, which are public documents. In 
contractual regimes, the regulatory arrangements such as service levels, customer 
service and investment planning are stipulated in contracts which – unlike licences – 
could be subjected to confidentiality clauses.  Licence based regimes such as in 
England also require that legislation properly specifies in detail the ways to obtain 
licencess and the conditions attached to them. 
 
7.2.2. The regulator’s internal governance 
In all three jurisdictions, legal frameworks regulate the composition, 
structure, term of office, appointment and removal mechanisms for members of the 
regulatory bodies. The power to appoint and remove members of the regulatory 
bodies is vested in the executive. In England, the power to appoint and remove rests 
with the Secretary of State, whereas in Jakarta, it rests with the Governor. In 
Victoria, the power to appoint rests with the Governor in Council but removal must 
 
1612 See section 6.4.2  
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be approved by parliamentary resolution (see below). Presumably, this is meant to 
reinforce the regulatory body’s insulation from the executive’s political interference.   
 
With the exception of Victoria, transparency mechanisms are used when 
filling positions as members and chairpersons of the regulatory body. In Jakarta, 
selection for JWSRB members must be announced to the public. There is, however, 
no explanation of whether this obligation falls to the Governor and no clarification 
on how the publication needs to be carried out. The Victorian legal framework lacks 
a transparency mechanism in the appointment of ESC members. The ESC Act 
contains provisions on appointment, as discussed in the previous paragraph, but is 
silent on its mechanism. The best practice of the three jurisdictions compared is 
England. OFWAT’s board appointments by the Secretary are subject to transparency 
requirements imposed by The Commissioner for Public Appointments. The 
selection is carried out by setting up a recruitment website and candidates may be 
required to appear before a parliamentary select committee.1613  
 
Other than appointments, removal of members from the membership of a 
regulatory body is also an important issue. This is mainly because the creation of 
‘independent’ regulators needs to calculate any possible conflict between the 
executive and the regulatory body and the abuse of the executive’s statutory powers 
in removing them from their membership. Victoria addresses this by requiring 
parliamentary approval and Jakarta addresses this by requiring suspensions (which 
precede removal) to be announced transparently to the public. However, in Jakarta, 
 
1613See section 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 
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there is no parliamentary intervention in the removal process, so the position of the 
regulators in the face of the Governor is significantly weaker than in Victoria. 
England, while faring best among the three on its transparency in appointing 
OFWAT board members, does not regulate in detail the procedure of removal of 
OFWAT members by the Secretary.   
 
Conflict of Interest (CoI) management is another important topic in the 
regulator’s internal governance and transparency mechanisms play an important 
role. England has good practice in defining clearly what is meant by “prohibited 
interest” and requiring its disclosure. What is lacking in England is that OFWAT’s 
rule of procedure does not really clarify to whom the CoI should be disclosed: the 
public or OFWAT’s Chairman and Secretary. Nevertheless, some memberships, 
positions and relationships which may trigger CoI must be disclosed in the The 
Register of Board Members’ Disclosable Interests,1614 which – according to Ofwat’s 
procedure – is a public document. The register is a powerful transparency instrument 
of Ofwat’s internal governance as it allows the public to immediately scrutinise any 
possible CoI. Jakarta on the other hand is lacking in terms of CoI management. CoI 
is nowhere mentioned, defined or regulated in the legal frameworks applicable to 
JWSRB. There are only minimal regulations on appointment and dismisal of 
regulators.1615In Victoria, CoI is regulated in primary legislation, but it lacks 
definition and  transparency requirement. There are only two provisions relevant in 
the context of CoI: the obligation for the ESC Chairperson not to take paid 
 
1614 See section 5.3.3. 
1615 See section 6.4.4 
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employment and the obligation of all members to disclose existing or foreseeable 
pecuniary interest to the Minister.1616 However, there is no requirement to publicly 
disclose these interests.   
7.2.3. Means of Acquiring Information 
The regulators’ means for acquiring information from utilities carry  
important transparency implications since, if regulators lack power in obtaining 
information from the utilities, it will not have much to disclose to the public. 
However, there is no guarantee that regulators will publicly disclose all information 
it acquires from the utilities. Their propensity to disclose will depend on their 
disclosure policy – to be discussed on the next section. 
The legal framework used for acquiring information differs across the three 
jurisdictions compared and is dependent upon the regulatory model. In Jakarta, the 
primary instrument is the Cooperation Agreement. In Victoria, it is the legislation, 
the WIRO and each company’s SOO. In England, it is legislation and licences.  
The content of the power to acquire information is quite typical, although the 
empowering instrument varies as discussed above. The most common is “reporting 
duties”. This method must be supplemented by specification of information and data 
to be submitted, usually stipulated through the “regulatory” accounting guidelines 
but can also be through other means.  
In Victoria, the regulatory account is empowered by the ESC Act.1617 The 
commission may also request another set of information not specified in the ESC 
 
1616 See section 4.3.3 
1617 See section 4.4.2 
 
 445 
Act, by a written notice which contains direction as to the details of information that 
needs to be submitted to them.1618 In England, the power to acquire information is 
outlined in the WIA 19911619 and each company’s licences. 1620 The annual data 
requirement is known as the “June Return”, 1621 the misreporting of which entails 
penalty.1622 OFWAT also obligates the companies to follow the Regulatory 
Accounting Guideline, which is not prescribed by statutes, but is referred to in the 
company’s licence conditions. The position of the regulatory account in England is 
thus different from Victoria. In Victoria, the regulatory accounts are directly 
stipulated in the ESC Act whereas in England, they becomes binding because they 
are referred to in each company’s licence.  In Jakarta, the private sector is obligated 
under the contract to submit reports to PAM Jaya monthly, quarterly, semi-annually, 
annually and every five years. On the other hand, the private sector is under no duty 
to submit any report to JWSRB.  There is also an obligation to ‘maintain transparent 
accounts’ but this is not followed by any reference to regulatory accounts. 1623 
Hence, in Jakarta, there is no obligation to submit reports based on a prescribed 
regulatory account, although this could have been done by inserting a clause in the 
contract.   
The second most common feature is the “investigative power”. In this 
feature, the regulator does not rely on data submitted by utilities, but may 
appropriate data and information that it finds in the utility’s premises. Hence, the 
 
1620  See section 5.4.2  
1620  See section 5.4.2  
1620  See section 5.4.2  
1623 See section 6.5.2 
1623 See section 6.5.2 
1623 See section 6.5.2 
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role of the legal framework is in enabling the regulator to enter, investigate or even 
confiscate materials from utilities’ premises. In England, this is enabled, for 
example, through licence condition J though applicable only on several matters.1624 
The power includes the authority to inspect, make photocopies and take extracts 
from any books and records, carry out inspections, measurements and tests on any 
premises or plants, and take equipment onto such premises and plants. 
In Jakarta, this is enabled by the contract, but limited to copying and 
verifying of the assets register and any documents directly related to it. Concerning 
utilities’ accounts, PAM Jaya and JWSRB have the power to conduct audits and the 
concessionaire has the corresponding obligation to “provide all requested 
information and data”, but there is no mention of the power to enter premises. The 
contract enables external audit by state audit agencies, and requires that they are 
given “access at all reasonable times to the relevant books and records”.  
Victoria’s Department of Sustainability and Environment Inspectors are 
granted broad powers via the WIA 1994.,This includes the authority to conduct 
searches in premises, to inspect, take photographs or samples, seize or open any 
closed containers but they are limited to (a) matters on planning, construction, 
operation or maintenance of works; (b) technical performance standards; and (c) 
water quality standards. Similar powers are enjoyed by English DWI. The Jakarta 
regulator lacks these powers. The ESC also has audit power under WIRO, but the 
WIRO makes no mention that it enjoys the power to enter premises.  
 
1624 See section 5.3.4  
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The third type is the power to acquire information from unregulated third 
parties. Jakarta regulates this in the contract by guaranteeing that PAM Jaya (but not 
JWSRB) shall obtain any data and information it requires from the concessionaire 
“…or, through the Second Party, from any of its agents, contractors, and 
representatives associated with the performance of this Agreement”. England, on the 
other hand, lacks this approach, despite the fact that for governing ring fencing, 
OFWAT has required utilities to procure undertakings from their parent companies,  
which include the provision of necessary information. In Victoria, the DSE 
inspector’s power, as mentioned above, is exercisable against a person, not just the 
regulated company. The ESC also enjoys wide powers. It has the power to acquire 
information from (1) any person – albeit with some possible limitations – and (2) 
the regulated companies.1625 In addition, the ESC may require the companies to 
enter into an arrangement with third parties to submit information to the ESC.  
It is important to note that although Victoria has the strongest legal means in 
acquiring regulatory information, England has the most detailed regulation on 
information acquisition; this can be seen from the sections below. Strong legal 
empowerment means that the regulator enjoys broad power (i.e. it can request 
information from any person, not just the regulated company, it can inspect premises 
or there is a harsh punishment for violating reporting duties) but unless this power is 
accompanied by adequate expertise and resources, it is no more than a paper tiger. 
Knowing which information is relevant to be asked for from utilities requires special 
expertise.  
 
1625 See section 4.3.4 
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7.2.4. Regulator’s General Disclosure Policy 
As mentioned, a regulator who has powerful means to acquire information 
will have the most opportunity to disclose regulatory information to the public. This, 
however, depends on whether legislation and their policies allow them to disclose 
such information.  
In England, a disclosure policy is mostly the result of OFWAT’s own 
initiative, as legislation is generally silent on the publication of information. 
Legislation acts as an “enabler” of transparency by providing regulators with wide 
discretion to publish information that they believe to be in the public interest.1626 
This discretion is further reinforced in the company’s licence which enables 
OFWAT to publish any regulatory material for the purpose of carrying out of its 
functions. This discretion has some restrictions. Regulators should have regard to 
private affairs and caution if publication will “seriously and prejudicially affect” the 
private parties’ interests. Another good practice from England is the policy to 
publish major regulatory information submitted by the utilities in their “June 
Return” data. A small category of information is allowed to be excised. These 
excision categories developed out of practice and are only to be used as a guideline. 
If companies invoke some of the excision category, it must be able to justify its 
excision and such justifications will be published along with the rest of the data. 
OFWAT has the final say as to whether or not to accept the utilities’ rationale in 
invoking excision. In addition, the FoI channel is still available even if OFWAT 
granted the company’s request for excision. However, the collection and publication 
 
1626 See section 5.3.5 
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of the June Return will no longer be relevant when OFWAT formalises its risk-
based approach to regulation. As utilities will be required to publish regulatory 
accounts and key performance indicators, the locus for transparency in England 
water regulation will slowly shift from regulators to utilities. This may require 
amendment to the legal framework, presumably the utilities’ licence condition, so 
that they are obligated to publish this information. The implication of the shift to 
risk regulation towards transparency will remain to be seen.   
As opposed to England, regulators in Victoria and Jakarta lack 
empowerment to publicly disclose regulatory information. Jakarta’s regulator has no 
obligation to disclose. On the other hand, it has the obligation to keep regulatory 
information secret. In Victoria, the closest thing to a requirement of public 
disclosure is the WIRO’s general mandate for the ESC to “publicly report the 
performance of a regulated industry”.1627 This is more of a specific publication 
requirement of information related to performance (which we will discuss and 
compare in the following sections) rather than a general discretion to disclose 
regulatory information.  
Legal frameworks often mandate regulators with the duty of non-disclosure. 
This is found in all of the three jurisdictions. The regulator’s duty of non-disclosure 
is often perceived as a counter balance to its powers in acquiring information 
(discussed in the previous section). However, if the duty of non-disclosure is too 
broadly construed, it may act as an impediment towards transparency.  
 
1627 See section 4.3.5 
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In England, restriction from disclosure is imposed through WIA.1628 WIA 
s.206 clearly indicates that information acquired by virtue of the regulator’s powers 
under the act which pertains to the affairs of individuals or businesses shall not be 
disclosed. A similar restriction applies in Victoria, for information acquired through 
the powers granted by s.37 and s.37A of the ESC Act. The restrictions come with 
qualifiers, for example, if consent is given by the supplier of information (England) 
or if it is required to facilitate the performance of the regulators’ functions (England) 
or if the ‘public benefit’ outweighs the harm (Victoria).  
 In Jakarta, the strict formulation of the confidentiality clauses renders public 
disclosure virtually impossible. The contract only allows the disclosure of technical 
and commercial information1629  to third parties if such third parties enter into a 
confidentiality agreement with the discloser. Furthermore, such engagements must 
be approved by all parties to the Cooperation Agreement. As a result, only limited 
and specific disclosure to third parties is permitted, but “public” disclosure is 
impossible. The regulatory body, JWSRB, is instituted under the contract and 
reinforces this confidentiality policy in its mandate. Hence, although it is not a party 
to the contract, it is prohibited by its statute from disclosing information.  
 
7.2.5. Investment and Price Determination   
 
1628 See section 5.3.5 
1629 See section 6.4.6 
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In Victoria, every investment plan for the upcoming regulatory period is 
stipulated in each utility’s “Water Plan”.1630 Utilities are required by their SOO to 
submit a water plan, for the purpose of price determination. The Water Plan is 
published o each utility’s website and the ESC, although there is no specific obligation 
to do so, but each utility’s SOO contains an obligation for the utility to “develop and 
implement open and transparent processes in its planning stage. As a matter of 
regulatory practice, the draft Water Plan is being released for discussion for a one 
month period to provide opportunities for commenting before the final draft water 
plan is submitted to the ESC. There is no exact mechanism regulating the publication 
of this draft water plan and the one month period is too short to allow informed 
participation. Utilities are also required to submit corporate plans to the treasurer. 
There is no obligation to publish the corporate plan, but there is an obligation to have 
it ready for inspection, upon request. When the ESC finally makes determination, 
there is a legal obligation to include a statement of purpose and the reason for making 
such determination and the notice must be published in the Government Gazette, daily 
newspaper generally circulating in Victoria or on the internet.  
In England, the primary transparency tools in investment and price 
determination are the publication of companies’ Five Year Business Plans, and annual 
June Return. There are no legal requirements to publish these plans, but the company 
websites publish them and OFWAT’s website compiles the  links. OFWAT also 
publishes each company’s leakage target in its five-yearly Price Determination.1631  
There is also a yearly monitoring of each company’s leakage target. If companies fail 
 
1630 See  sections 4.3.6 and 4.3.7 
1631 See section 5.3.8 
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to achieve leakage targets, OFWAT will “name and shame” them in its annual report 
or if it is serious, categorise it as breach of its licence condition.   
In Jakarta, there is no such investment planning process. Unlike in Victoria 
and England, Jakarta concessionaires are not required to submit periodical investment 
plans that the regulator must approve for the purposes of price determination, because 
they are paid directly based on the volume of water delivered to consumers’ taps.1632 
Investment targets are not determined periodically in the regulatory process like in 
Victoria and England, but are already contained in the Cooperation Agreement. This 
includes afive year investment programme and an annual Investment and O/M 
program (which must be approved by PAM Jaya – not JWSRB). There are obligations 
to extend the network which forms a part of “technical targets”. This five-yearly and 
annual investment plan is not disclosed to the public and there is an impediment  to 
doing so due to the confidentiality clause. Tariffs are determined separately by the 
Governor. The national law has a relatively transparent tarrification method but is 
deemed inapplicable to the Jakarta concession. 
Ideally, investment (and service levels) should reflect consumer demand and 
therefore be appropriately reflected in prices, as is done through various stakeholder 
participation mechanisms preceding price determinations in England and Victoria. 
However, in Jakarta, the “water charge” system and the contractually pre-determined 
investment targets disconnect prices from politics, as they put investment matters into 
the hand of PAM Jaya themselves without public involvement. This situation can be  
slightly improved if, at the very least, the five year approval process of investment 
 
1632 See sections 6.4.8 and 6.4.9 
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targets is conducted publicly and all investment plan documents are published. 
However, such a measure would require contractual amendment on the part of the 
confidentiality clauses and the reforming of Jakarta’s regional by-laws regulating 
PAM Jaya and water services in Jakarta. The former would require agreement from 
the private sector and the latter requires strong political will from the local councillors.   
7.2.6. Service Levels and Customer Service   
The transparency of service levels and customer service standards is required 
so that customers would be able to exercise their rights and utilities would have an 
incentive to comply. In both England and Victoria, there are obligatory publication 
requirements on service standards and customer service.  
In England, information on both service levels and customer service standards 
is regulated in a Statutory Instrument (the “GSS Rule”) and so they are available to 
the public. In addition, utilities must enact a code of practice, based on the GSS Rule, 
to be approved by OFWAT. An important transparency mechanism in England is that 
in the company’s licence condition, OFWAT requires that such code and any 
substantive amendment thereof be put to the attention of customers, its copies made 
available for inspection and anyone requesting it should be able to obtain it free of 
charge.1633  
In Victoria, the service standard is regulated through the Customer Service 
Code (CSC).1634 Utilities must enact and publish a customer charter which is 
 
1633 See section 5.3.6 
1634 See sections 4.3.8 
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formulated based on the CSC. The guaranteed service level compensation, however, is 
not mandatory. If utilities choose to enact them, they must be approved by the ESC 
and published as a part of the CSC. 
Jakarta has no published service levels and customer service standards. Jakarta 
has by-laws regulating water services, but the by-laws barely regulate service 
standards.1635 Albeit with less detail than England and Victoria, the national law 
broadly regulates some guarantee on service levels but this is deemed inapplicable to 
the concession. The Cooperation Agreement regulates some service standards and 
guaranteed payments on service levels, but it is confidential.  
Service levels and customer service standards in England and Victoria are 
transparent, partly because they are part of the regulatory instruments. The GSS 
Rule (England) is a Statutory Instrument, and the Customer Service Code (Victoria) 
is a code enacted by the regulatory body, empowered to do so by the ESC Act. 
Conversely, in Jakarta, they form part of the Cooperation Agreement. Even without 
the confidentiality clause, as a private arrangement, a contract would be less 
transparent compared to a secondary legislation (the English GSS Rule) or a code 
(Victoria’s CSC) due to the negotiatory nature of any service level improvements 
which restricts direct involvement from the public. On the other hand, there is 
greater opportunity for public involvement if service levels are regulated in 
instruments such as the English GSS and Victoria’s CSC.  
Another reason why England and Victoria is more transparent than Jakarta is 
because in addition to stipulation of service standards in a regulatory instrument (in 
 
1635 See sections 6.4.7  
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a Statutory Instrument or in a Code), there is a legal obligation to further 
disseminate the service standard information in the form of a customer charter 
(Victoria) or code of practice (England). These charters and codes are drafted based 
on the empowering regulatory instrument, but in a language which is simpler and 
more understandable than a legal instrument.    
7.2.7. Non-compliance 
In Victoria, the two types of enforcement mechanisms, provisional and final 
‘orders’, require publication in the Government Gazette. 1636 In England, it is much 
more detailed as transparency is applied to every enforcement stage and type of 
orders. Enforcement Orders must be preceded by a published notice, clarifying the 
violations, points of the licence condition or other regulatory instrument being 
breached and what is required to cease the violation. 1637 If an undertaking is to be 
provided, a published notice is also required. Likewise, if a fine is to be imposed, a 
notice must be published specifying the proposed amount of penalty, the acts or 
omission which is deemed to constitute a contravention, supporting facts and 
justification and a period for the utilities to make an objection.  
Jakarta is the least transparent. The Cooperation Agreement regulates that 
concessionaires are obligated to pay penalties for violation of customer service and 
service level standards, and such payment must be made directly (by the 
concessionaire) to the consumer, in the form of rebates. However, this has never 
been disclosed and has prompted a polemic between the regulatory body and PAM 
 
1636 See section 4.3.9 
1637 See section 5.3.7  
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Jaya.1638 PAM Jaya may have incentives towards non-disclosure since the payment 
of compensation could decrease its income from the concession, which is used to 
repay its debt to the concessionaire, despite the fact that such compensation and 
rebates must be paid directly to the customer. The Cooperation Agreement contains 
no obligation to publish non-compliance or enforcement. Disclosure on non-
compliance is also prohibited by the confidentiality clause. Matters of non-
compliance are settled bilaterally between PAM Jaya and its concessionaires. 
7.2.8. Redress 
Victorian water utilities are obligated by their licence conditions to enter into 
a dispute resolution scheme. The industrial ombudsman EWOV is currently referred 
to as the dispute settlement body in the Customer Service Code. The existence of 
EWOV as a private body may pose an accountability problem on its own1639; 
however, to the extent that information pertaining to redress is communicated, 
Victoria is relatively transparent. The CSC requires utilities to inform customers 
about referral to EWOV and other available dispute settlement mechanisms.  
 
In England, both OFWAT and CC Water have complaint handling 
functions.1640 CC Water will only interfere if water companies have been given the 
opportunity to address the complaint. Similar to Victoria, there is an obligation for 
 
1638 See section 5.4.10 
1639 See section 4.3.10    
1640 See section 5.3.10     
1640 See section 5.3.10     
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the utilities to describe how complaint handling works in the water industry, the 
functions of CC Water and how they can be contacted.  
 
In Jakarta, a regulatory redress mechanism is virtually non-existent, except 
for some issues related to inaccurate water metering1641  and water theft penalties. 
By-law 11 also provides no alternative recourse mechanism for customers to go to 
Court. The previous sections mentioned that there are some service level guarantees 
and compensation mechanisms in the Cooperation Agreement. However, customers 
have no direct recourse to this, as they are not a party to the contract.  
 
Service levels, customer service, non-compliance and a redress mechanism 
are a continuum. The first two determine the content of the rights and the last two 
determine how they can be enforced. Jakarta is lagging behind in all of the four 
aspects, but especially in a redress mechanism: it hardly exists. In order to be 
transparent, the content of the rights and how they can be enforced must be 
communicated to the public. This is a legal obligation in England and Victoria, but 
not in Jakarta. 
 
 
7.3. Utilities’ Corporate Governance 
7.3.1. The Board and its accountability  
 
1641 See section 6.4.10   
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From all three jurisdictions, basic corporate information1642 is available 
through the companies themselves or the company regulator (or other administering 
body) for a fee. Listed companies generally have more disclosure requirements than 
privately-owned companies. In England, quoted companies must publish their annual 
account and report on their corporate website free of charge.1643 Thus, if the utilities 
are not quoted companies, they are not subject to these rules, unless they are required 
by OFWAT to comply with capital market disclosure rules as if they are listing their 
equities.  
In Victoria, the obligation to disclose the directors’ report and financial report 
is only towards members and not the general public.1644 However, the Victorian water 
retailers are under an obligation to disclose those reports to the parliament under the 
SoE Act.  
The situation in Indonesia is similar. Directors of a company must produce an 
annual report but these are only delivered to the shareholders, except if they are listed 
(which is the case – for the time being – for Palyja and Aetra due to their bond issue), 
then they are required to disclose their audited financial accounts annually in 
newspapers.1645 However, there is no obligation to disclose their annual report to the 
public. PAM Jaya – which is governed by the regional SoE Law – has even lower 
reporting standards compared to the concessionaires. PAM Jaya is only required to 
 
1642 England: CA s.162 (5) (Directors Register),  CA s.116 (1) (Register of Members), Victoria: 
Corporations Act 2001 s. 205 B. Indonesia: Peraturan Menteri Hukum dan Hak Asasi Manusia Nomor 
M.HH-03.AH.01.01 Tahun 2009 
1643 See section 5.4.2 
1644 See section 4.4.2 
1645 See section 6.5.1  
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report to the Governor its “profit and loss account” and this should later be reported to 
the parliament as  part of the Governor’s general accountability report.     
For directors’ appointments, the Victorian legal framework is less clear. The 
Three Retailers are governed by the Corporations Act and the Act only regulates 
appointments in general, the details of which are left to resolutions. The author is not 
able to obtain such resolutions, although in theory they should be tabled at the 
parliament and therefore recorded on the Victorian Government Gazette. However, 
the practice of appointment is quite transparent, the vacancies are announced on the 
DSE’s website, outlining the selection criteria and its process and the procedure for 
applying.  
Jakarta’s By-law 13 only prescribes that directors are appointed by the 
Governor, and there are no rules governing the prerequisite of directorship and the 
appointment process.1646 For Palyja and Aetra, their directors are appointed by the 
General Meeting of Shareholders, and can be dismissed through a resolution. 
According to the capital market rule, a change in directorship in Palyja and Aetra must 
subsequently be announced to the public. 
There are three important lessons. First, as demonstrated by the Jakarta case of 
PAM Jaya, public ownership of water utilities is not a guarantee for transparency if 
the rules governing public utilities are under-reformed. In order to increase 
transparency, the Jakarta by-law regulating PAM Jaya needs to be reformed in order 
to raise the reporting threshold, followed by the public disclosure of such reports and 
 
1646 See section 6.5.1 
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tabling at the local parliament. Second, corporatisation may indeed increase disclosure 
by water utilities, but the transparency mechanism in general corporate law is geared 
toward members, and not the public at large. As such, corporation law can be used to 
facilitate transparency, only when there are further requirements to publicly disclose 
information which is disclosed to members (as applicable to Victorian SoEs). Third, 
listed companies do have more disclosure requirements compared to ordinary 
companies, both in terms of the types of information which should be disclosed and 
the obligation to disseminate such information. However, utilities may no longer be 
bound by those disclosure rules if they delist themselves from the capital market. 
Hence, capital market rules can be used to facilitate disclosures in utilities, but in 
order for transparency to be sustainable, regulators must have powers (or contracts 
must contain provisions) to impose requirements that utilities would still be subjected 
to those rules, even when they decide to delist themselves.   
7.3.2. Related Party Transactions 
From all three jurisdictions, accounting standards generally impose higher 
disclosure requirements for related party transactions, compared to the default 
disclosure requirement found in each country’s company laws.1647  In Indonesia, the 
 
1647 In Indonesia, the Company Law does not require disclosure of related parties, the accounting 
standards do. (See Undang Undang No.40 Tahun 2007 Tentang Perseroan Terbatas and Ikatan Akuntan 
Indonesia, Pernyataan Standar Akuntansi Keuangan (PSAK) No. 07: Pengungkapan Pihak Pihak 
Berelasi ). In the UK, disclosure is required by the company law, for related party transactions made not 
under normal market conditions, however, the FRS 8 requires disclosure of all types of related party 
transactions, irrespective of market conditions. (See SI 2008/410 para 72 (1) and compare with 
Accounting Standards Board, Amendment to FRS 8 Related Party Disclosures: Legal Changes 2008  ). 
In Australia, The Corporations Act’s definition of “related parties” (See Corporations Act 2001 s.210 ) 
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Company Law does not require disclosure of related parties but the accounting 
standards do. In the UK, disclosure is required by the company law, for a related 
party transaction made not under normal market conditions, however, the FRS 8 
requires disclosure of all types of related party transactions, irrespective of market 
conditions. In Australia, The Corporations Act’s definition of “related parties” is 
narrower than the Australian Accounting Standards Board, AASB 124. 
Capital market rules also generally require more disclosure threshold than 
company law, as is the case in Jakarta, but its applicability to water utilities will 
cease when they delist their equities or debt from the capital market. Thus, 
subjecting water utilities to accounting standards may increase transparency on 
related party transactions. Company laws generally refer to each jurisdiction’s 
accounting standards; such linkage is strong in England and Victoria but is weak in 
Indonesia. Therefore, ideally, regulators should be empowered with the ability to 
require utilities to comply with certain accounting standards.  
Regulators in Victoria and England impose regulatory accounts on utilities. 
In both jurisdictions, Related Party Transactions are a part of regulatory accounts 
which are confidential. In Jakarta, there are no specific regulatory accounts which 
utilities must submit to regulators; the Cooperation Agreement subjects utilities to 
prevailing general accounting standards. This is unfortunate, as regulatory accounts 
are much more specific in focusing on business and industry information rather than 
general corporate information as imposed by statutory accounts.   
 
is narrower than the AASB’s (See  Australian Accounting Standards Board, AASB 124, Related Party 
Disclosures). See sections 4.4.2 (Victoria), 5.4.2 (England) and 6.5.2 (Indonesia/Jakarta). 
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However, in both England and Victoria, Related Party Transactions form the 
confidential part of the regulatory account. This could be detrimental for 
transparency, as one of the benefits of disclosure of related party transactions in 
regulatory accounts is for customers to be able to track companies’ possible anti-
competitive behavior.1648  
The excision of related party transaction documents in England is subject to 
some categories1649  developed out of regulatory practice. Such invocation, however, 
appears to be arbitrary, as there is no consistency between companies although the 
information sought for confidentiality is similar, i.e. information on related party 
transactions. Some categories such as “security risk” are arguably reasonable, but 
other categories such as those where disclosure will provide third party commercial 
advantage (Category 4) must be subjected to a balancing test with the general 
purpose of regulatory account disclosure discussed above.  
Victoria is more secretive than England with regards to its related party 
transaction confidentiality policy, as it provides no attempt to justify why such 
information is confidential. Furthermore, if the English style excision category is 
applied to Victoria, it will have less justification to impose confidentiality than its 
English counterparts due to its legal form as a state-owned company. 
7.3.3. Corporate Restructuring 
 
1648 Inter-Regulatory Working Group, The role of regulatory accounts in regulated industries, A joint 
consultation paper by the Directors General of Oftel, Ofgem, Ofwat, Electricity & Gas Supply 
(Northern Ireland), Rail Regulator and Civil Aviation Authority 
1649   See England Case Study Section 4.3.5 on “OFWAT’s General Disclosure Policy” and “Related 
Party Transaction” section 4.4.2 
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Transparency mechanisms are used in the regulatory process to gather 
information from the public on the credibility of the new owners, in understanding 
the consumers’ views and to deal with the effects of corporate restructuring.  
In England, there is a good practice of publishing “Consultation papers”1650 
detailing the process of restructuring. OFWAT does not have any power to block 
acquisition, but information and views generated from the consultation process is 
then used by the regulator in modifying utilities’ licences. The Jakarta regulator has 
the power to block acquisition if the transfer of shares involves more than 51% of 
total shares. Unfortunately, it did not conduct any consultation process during past 
acquisitions. In Victoria, all utilities’ shares are currently owned by the State 
Government and there is constitutional entrenchment in retaining the status of public 
ownership. 1651 Any attempt to transfer utilities’ shares to a private entity which 
changes its nature as a public entity will therefore require parliamentary approval.   
Some restructuring in England had caused the delisting of equities from the 
stock exchange. To compensate for the loss of information used in comparison, 
OFWAT requires the publication of the utility’s financial information as if it were 
listed and subject to the rules of the stock exchange.1652  In England, utilities’ 
accounting statements, auditors’ report and annual accounts must be published and  
copies  made available to customers upon request. 
 
 
 
1650 See section 6.5.3 
1651 See section 4.4.3 
1652 See section 5.4.3 
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7.4. Passive Disclosure Rules 
7.4.1. Applicability 
Regulators in England (including OFWAT) and Victoria (including ESC) are 
subject to the provisions of FoI laws, but in Jakarta there is disagreement whether 
the FoI law applies to JWSRB. The main reason for this is because, unlike OFWAT 
and ESC, the JWSRB is an entity established under a contract. The JWSRB does 
have a legal mandate under a Governor Regulation, but it suffers from some 
problems, namely, that the mandate itself lacks regulatory power and this prevents it 
from being categorised as “related to the organization of the state”.1653, the legal 
form of the mandate as a Governor Regulation is considerably weak under the 
Indonesian legal system and  there are technical legal defects which may cause the 
mandate to be unenforceable. Due to the above, the argument that JWSRB is a 
public body becomes less compelling.  
Victorian water utilities, being state-owned companies, are covered by 
Victorian FoI. Conversely, FoI is not applicable to water utilities where services are 
carried out by the private sectors such as in England and Jakarta. This appears to 
support the thesis that ‘privatisation’ decreases the level of transparency of the 
decision making process in the water sector.1654 Nevertheless, there are various 
dimensions to “transparency”.1655 Delegation to the private sector does not 
necessarily result in the decrease of all of those dimensions. “Availability” of 
information to regulators may actually increase, as demonstrated by the England 
 
1653 See section 6.6.1 also on JWSRB see section 6.1.3.4 
1654 On general discussion about transparency and private sector participation see sections 1.1.1 and  2.1 
1655 See section 2.6 
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case study. Thus it is more suitable to say that delegation to the private sector has 
the potential to obstruct information from being accessible to the public.   
In England, water utilities are not covered by the FoI Act, but there are 
growing pressures for utility companies to be covered by it, through designation by 
the Secretary of State.1656 The rationale is that utilities, including water, provide 
essential services and there is a public interest in knowing how the companies 
deliver their services. At the moment the UK Government still considers that 
information about utilities is adequately accessible via regulators and, therefore, has 
not included utilities in the initial s.5 designation, although they are strong 
candidates for inclusion in the future. Another strong point for subjecting water 
utilities to the FoI Act is because of OFWAT’s plan to move towards risk-based 
regulation in an effort to reduce its (and utilities’) regulatory burden. In practice, this 
would mean a decrease in the amount of regulatory information made available in 
the public domain, as utilities would no longer be required to submit their June 
Return. With fewer regulatory burdens and more reliance on self-regulation, 
additional public scrutiny via the FoI Act is the appropriate counter-balance.  
The application of the UK’s EIR to water utilities is problematic. This is 
because, unlike the FoI Act which lists a number of public bodies in its schedule, the 
EIR relies on the legal interpretation of several terminologies, namely, whether the 
body carries functions of public administration or it is acting “under the control” of 
other public bodies with some environmental functions. Water utilities fail on both 
tests.  
 
1656 See section 5.5.1 above 
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The interpretation of both of the elements above relies heavily on the UK’s 
internal experiences and is influenced by the UK’s regulatory psyche. For example, 
the Upper Tribunal in Smartsource explicitly recognises that water utilities have 
some “administrative” functions but it denies that such functions are “functions of 
public administration” under EIR. 1657  If these are not functions of public 
administration, then what are they? The Upper Tribunal in Smartsource does not say 
anything. However, in The Duchy of Cornwall, the first trial tribunal interprets 
Smartsource and suggests that water utilities do indeed have  “functions of public 
administration” but since these functions are ancillary to the ultimate “commercial” 
functions they are not regarded to be a public authority under EIR. This is another 
blunder: if the first tier tribunal has acknowledged that the body carries  “public 
administrative functions”, then should it not be straightforwardly covered by the 
EIR? The Aarhus Convention clearly does not distinguish whether the function of 
public administration is ancillary or primary.  
As for under the control, the Upper Tribunal suggests that “regulation” is not 
a “control”. For them, a “control” would mean ‘command and compulsion’ within 
which both the means and outcome are dictated by the state, whereas in 
“regulation”, the entity is positioned at arms-length from the state’s machineries, 
whose function is restricted to “formulating policy and strategy, determining 
outcomes, setting standards, making and enforcing rules and issuing guidance”.1658 
Fot this argument, the strong pressure for differentiating between “regulation” and 
“control” is visible, and this is highly influenced by the UK’s long time experience 
 
1657 See section 5.5.1.2 
1658 See section 5.5.1.2 
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with privatisation and regulation. This is despite the fact that the Aarhus Guide 
provides a strong indication that high regulation of companies exercising 
environmental functions such as water utilities can be regarded as “control”. 
The status of the concessionaires in Jakarta is also similarly elusive. While 
they are not straightforwardly covered by the Indonesian FoI Law as a government 
entity, the FoI Law could also be applicable to “non-governmental” entities whose 
budget is derived partially or in its entirety from the state or regional budget or from 
foreign contribution.1659 This is possible in the Cooperation Agreement, in cases 
where the tariffs collected are smaller than the “water charge” that must be paid to 
the operators. The remaining “shortfall” must be paid by PAM Jaya. If the payment 
of such a shortfall is derived from the state or regional budget, then this will trigger 
application of the FoI Law. Indeed, PAM Jaya currently owes a great deal of money 
to the concessionaires, the repayment of which can only be derived from state or 
regional budgets.  
Secondly, the concessionaires can be categorised as bodies (other than the 
executive, judiciary or the legislative), whose “main tasks are related to the 
organization of the state”.1660 Unlike in the UK, there has never been any decision to 
delegate entirely water services to the private sector as it is constitutionally 
forbidden. Any authorities vested in the concessionaires are derived from the 
Cooperation Agreement, but can only exist if it is sourced from public law. The 
primary sources of these are the regional by-laws. Hence, the concessionaires are 
effectively exercising a function “related to the organization of the state”. This 
 
1659  See section 6.6.1.2  
1660 See section 6.6.1.2 
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argument, however, is dependent upon whether the concessionaires receive portions 
of the state or regional budget.  
Comparing the three jurisdictions above, we can tell that jurisdictions which 
rely on the applicability of FoI by way of definition (UK’s EIR and Indonesia’s FoI) 
will require lengthy legal interpretation in determining whether non state entities 
involved in regulation of water services is covered by its access to information 
regimes. The situation becomes difficult when it involves the delegation of public 
services to non-state entities. As Smartsource had demonstrated, the debate is 
confined to whether water utilities fit the legal technical definition of “functions of 
public administration” or “acting under the control”, while the wider public policy 
problem of accountability arising out of the delegation of water services to the 
private sector in which such service is crucial to the fulfilment of human rights and 
its users often have limited or no ability to switch to another provider/seller were not 
considered.1661 Such public policy concerns would have been more effectively 
considered through public consultations carried out by a “designation” system such 
as the UK’s FoI, rather than debates on statutory definitions.     
Such an inapplicability problem, in a way, mirrors the concern of authors 
such as Swyngedouw and Minow on the possibilities of information being 
 
1661 Various authors had elaborated why an access to information regime needs to cover utilities, see 
Al'Afghani, ‘The transparency agenda in water utilities regulation and the role of freedom of 
information: England and Jakarta case studies’ Calland, ‘Transparency in a Profit Making World’ 
Palast, G. and others, ‘Democratic regulation a guide to the control of privatized public services through 
social dialogue : working paper’ 
<http://ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/sector/papers/pubserv/demreg.pdf> accessed 2000 Palast, 
Oppenheim and MacGregor, Democracy and Regulation: How the Public Can Govern Privatised 
Essential Services 
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“privatised” following the “privatisation” of services. 1662 The crux of the problem, 
however, lies not with the decision to delegate services to non-state actors, but with 
the unpreparedness of the access to information regimes and the body of 
administrative law in answering such delegation challenges. The general view is 
“either-or”: either an entity is an extension of the state state and therefore covered by 
an access to information law, or not at all. This was shown in the debates in 
Smartsource in which a counsel argued that in order for a function to be of public 
administration it “must be an extension of the state system of public administration” 
and that ”regulation was intended to cover executive governmental processes in all 
their guises”.1663 What about non-state entities with state-like power? The 
jurisprudence does not seem to have an adequate answer to this because they were 
created in the age where the state was the centre of accountability, whereas these cases 
emerge in the age where the state is in “retreat” and the locus of power is partially 
transferred from the state to corporations.  
Since water utilities are already faced with a high degree of regulation and 
accountability requirements under sectoral rules, it is only reasonable that general 
access to information regimes follow suit. Legal interpretation of the phrase “public 
bodies” with the backing of case law cannot be relied on for the reasons mentioned 
above. Any reform measures to cover non-state actors under access to information 
laws or any other accountability generating mechanisms must be specifically 
stipulated in legislation.  
 
 
1662 See Literature Review section 2.1 
1663 See section 5.5.1.2 
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7.4.2. Exemptions 
From the three jurisdictions compared, the Indonesian FoI Law is generally 
the most pro-disclosure. The law has narrow exemption clauses, balancing tests 
applicable for all of its exemptions and contains no exemption on information 
obtained in confidence. The Victorian and UK FoI Acts have broad exemptions, 
some of which may be either absolute or qualified (do not require harm and/or 
public interest test) and as common law countries, contain exemptions on obligation 
of confidence.  
Five types of exemptions clauses were compared, as they are deemed to be 
relevant in water utilities’ regulation1664: law enforcement and investigation, 
decision making and policy formulation, obligation of confidence, commercial 
information and Intellectual Property Rights.   
7.4.2.1. Law enforcement and investigation; decision making and policy 
formulation  
For law enforcement and investigations, Indonesian water utilities’ 
stakeholders will benefit from the narrow exemption clause, as it only deals with 
criminal proceedings or if the exemption endangers the life of law enforcement 
officials or jeoperdises law enforcement facilities.1665 Civil and administrative 
(including regulatory) investigations are not covered by the exemption. Conversely, 
in England and Victoria they are covered as it uses broad terminologies such as 
 
1664 See Theoretical Framework section 2.4 
1665 See section 6.6.2.1 
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“proper administration of the law”1666 (Victoria) or “investigation” and ‘charged 
with an offence’1667 (England) and this covers investigation for “regulatory 
offences”.  
Indonesia has no exemption on policy formulation, although it has 
exemption for “confidential memorandum”. Victoria has exemptions for “internal 
working documents” which comprise of recommendation, advice, opinion, 
consultation or deliberation. The UK FoI and EIR also has exemptions for 
‘formulation’ or ‘development’ of government policy and “the effective conduct of 
public affairs”.  The exemptions in Victoria and England are wide, and may cover 
all sorts of formulation and development of policies on water services. Conversely, 
Indonesia’s FoI exemption is narrow, as it only protects memoranda, but not other 
policy documents.  
 
7.4.2.2. Obligation of Confidence, Commercial Information  
“Obligation of confidence” can be a serious deterrent to transparency in 
water utilities’ regulation, as it is applicable not only to natural persons, but also to 
corporations. Again, Indonesian stakeholders benefit from the non-existence of law 
of confidence in its legal system. In both Victoria1668 and England1669, this law 
exists and as such their FoI Acts provide for its exemption. Both in England and 
 
1666 See section 4.5.2.2 
1667 See section 5.5.2.1 
1668 See section 4.5.2.4 
1669 See section  5.5.2.3 
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Victoria, information generated jointly by the government and a third party is not 
considered to be “submitted in confidence”. 
All three jurisdictions compared have an exemption for “commercial 
information” and all are subject to ‘harm’ test. A leading case in Australia is from 
Queensland1670, in which the information commission interpret harm to include the 
loss of “goodwill” if it amounts to the loss of customers to a competitor and 
eventually leads to the loss of profit. In all three jurisdictions there is a reference to a 
company’s “competitive edge” in considering harm, but this is not clearly 
manifested in the UK. 1671 The consideration of competitive edge is particularly 
interesting given that water utilities operate in a natural monopoly environment: 
there is no competition in its service area.  
An important note on the Queensland case is that it considered if the 
company is operating in a monopoly context, which renders ‘harm’ caused by 
disclosure to become less relevant. Victoria’s FoI Act requires that “substantial harm 
to the competitive position” or “competitive disadvantage of an undertaking” is one 
of the elements to be considered in maintaining the exemption. The Indonesian FoI 
Law only provides exemption where disclosure would “jeopardize the protection of 
intellectual property rights and protection from unhealthy competition” and the 
elucidation clarifies that the purpose of such exemption is to protect healthy 
competition.1672 The English FoI Act contains no such consideration, although the 
 
1670 See section 4.5.2.3 
1671 For Victoria, see Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic) s.34(2) a and c Also, Undang Undang 
No.14 Tahun 2008 Tentang Keterbukaan Informasi Publik Article.17.b. FoI Act 2000 (England) s.43 
(2) contain no such provision, although ‘competition’ is considered in the Guideline, See , Freedom of 
Information Act Awareness Guidance No. 5, Commercial Interests (Version 3) p.4. 
1672 See section 6.6.2.2 
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guideline requires weighing the industry’s competition level and recommends that 
prejudice to commercial interest is less likely to occur if the company enjoys a 
monopoly. An earlier DTI Green Paper on utility regulation also proposed that the 
degree of disclosure should be linked to the entity’s degree of competition and that a 
monopoly business should be generally disclosable.1673  
As such, the English FoI Act exemption is the broadest compared to Victoria 
and Indonesia as it only requires that disclosure “would, or would be likely to 
prejudice”  commercial interests, without requiring any consideration as to whether 
the market is competitive. A “prejudice” would suffice.  
In practice, the idea that utilities’ natural monopoly is a perfect justification 
for disclosure is not always true, as demonstrated by a Scottish case.1674 The 
Scottish FoI Commissioner maintains exemption in a case involving a disclosure 
request to Scottish Water – a state-owned company – as the charges collected from 
the information request are considered for the Public Interest: it may contribute in 
decreasing the overall water and sewerage charges. Contrary to what critics often 
said, the commodification of information in this particular case may actually serve 
the Public Interest, in the form of lowering consumer charges.  
A challenge for the FoI Commissioner is in determining the ‘relevant 
market’ since the market for information could be distinguishable from and may not 
necessarily influence the market for water supply. If disclosure serves only the 
particular undertaking whose business is confined to services in the market of 
information, and it has no influence whatsoever in expanding consumer choices or 
 
1673  See Literature Review section 2.1 
1674 See section 5.5.2.2 
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in increasing competition in the market of water supply, then the exemption would 
be justified. Conversely, if disclosure has implications for the increase of 
competition in the water supply market or in decreasing consumer charges, then 
exemption should not be justified. Nevertheless, any Public Interest argument 
towards increasing competition in the water supply market would require sufficient 
backing from a liberalisation policy. If, in that particular jurisdiction, there is not yet 
any policy to liberalise and introduce competition in water supply then the argument 
of Public Interest through disclosure will have no merit.  
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8. CONCLUSIONS  
8.1.1. Transparency: motivation and competing interests 
As section 1.1.1 has argued, transparency is a prerequisite to good governance. 
It enables citizens and regulatory stakeholders to participate in the regulatory process 
and for regulators and utilities to be held accountable for their actions.  By increasing 
accountability, transparency helps in combating and preventing corruption, which, 
according to some reports, is rampant in water services provision, especially in the 
developing countries. As such, transparency will also increase the legitimacy of 
regulatory systems. Furthermore, transparency is also a prerequisite in materializing 
the human right to water. The recent developments to the human right to water 
operationalise transparency in water services provision and seek to restrict the use of 
confidentiality provisions. 
Combined with participatory mechanisms, such as by providing comment on 
utilities’ corporate and investment plans or regulators’ draft determinations, 
information received by the regulator from the public will be beneficial for the 
regulatory process. Section 1.1.2 has elaborated that regulators will arrive at better 
decisions through exchanges of opinion with the public, and information from the 
public will decrease the costs of finding information on behalf of the regulator. Thus, 
other than providing for democratic regulation, transparency can also increase the 
quality of regulation and lower the regulatory burdens.  
In sum, the justification for transparency can either be normative (such as for 
fulfilling human rights or providing democratic regulation) or descriptive (such as in 
reducing regulatory burdens and fostering competition). The thesis is not aimed 
towards evaluating the validity of such justifications and chose to treat them as the 
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underlying assumptions used in the thesis. However, as will be elaborated below, the 
thesis acknowledges that there may be competing interests in transparency. 
Since there is no single regulatory objective and no single principal in 
regulation, but rather a series of principal-agent relationships, transparency must be 
aimed toward the public (see Section 2.3). The thesis has provided examples that 
information which is useful for economic regulation (such as the June Return) is also 
useful for public accountability. Likewise, information required by downstream 
businesses may also have an impact on competition, which should eventually benefit 
consumers. Therefore, public disclosure serves multiple purposes and multiple 
stakeholders. 
Nevertheless, there may be a competing interest in transparency, especially for 
entities which become the primary loci for transparency initiatives, such as utilities 
and regulators. As the preceding case studies demonstrate, utilities usually put forward 
arguments relating to the protection of commercial information while regulators 
typically forwars the arguments of “free and frank exchange of opinion”. Freedom of 
Information (FoI) legislation usually contains clauses which protect certain interests 
from disclosure. As demonstrated in the Victoria case study, this protection granted by 
FoIs can also be used as guidance in active disclosures. Depending on the jurisdiction, 
an exemption clause might be strong or weak.  
One must first evaluate whether such interest towards confidentiality is 
legitimate. Sections 5.5.2.2 and 7.4.2.2 have explored a proposal which seeks to 
increase the burden of disclosure based on market power, in which higher market 
power entails more disclosure. Meanwhile, from another point of view, confidentiality 
in a natural monopoly situation is considered as an oxymoron as no competition is 
present. Thus, generally speaking, in water utilities where there is an absolute 
monopoly, confidentiality may not be legitimate. Nonetheless, as the MacRoberts case 
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demonstrates, this principle is also not absolute. In situations where disclosure can be 
associated with an increase of customer charges, exemption(s) might be granted.  
After it is discovered that there is a legitimate interest, a balancing test must be 
employed before a disclosure is made. There is no one-size-fits-all-solution for a 
balancing test in disclosure cases. It all depends whether FoI and corresponding 
legislation protects a certain interest. Some legislation protects all commercial 
information from disclosure and some others protects business from unfair 
competition. The former accords more protection from disclosure than the latter 
because the latter requires competition to exist for the protection to take place – which 
may not be relevant in some natural monopolies, whereas the former is also relevant 
in monopoly setting. The thesis has explored disclosures in relation to commercial 
information and found out that the form of ownership, the level of competition, the 
existence of a statutory mandate to increase competition in the water sector, the 
relevant market for information disclosure and how such disclosure would contribute 
to the public interest would be among the factors which must be considered before a 
disclosure is made.   
8.1.2. How legal frameworks can enable transparency in water utilities’ 
regulation 
The research question posed at the beginning of this thesis is: “How can Legal 
Frameworks Enable Transparency in Water Utilities’ Regulation? The thesis found 
that irrespective of the regulatory or ownership model used in any given jurisdiction, 
legal frameworks could enable transparency in the following ways. 
In terms of the policy in involving the private sector, legislation must clarify 
the extent and breadth to which the private sector’s involvement is allowed and the 
political and accountability mechanism in approving such involvement. For example, 
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if the scope of the PSP includes all segments of the water cycle from abstraction, 
treatment to retail distribution such as Jakarta’s concession, the accountability 
threshold must be higher than simple build-operate-transfer projects for water 
treatment plants. In addition, the procurement method must account for the loss of 
accountability and transparency due to contracting out as risk. A business to 
government (such as Victoria’s Wonthaggi Desal Project), rather than business to 
business (such as the Jakarta concession) contracting scheme is preferrable for large 
scale and significant PSP projects.  
After the contract is concluded, information on performance must be 
available. To enable transparency, freedom of information (FoI) laws must be 
adequately integrated with procurement policies and legislation. Government 
contracts must contain “waiver clauses” which would render contractual 
confidentiality clauses inapplicable in the event of an FoI request to contracting public 
bodies or when there are other mandatory disclosures required by law. Finally, all 
contracts must be published in full. Redaction should be allowed only if there is 
significant harm and a public interest not to disclose information. Any redaction 
should be accompanied by justification, published, and limited only to a certain 
period.  
For regulatory decision making, regulations must clearly stipulate the types of 
licences, the criteria and mechanism for applying licences, licence conditions and the 
effect of violations. Licences must be published. Regulatory bodies’ composition, 
structure, term of office, prerequisite of appointment and removal mechanism for 
members, must be clearly stipulated and published. Regulators must have a conflict of 
interest policy and publish a register of disclosable interests. Regulators must also be 
empowered with sufficient means to acquire information from regulated utilities. 
Typically, this is in the form of “reporting duties” (submission of accounts based on 
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standardised regulatory accounts and performance reporting) and “investigative 
powers” which would allow regulators to inspect utilities’ premises and conduct 
audits. Mechanisms must also be available for regulators to reveal information from 
unregulated third parties who have involvement with utilities’ operations. Regulator 
must also have wide discretionary powers to publish information in the public interest, 
which outweigh any other contractual or private law obligation owes to the utilities. 
Regulators should have the final say in determining whether information from utilities 
can be disclosed to the public. Regulators should also enact and publish a disclosure 
policy.  
The rationale behind investments and price determinations must be published. 
This entails the publication of utilities’ business plans. Service Levels and Customer 
Service Standards must be published. Utilities must be obliged to ensure that 
customers understand their rights. Information on utilities’ non-compliance with 
regulatory standards must be available in the public domain. Any regulatory sanctions 
imposed on utilities must have rationale and must also be published. Regulations must 
clearly establish redress mechanisms for violations of utilities’ service levels and 
customer service standards. Utilities must be obliged to ensure that customers 
understand the mechanism for obtaining redress. 
As for utilities’ corporate governance, there are three primary transparency 
schemes. The first is that any statutory annual and financial reports produced by 
utilities’ directors for their shareholders or members must be published. Second, 
information on utilities’ related party transactions must be published and any 
confidentiality policy on this issue must be standardised and justified. Finally, any 
plans for corporate restructuring must be, to the extent possible, published by utilities. 
With regards to Passive Disclosure Rules, the thesis makes two 
recommendations. First, due to high cost and the unreliability of judicial 
 
 480 
interpretation, states should not rely on Freedom of Information laws’ definition of 
“public bodies” to ensure the applicability of FoI rules to delegated private water 
provisions. Privatised water utilities must be specifically designated as public bodies 
in the legislation. Second, the form of ownership, the level of competition, the 
existence of a statutory mandate to increase competition in the water sector, the 
relevant market for information disclosure and how such disclosure would contribute 
to the Public Interest are among the factors that must be considered in adjudicating 
whether “commercial exemption” under FoI laws applies to water services.  
Finally, the thesis advocates against using access to information laws (FoI or 
EIR) to regulate detailed “active disclosure rules”. Details of active disclosure rules 
should form a part of sectoral regulation, such as water laws and procurement rules. 
The reason is because institutions involved in the drafting of sectoral rules will have 
more knowledge as to which information should be disclosed in its sector. It would be 
incoherent if active disclosure rules for water or electricity companies, for example, 
are regulated in access to information laws.  
Some authors have advocated that governments should enact legal 
frameworks for regulatory transparency at national or regional level.  It is unecessary 
that these are materialised in the form of specific ‘regulatory transparency’ legislation. 
On the contrary, due to its contextual nature, active disclosure rules should be 
embedded in sectoral laws. 
8.1.3. The impact of ownership and regulatory model on transparency 
Ownership and a regulatory model of water utilities has implications on how 
transparency can be enabled through the legal frameworks. Aquafed, The 
International Federation of Private Water Operators is of the opinion that Private 
Sector Participation “ensures key requirements related to transparency and 
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accountability” as the contract or licence defines “the respective roles of the public 
authority and the operator.; the content of a regular detailed reporting, at least 
annual, on achievements and performance and that the private operator is 
permanently regulated by an authority, which checks its compliance with the 
contract/licence.”1675  Despite such a statement, Jakarta is the least transparent of all 
of the jurisdictions compared in almost every aspect of the analytical framework 
although its FoI is the most transparent. Chapter 5 demonstrated that the publicly-
owned Bogor water utilities are relatively more transparent than Jakarta, in terms of 
general disclosure policy, service levels and customer service, tariff setting and 
redress mechanisms. Why is it that Bogor’s water services – in some of the aspects 
mentioned before – are more transparent than Jakarta, despite the fact that both are 
covered under similar legislations at national level?  
Before we deal with the answer, we must first identify what are the causes of 
non transparency? The first culprit would be the confidentiality clause, which is 
interpreted to cover all regulatory information (including regular reporting and 
performance) and the contract itself which includes basic information such as 
service level and customer service standard contained within it. If Jakarta is run 
completely by a publicly-owned company like Bogor, the service levels and 
customer service standards would have been stipulated by law which by default is a 
public document.1676 So far, the private sector’s position is that it generally does not 
 
1675 Payen, Moss and Waeyenberge, Private Water Operators Contribute to making the Right to Water 
& Sanitation real, AquaFed’s submission, Part 3 Avoiding misconceptions on private water operators 
in relation to the Right to Water and Sanitation  
1676 See section 6.4.7.4.  For further discussion on this see the comparison between Bogor and Jakarta 
water utilities’ regulation Al'Afghani, M.M., ‘Anti Privatization Debate, Opaque Rules and Neglected 
‘Privatised’Water Services Provision: Some Lessons from Indonesia’ (STEPS II Conference, “Liquid 
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object to disclosure,1677 but at the same time it remains passive instead of 
proactively seeking to disclose the contract. Furthermore, disclosure is not a one-
sided decision as PAM Jaya’s approval is required. Nevertheless, PAM Jaya (and 
the Governor’s office) may regard the contract to be politically sensitive and 
therefore refrain from being transparent.1678  
Victoria has an innovative solution1679 in manipulating the confidentiality 
clause in a concession contract so that it will become unenforceable in the event of 
an FoI request or disclosure made by regulators. Notwithstanding PAM Jaya’s 
approval and political will from the regional government, this could be implemented 
in Jakarta (it would require contract amendment) and may tackle the contractual 
confidentiality question.  
However, non transparency which is caused by the regulatory structure in 
Jakarta, in which there are three overlapping ‘regulators’, each empowered to 
supervise the contract (PAM Jaya, the Governor and JWSRB), may not simply be 
tackled by modifying the contract’s confidentiality clause. PAM Jaya is the most 
privileged ‘regulator’ under the Cooperation Agreement but at the same time is also 
a party to the contract and evidently has a conflict of interest in the form of 
repayment of its debts to the concessionaires. When the institution which has a 
 
Dynamics”, organized by the International Development Study (IDS) at the University of Sussex, 
Sussex, 22-23 March 2011) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1885726> December 15, 2011 
1677 Correspondence with One of Jakarta's Private Sector Concessionaire Concerning Confidentiality 
Clause and The Publication of Contract (October 9-20) (2011)   
1678 Aquafed’s submission actually noted that local government may refrain from publishing contract or 
other regulatory information from fear of being politically targeted, which, if it occurs, would bring a 
negative impact to service delivery. Payen, Moss and Waeyenberge, Private Water Operators 
Contribute to making the Right to Water & Sanitation real, AquaFed’s submission, Part 3 Avoiding 
misconceptions on private water operators in relation to the Right to Water and Sanitation   
1679 See Victoria Case Study sections 4.2.2.2.4 and 4.2.3 
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regulatory function is also the player, and has a certain conflict of interest, 
transparency would be very difficult to implement.  A way to to solve this problem 
is by altering the regulatory structure which reduces PAM Jaya’s and the Governor’s 
powers and transfers them to JWSRB as envisioned by Clause 51.2 of the 
Cooperation Agreement. However, more powers mean that it must be balanced by 
credible and highly qualified regulators. Thus, reforms could be conducted in phases 
and could start by conducting reforms on the regulator’s internal governance. 
Last but not least, is the position of the supposedly independent regulator, 
the JWSRB as the “creature of contract”. As demonstrated in the Indonesian case 
study, the position of JWSRB as a “creature of contract” could render the 
application of the Freedom of Information Law problematic. It is a very odd 
situation, in which a regulator which is supposed to represent the Public Interest 
turned out not to be a “Public Body” under the FoI Law.  This is contrary to the 
situation in the UK and Victoria where OFWAT and the ESC must comply with FoI 
Acts. In order to solve this, application of the Indonesian FoI Law could be extended 
to private entities carrying out delegated governmental functions. This sort of reform 
will expand the reach of the FoI not only to JWSRB but to other private entities 
including the concessionaires. Furthermore, inapplicability of the FoI will no longer 
become a problem when, in the future, the JWSRB’s statute is formalised in a 
regional by-law.  
However, reforms might be difficult for Jakarta. The Bogor municipality has 
been able to reform its by-law several times, the latest amendment being in 2006 but 
regulatory reform in Jakarta has stalled as there has been no reform since 1993. The 
rationale of why reforms can be carried out in Bogor is because their hands are not 
tied to the contract. In Jakarta, every reform project will have to be negotiated with 
the private sector, otherwise the government might be in breach of its contractual 
obligation. This also means that any regulatory reform project undertaken at national 
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level, such as the Water Law 7/2004 and GR-16 2005 which purports to enable 
accountability, transparency and participation, will have no meaning on Jakarta, 
because those changes will also need to be negotiated with the private sector. This is 
evident from the views of both the private sector and the Jakarta Water Sector 
Regulatory Body that ministerial and other guidelines issued by the central 
government are deemed not to apply to the Jakarta concession. 1680  
Jakarta’s water service lacks transparency in almost every dimension 
considered. Information is not really “available” to regulators (and hence cannot be 
available to the public) due to a lack of means by the regulator to acquire information 
(e.g. no regulatory accounting standard, no reporting duties to JWSRB). Finally, 
information in the posession of regulators, which is minimal due to the 
aforementioned reason, also cannot be disclosed to the public, because of the 
confidentiality provision, the conflict of interest of PAM Jaya in the regulatory 
structure that provides an incentive for it not to disclose information and the 
inapplicability of the freedom of information law to JWSRB and to the private 
sector. This thesis, through the case study of Indonesia, thus confirms the criticisms 
of several authors that regulation by contract can potentially have some transparency 
problems. However, the thesis suggests that this could be avoided when regulation 
by contract is done by previously strengthening and preparing the public law 
infrastructure. 
 
1680 See section 6.4.7 
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It may not be accurate to conclude that – as many authors1681 had suggested 
– ‘privatisation’ per se decreases transparency. The English case study has clearly 
demonstrated that the full divestiture accompanied by ‘regulation by agency’ 
implemented by English water utilities are fairly transparent almost in all parts of 
the analytical framework, the passive disclosure rule being an exception. Indeed, the 
major contribution of transparency in the English system is on the creation of 
information. From the point of view of the transparency “dimension”, the English 
system makes information more “available” to regulators  and hence, also 
potentially available to the public. On the second dimension, the “public disclosure” 
of the aforementioned “available” information, England is also – to date – 
transparent. This is due to legislation which provides discretionary powers to 
regulators to publish information which is deemed to be in the public interest and 
the practices of OFWAT in publishing regulatory information such as the June 
Return. Unlike in Jakarta, the legal frameworks in England (legislation and licence 
conditions) enable transparency by providing the discretionary power to disclose, 
whereas, in Jakarta, the legal frameworks (the concession contract and the 
governor’s regulation) constrain transparency.  
The drawback of the English system is probably that the information is too 
voluminous, thus requiring sufficient expertise and resources to interpret it.1682 
 
1681 Swyngedouw, ‘Dispossessing H 2 O: the contested terrain of water privatization’ Minow, ‘Public 
and private partnerships: accounting for the new religion’ Hall and Lobina, ‘Private to Public: 
International lessons of water remunicipalisation in Grenoble, France’ Psiru, ‘Undermining Democracy 
and the Environment, PSI Briefing, The Hague World Water Forum’ see Literature Review section 2.1 
and Problematique at section 1.1 
1682 Hendry, S.M., Ownership Models for Water Services: Implications for Regulation, vol 1 (Aileen 
McHarg and others eds, Oxford University Press 2010) 
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Therefore, there is an increase in the quantity of information, but without resourceful 
intermediaries, this may not necessarily translate into quality information. 
Fortunately, OFWAT is an able and resourceful regulator and legal frameworks 
contain obligations regulating the manners of disclosure including various reason-
giving duties.   
Ownership choice clearly has an impact on transparency in several ways. 
Access to information laws are directly applicable to Victorian water utilities and 
Jakarta’s PAM Jaya which are state-owned, but not to ‘privatised’ English water 
utilities or the private concessionaires in Jakarta and Victoria. Ownership choice 
may also determine the outcome of adjudication in FoI cases. The Scottish FoI 
Commissioner opted for non-disclosure because there is a Public Interest in 
lowering Scottish Water’s customer charges. Charging information requests would 
help it in doing so whereas disclosure would deprive them of such income. The 
situation could be different if the utility is fully divested, in which any additional 
levies may not necessarily correspond to lower customer charges.    
Market structure will also impact on transparency. If there is a clear 
legislative mandate to liberalise the water sector, then it would help to define the 
content of the “Public Interest” towards disclosure, which would be in the form of 
lower charges and expansion of consumer choice through competition. As 
competition requires information, disclosure might be in the “Public Interest”, 
although it could prejudice the incumbent’s commercial position. There are two 
questions which deserve their own in-depth research: can such disclosure be 
regarded as a form of “regulatory taking” and what would be the appropriate 
methodology for the“balancing test” by public bodies? 
Finally, regulatory style will also impact on transparency. If OFWAT is 
moving forward with the more ‘light touch’ risk-based regulation which removes the 
requirement of utilities to submit June Returns and other information, then there is a 
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reduction in availability of information on the part of the regulator and, as a 
consequence of that, a decrease in the volume of regulatory information in the public 
domain. Nevertheless, although the detail of information may decrease, the 
comprehensibility of the information disclosed may increase due to various levels of 
scrutiny and certification processes. This would be a trade-off between detail of 
information versus higher quality of information (and lower cost).  There may be a 
hazard to this move, which would be due to the inapplicability of access to 
information laws on water utilities. The next section will elaborate.   
    
8.1.4. Interaction between Passive and Active Disclosure Rules 
Victoria is a good example of this synchronicity between active and passive 
disclosure rules, as the Freedom of Information Act is well reflected in its 
procurement policy and in dealing with the contractual confidentiality issue. When 
contracting out for water utilities, Victoria incorporates the FoI principles into the 
procurement guide and loss of accountability due to inapplicability of FoI (and other 
administrative law protection mechanism) is considered as ‘risk’. This is an 
integrative approach which moves beyond standard value-for-money consideration 
in procurements. Conversely, the Indonesian procurement rules are disconnected 
from the FoI, presumably because it was created before the FoI law was in force. 
The result of this is there is no discussion at all about public accountability. 
Politically sensitive procurements, including water services, are confined only to 
standard value-for-money considerations. There are no public disclosure obligations 
under the procurement rule, although there are requirements in other legislations to 
disclose contracts entered into between public bodies and third parties. However, 
this is not reflected in the rules or guidelines and compliance levels have been 
extremely low.   
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Another example, where passive and active disclosure rules might be 
disconnected, would be England, when it decides to move to risk-based regulation. 
June Return data and various other regulatory information will no longer be 
available through OFWAT as the focus of information gathering will be based on 
risk. As a result, such information may not be available to the public. OFWAT has 
indicated that the reliance towards utilities’ self-regulation will be complemented by 
some “active disclosure” obligation, for example, the publication of utilities’ 
regulatory accounts and key performance indicators. But, what about the “passive 
disclosure” rule? 
Since neither the FoI Act (to this extent, until future s.5 designation decides 
otherwise) nor the EIR are applicable to water utilities, then it is under no obligation 
to disclose anything that the public request. This is a disconnection between active 
and passive disclosure policies. Under the present system, if the public would like to 
obtain the detailed regulatory information, it can do so by submitting an FoI request 
to OFWAT. But, in the future, the public may no longer do so, because OFWAT no 
longer collect such information from utilities. Utilities may have the information, 
but are under no obligation to disclose because access to information laws is not 
applicable to them. The public would then be deprived of its ability to recover 
information which is available to them under the present system. Thus, despite 
OFWAT’s efforts in requiring active disclosure of information on utilities, the 
public would not be able to get access in order to scrutinise the details behind those 
disclosures unless utilities are specifically designated as public bodies under access 
to information laws.  
8.1.5. Recommendation for future researches 
In order to increase transparency, the reform process in Jakarta such as 
formalisation of JWSRB statute, the transfer of regulatory authorities from PAM Jaya 
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to JWSRB and the expansion of Freedom of Information laws to regulated entities 
will require changes in both statutory laws and the Cooperation Agreement. However, 
as the Jakarta case study shows, there are problems for conducting reforms after a 
concession agreement is concluded. Most literature tends to discuss the institutional 
design prior to the concession. But for many of the world’s water services, regulation 
by contract has taken place for a number of years without first adopting the necessary 
institutional prerequisites. Thus, the appropriate question now is how to conduct 
reforms whilst maintaining the ongoing contracts.  
Corellated with the above question is the emerging research about the 
“regulatory state” in the south. The reconfiguration of the role of the state from 
provider to umpire accompanied by the defence of public interest in regulation and 
public participation in the regulatory process are all forms of an “ideal” model of the 
regulatory state in the northern hemisphere. Whether or not the states in the south 
should actually take the same path and share the same features of the regulatory state 
as their northern counterpart is a question in its own right.    
This thesis has already demonstrated that “natural monopoly” may not by 
itself imply full disclosure, as in certain contexts exemptions clauses can be 
legitimately justified to protect the public interest, as described in MacRoberts. 
Nevertheless, in most cases, disclosure would be the norm for natural monopoly 
industries since there would be no need to protect competition. In this respect, there 
might be a question as to whether disclosure of proprietary information could be 
regarded as a “taking”. This is not elaborated in detail in this thesis because this 
concerns the discussion of property right under economic regulation requiring a 
coherent discussion on its own. Future researches could benefit from previous works, 
such as Posner, which asserts that in the context of regulation, the property rights 
problem has to be interpreted in accordance with the regulatory aim, which is to 
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address the natural monopoly problem1683 or Hantke-Domas, who demonstrates that 
denying the utility’s property right if such is done under the purpose of addressing 
actual or future market failure, should not be regarded as taking.1684  
Finally, at the moment of writing, OFWAT’s new regulatory style is still in 
the planning stage and few details have been produced. What is presented in this 
dissertation is that without adequate information input from the companies, OFWAT 
will have nothing to disclose. That, combined with the inapplicability of access to 
information laws to English water utilities, will create a transparency problem.  The 
move towards risk regulation (and the tendency towards self-regulation of utilities), in 
which OFWAT will no longer implement reporting duties to companies could have 
more transparency implications beyond what has already been demonstrated here.  
Furthermore, liberalisation of the English water industry may include 
overarching disaggregation, procurements and implementation of PSP models other 
than divestiture. When this is materialised, the question of procurement in the 
analytical framework will be relevant for England. The consequence of this on 
transparency is unknown and warrants future research.  
 
1683 Posner, R.A. and Publishers, A., Economic analysis of law (Little, Brown Boston 1977) 
1684  Hantke-Domas, M.P., ‘Economic Regulation of Public Utilites with Natural Monopoly Features. A 
Study of Limitations Imposed by Property RIghts from a Legal & Economic Approach’ (Dissertation, 
University East Anglia 2005) 
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10. APPENDIXES 
Comparison Table 
Analytical Framework Victoria England Jakarta/Indonesia 
Overview 
of the legal 
and 
institutional 
framework 
Ownership Treatment Private (BoT) 
Private 
Private: 
Concession/ 
(Repair, Build, 
Operate, Transfer) 
Retail  
Public 
Bulkwater Public with 
concession Public 
Regulatory Model Regulation by 
agency (except for 
the WTP) 
Regulation by agency 
Regulation by 
contract and agency 
only as facilitator 
(hybrid) 
 
Regulators 
Economic Essential Services 
Commission 
OFWAT Governor/PAM 
Jaya/JWSRB  
Environmental Environment 
Protection Agency 
Environment Agency BPLHD/Ministry 
of Environment 
Quality Department of 
Sustainability and 
Environment, Dept 
of Health 
Drinking Water Inspectorate Department of 
Health 
Consumer  Essential Services 
Commission 
CC Water/OFWAT Department of 
Health and the City 
Government 
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Policy in 
involving 
the private 
sector 
Allowable extent of private 
participation 
Not clear. Water 
utilities must be a 
“public authority” 
but contracting out 
is possible. 
N/A 
(Full Divestiture through 
Flotation) 
Not clear. Water 
utilities must be 
owned by the state 
but contracting out 
is possible in 
regions ‘not yet 
served’.  
The decision to delegate 
services  
Minister of the 
Environment 
 
Director of PAM 
Jaya with 
Governor’s 
Approval. 
Regulation is not 
clear whether PSP 
is allowed for 
regions already 
served by publicly-
owned water 
utilities. 
 
Tender  Tenders are 
announced on the 
VGPB website. 
Transparency is 
aimed both at 
market 
players/potential 
Procurement Plan 
and Tenders are 
published. 
Transparency is 
aimed towards 
market players and 
potential bidders. 
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bidders and the 
citizen, although 
the emphasis is 
still on market 
players/bidders. 
Contracts must 
contain “FoI 
Waiver” clause. 
Procurement 
policy integrated 
with Freedom of 
Information Law. 
No FoI exception 
on the default 
confidentiality 
clause. 
Procurement policy 
not integrated with 
FoI Law. 
Publication of Contract Yes, as a matter of 
policy contracts 
worth more than 
100,000 USD in 
value must be 
given a headline 
and those worth 10 
million USD 
should be 
published in full. 
Commercially 
sensitive 
information can be 
redacted.  
The procurement 
rule does not 
obligate contracts 
to be published.  
The FoI Law and 
the Public Service 
Law contain 
obligations to 
publish of 
government 
contracts  but these 
laws are not 
referred by the 
procurement rule.  
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Regulatory 
decision 
making 
Licences Types of licences 
are specified in 
regulation. Criteria 
for application and 
the licence 
conditions are 
regulated. 
Application for 
licences should be 
published in 
newspaper. There 
is a gazettal 
requirement to 
publish licences, 
and their 
amendments or 
modifications. 
Types of licences are specified 
in regulation. Criteria for 
application and licence 
conditions are subject to 
OFWAT’s policy. Licences are 
published by OFWAT.  
Types of licences 
are not specified. 
The Jakarta’s 
regime is not a 
licence-based 
regime. The 
concession contract 
can be regarded as 
a form of licence 
but there is 
disagreement 
regarding this as 
some consider the 
contract as a purely 
private 
arrangement. The 
contract contains 
confidentiality 
clauses which 
prevents disclosure. 
Selection and Removal of 
Economic Regulators 
Chairperson and 
Members of the 
ESC are appointed 
by the Minister. 
The qualification 
for appointment is 
regulated under the 
The Secretary of State has the 
power under WIA to appoint 
and remove OFWAT Chairman 
and Members for incapacity or 
misbehavior.  England is the 
most transparent on public 
appointment, it has a centralised 
Prerequisites for 
appointment as a 
member of the 
regulatory body are 
broadly regulated 
in a Governor’s 
Regulation. The 
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ESC Act. Premier 
may suspend 
member or 
chairman 
accompanied by a 
full statement 
elaborating such 
decision to the 
House in 
Parliament. 
Removal must be 
approved by the 
House. 
body (CPA) with a centralised 
website. Suspension and 
removal is not regulated in 
detail. 
selection process 
must be announced 
to the public. Any 
suspension from 
office is also 
announced. There 
are no direct 
recourse to 
parliamentary 
scrutinies. 
Conflict of Interest in the 
regulatory body 
The ESC 
Chairman should 
not engage in any 
other type of 
employment. 
There is an 
obligation to 
disclose ‘pecuniary 
interest’ (to the 
Minister) which 
then bars the ESC 
member from 
taking part in a 
decision. These are 
The rule on CoI is vested in 
‘OFWAT Procedure’ and not 
legislated. There is an obligation 
to disclose CoI (to the 
Chairman) and the member may 
decide to absent himself for any 
related decision. Alternatively, 
the Chairman may decide on 
how to proceed. The Procedure 
stated that when parties affected 
are already consulted and raise 
no objection, the matter will stop 
being regarded as a CoI. 
OFWAT’s good practice is also 
There is no detailed 
regulation on CoI. 
Measure to address 
revolving door is 
briefly addressed as 
a condition of 
appointment of 
economic regulator. 
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all regulated by the 
ESC Act. 
in maintaining a register of 
disclosable interest which is 
available to the public. 
‘Revolving Door’ is also 
regulated by the Procedure. 
Means for Acquiring 
Information 
Legislation, 
Licence, Code of 
Practice.  
“Reporting 
Duties”: 
Regulatory 
Account (enabled 
by the ESC Act) 
and ESC may issue 
“written notice”.  
DSE (Under WIA 
1994) has the 
power to conduct 
inspections but this 
is limited only to 
certain subject 
matters. DSE 
inspectors have 
both “search” 
power on utilities 
premises and 
power to require 
WIA and licence condition.  
“Reporting Duties”: 
WIA (wide powers, pertains to 
“any matter” material 
considered important by the 
Secretary of State). Licence 
Condition M is also wide as it 
requires the companies to submit 
information to OFWAT 
Chairman which is necessary for 
regulatory purposes. In practice, 
the regular information 
requirement is listed in the June 
Return reporting requirement. 
“Investigative Power”: 
Licence Condition J regulates 
specifically Level of Service 
Information. Broad power 
provided to DWI inspectors, 
including the power to enter 
premises and conduct sampling. 
 
The Concession 
Contract, Governor 
Regulation. Only 
the Concession 
Contract is 
regarded as the 
most legitimate and 
enforceable.  
“Reporting Duties”: 
There is also an 
obligation of the 
concessionaire to 
‘maintain 
transparent 
account’ (see 
Clause 50.1(a)). No 
specific regulatory 
account. It is to be 
noted that these 
obligations are 
owed to PAM Jaya, 
not the Regulatory 
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information to be 
submitted to it.  
 
“Investigative 
power”:  
Broad power given 
to DSE inspectors, 
including the 
power to enter 
premises and 
confiscate 
property. ESC has 
audit power under 
WIRO (although 
no power to enter 
premises). 
 
“Third party 
information”: 
The ESC (Under 
the ESC Act) has 
power to require 
both (i) any person 
and (ii) the 
regulated utilities 
to submit 
information to 
“Third party information”: 
Duty to provide undertaking 
from parent companies in 
licence condition. There is no 
power to obtain information 
from non-regulated entity.  
Body. 
There is obligation 
for the 
concessionaire to 
submit reports, 
quarterly, monthly, 
semi annually, 
including a five- 
yearly report to 
PAM Jaya (not 
JWSRB). 
Investigative 
Power: 
No specific power 
granted to drinking 
water quality 
asessor. PAM Jaya 
and state audit body 
have the right to 
conduct audit.  
JWSRB has audit 
rights and the 
concesionaire must 
provide all 
requested 
information and 
data for the 
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them. This is a 
wide power and, 
therefore, the 
former can be 
limited through 
ministerial 
direction.  
purpose of such 
audit. 
“Third party 
information”: 
According to the 
Concession 
Contract (clause 
35.2.b) PAM Jaya 
(the State-Owned 
Water Company 
and First Party to 
the Contract) is 
entitled to obtain 
data and 
information from 
the concessionaires, 
this includes the 
requirement for the 
concessionaire to 
obtain information 
from third parties 
involved in the 
arrangement of 
water supply.   
General Disclosure Policy Legislation does 
not contain general 
empowerment to 
OFWAT Disclosure Policy is 
laid down in the Code of 
Practice and letters from the 
Disclosure of 
information to third 
parties or the public 
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disclose 
information which 
is deemed to be in 
the public interest. 
Instead, the ESC 
Act regulates 
restriction on 
disclosure. 
There is, however, 
obligation under 
WIRO to “publicly 
report the 
performance of a 
regulated 
industry”. 
 
If information is 
marked as 
confidential, the 
ESC must weigh 
the submission and 
provide the 
detailed rationale if 
they believe that it 
is neither 
commercially 
sensitive nor 
Chairman and Directors 
concerning the publication of 
June Return information to the 
public domain. WIA contains 
only general provision 
empowering OFWAT Directors 
to publish materials which are 
considered to be in the public 
interest. WIA comes with a 
caveat that information acquired 
under it relating to the affairs of 
individuals or business should 
not be disclosed.   
is not possible due 
to confidentiality 
clause in the 
contract. Disclosure 
to a third party (but 
not the public) is 
only possible 
through a written 
approval from both 
parties (the 
concessionaire and 
PAM Jaya).   
In the Governor’s 
Regulation on 
Regulatory Body, 
there is an 
obligation to 
maintain 
confidentiality as a 
result of the power 
vested in the 
regulatory body to 
obtain information.  
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confidential.   
Disclosure of 
confidential and 
commercial 
information may 
entail penalties. 
Information 
obtained from 
other regulators 
and exempted from 
FoI Act 1982 
cannot be 
disclosed by the 
ESC.  
 
Investment The “Water Plan” 
is the primary 
document used for 
approving 
investment plans 
and set prices. The 
Water Plans are 
created by the 
utilities and 
submitted to the 
ESC.  
 
There are several main 
documents important in this 
regard: Companies’ five year 
final business plans, the Security 
of Supply Index (SOSI) and 
annual leakage targets (which 
form a part of the Final 
Determination) and the June 
Return documents. The five year 
business plan is available on 
OFWAT’s website as well as the 
SOSI and the company annual 
The contract 
stipulates for a five 
year investment 
programme and an 
annual Investment 
and O/M 
programme. The 
five year 
programme must be 
agreed by PAM 
Jaya but the yearly 
investment and 
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In practice, the 
exposure draft of 
the Water Plan and 
the final Water 
Plan is published 
(on each utility’s 
website) as each 
company’s SOO 
contains the 
obligation to 
develop an open 
and transparent 
planning process 
and to engage with 
their customers 
and local 
communities.  
The Water Plan 
outlines utilities’ 
investment 
priorities in the 
next regulatory 
period as well as 
their plans for 
meeting those 
investment targets 
or other regulatory 
leakage targets are a part of the 
Final Determination published 
by OFWAT. All of these 
documents are published as a 
matter of policy, but the WIA 
empowers this (See “General 
Disclosure Policy” above)  
O/M programme 
requires only to be 
discussed with 
them. (see Clause 
9.1 of the 
Cooperation 
Agreement). These 
plans are not 
disclosed to the 
public. 
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target.  
Service Level & Customer 
Service  
Service Level and 
Customer Service 
Standards are 
contained in the 
“Customer Service 
Code” (CSC), 
published by the 
Customer Services 
Committee.  
 
Every regulatory 
instrument except 
for primary 
legislations should 
be provided upon 
request, by the 
utilities. 
 
Water Utilities 
should publish a 
Customer Charter 
containing the 
condensed form of 
CSC and details of 
service levels and 
customer service 
Service level and customer 
service standards are regulated 
in the Guaranteed Standard 
Scheme (GSS), Condition G of 
the company’s licence and a 
Code of Practice. As a statutory 
instrument, the GSS is 
published. Companies’ licences 
are also published by OFWAT 
as a matter of policy. The code 
of practice is available on the 
company’s website  
There are three 
regimes regulating 
service levels and 
customer service. 
First is the Water 
Law 7 Year 2004 
and its 
implementing 
regulation GR 
16/2005, second is 
regional by-laws 
no. 11/93 and 13/92 
and third is the 
concession 
contract.  
 
The first is quite 
detailed in its 
regulation, but its 
enforceability is 
challenged. The 
second hardly 
contains any 
regulation on 
service level and 
customer service, 
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standard.  except for the right 
to complain against 
a penalty decision. 
 
The third contains 
the service level 
provision and 
compensation 
scheme for 
customers, but is 
not published as it 
is considered to be 
a part of contractual 
confidentiality. 
According to the 
JWSRB, the 
contract contains 
Schedule 15 
stipulating the 
compensation 
scheme for 
customers but this 
was denied by 
PAM Jaya.  
Non-compliance  ESC adopted Key 
Performance 
Indicator. 
Enforcement mechanism by 
OFWAT is regulated under 
WIA and consists of three 
Neither the national 
rules nor the 
Jakarta regional by-
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Performance of 
each of the water 
utilities is 
published.  
 
There are two 
enforcement 
mechanisms:  
provisional and 
final. The purpose 
of such order is to 
ensure compliance 
with WIRO, Codes 
and 
Determinations or 
in rectifying the 
occurrence of 
contraventions.  
Enforcement 
orders must be 
published in the 
Government 
Gazette.   
layers: the securing of 
undertakings from the 
companies (s.19), enforcement 
order (s.18) financial penalties (s 
22 A).  Each of these contains 
obligation of publication and the 
duty to serve notice to the 
company. When financial 
penalties are imposed, WIA 
and/or the Statutory Instrument 
requires that an OFWAT notice 
proposing the penalty  should 
contain information on the 
amount of penalty (not more 
than 10% of the utility’s annual 
turnover),  the acts or omission 
which is deemed to constitute a 
contravention,  supporting facts 
and justification  and the period 
for the utility to make objection 
with respect to the penalties 
issued.   
laws contain 
sanctioning 
mechanism for 
non-compliance 
with regulatory 
standard. The 
Cooperation 
Agreement (Clause 
31) sets out a 
general sanctioning 
mechanism for the 
concession and 
specifies types of 
standards whose 
non-compliance 
entails penalty. 
This is further 
detailed on 
schedule 15. Both 
the main contract 
and its schedule are 
not available in the 
public domain. 
Neither the main 
contract nor the 
schedule stipulates 
the mechanism for 
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imposing sanction. 
Presumably 
sanctioning is 
imposed by PAM 
Jaya to the 
concessionaire by 
referring to the 
standards in Clause 
31 and Schedule 15 
and if the 
concessionaire 
disputes this, the 
matter will be 
referred to JWSRB 
for mediation. 
Thus, as opposed to 
England, the nature 
of sanctioning in 
Jakarta is highly 
negotiated. Non-
compliance towards 
the contract 
standards are not 
officially disclosed 
although there are 
instances where 
they had been 
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covered by the 
media. Without 
official 
announcement, this 
too causes 
speculation and 
confusion.  
Price Determination and 
Charges  
One of WIRO’s 
regulatory 
principles is an 
obligation on the 
utilities to enable 
customers and 
potential customers 
to understand price 
charges and how 
they are calculated. 
This is 
materialised by 
publishing the 
exposure draft of 
the Water Plan and 
by inviting 
customers and 
other stakeholders 
to submit their 
comments. 
The company’s licence 
condition and regulator’s 
policies contain primary details 
for price determination, while 
legislation regulates it only 
broadly. All of the documents on 
each phase of the Price 
Determination are published by 
OFWAT, as a matter of policy. 
One of the primary determinants 
is the company’s five year 
business plan which is available 
on the company’s website and 
compiled by OFWAT (see 
“Investment” above). 
Legislation acts as an enabler to 
these publications (See “General 
Disclosure Policy” above).  
 
 
Being regulated by 
contract, the Jakarta 
system does not 
recognise price 
determination. 
Companies are not 
free to impose 
prices within the 
limit set by 
regulator as is the 
case with England. 
Charges are 
contained in tariffs 
which must be 
approved by the 
Governor.  
 
National regulation 
contains 
transparency and 
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Utilities conduct 
consultation as part 
of drafting the 
Water Plan and 
their methodology 
for consultation is 
then reported in the 
Water Plan. The 
time period is only 
one month and has 
been criticised as 
being too short. 
 
The ESC Act 
contains obligation 
requiring the ESC 
to publish a notice 
of Determination 
in the Government 
Gazette and daily 
newspaper and to 
enable its copies to 
be sent to utilities 
and interested 
parties. 
affordability 
elements in tariff 
determination. 
These are not 
enumerated further. 
Furthermore, these 
regulations are 
deemed 
inapplicable to 
Jakarta concession 
Redress Customer 
complaints could 
WIA regulates the redress 
mechanism for companies and 
Since local 
regulation was 
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be raised with the 
utilities or referred 
to EWOV, the 
industrial 
ombudsman.  
 
The Customer 
Charter (which 
must be published) 
contains 
information on 
dispute settlement 
and information on 
service levels and 
customer service 
standards. 
 
The EWOV 
Charter (to which 
utilities must 
subscribe) also 
obligates the 
promotion of the 
dispute settlement 
mechanism. 
EWOV maintain a 
list of utilities 
consumers. If it concerns 
financial penalties, they can 
refer their objection to the High 
Court; for price determination to 
the Competition Commission 
(through OFWAT Director) and 
for a Competition Commission 
merger decision to the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal. 
 
For service levels and customer 
service, consumers can refer 
their case to OFWAT under its 
power to make “Determination”. 
In practice, OFWAT will issue a 
‘report’ when making 
determination containing the 
factual background and 
chronology of the dispute, the 
relevant part of the GSS 
regulation applicable to the case, 
views of the disputants and 
OFWAT’s considerations.  For 
non GSS disputes such as that 
relating to infrastructure and 
access, OFWAT also has power 
to adjudicate. Finally, CC water 
enacted before the 
concession period, 
it contains no 
provision on the 
redress mechanism 
for the private 
sector. 
Contractually, the 
concessionaire may 
request the 
Regulatory Body to 
mediate any dispute 
between them and 
PAM Jaya. If this 
fails, they may. as a 
last resort, take 
recourse to 
international 
arbitration.  
 
Local regulation 
contains only a 
minimum amount 
of redress avenues. 
There are only 
three redress 
mechanisms 
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which become its 
members. 
has residual power to investigate 
when all avenues have been 
exhausted.   
available to 
customers under 
local regulation, 
and that is (i)  the 
‘right’ to object to 
incorrect water 
meter to PAM Jaya 
, (ii) the ‘right’ to 
object to imposition 
of penalties by the 
Governor and (iii) 
the ‘right’ to 
request an 
examination of 
water meter.  
 
The concession 
contract mandates 
the regulatory body 
to “monitor” the 
provision of water 
to customer. The 
contract actually 
contains a clause 
that sets out the 
protection of 
consumers’ and the 
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community’s 
interest as one of 
the Regulatory 
Body’s objectives 
but this cannot be 
materialised until a 
competent 
governmental 
authority legislates 
a body of rules 
providing special 
mandate to the 
regulatory body. 
Up until now, the 
Jakarta local 
parliament has not 
enacted anything. 
Hence, customers 
can complain about 
their condition to 
the regulatory 
body, but there is 
nothing that they 
can do.     
Utilities’ 
Corporate 
Governance 
Corporate Structure and The 
Board 
The retailers 
Memorandum and 
Articles of 
The corporate structure and 
information pertaining to the 
board can be obtained through 
Two different 
corporate regimes 
are applicable for 
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Association as well 
as its amendments, 
(ii) financial 
reports, directors’ 
reports and 
auditor’s report 
and (iii) every 
report by the 
Auditor General 
with respect to the 
company must be 
tabled by the 
Treasurer to the 
parliaments. There 
is no public 
disclosure 
requirement 
although an annual 
report containing 
this information is 
in practice 
disclosed.  
 
Board Members 
are responsible to 
the Minister and in 
turn, the Minister 
two general channels: (i) duty to 
submit register to Companies 
House which in turn allows the 
public to inspect the data stored 
by it for a fee and (ii) Directors’ 
Report which is distributed to 
members. There are differences 
in the content of the Directors’ 
Report and its method of 
distribution between quoted and 
non-quoted companies. The 
former has a higher threshold of 
reporting and requires 
publication on the company’s 
website whereas the latter has a 
lower disclosure threshold and 
no requirement to publish on a 
website.     
Jakarta water 
services: Ordinary 
private company 
law (the 
concessionaires) 
and the regional 
SoE Law (PAM 
Jaya) which is the 
least developed 
regime compared 
with the othe 
regimes.  
 
Although there are 
no specific 
disclosure duties 
with respect to the 
identities of the 
PAM Jaya boards 
under the law, their 
names are available 
on their websites.  
As for the 
concessionaires, 
their data are kept 
by the Ministry of 
Law and Human 
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will be held 
accountable for his 
power to appoint, 
remove or dismiss 
board members.   
Rights and can be 
obtained for a fee.    
Related Party Transaction 
(RPT) and Conflict of Interest 
(CoI) 
The Corporations 
Act contains a duty 
to trade at arm’s 
length. The 
Regulatory 
Accounting Code 
(RAC) does not 
contain such duty.  
 
The RAC regulates 
disclosure 
requirement for 
any transaction 
with related and 
third parties, 
requiring the 
retailers to 
disclose, among 
others, the 
identities of the 
parties, the 
services provided, 
Under the CA, directors have a 
duty to avoid CoI, and if they 
have one to disclose it at 
directors’ meetings. There are 
also provisions which may 
require companies to prepare 
group accounts and make note 
with respect to affiliated 
undertakings. 
 
Licence condition contains a 
duty to trade at arm’s length and 
the prohibition of cross subsidy 
affiliates. Companies must 
submit regulatory accounts to 
OFWAT, including accounts on 
their transactions with affiliated 
companies, which forms a part 
of the June Return.  These 
documents, however, are 
marked confidential.   
The law on 
Regional SoE and 
the Jakarta By-law 
only regulates CoI 
briefly. It prohibits 
familial ties among 
directors and 
supervisory board 
except on the 
approval of the 
Governor. They are 
also prohibited 
from holding 
another office at 
another company. 
Directors (but not 
the supervisory 
board) are 
prohibited from 
having a ‘personal 
interest’ in another 
business whose 
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the payments made 
and its 
considerations. 
Disclosure on 
related party 
transactions, 
however, are only 
made to ESC and 
is deemed 
confidential. 
However, in 
practice the 
retailers disclose 
them. 
purpose is to seek 
profit. There is no 
clarity on what this 
means. There are 
no disclosure rules.  
 
For the 
concessionaire, 
under the company 
law, they may not 
represent the 
company in courts 
if they have CoI, 
but such does not 
bar them from 
entering into 
transactions. 
Capital market law 
contains more 
stringent CoI and 
affiliated 
transaction rules. 
This also entails a 
disclosure duty to 
the public within 
two working days 
after an affiliated 
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transaction occurs. 
CoI rules requiring 
approval of 
independent 
shareholders, 
however, are not 
applicable to the 
concessionaires 
since they only list 
their bonds. All of 
these capital market 
rules will not be 
applicable when 
their bonds are 
matured. The 
concession contract 
contains obligation 
for the 
concessionaire to 
enter into “fair, 
transparent, 
competitive arm’s-
length 
procurement” but 
only if the contract 
value is above IDR 
500 million. This 
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requirement is not 
detailed any 
further. 
Corporate Restructuring Every share issue, 
transfer or disposal 
must be approved 
by the 
Government. Any 
changes or 
amendment to 
companies’ 
Articles of 
Association and 
Memorandum 
must be tabled at 
the Parliament.  
 
Share issue, 
therefore, appears 
to be under 
executive’s 
control, although 
there are ex-post 
accountability 
consequences to 
the parliament.   
Mergers could be referred to 
Competition Commission if they  
affect OFWAT’s ability to 
compare. Beyond that, it has no 
power to block acquisition. 
 
OFWAT uses licence and 
undertaking as the legal 
instrument to manage 
restructuring. 
 
When restructuring results in the 
delisting of shares (this leads to 
the reduction of market 
information which is valuable to 
OFWAT), the response is to 
require companies to maintain 
the listing of a financial 
instrument (so that it is subject 
to capital market’s disclosure 
rules) and to require the 
publication of its accounts as if 
its shares are listed. 
 
PAM Jaya’s 
restructuring is 
technically difficult 
until the Regional 
SoE Law is 
amended. Such law 
does not regulate 
the transparency of 
corporate 
restructuring.  
 
For the 
concessionaires, 
there are merger 
formalities under 
the company law. 
There are no 
general disclosure 
rules however. If 
companies are 
listed there are 
some disclosure 
obligations 
involving media 
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When the restructuring causes 
the company to be limited only 
by guarantee (without share 
ownership, recourse entirely to 
debt financing) OFWAT 
requires it to certify that it has 
adequate financial and 
management resources and 
maintain “investment grade 
rating” in addition to the 
obligation to publish financial 
information as if its shares are 
listed in the stock exchange, the 
obligation to maintain and 
publish incentive schemes and to 
make available the copies of 
annual accounts and auditor’s 
report to customers.      
announcements. 
This may not be 
applicable to the 
concessionaires 
since they are only 
relevant for the 
listing of shares, 
not bonds. 
Regulators have the 
power to block 
acquisitions and 
had in the past 
threatened to use 
such power to 
require the 
concessionaire to 
provide them with 
adequate 
information on its 
restructuring plans. 
Passive 
Disclosure 
Rules 
Applicability All regulatory 
institutions and 
The Three 
Retailers are 
subject to FoI Act. 
Only Aquasure is 
not covered by 
Regulatory institutions are 
subject to EIR and FoI.  
 
Private water utilities are not 
subject to FoI although the 
government is considering they 
be covered, probably in the next 
Most regulatory 
institutions would 
be covered by FoI. 
The JWSRB denies 
that they are a 
Public Body as they 
are an entity 
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FoI.  s.5. designation.  
 
UK’s Supreme Court decision 
exempts private water utilities 
from the application of EIR but 
the case may be referred to the 
Aarhus mechanism. The reasons 
for non-applicability are: water 
utilities are not deemed to 
exercise the function of public 
administration (these functions 
resides on OFWAT and the 
Secretary of State) and  they are 
deemed not to be under the 
control of government  
(regulation is conducted at arm’s 
length, the means of service 
delivery is up to them and the 
government only set the 
outcomes and enforce the 
boundaries).   
 
established by 
concession 
contract.  
 
All regional 
waterwork 
companies are 
listed as Public 
Bodies by the 
Information 
Commission.  
 
Private water 
utilities (parties to 
the concession 
contract) are 
generally exempted 
from FoI Law 
unless they are 
financed through 
state budget or are 
exercising a 
governmental 
function.   
Exemption & 
Balancing  
Regime FoI FoI EIR FoI 
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Test Non-
disclosure 
threshold 
Medium Low High. Public 
Interest (PI) 
and harm test 
mandatory 
High. PI and harm 
test mandatory but 
the notion of PI in 
legislation and case 
law is not well 
established.  
Types: 
 
Law 
Enforcement/ 
Investigation 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contain wide 
protection of all 
sorts of “Law 
Enforcement”, 
including 
investigations, 
adjudications, 
“proper 
administration of 
law”, methods of 
law enforcement, 
informants. As the 
term 
“investigation” can 
be broadly 
interpreted, it 
covers potential 
investigation by 
the Ombudsman 
towards water 
utilities. 
May potentially block FoI 
request related to any 
enforcement action (see section 
on “non-compliance” above) by 
OFWAT. 
Non-disclosure 
applies only if it 
jeopardises the life 
of the investigator. 
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Obligation of 
confidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Applicable if 
information is 
submitted to 
Agencies “in 
confidence”. 
Contain a Public 
Interest test but 
does not contain a 
harm test. The 
Public Interest is 
whether or not 
disclosure would 
impair future 
collection of 
information by the 
Agencies. 
 
This clause is not 
applicable to 
information 
generated jointly 
with the Agencies. 
 
 
May arise 
from trade 
secret, 
contractual 
confidentiality 
and ‘personal’ 
obligation of 
confidence. 
The 
exemption is 
absolute (No 
PI and harm 
test). May 
virtually 
exempt any 
regulatory 
information 
but in practice  
OFWAT’s 
policy has 
been stringent  
N/A as separate 
exception, 
merged with 
commercial 
information. 
N/A 
Contractual 
confidentiality is a 
major problem, but 
this is considered to 
be a private law 
matter. 
Theoretically, 
contractual 
confidentiality 
should be 
subservient to FoI 
disclosure 
requirement. In 
practice, however, 
the threat of a 
lawsuit effectively 
deters disclosure. 
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Commercial 
information  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intellectual 
Property 
Rights 
 
 
 
Protects business, 
commercial or 
financial 
information. 
Contains harm test:  
“expose the 
undertaking 
unreasonably to 
disadvantage”, 
“substantial harm 
to competitive 
position”. 
 
 
Very broad, because unlike 
Victoria and Indonesia, there is 
no direct reference to 
competition.   
 
Protects healthy 
competition. In the 
case of 
procurement for 
natural monopoly 
services there may 
be a question as to 
whether the 
exemption which 
seeks to protect 
‘fair competition’ is 
relevant, because in 
a natural monopoly 
situation there are 
no competitors 
within their service 
area.     
Absolute 
exemption on trade 
secrets information 
acquired from third 
parties. 
Only trade 
secret is 
specified, 
other types of 
IPR is merged 
with 
commercial 
information. 
Protects all 
IPR. 
Protects all IPR. 
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Decision 
making and 
policy 
formulation 
Protects “Internal 
Working 
Documents”. Harm 
test not required. 
Contain Public 
Interest Test 
Protects 
“Policy 
Formulation”. 
Contains PI 
test.    
Protects 
internal 
communication. 
Protects internal 
memorandum. 
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